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ABSTRACT 
The frontier systems considered in the following work are 
defined as deliberately arranged preclusive cordons of forts 
and minor installations, generally supplemented in the second 
century by continuous barriers. It is argued that such systems 
only existed in the provinces of Britain, Upper Germany, Raetia 
and Dacia. Dacia is not treated in detail. The first chapter 
considers the date of origin and stages of development of the 
Upper German and Raetian land frontier before the Hadrianic 
period. Chapter 2 reviews the evidence for the daXe and 
existence of linear frontiers in Britain before Hadrian. A 
comparative study in Chapter 3 suggests the function and the 
historical significance of these earl .y linear systems. Chapter 
4 discusses aspects of the Continental linear frontiers of the 
second century and presents a sector by sector description of 
the setting and distribution of their installations. This is 
complemented in Chapter 5 by a discussion of the Hadrianic and 
Antonine Walls in Britain. In particular the evidence for two 
periods of occupation in Antonine Scotland is examined in 
detail. It is concluded that the Antonine Wall was held for a 
single period. on the basis of the conclusions of Chapters 4 
and 5, in Chapter 6 the second century frontiers are classified 
into types geared to varying intensities of frontier 
infiltration. Functions are suggested for individual frontier 
installations. The significance of the second century frontier 
walls is discussed, centring upon the question, broached in 
recent works on the subject, of whether these systems possessed 
any defensive or political rationale or were merely random 
by-products of aggressive Roman imperialism, military blunders 
and apathy. In Chapter 7 frontiers elsewhere in the empire are 
briefly examined to establish that (excepting Dacia), none 
displays a truly linear frontier system of the type 
characteristic of the provinces of northwest Europe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The frontier works of the'Roman empire have long been the 
subject of intensive study, but there have been few attempts to 
see what can be learned by comparing frontier systems in 
detail. The present work sets out to compare those frontier 
systems of the principate which may be described as artificial 
and linear. By 'linear' is meant a system in which forts and 
smaller installations were arranged in a deliberate chain or 
cordon, from the first, or later, supplemented by a continuous 
barrier. Such linear systems have, in fact, an extraordinarily 
limited distribution in time and space. once frontier systems 
which do not have a distinctly linear character, or where an 
apparently linear aspect in fact stems merely from the location 
of forts in relation to a road or a river, are excluded, 
frontiers of this type are seen to occur only in the provinces 
of Britain, Upper Germany, Raetia and Dacia. The type came 
into existence towards the end of the first century, and (with 
the exception of Hadrian's Wall in Britain) was extinct just 
over a century and a half later. The linear frontier was an 
idea, applied only in certain European frontier areas and at a 
certain time. 
This work therefore takes as its premise the belief that works 
such as Hadrian's Wall and the palisade-Pfahlgraben frontier of 
Upper Germany were relatives of one another, and that something 
can be learned of their function and significance by 
discovering what the landscapes in which they were used had in 
common, and by tracing the similarities and differences in 
their development and structure. Frontier systems of different 
kinds elsewhere in the empire are briefly described in Chapter 
7 to establish the point that, with the exception of Dacia, 
they do not resemble the linear frontiers of the Northwest. 
The frontier installations of Dacia are not treated in the same 
2 
detail as those of Britain, Upper Germany and Raetia, but*are 
described in chapter 7 in order to establish that they are of a 
closely related type. 
The'development of the northern frontier of Britain is traced 
down to the beginning of the third century; the Upper 
German-Raetian frontier down to its apogee of elaboration, when 
the German mound-and-ditch and the Raetian Wall were, built, 
probably before the end of the second century. Some of the 
fortlets on the Continental frontier considered here may 
possibly be third century additions. The varied fortunes and 
eventual loss of the Continental land frontier in the third 
century are not covered. ' 
'Frontier' is meant throughout in the archaeological sense of a 
system of installations. It is recognised that the visible 
installations of all Roman frontier systems were one aspect of 
frontier control as a much wider field of activity involving 
trade, subsidy, diplomacy and frequent more or less direct 
interventions beyond the archaeologically visible 
installations. Here, the principal point of interest is the 
day-to-day function of the frontier itself. The wider process 
of frontier control is only examined where it is required to 
explain the presence of military sites beyond a linear 
frontier, or the absence of a linear frontier system, as in 
Africa or the East. 
The linear land frontiers of Britain, Upper Germany and Raetia 
are identified and studied as systems of installations. Most 
emphasis is placed on the dating and distribution of sites. No 
attempt is made to study in detail the structures or internal 
plans of military sites, except where they have a direct 
bearing on the identification of the type of site involved. 
For example, fortlets containing barracks are differentiated 
from those containing smaller buildings, without a detailed 
description of the buildings themselves. 
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Distribution maps at a uniform scale of 1: 1,000,000 have been 
prepared to illustrate the main phases of development in the 
frontier areas considered in detail. The types of site 
differentiated on these, and in the text, are: 1. Legionary 
fortress. 2. Auxiliary fort (1.30ha and over) 3. Small fort 
(including the so-called Inumerus' forts of Germany) 
(0.50ha-1.30ha). 4. Large fortlet (0.10-0.50ha) 5. Fortlet 
(0.10ha or less). These categories doubtless subsume 
installations of differing type and purpose, but this 
simplification is necessary in order, to produce clear 
distribution maps at the same scale. 
The word 'system' is used throughout in the belief that the 
installations forming a given frontier, whether linear or not, 
formed an inter-connected whole, with some commonly understood 
function or purpose in mind. This is not meant to imply that 
frontier systems were planned unitarily from the beginning, or 
that the frontiers of the empire were organised to work 
together in some grand strategy. They were ad hoc creations, 
and developed gradually over time, but this does not mean that 
there was not something systematic about the way in which they 
worked. 
The word limes, so commonly used for frontier systems of all 
types, is generally avoided here, given recent doubts (Isaac 
1988) about its applicability to military installations. 
Nevertheless, it is one of the conclusions of this work that in 
the linear frontier provinces (and in those provinces only) the 
distinction between the military border and the limes, or 
land-boundary of the province, may have become blurred. In the 
absence of any known ancient term to refer to a series of 
military installations arranged in linear fashion, the term 
'military limes' is used in the title of this work to refer to 
this restricted and distinctive type of frontier system. The 
use of the term limes is more fully discussed in section 3.7, 
which may be read first if clarification of the use of this 
term in the title is needed. 
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In the linear frontiers we see an idea being put into practice. 
They have an 'ideal' aspect: arranging a hierarchy of forts, 
fortlets and towers along a line may not have made much sense 
in military terms, but as in the ideal plan of a Roman fort or 
city, the individual parts made up a coherent and rationally 
ordered whole. As an idea it had a short life, reaching its 
apogee in the early second century,, and proving inappropriate 
in the changed military conditions of the late-Roman period. 
It is one of the aims of the following work to show that behind 
the ideal facade and rhetorical flourish of these frontier 
systems, there lay a practicality of purpose which can reveal 
much about the'problems that the Romans faced in holding and 
securing their northwestern frontiers. 
Chapter 1 
FLAVIAN AND TRAJANIC LINEAR FRONTIER DEVELOPMENT IN UPPER 
GERMANY AND RAETIA 
One day in the last twenty years of the first century, an 
important and far-reaching decision was reached concerning the 
military frontier-policy of the Roman province of Upper 
Germany. As a result, -soldiers in one sector of the frontier 
zone began to construct a cordon of watchtowers along a cleared 
track: the resulting system forming, in an unmistakeable 
. 
fashion,. a linear demarcation of the area of Roman military 
occupation. In contrast to the very few linear obstacles 
constructed by the Roman army before this time, the frontier 
that was established in Upper Germany was to have a long 
history. It can also be seen as the ancestor - in a way that 
previous linear obstacles had not been - of the famous frontier 
walls and barriers of the Roman empire. On present evidence it 
is not possible to say who was responsible for the decision. 
It is uncertain whether it originated at local or central 
level, or whether it was the product of a provincial governor 
or an individual military engineer, or simply sprang from the 
traditions of building accumulated within the army itself. 
Almost immediately, however, the new method of border 
demarcation was extended into a system of such all-embracing 
length and uniformity so as to suggest that its direction came 
from at least the level of the governor. It is also notable 
that a similar arrangement may have originated on the British 
frontier at almost exactly the same time. 
For Germany and Britain, then, an attempt is made in this and 
the following chapter to clarify the date of the 'frontier 
6 
decision', to reconstruct the sequence by which various sectors 
of frontier came to be marked in this way, and to differentiate 
clearly between those systems of military installations which 
truly represented a frontier demarcation and those, albeit 
often interpreted in this light, which did not. It will be 
suggested that there are greater variations in the early linear 
frontier development of different parts of the northwestern 
provinces than have hitherto been noticed; the explanation of 
these is for the most part deferred to the comparative 
discussion of the third chapter. 
The frontier systems about to be described do not represent the 
earliest military dispositions of linear nature to be seen. 
The earliest linear, arrangements were in fact formed along the 
great river frontiers (the Lower Rhine and Upper Danube) by-the 
reign of Claudius. Their development is discussed in section 
7.1. However, although these dispositions were characterised 
by forts arranged per ripam, they displayed none of the 
characteristic features of the artificial linear land frontiers 
which originated in the period 80-100. 
1.1 Developments between the Rhine and the Main: before C90 
If forts had been arranged in a cordon along the lower Rhine by 
the time of Claudius, it was not until the aftermath of 
Domitian's Chattan war that the physical delineation of a 
frontier line began to take place in the newly created province 
of Upper Germany. This development took place at different 
rates and in different ways on the various sectors of the Upper 
German frontier. 
On the eve of the Chattan war of c83-85 (Schbnberger 1985,369 
for the arguments as to the date), the permanent Roman 
dispositions between the Vinxtbach and the Main were 
represented by two legions based at Mainz and a series of 
auxiliary forts, established as early as the time of Vespasian 
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(Schbnberger 1980,542), which controlled the fertile valley of 
the Wetter. Possibly this early, two forts at the confluence 
of the Rhine and Mosel faced the Neuwied basin. The five 
Wetterau forts lay along a major road of penetration at 
intervals of cl4km, and followed the line of march taken, two 
generations earlier, by Augustus' troops from the legionary 
base at Mainz. A further Vespasianic fort may have lain at the 
DomhUgel site at Frankfurt on the Main (RiH, 294). Probably 
within a decade (and certainly by the end of the century), 
this open system of military installations had been transformed 
into a static system of frontier lines. I 
The extent to which the launching and abandonment of Domitian's 
Chattan war immediately brought about the development of the 
frontier is now a matter of debate. The question is whether 
forts, fortlets and, watchtowers forming the earliest frontier 
should be dated to the immediate aftermath of the Chattan war, 
or whether most should in fact be dated to the years after c90, 
ie after the revolt of Saturninus. 
The traditional view is that I ... in the Taunus and 
Wetterau ... where the limes ran through forests, it consisted at 
first merely of a path free of trees. As early as the final 
phase of the Chattan war, it seems, the first wooden 
watch-towers were planted along this road... I (Schbnberger 
1969,159). To take the road and watchtowers first: did they 
originate as early as c83-85? The argument that'they did 
originate so early rests primarily upon two attempts to combine 
the historical and archaeological evidence. 
1.1.1 Literary Evidence 
The first of these attempts at marriage between ancient 
literature and archaeological evidence uses a famous passage 
from Frontinus' Strategemata (1.3.10. ): 
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... DoMitlanus ... cum Germani more suo e saltibus 
et 
obscurls latebris subinde Impugnarent nostros tutumque 
regressum in profunda silvarum haberent, limitibus per centum 
vigintl milla passuum actis non mutavit tantum statum belli, 
sed et sublecit dicione suae hostes, quorum refugia nudaverat. 
The notion that Frontinus' limitibus should refer to the 
frontier road and watchtowers originated with Fabricius in 1935 
(ORLA 3,43-5). Noting the coincidence between the 120 miles 
of the passage and the length of Strecken 2-4 (ibid., 45), 
Fabricius saw 11mitibus as referring to the early frontier. He 
argued that the Chatti were expelled from the wooded upland 
area on the south side of the Taunus ridge, from which they had 
been able to launch attacks upon the Romans to the south, and 
into which they had been able to melt away after the manner 
described by Frontinus. After the expulsion, Fabricius 
supposed, the construction of limitibus prevented the Chatti 
from returning to their refugla. The argument relied upon the 
proposition that the clause quorum refugia nudaverat described 
an action carried out prior to the action of 11mitibus ... actis: 
ie the refugla were laid bare of the enemy, and then the 
11mitibus constructed to prevent them from returning; limitibus 
thus clearly referred to the linear frontier. 
It is easy to see why Fabricius and most subsequent scholars 
have found this interpretation so attractive. Not only did it 
satisfy the desire to find archaeological confirmation of 
events described in a classical text; it also meant that the 
text provided a commentary upon the origins and function of an 
artificial Roman frontier system. In the absence of many other 
direct evidences for the working of frontier lines, the value 
of the Frontinus passage was bound to be seized upon. 
Unfortunately, however, it is most improbable that Frontinus 
referred to the establishment of a frontier line. The 
interpretation of the passage has been clouded by the 
significance-that has been placed upon the word, limes in the 
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sense of a defended frontier. If the passage is taken at 
face 
value, it simply says that Domitian defeated the Chatti 
by 
driving a series of roads into their woodland refuges, over a 
front of 120 miles. Elsewhere in the Strategemata (1.5.10), 
Frontinus clearly used the word limes in the sense of a road, 
and a road for advance and attack, at that: Pericles... limitem 
agere coepit, tamquam per eum erupturus. Writing in 1936, Syme 
took the Chattan war passage quite literally, and came to a 
different conclusion to Fabricius: 'Over a front of a hundred 
and twenty miles he [Domitian] drove military roads deep into 
the broken and wooded country that hitherto had secured them 
[the Chatti] impunity and thus opened access to their 
fortresses' (Syme 1936,162-3). Recently B Isaac (1988,126-8) 
has re-emphasised the sense of limes as 'a military road' in 
this context. 
In recent years less faith has been placed upon the Fabricius 
interpretation, but there has been a reluctance to accept that 
Frontinus does not at all refer to the Taunus watchtower 
system. Few would now maintain - as did Simon (1954,325-6) - 
that the construction of a limes (in the sense of a linear 
frontier) was part of the preparation for Domitian's campaign. 
Baatz has argued (1975,14) that it was the outermost of the 
military penetration roads described by Frontinus which 
eventually crystallised into the Taunus frontier. 
In a recent article, G Perl (1981), while emphasising the first 
century sense of limes as 'a road', notes that the chapter of 
the Strategemata (3) in which the passage lies is entitled de 
constituendo statu belli, and that every strategem listed 
within it is designed to force or alter the terms of warfare 
once it is underway. From this point of view it is unlikely 
that limitibus refers to something established in the 'final 
phase' of the war, or later. On the other hand, the fact that 
the passage does not occur in Chapter 1, which deals with 
precautions taken before struggles, should (along with the 
archaeological dating evidence discussed in 1.1.2-3 below) 
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dispose of the old idea that it may refer to any kind of system 
built before the commencement of the Chattan war. 
As a device for changing the nature of a war, a network of 
roads and lanes penetrating the fastnesses in which an opponent 
could take refuge would seem a much more convincing 
interpretation of limitibus than the'provision of a frontier 
road with watchtowers. The whole sense of the passage is that 
the enemy was brought under Domitian's sway: sublecit dicioni 
suae hostes. A preclusive frontier could hardly be considered 
to have subjugated the enemy. It is because multiple 
penetration roads are meant that Frontinus uses the plural form 
limitibus. The terminology of the Roman surveyor sometimes 
used limes-in the sense of a boundary (Isaac 1988,16); but to 
the same surveyor the phrase limites agere would signify the 
laying outýof paths in a grid pattern surrounding fields or 
areas of land (Perl 1981,577). 
If the earliest road with watchtowers in Strecken 2-4 can no 
longer be associated with the Frontinus passage, it follows 
that Frontinus can no longer be used to date the establishment 
of the system to the time of the Chattan war. 
1.1.2 Archaeological Evidence 
The second interplay of historical and archaeological evidence 
which has resulted in an early dating of the system centres 
upon the fact that the first phase of'the earliest timber 
watchtowers, principally in Strecke 2, appears to have ended in 
destruction. Until recently it was generally assumed that this 
destruction was wrought by attackers while the Roman military 
was distracted during the Saturninus revolt of 88-89. 
Therefore, it was argued, the towers must have been in 
existence by 88-89. Where no burnt first phase towers were 
evident, as in Strecke 3, Fabricius was happy to accept that 
the towers could only have been built after the Saturninus 
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revolt, while maintaining that their sites were chosen, and the 
line of the patrol track laid out, as early as the Chattan war, 
(ORLA 3,46-7). 
However,; while the destruction (where it existed) was real 
enough, a recent survey of the evidence from the Strecke 2 
towers has shown that datable finds from the demolition of the 
phase I post holes and ring-ditches (always filled before the 
digging of the outer ring ditches for the larger replacement 
towers) include, at five sites, Trajanic or Hadrianic material 
(Schbnberger 1985,379-80)., Thus the replacement of these 
towers has nothing to do with the events of 88-89, and the 
earliest towers need not-be earlier than the Saturninus-revolt. 
As with the association of the frontier line with the Frontinus 
passage, the dating of the burnt towers to the period before 89 
has stemmed from an eagerness to associate archaeological 
evidence with historical events. 
1.1.3 Ceramic evidence 
A similar uncertainty now attaches to the dating of frontier 
installations larger than watchtowers to, the pre-Saturninus 
period.. The traditional view is that 'Important connecting 
routes leading into the Wetterau from outside were given small 
earth-and-timber fortlets to guard them, obviously before the 
end of the [Chattan] war' (Schbnberger 1969,159). Altenstadt, 
in the eastern Wetterau, was cited by SchOnberger in 1969 as a 
clear case of a fortlet belonging to the closing stages of the 
Chattan war; now it is regarded certainly to post-date the 
Saturninus revolt (Schbnberger 1985,463). 
More recently an important paper by B Pferdehirt (1986) has 
expressed doubt, on the basis of a study of the samian pottery, 
about the dating of any of the frontier installations in 
Strecken 1-5 before c90, and has suggested that a number of 
frontier sites formerly dated to the late Domitianic period may 
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not in fact have come into being until the early second 
century. The re-assessment of these sites' foundation dates is 
based upon a study of the samian pottery: in particular the 
relative proportions of form Dr29 (formerly thought to have 
ceased production c85-90) and form Dr37, which eventually 
wholly supplanted it, at certain sites; and the relative 
proportions at given sites of South Gaulish samian and the 
Central and East Gaulish samian that by some date in the early 
second century had wholly replaced it. 
Pferdehirt's study certainly casts doubt upon the traditional 
starting date for sites in the Taunus-Wetterau in the mid 80s; 
among sites producing a significant sample, Butzbach and 
Zugmantel show no Dr29 whatsoever. In contrast, and as a 
control, the fort at Bad Nauheim, usually thought to have been 
founded in connection with the Chattan war, shows 14.3% 29 to 
85.7% 37 (Pferdehirt 1986,245). In Britain, Inchtuthil was 
abandoned in the later 80s; the proportions there are 55% 29 to 
45% 37 (Frere and Wilkes 1989,217). Pferdehirt can not be 
said to have disproved early occupation at all of the sites 
that she re-dates. Some of the samples are very small: only 11 
vessels in the case of Bendorf, sensibly seen as the site of a 
Chattan war bridgehead fort (CUppers 1990,330-32), and known 
to have enjoyed several phases before its abandonment under 
Trajan (ORLB 2,25), but dated by Pferdehirt to later than 100 
because of an absence of Dr29. At the Saalburg the percentage 
of Dr29 leads Pferdehirt to concede a date in the 90s for the 
earliest activity. I 
Pferdehirt argues that sites where Dr29 is absent must have 
been founded later than 100, on the basis of her belief that 
the form can be shown to have continued in use until that year. 
Her evidence for this longevity of Dr29 is the occurrence of 
the form at certain British sites founded or enlarged after the 
withdrawal from northern Scotland in c87-90; and the fact that 
form 29 was produced by the potter Natalis, whose period of 
production is claimed to begin no earlier than the late 90s. 
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For the end-date of form 29 Pferdehirt employs the Wetterau 
fort of Echzell, first built, on her argument in clOl, and 
devoid of Dr29 (ibid., 249-50). 
However, there are objections to these attempts to date the end 
of form 29 independently. The British forts employed are 
Newstead and Watercrook (ibid., 249). At the former there is a 
great risk that any pottery in use in a post-90 context may be 
residual; at Watercrook, perhaps not founded until the 90s, a 
striking feature of the samian report was I ... the scarcity of 
form 29 ... The complete collection from the site contains only 
one example of this form ... and a small rim sherd from 
another... I (Potter 1979,269). In any case the argument is 
circular, for the dating of the foundation of Watercrook to 
later than c90 is in part derived from the scarcity of 29. 
As for the production of form 29 by the potter Natalis: 
Pferdehirt's argument here is that as Natalis is not 
represented at fort III at Rottweil, which came to an end no 
earlier than the late 90s on coin evidence, then his period of 
production must begin very close to 100. The existence of 
Natalis 29s (although they formed only a small part of his 
output) is therefore taken to mean that the form was still in 
production up to 100. However, the absence of Natalis' 
products cannot be taken as proof that his period of production 
did not start earlier in the 90s. Given the potentially 
complex and ill-understood nature of samian production and 
supply it seems dangerous to make much of the absence of a 
given potter's products from a particular period on a site. 
For an earlier period Millett (1987,96) has recently shown 
that there need be little coincidence of potters' stamps in 
large samian groups from exactly contemporary deposits. Thus 
the existence of Natalis 29s need not be inconsistent with an 
earlier date for the end of the form: nor does it disprove that 
sites lacking form 29 could in fact have been founded in the 
90S. 
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Having argued for the continuation of 29 production into the 
90s, Pferdehirt then uses the evidence of Echzell to establish 
its end-date. At this site form 29 is completely absent. 
Pferdehirt believes the building date of the fort to be closely 
established at clOl by the occurrence of tiles of both XIV and 
XXII legions in an associated building, the so-called mansio. 
The presence of both legions is taken to suggest (1986,249-50) 
that the building dates to the time of the replacement of the 
XIV legion at Mainz by the XXII. The traditional date for this 
is C92, but Pferdehirt (ibid., 232) has accepted the re-dating 
of the change-over to clOl by Waurick (1986,834), and 
concludes 'Somit ergibt sich für das Kastell Echzell ein , 
GrUngungsdatum 100\101 n. Chr. 1 
However, even if the revision of the date of the legion-change 
was accepted, -it should be clear that the tiles, and the 
building in which they occur, ýdo not necessarily date to the 
foundation of the fort. The timber fort at Echzell could 
easily have pre-dated the Imansiol and have been founded 
earlier in the 90s, and so cannot be used to show that an 
absence of 29 means a foundation later than 100. As Eschbaumer 
and Faber (1988,235) remark, 'Das Kastell kann sehr wohl vor 
der Mansio errichtet worden sein. Damit fdllt Echzell als 
absolut datierter Fundort aus'. 
The second fundamental point Pferdehirt seeks to make is that 
South Gaulish samian did not begin to be dislodged by Central 
and East Gaulish in Germany until after cllO. This must be 
concurred with, as only South Gaulish occurs at Heddernheim A 
(given up cllO: Fischer 1961), while at Hofheim II the latest 
coin is a mint piece of 106. Here the vast majority of samian 
is still South Gaulish (Pferdehirt 1986,234). After cllO 
South Gaulish was rapidly driven off the market; it is 
considered by Pferdehirt finally to have stopped arriving 
between 115 and 120 (ibid., 234). At Bendorf, where the latest 
coins are of 112-117, Central and East Gaulish occurs in equal 
amounts to South Gaulish; at Heddesdorf, claimed by Pferdehirt 
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to be the obvious-successor fort to Bendorf, list 
einschliesslich des zugehbrigen Vicus keine sicher sUdgallische 
ReliefschUssel mehr nachweisbarl. Pferdehirt goes on to 
suggest that certain sites which have produced no South Gaulish 
samian cannot-have been founded until after c110. Of those 
which fall on the Rhine-Main frontier, Degerfeld and-Inheiden 
are generallyýnot necessarily dated'any earlier. The sites 
where problems arise', for their foundation date is usually seen 
in the 90s, are Zugmantel and Altenstadtý. 
To summarise: using the-available data from military sites, 
Pferdehirt has sought to establish an absolute sequence by 
which the declining ratio of 29 to 37, and South Gaulish-to 
Central and East Gaulish samian, can be seen to take place in a 
steady chronological progression. By revealing where the 
earliest known sites on the frontier lie on that scale, which - 
is dated by reference to independent, aceramic evidence, 
Pferdehirt's work has shown that they were probably not founded 
until after c90. Her independent dating of the sequence also 
leads her to the conclusion that much of the later frontier 
line was not in fact garrisoned until the early second century. 
However, her use of aceramic archaeological dating evidence is 
questionable, and with the possible intriguing exceptions of 
Zugmantel and Altenstadt, Pferdehirt cannot be said to have 
proved that the frontier sites in question were not already 
founded at some date in the 90s. 
1.1.4 Conclusion: the Beginnings of the Linear Frontier in 
Upper Germany 
Just as Frontinus and the supposed destruction of towers during 
Saturninus' revolt can no longer be taken to prove that the 
patrol track and watchtowers were constructed before c90, so 
Pferdehirt's thesis provides reason to think that-the linear 
frontier system may not have begun to develop until after that 
date. None of her data are drawn from the watchtowers 
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themselves, but if-the associated fortlet sites were 
constructed after c90, then there is a high probability that 
the watchtower system originated at the same time. 
Such a late dating of the watchtower system at first seems to 
pose difficulties: there would, it may be assumed, have been a 
desire to close the frontier after Domitian's advance against 
the Chatti was brought to a close in c85. In Germany in the 
mid 80s, however, the Chattan-war was discontinued within the 
reign of Domitian, possibly in connection with the defeat of 
Oppius Sabinus at the hands of the Dacians (Schbnberger 1985, 
369), when forces were apparently transferred to the area of 
crisis on the Danube. The intent may have been to resume the 
Chattan war at some time; at any rate the military situation 
between Rhine and Main may have remained fluid. The occasion 
when the decision was taken to constitute a linear frontier may 
not have arisen until the constitution of the two provinces of 
Upper and Lower Germany took place in C90. This provides an 
attractive context, supported by the archaeological dating 
evidence, for the, beginnings of the Rhine-Main linear frontier. 
It would also make the establishment of the watchtower system 
exactly contemporary withýthe building of the analagous Gask 
frontier in Britain, if the later of the two possible contexts 
for the latter is accepted (c90 as opposed to c80-81). 
1.2 Frontier development between Rhine and Main c90-clOO (Fig 
1) 
Strecke 1 
The later frontier line formed a salient-around the Neuwied 
basin, a fertile and ancient area of settlement on the far side 
of the Rhine. Here three forts are known which probably held 
garrisons by the 90s, although very little is known about their 
early histories. Pferdehirt, in her recent study of the 
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samian, has expressed doubt about the foundation date for two 
of the three sites being this early; but as one would expect to 
find some Roman occupation of this fertile area by the end of 
the first century, it is necessary to scrutinise the reasons 
given for supposing a later foundation date. 
Pferdehirt (1986,269) dates the foundation of Heddesdorf to 
later than c115, on the basis of an absence of South Gaulish 
samian. The only known fort at Heddesdorf is stone, however, 
so the possibility of an earlier timber site in the vicinity 
cannot be ruled out. 
At Bendorf (ibid., 269-70), Pferdehirt accepts that-the fort, a 
timber site never re-built in stone, probably did not last into 
Hadrian's reign, yet dates its foundation to after clIO on the 
basis of 'der verhaltnism9ssig hohe nichtsUdgallische 
BilderschUsslanteill. However, the proportion of East and 
Central Gaulish samian to South Gaulish is 42.10%, on a sample 
of only 18 vessels (ibid., 247)ý. This is surely consonant with 
a possible foundation date earlier than'that given by 
Pferdehirt, by which time there should have been little South 
Gaulish samian reaching the site. Furthermore the presence of, 
tiles of legio XXV have been-taken to suggest that Bendorf 
served as a bridgehead site during the Chattan war (Perl 198111- 
581). At the third fort, Niederberg, there is less , 
information, but a late Domitianic date has been considered 
likely (Baatz 1975,88; Schbnberger 1985,460). It seems 
plausible that these forts, whenever they came into being, 
replaced earlier posts on the west side of the, Rhine, perhaps 
at Andernach and Koblenz, although forts of, the period c90-clOO 
have not yet been proved at these sites. , 
In general then, the foundation of the Neuwieder forts falls 
somewhere between 90 and 110. At this early date, however, 
there is unlikely to have been a linear frontier system between 
Rhine and Lahn. This sector has produced none of the smaller, 
earlier phase towers of Strecken 2-4; the earliest wooden 
18 
towers of Strecke 1 are closely analogous to the secondary 
towers of'Strecke 2, for which a Hadrianic date may quite 
plausibly be argued. Indeed, until Heddesdorf, Bendorf and 
Niederberg were, founded beyond the Rhine, the Rhine and the 
Lahn between Rheinbrohl and Ems may have served as the frontier 
line. 
Strecken 2,3 and 411-53 
Moving into Strecken 2 and 3, a probable fort of the 90s lay at 
Marienfels, where two successive forts of lha and 2ha are 
known. By the mid-second century the site was abandoned in 
favour of Hunzel; nearer to the frontier line (Schbnberger 
1985,461; Klee 1989,55-6), a useful indicator that in its 
first conception Marienfels was not solely concerned with 
frontier line affairs. 
There are not many more forts in Strecken 2 and 3 more than 
0.50ha in size which can be shown to have existed this early. 
Even the evidence for Kleinkastelle, which small installations 
might fill the gap, is inconclusive; Auf dem Pohl, at Kemel, is 
treated in general by the German scholars as originating before 
the'end of the century (RiH 373; Schbnberger 1985,380). It is 
a pity there is no more positive proof, for the alignment of 
the earlier fortlet in relation to the frontier line suggests 
that the latter was in existence when the fortlet was built. 
At least three other fortlets in Strecken 2 and 3 may belong to 
the same early scheme as Kemel. A fortlet of about 0.25ha 
detected from the air in 1980 which preceded the second-century 
numerus fort of Alteburg-Heftrich, between Zugmantel and the 
Saalburg, was perhaps in use as early as the 90s (Schbnberger 
1985,478; plan in RiH, 343). Another strong possibility for 
an early Kleinkastell is Ockstadter Wald, which was succeeded 
by Kapersburg; this fortlet seems to have been aligned in 
relation to a road coming from Friedberg, and was itself 
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succeeded, by a watchtower at WP 4/11 (ORLA 4-5,62-4; Taf 3.5). 
An early fortlet may be suspected at the site of the later 
nume. rus fort of Feldberg, guarding the highest pass through the 
Taunus, ' although to date nothing larger than an early timber 
tower (WP 3/45*) has been discovered. 
Pferdehirt's study has cast doubt on, the existence of the known 
site at Zugmantel-so early, so the next secure site for stage 2 
is the Saalburg, where the 0.70ha timber fort (the Erdkastell) 
was almost certainly founded in the 90s (Sch6nberger 1985,461; 
Pferdehirt 1986,273). It had been immediately preceded by an 
enclosure (Schanze A) and a fortlet (Schanze B), each of 
0.10ha. A fort is considered possibly to have been founded 
this early at Langenhain, where the river Usa provides access 
through the eastern Taunus (Schbnberger 1985,463; 1983,59). 
A timber auxiliary fort, perhaps over 4ha in size (RiH 246), 
could have existed at Butzbach in the 90s, despite Pferdehirt's 
belief (1986,275) that the lack of Dr29 from the site dates 
its origin to after C100. The same applies to Echzell, a 
timber fort of 5.20ha (Sch6nberger-1985,463) on the opposite 
side of the Wetterau. As shown above (1.1.3), Pferdehirt's 
aceramic dating of the site's origin to 100-101 derives from an 
external building which need not be primary. Between the two a 
timber fort, possiblyýof considerable size, existed at Arnsburg 
by the 90s (ibid., 462-3; Pferdehirt 1986,276). 
It was argued above (1.1) that there is no overwhelming reason 
to see a watchtower frontier system originating, in the 80s. It 
is in this central sector of the Rhine-Main frontier (Strecken 
2-4) that the earliest watchtower cordons were created, , 
probably in the 90s. Only here occur the timber towers of very 
small size - c2.50m square - (ORLA 2-Taf, 7; 3,24; 45) which 
would later be replaced bytlarger examples. East of WP 4/53 
none of the earlier, small timber towers are known, supporting 
the suggestion that in the northern Wetterau, in the vicinity 
of Arnsburg, the original watchtower frontier terminated, 
perhaps at the river Wetter. 
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Strecken 4 (eastern part) and 5 
South of this spread of large, early forts, the later frontier 
line of the remainder of Strecke 4, and of Strecke 5, did not 
exist before the end of the first century. Rather, the line of 
Roman frontier control seems to have gone from Echzell to 
Hanau-Salisberg on the Main via Ober-Florstadt and 
Heldenbergen. Ober-Florstadt has been suggested as the site of 
a late-first century fortlet (Schbnberger 1985,463, not ruled 
out by Pferdehirt 1986,277); a small fort of cO. 80ha probably 
lay at Heldenbergen, while a military site, probably a 
cohort-fort, at Salisberg had replaced the site usually 
interpreted as an unfinished Domitianic campaign fortress at 
Hanau-Kesselstadt (Schbnberger 1985,464). 
No watchtowers or other paraphernalia of a linear frontier, , 
system are known on this earlier, western line. However, the 
known installations are most probably connected by a road. The 
suggestion that a military road connected Echzell and Hanau on 
the Main was made by Wolff (1916,58-66) and subsequently taken 
up by Fabricius (ORLA 4-5,36). Wolff had astutely realised 
that the installations along this alignment in the eastern 
Wetterau represented a linear arrangement earlier in date than 
the well-known frontier line to the east which terminated at 
Gross-Krotzenburg on the Main, although he saw it in terms of 
an earlier defensive line. Fabricius (ibid., 47-8) viewed it 
in the same way, rightly seeing the establishment of a 
watchtower frontier to the east as post-dating the 
establishment of watchtowers in Strecken 2,3 and part of 4 
(which he equated with the 120 miles of limitibus mentioned by 
Frontinus). The significance of an open road in exposed 
territory, with road stations at intervals, will be considered 
below (3.4.2) in relation to near contemporary dispositions 
elsewhere, particularly the Stanegate in Britain. 
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Conclusion 
One of the'most striking aspects of the development of the 
Rhine-Main frontier just outlined is the differential treatment 
of various parts of the frontier at the same time. It seems 
clear that while in places a watchtower cordon had been found 
necessary, elsewhere open dispositions of military sites were- 
allowed to prevail. 
1.3 Frontier Development between Rhine and Main clOO-cllO (fig 
2) 
The most striking change in Roman military dispositions in-the 
Rhine-Main area after the end of the first century was the 
evacuation of most of the road forts-by cllO (Schbnberger 1985, 
381-3; Pferdehirt 1986,309). Wiesbaden, Hofheim, Heddernheim 
(and Frankfurt DomhUgel) were given up at this time; Okarben 
and Bad Nauheim were held for a few more years. The 
abandonment of these forts led to more auxiliary units being 
placed on the frontier line itself, although, as we shall see, 
they were not evenly distributed. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the process of movement towards a thinly spread cordon of 
units pre-dated the reign of Hadrian, so often in the past 
attributed with the move away from in depth defensive 
arrangements to the rear of the frontier line (as by Brogan 
1935,17-18; Schleiermacher 1967,218-19). 
Strecke 1 
The foundation of the Neuwieder forts of Heddesdorf, Bendorf 
and Niederberg must have taken place-now if not earlier, 
although it is not clear whether the watchtower system of 
Strecke 1 should be placed this early. 
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Strecken 2 and 3 and the west part of Strecke 4 
Here an intensification of the frontier installations may be 
marked by 110, but overall coverage on the Taunus ridge 
remained very thin. By C110 the 0.70ha timber fort at 
Zugmantel, of corresponding size to the timber fort at the 
Saalburg founded c15 years earlier, was certainly in operation 
(Pferdehirt 1986,270), The small (0.40ha) fort of 
Heidekringen, on the north slope of the Taunus ridge, 5km south 
of the frontier-line, on the Roman road from Wiesbaden to 
Zugmantel, is thoughtýto have had a brief occupation in the 
early second century (RiH, 346). A further timber fort of 
0.80ha at Kapersburg was built most probably by cllO (RiH 364; 
Schbnberger 1985,462). This site was probably a successor to 
a fortlet - Ockstddter Wald - which had probably existed since 
the 90s. If a site did not already exist at Langenhain, the 
fort was now founded, possibly receiving cohors I Biturigum 
Aquitanorum equitata from Rottweil (Schbnberger 1985,462). 
The Kleinkastell of 0.09ha at Degerfeld was supplied by 110, if 
not earlier (it could in theory have originated at the same 
time as the fort at Butzbach) (Pferdehirt 1986,275). The date 
of the provision of a fortlet in such close proximity to an 
auxiliary fort could probably supply a vital clue to the date 
of the introduction of the watchtower system: a fortlet right 
up on-the line, as Degerfeld, is hardly likely to predate it, 
and should provide a terminus ante quem for patrol track and 
towers. In fact, none of the conclusions that can be drawn 
from the pottery evidence (Pferdehirt 1986,275) preclude a 
building date for Degerfeld in the 90s; as argued above 
(1.1.3), the terminus post quem of 100-101 for a site without 
Dr29 is derived from the spuriously dated Echzell. The amount 
of South Gaulish samian that Degerfeld yields (ibid. ), should 
at least prove that the watchtower system was in existence in 
Strecke 4 before 110. 
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The east part of Strecke 4-and-Strecke 5 
At some time shortly before cllO, probably lies the foundation 
of Inheiden (timber, 0.60ha in its first form: RiH, 363), which 
has produced South Gaulish samian (Pferdehirt 1986,276). This 
constitutes only 2.40% of the samian known (! bid., 247), 
suggesting that the foundation of the fort is not to be placed 
long before C110. Echzell, as we have seen, was probably , 
already in existence by the 90s. There is South Gaulish samian 
also at Ober-Florstadt, where it has been thought that the 
fortlet postulated for the 90s must, within the-first decade of 
the second century, have been replaced by a stone fort of 
2.80ha for cohors XXXII Voluntarlorum (ibid., 277; Schbnberger 
1985,463). 
From Ober-Florstadt to the Main there had been no watchtower 
system in the 90s; a road and its accompanying stations formed 
the only disposition of military sites along this line. In the 
years after clOO certain new sites came to be occupied to the 
east of the old road line, which was eventually to be entirely 
superseded by the new frontier. As the existence of the 
earlier, 'road' line has not always been clearly acknowledged, 
it is worth restating the reasons for believing the new line to 
the east to be a later development. 
The series of superimposed forts at'Altenstadt is traditionally 
thought to have originated in the late Domitianic period, 
partly on the basis of its multiplicity of phases, and partly 
on the presence of a tile of XXV Gemina (which had left for the 
Danube by clOO at the latest) and South Gaulish samian 
(Schbnberger and Simon 1983). However, the proportion of South 
Gaulish - five examples as against 102 Central and East Gaulish 
(Pferdehirt 1986,247) - make it unlikely that the earliest 
installations of 0.30ha and 0.80ha respectively pre-date cllO 
by very long'. 
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Markbbel, the next major fort to the south, where a timber 
predecessor to the known 3.30ha fort is undated, has produced 
no positive proof of occupation before the Trajanic period 
(Schbnberger 1985,, 464), and this is precisely what might be 
expected if Mark6bel succeeded Heldenbergen, 8.5km to the west 
on the 'road' line of the 90s. 
It would be tempting to see RUckingen replacing Hanau-Salisberg 
in the same way at the beginning of the second century, but the 
move to the east in this case may not have been so simple; the 
foundation of the known fort at RUckingen is generally dated to 
110-125 (Schbnberger 1985, -464; RiH 468) but a fortlet 
preceding the full-sized fort, perhaps manned from 
Hanau-Salisberg, has been suggested (ibid.; Klee 1989,114). 
Thus it is possible that the fort on the old road line 
continued to be held for a time, with a fortlet placed forward 
in the valley of the Kinzig on what would later become the sole 
frontier line. Thus on the distribution map for 100-110 
Hanau-Salisberg is retained and a fortlet suggested at 
RUckingen. It is possible, of course, that this development 
took place as early as the 90s, as assumed in most accounts. 
But this would imply the beginnings of a linear frontier in the 
area between Echzell and the Main at about the same time as 
watchtowers were being supplied in the Taunus and northern 
Wetterau. Yet the character of the watchtower system south of 
the Echzell sector certainly seems later, filling as it does in 
long straight stretches the gap between an already established 
linear frontier to the north and the Main, so it seems more 
likely that the first forward fortlets in this area originated 
clOO or later. 
Like RUckingen, Gross-Krotzenburg, at the Main crossing at the 
southern end of Strecke 5, is thought not to have existed as 
early as clOO. It had perhaps replaced Hainstadt, on the other 
side of the river, by cllO (RiH 325). At Gross-Krotzenburg 
too, an undiscovered fortlet may have preceded the known fort. ' 
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South Gaulish samian from the site suggests activity before 
cllO (Schbnberger 1985,464). 
The pattern that clearly emerges between the Nidda and the Main 
is of an alignment of sites along a road during the 90s being 
replaced by an artificial frontier system with new sites up to 
lOkm to the east between 100 and 110. This development of an 
artificial frontier from a rearward road has obvious parallels 
(3.5 and 6.1 below). 
1.3.2 The laying out of watchtower lines in all sectors 
With the possible exception of Strecke 1 it seems that the 
course of the frontier line between Rhine and Main was entirely 
finalised in these years, ie by cllO. In Strecken 4 and 5, 
Altenstadt, which must at the latest have originated in the 
first decade of the second century, and Gross-Krotzenburg, 
probably of similar date, are both situated right up against 
dead straight watchtower alignments which have obviously been 
surveyed over many miles. It is hardly likely that the forts 
pre-date the frontier line, and therefore they should provide a 
terminus ante quem for its establishment. Strecke 1, between 
the Rhine and the Lahn, may have been, laid out at this time, 
but there is no clear evidence. 
1.3.3 The earliest running barriers 
The first running barriers were certainly beginning to appear 
on the Rhine-Main frontier by the first decade of the second 
century. One length of timber fencing, or Zaun, seems 
associated with the early fortlet at Ockstddter Wald (4/11: 
1.2 above). Elsewhere, notably in the northern Wetterau, the 
palisade conventionally dated to the Hadrianic period is 
preceded by a ditch containing posts at intervals of 1-1.30m, 
running about 10m in front of the watchtowers (4.7. S4 below). 
26 
Such a 'Zaungrgbchen' was contemporary with the second phase of 
certain timber tower sites in Strecke 4 (Baatz 1975,122-3). , 
1.4 Frontier Development on the Main, Odenwald and Neckar 
C90-ClOO (Fig 5) 
1.4.1 The Main 
At some date after the close of the Chattan War, military 
installations began to be arranged in a linear disposition 
along that part of the river Main which runs south from Gross 
Krotzenburg, and also along that part of the Neckar between 
Wimpfen and Kbngen. The date of the beginning of this 
arrangement is debated. The intervening Odenwald sector 
(Strecke 10) does not seem to have been garrisoned as early as 
the two stretches of river. The traditional date for the first 
installations along the Main (Strecke 6) is soon after c90 
(Baatz 1975,148); in the Odenwald, clOO (ibid., 153), and 
again after c90 for the Neckar (Strecke 11) (ibid., 173). 
The Main, Schbnberger has suggested (1985,383-4), may have 
been garrisoned in the first instance only with small fortlets; 
an early timber fortlet of 0.30ha is known at Stockstadt (RiH 
480), and this has led to the suggestion that another fortlet 
may have formed the earliest installation at Obernburg (ibid., 
457-8), but there is no firm evidence for this. Likewise, B. 
Beckmann has suggested (ibid., 334) that a series of small, 
numerus type forts of the 90s remain to be found on the old 
Main line, on the basis of Hainstadt (0.90ha): other possible 
early sites of this type have been suggested at Hanau-Salisberg 
where a sequence of two bath-houses has been taken to suggest a 
smaller early site, and Seligenstadt (Schbnberger 1985, 
464-65). Pferdehirt points out (1986,277) that the samian 
does not support the suggestion of such an early site at 
Seligenstadt. 
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In general, the traditional foundation date in the 90s for the 
whole series of sites on the 'old' Main line may be questioned: 
Pferdehirt (1986,277-79) argues for a foundation later than 
100 for Seligenstadt, Stockstadt and Obernburg, on the basis of 
absences of Dr29; as established above (1.1.3) this need not 
preclude a foundation date in the 90s, but there seems no other 
evidence on which to base the suggestion that the sites along 
the Main are generally this early. Indeed, at Seligenstadt, 
Niedernberg and Obernburg there is no structural evidence for 
the postulated earlier fortlets of the 90s. While there is no 
way of disproving that earlier timber phases await discovery, 
the expectation that they-will be found seems to be derived 
from a preconceived-notion of the development of a linear 
frontier system. The most generous reconstruction of the 
arrangement of installations on Strecke 6 in the 90s is as 
follows. If the sites with asterisks (where there is no real 
evidence) are omitted, a different picture emerges: 
Hanau-Salisberg size unknown 
8km 
Hainstadt 0.90ha 
4km 
Seligenstadt* 
9km 
Stockstadt 0.30ha 
9km 
Niedernberg* ? 
9km 
Obernburg* ? 
5km 
Wbrth?, early fort? 
(The only known watchtowers lie between Obernburg and Wdrth; 
they may not be this early, and in any case do not constitute a 
cordon, consisting as they do of individual examples. ) 
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If the postulated early sites are discounted, a much thinner 
disposition of installations is seen. The sites would then be 
spaced at much wider intervals of 13 and 23km, with a variety 
of fort sizes represented: small fort, fortlet, fort. 
It is tempting to associate this series of sites with the 
arrangement of the 90s further north in the eastern Wetterau 
(cf figs 1 and 5), where extensive use was made of somewhat 
more closely spaced installations of various sizes, along a 
road which, terminating at Salisberg, was (before the frontier 
was established running via Rqckingen to the east) directly 
linked to the forts on the Main. As in the case of the road to 
the north there is no reason to assume that the function of 
these fortlets was anything other than provision of security to 
what was an important route. Given the apparent connection 
with the eastern Wetterau road and forts to the north, which 
seem to have originated c90-clOO, it seems most satisfactory to 
date the beginnings of the garrisoning of the Main line to this 
time, despite Pferdehirt's suggestion that the river may have 
been unoccupied before 100. Of course, in this first instance, 
it may simply have been a case of very small outposted 
detachments; the move of whole garrisons to the Main line may 
not have come until well after 100, and Pferdehirt is surely 
right in attempting to demolish the idea of a regular provision 
of fortlets or small forts forming a frontier system along the 
Main in the 90s. 
1.4.2 The Odenwald 
It seems probable that for most of the 90s the Odenwald (where, 
later, Strecke 10 connected the Main and Neckar frontiers) 
remained unoccupied and without installations. The 
conventional date for the foundation of this frontier is 
furnished by the samian from Hesselbach, where the absence of 
earlier decorated types and the presence of a high proportion 
of South Gaulish samian were taken to suggest a foundation 
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within the date range 90-105. However, Dr29s are completely 
absent (Pferdehirt 1986,279), leading Pferdehirt to suggest a 
foundation date after 100; while South Gaulish samian dominated 
the market down to c110, 'implying that Hesselbach could be that 
late. While there is no proof that sites without Dr29s may not 
have been founded as early as the 90s, we'must accept 
Pferdehirt's demonstration that the conventional end of the 
date range for Hesselbach's foundation - 105 - must now be 
extended to cllO. For the purposes of this study, then, 
Hesselbach - and, the Odenwald frontier - are placed on'the maps 
as originating after clOO, and probably nearer cllO. 17% of 
the samian from Hesselbach was South Gaulish: theoretically the 
site could have been founded after cllO. 
1A. 3 The'Neckar 
Certain of the sites on the river Neckar, on the other hand, 
clearly seem to originate by the 90s: Wimpfen by c80 
(according to Pferdehirt's (1986,280) study of the samian, 
although on the basis of the scarcity of Flavian material 
Planck (1988,261) has doubted whether the site was really 
founded this early); Bbckingen probably in the 90s, having the 
same percentage of Dr29 as the Saalburg (Pferdehirt 1986,281); 
Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt by c90; and Kbngen in the 90s 
(Pferdehirt 1986,282). Walheim and Benningen are dated to the 
last decade-of the first century by association. The model 
that emerges is of distributions of sites forming along the 
river lines in the 90s, but not so early in the Odenwald; in 
other words, in the 90s'and perhaps up to cllO or beyond, the 
Odenwald would have projected as a great free salient into the 
territory occupied by Roman forts and roads. This need not 
occasion surprise; it was a natural obstacle to movement, and 
not being a populous or tractable area was not considered 
deserving of garrisons. In fact the garrisons of the Rhine 
valley, the Main and the Neckar will have effectively encircled 
the Odenwald on three sides. Interestingly, then, as late as 
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the 90s the emphasis here, was still, on the advancing of routes 
of communication and control of territory rather than on 
frontier delineation. It is also important to realise that 
alongside the sites on Main and Neckar, older foundations in a 
great arc sweeping around the west side of the Odenwald were 
still in play: Gross-Gerau; Gernsheim; Ladenburg (Sommer and 
Kaiser 1988); Neuenheim; all of these except Ladenburg remained 
in use for a time after the eventual, establishment of the 
Odenwald frontier. Planck (1988,264-66) has suggested that as 
the move from the Rhine and lower, Neckar to Middle Neckar 
entailed an unusually deep thrust from old installations to 
new, some intermediate system of forts may await discovery; 
perhaps a line running north from Rottenburg towards the lower 
Neckar. However, it is probably anachronistic to expect an 
intermediate clear linear frontier system to have developed; 
individually sited forts and a network of communications filled 
the space between Rhine and Neckar, and while hitherto - 
undiscovered elements of this may still come to light, there is 
no reason to believe that a linear arrangement pre-dated the 
beginnings of the placing of installations along the river, 
lines. 
Not only was there a great gap in the linear aspect of the 
Main-Odenwald-Neckar frontier in the 90s; the Neckar itself 
possessed few of the characteristics of a frontier line - nor 
would it, later. The spacing between some fort sites in the 
90s was very wide: up to 20km between BOckingen and Walheim, 
Benningen and Canstatt, Canstatt and Kbngen. The river ran 
through good settlement land on both sides, was easily crossed 
by numerous fords, and the Roman-road itself ran variously on 
the east and west banks (ORLA 11,7; Baatz 1975,172-3). An 
imperial estate existed in the 90s which extended beyond the 
river (ILS 8855; ORLA 11,39-41). Clearly neither the river 
nor anything else formed a defined linear frontier; there was 
still only an area of military control. 
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1.5 Frontier Development on the Main, Odenwald and Neckar 
C100-C110 (Fig 6) 
1.5.1 The Main 
Changes probably took place along the Main in these years, 
linked to the realignment of the eastern Wetterau road as a 
frontier which seemingly took place now. The 0.90ha fort at 
Hainstadt on the west bank of the Main was perhaps given up now 
to be replaced by a full-sized fort at Gross-Krotzenburg. At 
Seligenstadt there may have been a full sized timber fort by 
cllO; on the available pottery, however, the timber fort'cannot 
be dated more closely than to the Trajanic period. At some 
date in the early second century, the fortlet at Stockstadt was 
replaced by a timber fort of 3.20ha (an intervening structure 
perhaps representing a construction camp) (RiH, 480). There is 
an absence of South Gaulish samian from the new fort, leading 
Pferdehirt (1986,279) to date it to c115 or later. The 
ditches of the fortlet contained East and Central Gaulish mixed 
with South Gaulish samian, implying that they were not filled 
in until after cllO; South Gaulish samian has not yet occurred 
in the timber cohort fort. In the interval between the use of 
these installations must be fitted the second enclosure, 
interpreted variously as a construction camp or a timber fort 
preceding that known beneath the later stone fort. Again, here 
the implication is that a full-size conventional cohort fort 
need not have been built until the. late-Trajanic or the 
Hadrianic period. At the next fort along the Main, 
Niedernberg, there is still a lack of information about the 
timber phases pre-dating the known stone-fort; a site is 
assumed on the grounds of circumstance and spacing, but nothing 
can be said about its character or size (RiH, 455). Again, one 
must wonder whether a fort here was a late installation. At 
Obernburg, no structural evidence for the predecessor to the 
known stone fort has yet come to light. Presumably there was a 
military site of some kind here before the Hadrianic period, on 
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the-strength of six South Gaulish Dr37s (Pferdehirt 1986,247; 
279). 
1.5.2 The Odenwald 
As argued above (1.4.2),. the-most likely date for the 
foundation of Hesselbach lies towards the end of the decade 
clOO-110. With the establishment of this and the other numerus 
forts of the northern Odenwald -a series luberraschend 
gleichartig gebaut' (Baatz 1975,153) - is usually placed the 
establishment of a, road and watchtowers demarcating the 
Odenwald frontier. Certainly there is no reason to believe 
that the disposition of forts pre-dates the cordon of towers. 
There is an indication that Pferdehirt may be right to assign 
this system-to the end, rather than the beginning of, the first 
decade of the first century: the fact that it is unusual (while 
not unknown) to find more than one phase of timber watchtower 
at any given site in the northern Odenwald, which may be taken 
as evidence that the sector originated rather later than most 
of the Taunus-Wetterau, the life of a single timber tower being 
sufficient to see out the time before its replacement in stone 
(Baatz 1975,155). 
However, it was established above (1.2) that the provision of a 
watchtower system in all parts of the Wetterau may not have 
been completed until after clOO. If the implied lagging behind 
of the Odenwald sector is to be believed, it cannot have come 
into existence much before cllO. Additional support for'a 
later date is provided by the distinctive design of the - 
earliest Odenwald towers, with their characteristic foundations 
of interlaced dry stone and timber. ý Furthermore, 'as Planck has 
pointed out (1988,262), the closing off of the Odenwald 
implies that the decision had already been taken that the Main, 
at least, should serve'as a frontier line (for the Odenwald 
line takes the most direct'arbitrary route from Main to 
Neckar); ie the Odenwald followed as a consequence of the 
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establishment of the river frontier: and as we have seen 1 
(1.4.1; 1.5.1), the provision of full-sized auxiliary forts on 
the Main river line probably did not begin until some date 
between clOO and cllO. 
In the southern Odenwald two cohort forts were provided, 
Oberscheidental and Neckarburken West. This latter, the more 
southerly, should, like Hesselbach, have been in existence by 
cllO-15 on the basis of its high percentage of South Gaulish 
samian (Pferdehirt 1986,280). It lay alongside a 0.60ha fort 
of the more usual Odenwald type, Neckarburken East, apparently 
founded at the same time (Schbnberger 1985,280). The 
co-existence of these forts at this site, and the fact that 
both Neckarburken East and Oberscheidental have east walls 
lying less than 50m from the frontier line, which runs in a 
dead straight course from Schlossau to the Neckar, make it most 
unlikely that these forts were founded before, or independently 
of, the watchtower system, and effectively provide a terminus 
ante quem of cllO for its establishment. 
1.5.3 The Neckar 
Along the Neckar, the-forts of Wimpfen, Bockingen, Walheim, 
Benningen, Stuttgart Bad Canstatt and Kbngen had already been 
founded as early as c90-clOO (Schbnberger 1985,386; 468). 
What little of the paraphernalia of formal frontier 
installations that the river has produced are not necessarily 
to be dated as early as the Trajanic period. On the basis of a 
tower seen from the air south of Heilbronn-Bbckingen, Planck 
(1987,422) has raised the possibility of, at, least isolated 
towers along the Neckar line. However, isolated towers, seem to 
have served specialised local purposes, and to have provided 
security on routes of communication: unless they are regularly 
spaced in a cordon, there is no reason to believe that they 
necessarily served the functions of border demarcation and 
surveillance. This point is seen particularly clearly in 
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relation to the Stanegate in Britain, a major road with 
examples of individual towers. Therefore the discovery of 
isolated towers on the Neckar does not suggest that a whole 
chain of towers awaits discovery. 
1.5.4 The Sibyllenspur 
One development which seems out of place amidst the still fluid 
dispositions of the Neckar and western Raetia is the running 
barrier, crossing the floor of the Lauter valley at 
Dettingen-unter-Teck, known as the Sibyllenspur (Planck 1987). 
The barrier comprised, two phases: first, a double palisade or 
timber framed wall of earth, fronted by a ditch 3.50m wide and 
1.30m deep; second, succeeding the'demolition of the first, a 
palisade fronted by a slightly smaller ditch. The line has 
been traced for 0.75km northwest-southeast across the level 
floor of the Lauter valley. 25m behind the phase 2 palisade 
lay the Dettingen fortlet, which the published account (Planck 
1987,411-16) gives an area between 0.20 and 0.30ha. The line 
is correctly aligned to form a link between Kbngen and 
Donstetten, although how far it extended in either direction is 
not known. Its general context and role at first sight seems 
clear; it links the military dispositions on the Neckar and on- 
the Schwabian Alb (which had formed by the 90s), and blocks a 
natural funnel of access between the two systems, movement into 
which might threaten the vital communication between provinces 
(for the rearward road see: Planck 1988,260). 
There are obvious problems in relating the dispositions of the 
90s on the Neckar and in Raetia to a continuous frontier 
barrier. Furthermore, this would be a curiously early date for 
such a continuous barrier. The pottery published by Planck 
from the demolition or silting contexts of the ditches of theý 
barrier could, in fact, be given an early second century date, 
but here again problems arise, because by the Hadrianic period 
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it seems likely that a network of forts (eg Eislingen) may have 
existed beyond the Sibyllenspur, making it redundant. 
One solution would be to interpret the Sihyllenspur in a 
different way from the linear frontiers that we have seen 
forming as a general policy decision as military advance 
faltered after the Danubian crisis. Rather, it may represent, a 
strictly local specialised device to prevent movement through 
an inviting corridor, rather in the manner of Caesar's Wall 
built to prevent the migration of the Helvetii, discussed below 
(6.3.1.3). As a local military device to prevent anticipated 
population movement or attacks, it need not have formed a 
unitary system with the Neckar and Schwabian Alb dispositions. 
As for the morphological similarity between the 0.30ha fortlet 
at Donstetten, apparently founded in the 90s (Pferdehirt 1986, 
286), and the fortlet at Dettingen associated with the 
Sibyllenspur, which has prompted speculation (Schbnberger 
1985,388) that they formed part of the same system: this may 
suggest that the barrier was still being maintained at the end 
of the first century, the date for its use proposed by its 
excavator. 
1.6 Developments on the Raetian Land Frontier c90-clOO (Fig 8) 
It is not possible to trace the evolution of the-Roman frontier 
in western Raetia in the same schematic stages which were 
proposed for the Upper German system; in much of Upper Germany, 
a frontier line, chosen - or reached - at an early date, was 
gradually elaborated. However, in the southern part of Upper 
Germany, and in western Raetia, military dispositions continued 
to be moved forward after the Flavian period. Presumably this 
was partly because there was still distance to be run in the 
process of finalising the frontier line. By cllO all territory 
that would ever be occupied north of the Main had been 
enclosed; the army had acquired all it rationally needed beyond 
the Rhine in order to safeguard the occupied areas, and from 
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then on most of the frontier there remained static, and was 
elaborated where it stood. But in western Raetia (and in the 
most southern part-of Upper Germany), lines of communication 
and military sites continued to be given up in favour of'better 
ones, as late as the Antonine period. 
The pace of development, on the Raetian frontier also seems 
somewhat slower than that in Upper Germany and Britain, with 
the result that it is harder to propose a model of the Raetian 
frontier in, say, the 90s, which is clearly distinguishable 
from a model of the frontier in the decade clOO-cllO. An 
attempt has been made to produce two such models, although such 
hypotheses are naturally very speculative and schematic, and 
only time will tell whether they will stand the test of new 
discoveries and closer dating of sites by means of excavation. 
It is possible that a military road passed between Rhine and 
Danube as early as the Claudian or Neronian period (Planck 
1988,255, and map 2), possibly running from the recently 
discovered Claudio-Neronian fort at Riegel-(RiBW, 505), 45km, 
south of Strasbourg, towards Tuttlingen on the Danube. 
However, the'earliest of such systems of which we have any 
direct knowledgeýconnected Strasbourg and the Danube via 
Cornelius Clemens' road, constructed c74 (CIL 13-9082). A fort 
was established at the Neckar crossing at Rottweil about this 
time (Planck 1988,254-57). The disposition of forts 
associated with this route is not-really linear, however 
(Planck 1988, map 2). The individual sites seem to have 
commanded lines of easy communication, controlling-the country 
in a fluid way by means of a complex network of roads. 
1.6.1 The Schwabian Alb 
Despite an early Flavian date offered by Filtzinger (RiBW, 51), 
the recent researches of Heiligmann confirm that it was in the 
80s or 90s that western Raetia saw the foundation of a series 
37 
of forts in the Schwabian Alb, a rolling upland north of the 
Upper Danube. Although Heiligmann (1990,192-3) would see the 
evidence as allowing a foundation for these forts as early as 
the 80s, Pferdehirt's study of the samian suggests that it is 
more likely to be as late as 90. The foundation date of these 
forts thus sits very nicely with-, that of Kbngen and the other 
sites to the northýestablished along the Neckar in the 90s. 
Burladingen had existed since the early Flavian period 
(Pferdehirt 1986,285), but the fort at Gomadingen, on its 
proportion of Dr29 (similar, to the Saalburg and Stuttgart 
Bad-Canstatt) would seem to be a foundation of the 90s. The 
same goes for the 0.30ha fortlet at Donnstetten, and the fort 
at Urspring (Pferdehirt 1986,286-87), from which a road may 
have continued, perhaps via undiscovered sites, to Gunzburg on 
the Danube. 
It might, be tempting to associate these foundations of the 90s 
with Tacitus' famous phrase, written just before the end of the 
first century, describing the introduction of the agri 
decumates to the empire: mox limite acto promotisque praesidlis 
sinus IMPerii et pars provinciae habentur (Germania 29). 
However, limite here is more likely merely to refer to road 
building in general (which is what opened up the tract between 
Rhine and Danube), rather than being a technical term referring 
to an artificial frontier delineation, still less a fortified 
line of defence (Isaac 1988,127-28). There is still a strong 
tendency amongst German scholars to read the passage in this 
way, seeing it as referring to a specific frontier building 
programme in the 90s (eg Planck 1987,422). However, it is 
notable that Tacitus' passage, in a work which considers the 
origins of various ethnic groups, does not imply that the 
incorporation of the Gallic settlers of the decumates had taken 
place immediately before the time of writing; it merely states 
that it was a process that began soon, after the original 
settlement of the area,., It may mean no more than that Tacitus 
was aware of the various roads that had been driven into the 
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Black Forest, and forts that had been planted there, since the 
Claudio-Neronian period. 
The Alb forts are often considered to form a linear system; 
hence the term Alb-11mes. Certainly, like the Flavian 'Glen 
blocking' forts in Scotland, they fall into a line on the map. 
They lie on the south side of the mountainous Schwabian ridge, 
having neither a good outlook or strategic command over the 
area to the, north, and the land was not of high-agricultural 
value and lacked a concentration of native population. It has 
recently been re-emphasised that rather than securing land for 
strategic or economic advantage, the Alb forts were most 
probably concerned with the securing of a route between the 
provinces of Upper Germany and Raetia (Heiligmann 1990,196-99; 
Schbnberger 1985,387; Planck 1988,260). In this way their 
role was, reminiscent of that of the sites founded along the 
Neckar in the 80s and 90s. 
These years saw the first substantial foundations of military 
sites north of the rest of the Danube in Raetia. Urspring was 
founded before clOO (Pferdehirt 1986,287); Heidenheim was 
added to the east of the Alb forts. Heidenheim itself could 
conceivably have been founded in the late 80s, but was probably 
built in the 90s, possessing a similar proportion of Dr29s to 
the Saalburg (Pferdehirt 1986,287-88). 
1'. 6.2 The road to the NOrdlinger Ries (The Rdmerstrasse) 
At the same time sites were advanced along a road going 
northwest from the Danube via Kbsching. The road was not part 
of the system of communications providing ever more direct 
links between Upper Germany and Raetia. Rather its purpose 
seems to have been to enclose, and plant garrisons by, tracts 
of fertile land lying north of the Danube; the presence of a 
network of prehistoric roads and an ancient iron-working 
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industry in the region (Brogan 1935,9) attests the wealth and 
populous nature of the area. 
The situation of the road is reminiscent of the Flavian 
penetration route in Scotland north of Camelon, which skirts 
Fife and runs along the edge of the Highlands; and the Raetian 
example must have an early date. Weissenburg, 60km along the 
road, northwest of the Danube, appears, on the basis of its 
proportion of Dr29s (Pferdehirt 1986,292) to have been founded 
by the 90s or quite possibly slightly earlier. This dating has 
been confirmed by more recent excavation, which also suggests 
that the fort housed an ala from the beginning (Grbnke and 
Weinlich 1987; 1988). Kbsching is traditionally dated by an 
inscription to 80. On the basis of-an absence of Dr29 
Pferdehirt (1986,292-93) has proposed a foundation date after 
100 and suggested that the inscription might have been carried 
from nearby Oberstimm. for re-use. However, as the analysis of 
the pottery is based upon only 19 vessels, it seems better to 
take the inscription at face value. The lack of early pottery, 
may be explained by the possibility (Baatz 1975,273) that the 
earliest fort lies slightly south, of the known stone fort. 
If there was a fort at Kbsching by c80, and Weissenburg was 
founded by the, 90s, we might expect the fort at PfUnz, guarding 
the point where the road crosses the Altmiffil, to fit with these 
dates. Again, Pferdehirt (1986,292) has dated it to after 
clOO on the basis of its absence of Dr29s, but as we have 
established, this need not preclude a foundation date in the 
90S. 
Between Heidenheim and Weissenburg, both founded by the 90s, 
lay the fertile basin of the. Nbrdlinger Ries, and it is just 
possible that this area was also garrisoned before the end of 
the first century. The sites in question are Oberdorf, 
Munningen and Nbrdlingen. Neither of the former two, which 
have been excavated, nor sites immediately to the north 
(Unterschwaningen, Gnotzheim), have produced any Dr29: but it 
40 
is not possible to preclude a foundation date before clOO for 
any of these sites. Indeed, some (RiBW, 53) have placed them 
as early as the 80s, though without detailed argument. At 
Munningen a dendrochronological date from timber associated 
with a repair to the defences-was 104+\-20 (Pferdehirt 1986, 
290 for ref. ). Pferdehirt denies that this suggests a 
foundation in the 90s by arguing that the defences may have 
been weakened in a landslip in the first major rainfall after 
their construction. All that can be concluded at present, 
then, is that within the date range c90-cllO the garrisoning of 
the-Nbrdlinger Ries took place; more probably in the 90s. 
1.7 Developments on the Raetian Land Frontier clOO-cllO (Fig 
9) 
1.7.1 The Alb 
Some time in the early second century a route was established 
between Kbngen and Urspring and/or Heidenheim, thus advancing 
the military network beyond the Sibyllenspur area, and 
shortening the distance between the Neckar and the Alb. The 
route was secured by a fort at Eislingen, discovered from the 
air in 1966 (Schbnberger 1985, - 469). Although thought to be of 
early second century date, this timber fort of 2.20ha is not 
closely dated. 
1.7.2 The road to the Ries (The Rdmerstrasse) 
Installations continued to be added to the road that ran 
northwest from the Danube, via Kbsching, towards the NOrdlinger 
Ries. By about 110 (Pferdehirt 1986,295) Pfbrring had been 
provided on the north bank of the Danube. 
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The first decade of the second century perhaps saw the 
beginnings of a screen of forts to the, north of the Nbrdlinger 
Ries, with sites at Aufkirchen (unproven), Unterschwaningen and 
Gnotzheim. Unterschwaningen, timber and only 0.70ha in size, 
has produced only tiny amounts of pottery (Pferdehirt 1986, 
290-91, -245). The neighbouring fort of Gnotzheim (2.20ha in 
its eventual stone form) has produced only Dr37, suggesting 
that it was not founded until after c90 (after clOO on 
Pferdehirt's reckoning); perhaps it was founded at the same 
time as, or slightly later than, the-Ries-forts. 
North of the road on which these forts lie, and to the east of 
Gnotzheim, a timber fort was established at'Theilenhofen, whose 
foundation has been placed at various dates around C100. It 
has, from 48-vessels, produced no Dr29, yet has a high 
percentage of South Gaulish samian (Pferdehirt 1986,291), 
which ought to imply that it was founded before cllO. It is 
interesting that it has been noted-(H-G Simon, cited in 
Pferdehirt 1986,291) that 'die frOhesten Theilenhofer 
Sigillaten junger ... als das aus den wohl in spatdomitianischer 
Zeit angelegten Kastellen Gnotzheim und Weissenburg bekannte 
Material... 1. Of these sites Gnotzheim is also dated by 
Pferdehirt by its absence of Dr29s to after c100, but the 
observed differences in the finds from Gnotzheim and 
Theilenhofen would suggest that at least some sites which have 
not produced Dr29 may have been founded as early as the 90s. 
The model that emerges, then, is of Gnotzheim being founded on 
the road by clOO, with Theilenhofen being added only a few 
years later. 
While the earliest known fort at Theilenhofen is full-sized, 
Unterschwaningen was of only 0.70ha and possessed only two 
gates. It is interesting in this connection that another site 
north of the road, near the later frontier line, Ellingen, 
seems on the basis of its early finds'(1: 19 Dr2g, 10.20% South 
Gaulish; Pferdehirt 1986,291-92), almost certainly to have 
been founded before cllO. Ellingen was formerly supposed to 
have a Hadrianic or Antonine origin (Schbnberger 1985,486), 
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despite the discovery of an earlier timber fort in the 
excavations of 1980-82. After the excavations a foundation 
date of, cll5-125 was suggested (Zanier 1987,47-9). 
The tendency of the foundation date of individual sites to be 
pushed back as investigation proceeds-, is interesting, for there 
are, other key sites which may respond to such treatment. For 
example, the small fort at Gunzenhausen, guarding the point 
where the'later frontier line crosses the AltmUhl,, is 
conventionally dated to the mid-second century (Baatz 1975, 
236; Schbnberger 1985,486; Ulbert and Fischer 1983, -70); but 
the site is built-over and little investigated since the ORL 
account; a timber predecessor fort could easily await 
discovery, as in the case of Ellingen, and the possibility 
that, with other sites on the forward frontier line, it was 
really founded, before cllO, cannot be ruled out. It appears as 
an open square on the clOO-cllO map (Fig 9). 
1.7.3 The beginnings of a formal frontier line in Raetia 
The date of the establishment of a formal-frontier line on the 
most northerly sector of the Raetian military dispositions 
remains unknown. It is not possible to argue for the date of 
the earliest watchtower line in the same sort of detail, on the 
basis of the ceramic evidence for the origin of small 
installations, as has been attempted for the Upper German 
frontier. Although the watchtower system in Strecke 13, the 
most northerly part of the Raetian frontier, is reckoned to 
have been the earliest element - Baatz (1975,235), for 
example, raises the possibility of, the provision of towers and 
a patrol track as early as the Trajanic period - this dating 
must be argued on the basis of a dead reckoning back from 
better dated later developments and their relationship to those 
an other parts of the Raetian line. 
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In addition, the indications considered above (1.7.2) of early 
foundations at Theilenhofen and Ellingen, each apparently 
associated with the frontier line rather than the rearward 
road, would support a Trajanic dating, although-not prove it. 
Gunzenhausen, as we have seen (1.7.2), may have originated this 
early, despite its conventional mid-second century foundation 
date. Although a recently discovered short-lived timber fort 
of the late-Trajanic or early-Hadrianic period at 
Weissenburg-Breitung, only 1.50km from the known ala fort at 
Weissenburg (which was in existence by the'90s) has been 
interpreted as temporary troop accommodation during the first 
layout of the linear frontier in Strecken 13 and 14 (HOssen 
1991), it is possible that the site is not as early as those of 
Ellingen and Theilenhofen. It is not clear whether this means 
that Theilenhofen and Ellingen stood for some time without a 
linear frontier, or whether the purpose of the site at 
Weissenburg-Breitung has been misunderstood. 
It would be unwise to use the date of the abandonment of forts 
in the Nbrdlinger Ries to deduce the date of construction of 
the first linear frontier to the north. Their end-date is only 
poorly understood, and in any case their is no reason why some 
or all of-them might not have continued in occupation after the 
layout of the frontier line had begun. 
From the evidence of the Dalkingen sequence and 
dendrochronology (4.5 below), the earliest running barrier(a 
'Zaun') in Strecke 12 to the west was probably provided by the 
140s. Its different, character from the earliest barrier in 
Strecke 13 -a palisade - suggests that the latter was of 
different, and presumably earlier date, as Strecke 12'evidently 
represents an extension of the frontier line to the west. If, 
the earliest palisade was Hadrianic (perhaps having its western 
termination at the double watchtower 13/22-23), as we might 
expect, its later replacement by a Zaun might be explained. 
By, say, the 140s, parts of the earliest palisade may have 
decayed enough to warrant piecemeal replacement (presumably at 
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a date before the mid-Antonine completion of the frontier in 
Strecke 12, when the Zaun there (of c140) was replaced 
throughout by a substantial palisade). If we are right in 
guessing that the palisade in Strecke 13 might originate under 
Hadrian, it is of interest that it apparently post-dates a 
timber watchtower (13/43), supporting at least the, possibility 
of a Trajanic date for the earliest layout of towers. 
How far the earliest watchtower system extended to the east is 
not clear: there is a general assumption amongst German 
scholars that the system must have originally terminated at 
some point after ascending the high plateau of the Jura, only 
later being extended to the Danube via the AltmUhl crossing at 
Bdhming. Whether this extension had taken place by the 
Hadrianic period, or occurred somewhat later, cannot be 
determined. The presence of the 'Bretterzaun', a replacement of 
the original palisade, itself preceding the Plechtwerkzaun (4.5 
below), may be a clue to the limits of the oldest stretch (the 
oldest parts requiring the most replacements of their timber 
continuous barrier). The last known occurrence of the 
Bretterzaun is at 14/50 (ORLA 14,92), suggesting that the 
original watchtower and palisade line may have terminated near 
Petersbuch, where the completed line makes a sudden change of 
direction. Whereas the Plechtwerkzaun occurs in Strecke 15, 
the Bretterzaun does not occur this far east. 
Another possibility may be that the original layout of towers 
ran as far as Raitenbuch, where the Rdmerstrasse turns to run 
southeast to the Danube, and that from this point on the forts 
along the road were originally considered sufficient 
protection; across the high plateau of the Jura infiltration 
was considered less likely to occur than through the openings 
into the Ries enclosed by the frontier further to the west, and 
a linear frontier at first thus considered unnecessary. Down 
into the reign of Hadrian, however, the area to the west of the 
earliest tower system (west of 13/22-3? ) remained occupied by 'a 
fluid system of roads and garrisons. West of Bbbingen, this 
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would be the case down to the reign of Pius or Marcus. The area 
of the Neckar and western Raetia seems to lag behind; here the 
choice of a final frontier line was long delayed. For whatever 
reason - the possibilities are discussed below (3.5) - it was 
felt that the military situation in the re-entrant was likely 
to be a short-lived one; here change could still take place. 
In'this part of Europe the Romans were to choose their frontier 
at their leisure. i 
Chapter-2 
FLAVIAN AND TRAJANIC LINEAR FRONTIER DEVELOPMENT IN BRITAIN 
2.1 A pre-Flavian linear frontier in Britain? 
In Britain, as in Germany, there has been a tendency for 
retrospective knowledge of the development of linear frontiers 
in the late-first and second centuries to influence 
interpretations of earlier military dispositions. The most 
celebrated example of this is the supposed Fosse Way frontier, 
argued by Collingwood and later scholars to have been drawn up 
behind Trent and Severn shortly after the completion of the 
over-running of-lowland Britain. Collingwood himself invented 
the notion and dated the supposed linear arrangement of sites 
along the Fosse Way to the Scapulan period (47-52) (Collingwood 
1924). Webster realised that such a frontier would have been 
left behind by the Scapulan assault on Wales and the offensive 
transfer westwards of legio XX; rather than taking this as 
evidence that such a frontier was never conceived of, he chose 
to elaborate the theory and to re-date the construction of the 
frontier to the governorship of Aulus Plautius, seeing the 
earliest Claudian ambitions as being limited to the conquest of 
lowland Britain, this a policy to be overturned under the 
succeeding governor (Webster 1958; 1970; 1980). 
While it is not possible to disprove the theory of a Fosse Way 
frontier, it must be pointed out that there is no direct 
evidence to support it. The literary accounts of the conquest 
of Britain give us no reason to believe (in spite of 
Collingwood's adoption of Bradley's famous emendation-of the 
text of Tacitus) that the conquest was initially meant to be a 
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limited one. If this was the case, it was an idea that was 
overturned almost instantaneously, and even the proponents of a 
Fosse frontier must admit that it will have been over before it 
had even begun. The text of Tacitus, as emended, need mean 
nothing more than that a line was perceived beyond which squads 
of soldiers could not safely be sent in to disarm and terrorise 
the locals; in other words a distinction was recognised between 
a zone where occupation required consolidation, and zones where 
either warfare was still taking place, or where the existence 
of clients (such as the Brigantes north of the Trent) prevented 
direct interference. It does not in any way imply that the 
conquest was not always meant to continue. 
More concretely, there is no evidence,. as Maxfield (1986; 1989, 
26-27) has pointed out, that any except perhaps three of the 
sites along the Fosse (Cirencester; Bath? Lincoln? ) are as 
early as the Plautian period in date. To have any significance 
as a linear frontier system all of the sites associated with 
the road would have to be Plautian. Even on the most generous 
acceptance of early fort sites as being-this early, we are far 
from arriving at a recognisable frontier system. Frere (1987, 
79) writes: 'The spacing of the sites at Broxtowe, Mancetter, 
Alcester, Gloucester and Sea Mills at uniform distances apart 
and at a uniform distance beyond the Fosse Way is systematic 
and significant... I However, these sites are all spaced at 
intervals in excess of 40km (Webster 1980,121; Maxfield 1989,, 
27); rather than tending to suggest a linear frontier, this is 
well in excess of the spacing often seen, between garrison forts 
to maintain road security in conquest areas. 
But most importantly, the 
a linear belt relies upon 
was yet held. Yet there 
evidence to differentiate 
occupation of these sites 
west, whose occupation at 
tendency of these sites to fall into 
the belief that nothing in advance 
is no sufficiently close dating 
clearly between the period of 
and similar sites to the north and 
the same time would make the forts 
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along the Fosse become simply a disposition within a general 
network of military occupation. 
It will, also be one of-the conclusions of the comparative study 
(3.3 below) that there is no circumstantial reason to expect a 
linear frontier in Britain at this time. To postulate the 
Fosse Way frontier is to-demand that artificial frontier, 
systems could be constructed on the basis of a policy that was 
likely to be overturned the following year; or that frontier 
systems were constructed as temporary solutions to short term, 
problems in the course of wars of conquest. The former of 
these circumstances occurred very rarely (if at all) during the 
whole history of the northwestern frontiers; the latter, never. 
Frontier building in general represented a permanent investment 
and acceptance of aýsituation; it is very hard to see this 
being the case in Britain in c47. Decisive, also, is the 
absence of the continuous systems of towers which characterise 
the earliest artificial land-frontiers. 
Significantly, the Fosse Way remained an important arterial- 
road throughout the history of Roman Britain (and beyond: 
Maxfield 1989,27); yet one of-Collingwood's starting points in 
deducing a frontier had been its supposed uselessness as a 
traffic route. It is also notable that when, in the aftermath 
of the Boudiccan rebellion, Roman military advance was halted 
on the threshold of Brigantia for at least ten years, no 
frontier system, linear or otherwise, seems to have come into 
being. Indeed not until military advance reached the northern 
parts of Scotland, more than a generation after the proposed 
Fosse frontier, did thoughts really turn to an artificial 
linear frontier in Britain. However, the date and 
circumstances of its construction are much debated. 
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2.2 The Flavian Frontier in Scotland 
2.2.1 The Gask Frontier (Fig 14) 
Early observers were aware of the Roman road which, having come 
from Camelon, runs from Ardoch to Strageath, and then along the 
northern ridge of the valley of Strathearn towards Bertha. 
Certain works associated with-this road were first noticed by 
Thomas Pennant (correspondent of the-naturalist Gilbert White): 
'Pass by the, great plantation at Gask Hall; in these woods is a 
small circular entrenchment, and about half a mile further on 
Gask Moor is another. -.. and between this and Innerpaffrey are 
two other similar, placed as near that everything that stirred 
beneath, or at a certain distance around, could be seen' (1776, 
90). 
Now some 17 of these earthworks, strung along the road from 
south of Ardoch to Bertha are known (Maxwell 1989,118-21). 
They fall on either side of the road; they are'never separated 
by more than one kilometre, and usually by much less. Each 
excavated example has proved to be a ditched and banked 
enclosure, with a causeway facing the road, and containing four 
corner post holes to support a tower. Each site would have had 
an uninterrupted view of its neighbours. The towers were, on 
average, 3.05m square. 
Despite Pennant's early observation that the close spacing of 
the sites enabled all-round supervision, with the implication 
that the towers constituted a form of security cordon, modern 
archaeologists tended until recently to see them as a lateral 
signalling system, and 'signal station' was the term usually 
employed for these sites (Crawford 1949j 32; Robertson 1974). 1 
By 1970 it was realised that the Gask towers, too closely 
spaced to be intended merely for signal-transmission, formed an 
artificial frontier line (Daniels 1970,93), whose closest 
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parallels lay on the German frontier between Rhine and Main. 
As Pennant had realised, they were watchtowers, forming a line 
of control. A mortarium rim from the Gask House site has been 
dated to the period c70-95 (Robertson 1974,20-21); on the 
basis of this and the similarity of the towers to structures 
supposed to be of Domitianic date in Germany, a Flavian date 
for the Gask towers has been generally accepted. 
As more elements of the Gask frontier come to light, it is seen 
more and more to resemble the early German watchtower 
frontiers. Besides the towers themselves, the system consists 
of fortlets right up on the frontier line. Kaims Castle has 
long been known, and most probably forms part of the system, 
while a new discovery lies 8km away, south of Ardoch, at 
Glenbank (Maxwell and Wilson 1987,16-17). At just under 
0.10ha in, area, these fortlets are closely comparable to 
examples such as Butzbach on the Upper German frontier, and are 
also similar in that they seem to have worked in close 
proximity to-auxiliary forts. A square ditched enclosure of 
similar size detected from the air within the marching camp at 
Innerpeffray (St Joseph 1958,90) may just represent a 
permanent fortlet of similar type. The known auxiliary forts 
of Ardoch, Strageath and Bertha complete the system. The 
observation that the positions of towers north of Ardoch seem 
to have been surveyed in units of distance relating to the 
north gate of that fort (Hanson 1987,155-57) provides 
important evidence that the auxiliary forts were in use at the 
same time as the towers. 
The Gask system is certainly the earliest artificial linear 
frontier that can be detected in Roman Britain. Indeed, it is 
arguably the only artificial frontier to be seen in Britain 
before Hadrian's Wall. Unfortunately its context cannot be 
closely established, despite the general agreement as to its 
Flavian date. All that can be done for the present is to 
outline the movements of the Roman army on the northern 
frontier of Britain, as best they can be established, and point 
51 
to those contexts where the Gask tower system might best fit. 
Most commentators in the last twenty years have preferred to 
see the Gask frontier as being part of a staged withdrawal, 
occurring after the final abandonment of ambitions to conquer 
the whole of Scotland, or at least to garrison a legion there - 
this abandonment graphically attested by the unfinished 
legionary fortress at Inchtuthil. An alternative view-has, 
however, recently emerged. - 
2.2.2 The Gask Frontier in Agricola's Fourth and Fifth 
seasons? 
By the end of his third season (79 or 80), Agricola had carried 
Roman arms as far as the river Tay (Agr. 22). For the following 
two seasons (80 or 81 and 81-or 82) something made Agricola 
mark time and, we are explicitly informed in the Agricola (23), 
the situation almost arose where Inventus In Ipsa Britannia 
terminus. The incipient terminus was specifically located by 
Tacitus as lying on the Forth-Clyde, isthmus, quod tum 
praesidlis firmabatur. After the two seasons' halt, advance 
was resumed, culminating in the victory at Mons Graupius in 
Agricola's seventh season (83 or 84). 
The two-year halt is very convincingly explained as being 
brought about by the death of Vespasian. On the early 
chronology for Agricola's governorship (77-83) these two years, 
80-81, would coincide exactly with the principate of Titus, who 
may have intervened personally to halt the British war, only to 
have Domitian reverse this policy after his death (Breeze 1988, 
16-17). 
There has been a long, traditional quest for the archaeological 
evidence for the physical frontier that Tacitus states was 
constructed in these two years of inertia. In the past Tacitus 
has been taken at face value in his clear statement that the 
terminus consisted of forts strengthening the narrow isthmus 
52 
between Forth and Clyde (Agr. 23), and until very recently the 
Agricolan sites were not unnaturally sought beneath the 
Antonine Wall forts which lined a frontier across the isthmus 
at a later date. The enclosure detected beneath the fort of 
Bar Hill was once unquestionably that-fort's Agricolan 
predecessor (MacDonald, 1934,271-73). A similar enclosure 
pre-dating theýfort at, Croy Hill was. inevitably interpreted as 
an Agricolan praesidium (ibid., 267-69). 
As early as 1960, however, K Steer had expressed doubts about 
the Agricolan date of these enclosures; 'subsequently, doubts 
have grown about the necessity to search for Agricola's ý 
praesidia beneath the Antonine Wall forts. As early as 1970 
the suggestion was made (Daniels 1970,92) that the sites of 
Agricola's fourth and fifth seasons may actually have lain 
north of the isthmus. 'This possibility has been seen (Maxwell 
1984) to be strengthened by the discovery of a Flavian fort at 
Doune on the Teith. ý 
Meanwhile, re-excavation has shownýthe Croy Hill enclosure to 
be Antonineý(Hanson 1979,19), and the Bar Hill praesidium to 
have been open-immediately before the construction of the 
Antonine fort there (Keppie-1986). There is no other 
structural evidence for any other Antonine wall fort having a 
Flavian origin, although on the basis of finds, Mumrills, 
Castlecary and Cadder have in the past been considered as 
originating this early. 
The possibility has been raised that, 'if the frontier of c8O-81 
is to be sought north of the isthmus, then the Gask, frontier 
may be associated with it., Certainly the Gask frontier must 
belong either between c8O and c84 (ie in Agricola's 
governorship), or to the very end of the Flavian episode in 
Scotland: for in the period c85 c88 there was apparently an 
arrangement of forts that could hardly have co-existed with the 
Gask towers. To the north and west of the forts (Ardoch, 
Strageath and Bertha) on the road over the Gask which at some 
53 
time formed a linear frontier, there lay another line of 
Flavian military sites, gradually converging on the road 
northeast (Fig 13). 
This outer line consisted of forts placed in the mouths of the 
highland glens (Drumquhassle, Malling, Bochastle Dalginross, 
Fendoch), and at the crossings of rivers, emerging from the 
Highlands (Cardean, Inverquharity, Stracathro). There was also 
the legionary fortress at Inchtuthil. With one possible 
exception, those of the 'glen' forts which have been excavated 
appear to have had a single, extremely brief period of 
occupation, before being carefully dismantled and abandoned. 
Inchtuthil itself was still incomplete when itsýdemolition 
began at some date later than 86. 
The 'road' forts and the 'glen' forts could have been held 
simultaneously: but it is hard to see the Gask towers 
coexisting with the 'glen forts'. The towers were not road 
stations, but rather, on the clear analogy of the earliest of 
the German watchtower systems, an artificially delineated 
border surveillance system. For the towers and their 
accompanying forts and fortlets to have lain 5-8km behind an 
arrangement of auxiliary forts and a legionary fortress would 
have been inexplicable and unparalleled. The Gask frontier was 
intended to be a permanent drawing up of the border line at the 
limit of Roman occupation. As such it must either pre-date or 
postdate the system of which Inchtuthil formed a part. 
The idea that the watchtower system might be earlier than the 
advanced 'glen' forts gains increasing support. Frere, (1981, 
96) has suggested, and Hanson and Maxwell (1983,41) have 
acknowledged, the possibility of the towers belonging to the 
Agricolan advance of 79 or 80, or to the two year inertia when 
the frontier lay on the isthmus in 80 and 81 or 81 and 82. -- CM 
Daniels has argued (1988,261) that the circumstances of 
Inchtuthills abandonment point to a more final and drastic 
withdrawal than a mere retreat to build the Gask frontier would 
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have involved. It is argued that the elaborate nature of the 
precautions to stop iron from falling into hostile hands and 
the massive nature of the abandoned stock - over 875,000 iron 
nails buried in a specially prepared pit dug four metres-into 
the earth - shows that the Romans were clearing out of the 
whole area, and withdrawing in one fell swoop to the lowlands 
and points south of Newstead. 'If this is accepted, the only 
possible, context for the towers is much earlier, under 
Agricola. 
If the construction of the frontier is to be placed thus early, 
it would seem preferable to associate the towers with the two- 
year halt rather than with some stage of Agricola's advance. 
It is the only convincing context. It is important to stress 
that for the watchtower system to have played-a part in some 
fluid advance would have been utterly without parallel. None 
of the watchtower systems onýthe continent ever functioned in 
this way; the association of the Taunus-Wetterau towers of 
Upper Germany with Domitian's ChattanýWar is a purely 
traditional one, unsupported by the archaeological dating 
evidence (1.1 above). It is quite possible to square the 
location of the Gask frontier with Tacitus' description of the 
praesidia on the isthmus: although that writer specifically 
places the praesidia angusto terrarum spatio, there is no need 
to think that he is using any greater geographical, exactitude 
than was usual in the Agricola. A disposition of forts in an 
arc north of the isthmus, as suggested by Maxwell (1984; he 
includes Dumbarton, Drumquhassle, Malling, Bochastle, Doune and 
Stirling as his proposed praesidium sites) could easily be 
accommodated by the text. More importantly; such an open 
disposition would leave unprotected the Fife peninsula, with 
whose inhabitants there is reason to believe the Romans 
cultivated a friendly relationship, and thus perhaps 
necessitate a watchtower frontier in the-limited sector between 
the'Forth and the Tay. The Gask frontier would divide the Fife 
peninsula, with'its absence of known Roman forts and close 
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communication with the pro-Roman Votadini, from the 
Caledonians. 
Indeed, the idea that the Gask towers could have formed a 
far-flung annexe to Agricola's stop-line of c80-81 may even be 
thought to be supported by Tacitus' text, which asserts that 
once the praesidia had been established, omnis proplor sinus 
tenebatur, summotis velut In allam Insulam hostibus. Omnis 
proplor sinus has usually been taken to mean "'the whole sweep 
of country nearer" (i. e. southward)', in other words the area 
south of the isthmus. It is possible, however, to see how 
sinus, in its sense as a projecting piece of land (Ogilvie and 
Richmond 1967,234), may have referred to the projecting sweep 
of land enclosed by the Gask system north of the isthmus. 
Omnis proplor sinus tenebatur could clearly be translated: the 
whole of the nearer projecting curve of land [i. e. the Fife 
peninsula] was held'. Whether or not this is considered 
evidence for the Gask towers dating to this time, the Agricola 
taken at face value certainly suggests that Agricola's 
arrangements during his fallow years included control of the 
Venicones north of the isthmus. This should hardly be 
surprising, for Agricola is said (Agr. 22) to have penetrated! 
as far north as the Tay in his third season. 
The view that the Gask frontier predates Mons Graupius - and 
the building of Inchtuthil - has received considerable 
additional support from the recent study by Hobley (1989) of 
Domitian's coinage in Britain. Hobley suggests that the 
absence of asses of 87 from forts north of the Tweed indicates 
that if the Gask frontier operated after the abandonment of 
Inchtuthil, it will have stood without the support of forts 
further north than Newstead. The thesis relies on the point 
that as coinage of 86 and 87 (and of no other years in 
Domitian's reign) is known to have arrived in Britain in 
massive quantities (Tomlin and Walker 1988,286-88), the 
absence of asses of 87 on sites where those of 86 are present, 
shows that the garrison had departed in the meantime. At sites 
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such as Strageath and Elginhaugh, the latest asses are of 86. 
At Newstead asses of 87 occur. On-this evidence the idea of 
any military occupation north of the Tweed after 86, including 
a Gask frontier of this date, becomes difficult to sustain. 
2.2.3 A later dating for the Gask Frontier? 
However, an date of c80-81 for the Gask frontier seems rather 
at variance with the date of the building of the exactly 
analogous Upper German frontier. It has often been stressed 
(eg by Breeze 1982,63) that the similarity of the Gask and 
Taunus-Wetterau systems should imply contemporaneity. If this 
be the case, the evidence would seem to be pulling in two 
directions, for it is hard to see the continental watchtower 
systems originating before c90, a decade later than the latest 
possible Agricolan dating for the Gask. 
The other point about the continental analogies is that it is 
clear that permanent frontiers only came into being beyond 
Rhine and Danube when dispositions had unmistakeably and 
irretrievably fossilised. This is discussed below (3.1.4): it 
is clear that frontiers were not constructed lightly, or while 
wars were still going on. Once established, the formal 
frontiers between Rhine and Main were to endure, without 
movement back and forth, until the third-century crisis. The 
watchtowers of the Gask frontier unmistakeably constitute a 
formal frontier system of the same kind. 
Now it does seem that there was a change of policy upon Titus' 
accession which affected Agricola's progress in Britain. The 
decision to build a frontier in Upper Germany seems to have 
followed an from Danube crisis and troop withdrawal. There was 
no such crisis during the reign of Titus, and no reason to 
believe that troops were withdrawn from Britain. Nor can any 
true parallel be found for a watchtower frontier so rapidly 
constructed - and abandoned - on a mere imperial whim. The 
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Gask frontier could fit here, but it would serve a much more 
intelligible purpose as the frontier of northern Britain after 
the debilitating withdrawal of a legion after 86; when the idea 
of a legion for offensive purposes in Scotland had become a 
dead letter. The later date would also bring the Gask frontier 
much closer in time to its continental counterparts. Unlike 
the continental frontiers, it was soon abandoned, but this is 
the only respect in which the frontier at the later suggested 
date would have been exceptional, and this can be explained by 
the special circumstances in which troops were withdrawn from 
Britain to meet the emergency on the Danube. 
There remains the absence of asses of 87 in the forts - such as 
Strageath - which would need to be garrisoned with the Gask 
frontier. Hobley's challenge is powerful: if one is to suggest 
that forts north of the Tweed were held after Inchtuthil, one 
is forced to argue that the asses of 87 behaved in a different 
way to those of 86. Hobley's argument depends on the following 
assumptions: I 
1. It is implicit in Hobley's thesis that a primary purpose of 
the imports of freshly minted asses of 86 and 87 was to pay the 
army, and that the issues were immediately distributed to all 
occupied, military sites: 'none of this vast input [of asses of 
871 were sent directly to Wroxeter as there were no troops 
based there' (Hobley 1989,72 and note 14). Therefore the 
issues of 86 and 87 rapidly, and at equal rates, reached the 
army on the frontier. 
2. The issues of 86 and 87 are both well represented on British 
sites occupied in the reign of Domitian. 
It seems that the absence of the issue of 87 from the northern 
Scottish sites must be accepted; although the numbers of coins 
recovered is small, the fact that when all of the sites are 
taken together, there remains an entire absence of the 87 asses 
north of the Tweed, must be regarded as significant. It is not 
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intended here, then, to question Hobley's conclusion on the 
basis of the numerical size of the sample. So, if we are to 
argue that forts north of the Tweed were held for a short time 
after the arrival of the 86 issue, we must propose an 
explanation of, why the next year's issue never arrived at these 
sites. 
Regarding the first assumption, it cannot be proven that these 
issues were immediately distributed to all frontier sites. 
Walker (Tomlin-and Walker 1988,286-8) argued that these 
special issues of bronze under Domitian were one-off imports 
designed to introduce small change into Britain, or rather into 
the pockets of soldiers and salaried civil servants in Britain. 
If the 86 and 87 asses arrived in special inputs, the 
possibility arises that the inputs were sent to special target 
areas, or central points of storage and distribution. No doubt 
the generality of army pay arrived in consignments at specific 
points, but because it normally consisted of old coinage, this, 
is not now apparent from finds of coins. This is not to resort 
to the old notion of the 'drift' or 'time-lag' in the arrival 
of artefacts on the northern frontier, which formed such a 
point of contention in a former debate about the date of the 
first Roman abandonment of northern Scotland (Pryce and Birley 
1935,68-9; MacDonald 1935,197). That will not work in this 
case, for whatever delay there was in coins of 86 reaching the 
frontier, given the same time-lag, the 87 issue should have 
arrived the following year. Howeveri if the special inputs 
were sent directly to legionary fortresses, rather than the 
generality of frontier forts, it can be seen exactly why no 
asses of 87 arrived north of the Tweed even though sites there 
may still have been occupied. Between the arrival of the 86 
issue and the 87 issue, Inchtuthil was finally abandoned, and 
the Inchtuthil legion withdrawn from its offensive position in 
Scotland. 
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Of course, these coins did reach non-legionary sites. The 
suggestion here is that this was some time after their arrival 
as a special input at a legionary centre. This brings us to 
the second of Hobley's implicit assumptions: that the vast 
inputs of 86 and 87 leave their traces in the coin records of 
all British sites occupied at the time of their arrival. This 
is not in fact the case. Hobley himself is forced to address 
the problem of certain sites in southern Britain, where 
although asses of 87 are present, they occur in a much smaller 
proportion than the issue of 86. The sites are Wroxeter and 
Richborough; Hobley (1989,72) explains the disparity in terms 
of the departure of units from these sites. The base of legio 
XX at Wroxeter is seen as being given up in favour of Chester 
upon the withdrawal from Scotland; at Chester coins of 87 
predominate; the legion had arrived there in time to receive 
the input. He speculates that the unit at Richborough may have 
left for the continent at this time. Yet occupation of these 
sites continued; at Wroxeter the legion may have left but the 
inhabitants of the new city remained. Hobley's own explanation 
points to the possibility that, rather than arriving uniformly 
at all sites, the inputs of 86 and 87 followed the legions. 
Thus one alternative explanation for the absence of the 87 
issue in north Scotland might be that when these coins arrived 
in Britain, the most northerly legionary base was now that of 
IX Hispana at York. Inchtuthil had served as a reception point 
for the input of coins minted in 86; it was no longer there to 
receive the coins minted in 87. Of course, coins of 87 would 
have reached the units in the far north in time, and it is to 
be expected that legionary detachments were active in the 
construction and operation of any post-Inchtuthil frontier in 
northern Scotland. Asses of 87 eventually reached Newstead 
(where legionaries were present). So, if the absence of the 87 
issue may not prove that all Scotland north of the Tweed was 
immediately abandoned with Inchtuthil, it does show that if 
there was continued occupation it was of an extremely brief 
duration. 
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To summarise: it would be tempting to suppose, on the analogy 
of events on the Continent, that the Gask frontier in Scotland 
did not originate-until a legion had been withdrawn and the 
final offensive against the Highlanders cancelled as a 
consequence. To date the frontier to the time of the 
abandonment of Inchtuthil seems at first sight at loggerheads 
with the absence of asses of 87 in the northern forts. 
However, if the arrival of a huge, special consignment of asses 
is linked to the presence of a legion at Inchtuthil, the 
absence of the legion after the abandonment of the fortress may 
provide a reason for a more gradual distribution of the asses 
of 87 to the northern sites, and allow a very short period of 
occupation after the legion's departure - say up to two or 
three years - to be postulated at the forts related to the Gask 
frontier. If Inchtuthil was being dismantled in c87 or c88, 
this would make the construction of the Gask system as exactly 
contemporary with events in Upper Germany as archaeological 
dating evidence will allow. Many will prefer to find Hobley's 
argument decisive; here it is suggested that the evidence at 
least leaves open the possibility of a later date for the Gask 
frontier. 
It is worth noting that if the later dating of the Gask system 
is preferred, it does not mean that we have to dispense with 
the meaning of Tacitus' proplor sinus, secured in Agricola's 
fourth and fifth seasons, as land north of the Forth-Clyde 
isthmus. Even if the Gask towers were not built this early, 
the forts of Ardoch, Strageath and Bertha probably were. While 
clear about the halt on the isthmus in seasons four and five, 
Tacitus implies that forts existed to the north. 'There was 
even time for the establishment of forts' (Agr. 22). In the 
sixth season the Caledonians 'went so far as to attack some... 
forts' (Agr. 25). The statement of Tacitus that some 
faint-hearts advocated retreat behind the Forth, because 
'evacuation was preferable to expulsion' - cedendum potius quam 
pellerentur - would seem to confirm that Agricola had indeed 
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established forts north of the isthmus before the great advance 
of his last two seasons. During the two-year halt, Ardoch and 
the road forts may well have comprised part of the praesidia of 
the terminus. They could have fulfilled this function without 
the cordon of towers, so characteristic of a later stageýof 
frontier development. 
As both the coins and the samian pottery from the sites north 
of the Tweed indicate, the final Flavian frontier in north 
Scotland (if we are right to postulate its existence) was very 
shortly given up. The forts and the towers were deliberately 
dismantled. i 
Permanent linear frontiers were not built capriciously,, and not 
liable to move back and forth in fluid military situations 
(3.3; 6.4 below). In this light it is important to attempt to 
explain this second, more drastic phase in the abandonment of 
northern Scotland, distinct and later than the legionary 
withdrawal which may have precipitated the Gask frontier 
arrangement. The answer may lie in the persistent neglect of 
the British war, and possible further diminution of the 
garrison, brought about by repeated crises on the Danube. 
The Dacian attack on Moesia in 85-86 had led to the destruction 
of the governor Oppius Sabinus and a legion (Dio 54.24.3; M6csy 
1974,82). The concentration of troops on the Danube which 
followed probably led to the transfer of II Adiutrix and other 
troops from Britain, and thus caused the abandonment of the 
Flavian offensive in Scotland. In view of the permanent type 
of frontier that was now (if the above arguments are accepted) 
built in Strathmore, we can be sure that the Roman army in 
Britain foresaw no sudden return of resources from the Danube 
with which to resume the British offensive. The British war 
was closed. That is what artificial frontiers in this period 
always meant. However, sometime after 89 a new war broke out 
on the Danube: the Suebian-Sarmatian warý Again a whole legion 
(XXI Rapax) was destroyed. Domitian returned to Pannonia in 92 
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or 93 in person to deal with the emergency. In preparation, 
further troops had to be transferred to this sector of the 
Danube (M6csy 1974,84-5). - 
The interval of time between the two emergencies is exactly 
right to explain the short-lived Gask frontier and its sudden 
abandonment. Withdrawal of further troops from Britain soon 
after 90 leading to the final abandonment of Scotland north of 
the Tweed would suit both the archaeological and circumstantial 
dating evidence for the Gask frontier's short life eminently 
well. 
2.3, The abandonment of northern Scotland and the Frontier in 
North Britain c92-clO5 (Fig 15) 
The basic evidence for the abandonment of sites north of the 
Forth-Clyde by c90 is the absence from sites such as Inchtuthil 
and Camelon of the characteristic latest exported South Gaulish 
samian products of La Graufesenque (Hartley 1972,13-14). The 
samian recovered from Strageath (Frere and Wilkes 1989,218) 
conforms to the same pattern, showing that the Gask system 
cannot have outlived Inchtuthil by long. 
This ware is, however, present at Newstead (Hartley 1972,9; 
14). It also occurs at Cappuck and Broomholm (ibid., 9-10). 
Both Newstead and Dalswinton have also produced Central Gaulish 
samian of Trajanic date (Stanfield and Simpson 1958,16-17; 
Hartley 1972,11). The ceramic evidence has been combined with 
the structural evidence from certain sites to suggest an 
occupation of the Scottish lowlands continuing into the 
Trajanic period. At Newstead, the second Flavian fort was 
certainly not constructed until in or after 87 (Richmond 1950, 
7-11). On the structural evidence alone, these two phases 
could theoretically pre-date the final abandonment of northern 
Scotland after c90 suggested above (2.2.3); the same could be 
true of the possible four phase site at Dalswinton, especially 
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now that suggestions of a pre-Agricolan origin for the site 
(Hanson 1987,61-2) have received some support from a Cerialan 
dendrochronological date from Carlisle (Frere 1990,320). 
Indeed the suggestion has recently been made by CM Daniels 
(1989,10) that the large second phase Flavian forts at 
Newstead and Dalswinton were abandoned (along with their 
companions) and replaced by a series'of large forts on the 
Tyne-Solway isthmus before the end of Domitian's reign. 
However, given the ceramic differences between forts north and 
south of the'Tweed; it is clear that the idea of a withdrawal 
from northern Scotland to the*lowlands must be retained; and 
given the probable survival of the forts associated with the 
Gask system down to c90, it-becomes difficult to compress the 
histories of the lowland forts, with their distinct ceramic 
assemblage, into what becomes a five or six year period before 
the death of Domitian. - 
Rather it seems best to pursue their occupation into the 
Trajanic period; this seems the only way to explain the high 
incidence of the latest type of South Gaulish samian (produced 
c90-cllO and completely absent north of the isthmus) at 
Newstead. Not all forts south of the Tweed necessarily 
continued to be held; Hartley himself (1972,; 14) doubted that 
the lowlands were now very intensively garrisoned. The forts 
where there is good evidence that activity continued into the 
Trajanic period are: Newstead (samian), Dalswinton (samian). 
The forts where there is evidence for possible continuation 
into the Trajanic period are: Cappuck (samian), Broomholm 
(samian). Oakwood, Milton and Glenlochar are sometimes added 
(Breeze 1982,65) on the basis of multiple structural phases. 
No evidence for any kind of linear frontier attached to the 
network of surviving forts has ever been discovered. It has 
been tempting to see a linear arrangement in the forts of 
Newstead, Oakwood, Milton, Dalswinton and Glenlochar, which all 
lie on a line-drawn on the mapý The interpretation of this 
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arrangement of sites has been heavily influenced by the model 
of later formal frontier systems, as the following passage 
illustrates: 'Four of the forts in the Scottish lowlands at 
this time ... all on the same axis, were larger than usual... 
It 
is possible-that these large forts were the bases of garrisons 
charged with long range patrolling and the maintenance of 
surveillance over those lands recently abandoned ... Such an 
explanation might account, for-the occupation of stations 
further to the north and west ... Forts to the rear ... also 
continued in occupation. ' (Breeze 1982,65). All this is 
possible, but the terms of reference -a line, and troops 
patrolling an area beyond abandoned-apart from some isolated 
outposts - are really inspired by Hadrian's Wall and its third 
century outpost-forts as portrayed by Richmond in The Romans In 
Redesdale (1940). 
Indeed the forts on the axis can be seen simply to be placed in 
valleys or low-lying areas which penetrate the southern part of 
the lowlands (with the possible exception of'Oakwood, -which is 
only supposed to have continued in occupation on the evidence 
of structural phases). Lateral communication between the forts 
on the map alignment would have been arduous, and there is no 
evidence whatsoever for such a system of lateral communication. 
More important is the evidence for continuing occupation, 
perhaps into the second century, at Castlecary on the 
Forth-Clyde isthmus (ceramic; Hartley 1972,6-7) and at Loudon 
Hill (Taylor 1949,98). It is a very selective use of the 
evidence to place forts on the 'Newstead-Dalswinton axis' 
firmly on distribution maps of the period c90-clO5 and to add 
Castlecary and Loudon Hill as uncertain sites: the evidence for 
occupation this late at some of the forts on the axis is just 
as circumstantial or slight. The only other resort, if one 
persists in seeing a frontier line in Britain at this time, is 
to explain these two northern sites as some sort of outposts 
(Breeze 1982,65). If, the evidence is taken at face value, and 
it is realistically assumed that a number of sites must await 
discovery, this period presents a disposition of forts 
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surrounding the Lowland hills, placed (on the southern side) in 
openings penetrating. the hill country, and (on the northern 
side) on low ground, set back from the hills, that was 
accessible by sea. There is nothing, at present, to suggest 
the beginnings of any sort of linear frontier system to replace 
the abandoned line on the fringe of the Highlands. Such an 
interpretation would find a number of-parallels: these and 
possible reasons for the failure of a linear frontier to appear 
at this time are discussed below (3.4.1). 
-'Eventually, by 105 at the latest, even the tenuous grip on the 
Lowlands-had gone. ' So concluded Hartley (1972,15), on the 
basis of the near absence of Central Gaulish samian from Les 
Martres-de-Veyre from north of the Tyne-Solway - although 
pieces do occur at Newstead and Dalswinton; this suggests that 
these places may have been occupied for long enough for this 
Trajanic samian, produced perhaps in the period clOO-c120, to 
have begun to reach them (Stanfield and Simpson 1958,16-17). 
The evacuation is conventionally linked to the preparations for 
Trajan's Dacian Wars (Frere 1967,122; Hartley 1972,15; Breeze 
1982,66-67 adds the possibility of further withdrawals for 
Trajan's Parthian War of 114-117). 
2.4 A Linear Frontier on the Stanegate? (Fig 16) 
It is still commonly believed that following a complete 
evacuation of the area north of the Tyne-Solway this line 
became a defended frontier consisting of a linear arrangement 
of forts and fortlets along a road: the Stanegate system. The 
idea originated with RH Forster (1915,268-89), and the 
schedule of sites was formalised by Birley (1961,134-36). 
Belief in the existence of a linear frontier system on the 
Tyne-Solway at this time depends upon-two basic theories about 
the distribution of military sites between c105 and c120: the 
first, that the garrisoning of the isthmus was intensified so 
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as to form a more preclusive chain of installations; the 
second, that everything north of the isthmus had indeed been 
abandoned. Here each of these assumptions will be considered 
in turn. 
2.4.1 The installations along the isthmus 
Recently B Dobson (1986,2-4) has carefully reconsidered the 
evidence for the provision of a linear system of-installations. 
He casts doubt on the belief that forts spaced along the 
Stanegate at a usual spacing of 20km (1 day's march) had, at 
some time after c105, their spacing regularly reduced by the 
addition of 'half-day ' forts; he reminds us that of the - 
fortlets supposed to alternate with forts (Birley 1961,135-6), 
only two are actually known to exist; and thirdly makes the 
vital point that the known towers stand in isolation and do not 
form part of a cordon of the type distinctive on linear 
frontiers. 
Between Corbridge and Carlisle (the only sector where the name 
Stanegate is correctly applied and the road is known over large 
distances) there is clearly an arrangement of forts at 20km 
intervals-that is later augmented; to the east and west of this 
central sector the situation is less clear. The following 
schedule is intended to demonstrate that the augmentations, and 
other sites which do not fit into the 20km model (including 
those known in the east and west 'extensions') may be 
understood simply in terms of the securing of a line of 
communication. 
South Shields 
There was almost certainly a fort at this site by the Trajanic 
period, as the two clear periods of timber buildings and roads, 
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sealed by the earliest stone fort of the mid-second century 
imply. 
Washing Well, Whickham 
The fort of two periods at Whickham exists in isolation of any 
known road. However, it would be well-placed to oversee a road 
leading from a port at South Shields inland towards Corbridge, 
either joining Dere Street south of the Tyne or crossing the 
Tyne in the, vicinity of Wylam. The fort is not placed upon a 
river crossing; however it may have been situated to allow 
supervision of the crossings of the closely spaced rivers Team 
and Derwent from the same site. A clear parallel for this sort 
of fairly widely spacedýprovision of military-installations 
along a route joining up important points through rolling 
country may be found on the eastern Wetterau road between 
Echzell and Hanau-Salisberg before C100. The spacing between 
South Shields and Whickham (20km) and Whickham and Corbridge 
(24km) is rather wider than the average spacing of llkm between 
installations on the eastern Wetterau road; however, the latter 
includes fortlets, which may await discovery south of the Tyne. 
Similarly, a predecessor to Rudchester south of the Tyne would 
make the arrangement of forts more similar to the German 
example. The rolling, populous country of this eastern sector 
is probably the'key to the wider spacing, here than on the 
central Stanegate; this is also noted below (3.4.2), where it 
is shown that although the same sequences of fort types for 
road supervision occur on the eastern Wetterau and central 
Stanegate, those on the latter are much more closely spaced, 
presumably because of the difficult broken country through 
which the central Stanegate had to run. 
In the absence of evidence for the road forming the eastern 
Stanegate, all must remain speculation (although it will be 
noted that the eastern Wetterau route, through its redundancy 
after the first century, has left no certain archaeological 
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trace). - However, there is every reason to suppose that a 
Flavian-Trajanic site at South Shields would have had a direct 
link with the interior, and the fort at Whickham points to its 
existence; the two visible periods at the site supporting the 
possibility that it continued in use during the Trajanic 
period. 
Corbridge 
At Corbridge the discovery (Gillam 1977,60) of coins of no 
earlier than 103 under the rampart and in a construction trench 
of Fort II has generally been used to help to date the 
abandonment of southern Scotland and presumed establishment of 
a new frontier system on the Stanegate (eg Breeze 1982,69; 
Frere 1987,108). The most obvious military importance of the 
site, however, lies not in a role as part of a linear system, 
but rather in its situation at a major crossroads and 
river-crossing. 
Newbrough- 
(Birley (1961,134-36) postulated a fortlet at the crossing of 
the North Tyne, a fort at Newbrough and a further intermediate 
fortlet at Grindon Hill to fill the space between Corbridge and 
Vindolanda in his postulated 'regular' sequence of sites. 
There is no evidence for the fortlets. One would certainly 
expect a site to guard the crossing of the North Tyne; in the 
absence of any candidates, or even knowledge of the whereabouts 
of the crossing, another'suggestion of Birley's, the existence 
of a pre-Hadrianic site at or near Chesters, comes to mind 
(ibid., 173). 
A late Roman fortlet is known to have existed at Newbrough 
(ibid., 147-49). The failure to find early material at 
Newbrough is cited in arguments against an intensification of 
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garrisons forming a linear frontier on the Isthmus (eg Dobson 
1986,3). However, it is surely possible that an early road 
station existed here; a site lOkm from Vindolanda and about 
12km from Corbridge would not be diminishing the spacing to an 
extent which demanded interpretation as a preclusive frontier 
system. -Sites were as closely spaced across the Stainmore Pass 
(Bowes and Greta Bridge 8km apart; -Brough under Stainmore and 
Maiden Castle 9km); on the road north into Scotland (where 
Ardoch and Strageath lie less than lOkm apart); and on the 
eastern, Wetterau road of the 90s, where forts were spaced on 
average llkm apart. Thus, a Trajanic site at Newbrough should 
be expected (a fourth century site here ab origine would be a 
strange occurrence), but such an expectation should not extend 
to the return of the regular Stanegate frontier system. The 
features detected from the air at nearby Sitgate (Frere 1990, 
316) may constitute a marching camp and pre-Roman enclosure 
rather than concealing the earlier site. Although most 
commentators have rejected Birleylsýregular scheme, they still 
follow him to the extent that any earlier site at Newbrough is 
expected to be a cohort fort: however, a fortlet of some kind 
is surely a strong possibility, which would increase the 
Stanegate's resemblance to the eastern Wetterau road and might 
explain the failure to find early remains outside the perimeter 
of the fourth century fortlet. ) 
Barcombe Tower 
As Dobson observes (1986,4), this free-standing-watchtower, 
sometimes considered part of the Stanegate 'frontier' (Birley 
1961,147; Woolliscroft 1989,6), could easily have served an 
independent local role as an observation. post for Vindolanda. 
70 
Vindolanda 
Vindolanda has long been recognised as the site of a series of 
full-sized auxiliary forts originating on the-Stanegate in the 
Flavian period. According to the chronology of the excavator 
of the early timber-, forts, the earliest fort of cl. 40ha was 
replaced after c90 with a larger fort of 2.80ha which survived 
until the Hadrianic period, although replanned after c105 (R 
Birley in Daniels 1989,46). However, no account of, or 
evidence for, this sequence and dating has been published in 
detail. 
Haltwhistle Burn 
The key question, about this small fort is whether it dates to 
the late-Trajanic arrangements on the Stanegate, or whether it 
was first constructed after the commencement of Hadrian's Wall. 
The matter cannot be proved either way, although the fortlet 
clearly seems to be aligned upon the Stanegate, and is 
positioned to guard that road's crossing of the Haltwhistle 
Burn. This, of course, could well have been a role deemed 
necessary in the first scheme for Hadrian's Wall. All that can 
be said is that even if it existed cl05-cl2O (the presence of 
BB1 (Gibson and Simpson 1909,267 nos. 5,6,18,19) which 
first appears in the north c120, does not rule out such an 
early date, as the pottery is not stated to have occurred in 
construction levels) there is no need to see the installation 
as anything to do with a system of linear defence or even 
surveillance. Stukely may have sensed correctly when he 
described Haltwhistle Burn as 'the compass of an inn, or little 
station for lodging of travellers or soldiers' (1725,59). 
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Turret 45a (Walltown Crags East) 
This element of Birley's Stanegate schedule was structurally 
earlier than Hadrian's Wall, although the pottery has been 
taken to suggest that it was not constructed until the early 
years of Hadrian (Woodfield 1965,165-67). Whatever its date 
of origin this tower could have, had an independent 
free-standing role in relation to Carvoran. 
carvoran 
A pre-Hadrianic fort here, for which the structural evidence is 
gradually emerging (Daniels 1989,41-43), may have enjoyed an 
independent role from an early-period as a station at the 
junction of the Maiden Way and the Stanegate (Dobson 1986,3). 
Throp 
The well known fortlet on the Stanegate at Throp may have 
served to safeguard a point where the road crossed the Poltross 
Burn. 
Birdoswald 
Birley (1961,143) supposed structures located by Richmond 
south of the fort to represent a Trajanic part of the Stanegate 
system. If either of the remains, or the stone tower located 
southeast of the fort (Richmond 1931,130) belong to the period 
C105-c120, they may well have been isolated installations, not 
forming part of an overall system, designedýto alert Nether 
Denton to movements to the north of the Irthing. 
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MaInS Rigg 
Usually interpretedzs a signal-station in the Stanegate 
system, allowing intercommunication between Throp and Nether 
Denton, there is no need to see this tower as part of a linear 
chain; rather than providing a complex alert of infiltrators 
from the north, such a tower may well have simply provided 
protection and supervision for travellers on a dangerous length 
the road. 
Nether Denton 
As with Corbridge and Vindolanda, this site is best seen as 
part of a standard provision of garrison forts along a road. 
Pike Hill Tower 
Another free-standing structure of uncertain date, incorporated 
into Hadrian's Wall. Again, it could have been a pre-Hadrianic 
watchtower; again its role may have been related to an 
individual site, and there is no need to see the tower as 
forming part of a chain or a linear system. However, its 
dimensions (120 feet square': Birley 1961,140-1) recall 
exactly those of the tower recorded (Richmond 1931,130) 
outside-the east wall of Birdoswald fort, as does its massive 
build. The two towers are equidistant from Nether Denton; they 
both lie on the crest of the ridge on the North side of the 
Irthing which impedes the outlook of Nether Denton to the 
north. It seems possible that they were provided at the same 
time, but simply as 'eyes' for Nether Denton, and not as part 
of a general frontier system. Perhaps it was felt that Nether 
Denton could not be shifted from its place on the road to a 
position further north. 
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Castle Hill, Boothby 
This is the postulated 'alternating' fortlet between Nether 
Denton and Old Church, Brampton. There may actually be a 
military site here: Simpson found a ditch and early second 
century pottery (Birley 1961,140). Again, if it is 
pre-Hadrianic, it could be read in terms of a roadside 
installation as the Stanegate runs through broken country. 
Old Church, Brampton 
The same ambiguity as to date prevails here as to previous 
sites, and the possibility that it forms part of the first 
scheme for Hadrian's Wall has been considered strong (Birley 
1961,139). But even if this site was added, to close the gap 
between Nether Denton and Carlisle, in the pre-Hadrianic 
period, the resultant spacing - lOkm - would be close to that 
on the eastern Wetterau road of the 90s. A possible role for 
the fort in the first scheme for Hadrian's Wall is discussed 
below (5.1.6). 
High Crosby and the Stanegate to Carlisle 
(Birley postulated a fortlet between old Church, Brampton and 
Carlisle at High Crosby (ibid., 137-8); there is no evidence to 
substantiate this (Frere 1986,383); - In any case,, - the belief 
that the Stanegate crossed the Irthing at Irthington (north of 
Old Church) and ran to Carlisle along the north side of the 
river Eden may be mistaken. Daniels (Bruce 1978,273) 
suggested a route going south of Old Church and south of the 
rivers to Carlisle; and it has been shown (Bidwell and Holbrook 
1989,150-153) that the road taken to'be the Stanegate north of 
the Eden (Birley 1961,137-8) is probably a service road for 
Hadrian's Wall. If the Stanegate indeed took the southern 
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route a fortlet might be expected to have guarded its crossing 
of the Eden in the vicinity of Warwick bridge. ) 
Carlisle 
The well-attested major military base 
present, be associated with any linea: 
installations (except the arrangement 
Stanegate itself).. The course of the 
from the east, or of any road leaving 
unknown. 
'The Western Stanegate' 
at this place cannot, at 
r arrangement of 
of known forts along 
Stanegate approaching 
Carlisle to run west, is 
From Carlisle to Kirkbride on the Solway Firth there most 
probably ran a road, possibly detected in a few places by GBD 
Jones and usefully termed 'The western Stanegatel by him 
(Daniels 1989,92-95). While it is-possible that the observed 
road may inýfact have originated as the service road which 
probably ran behind Hadrian's Wall in the Hadrianic period 
(Bidwell and Holbrook 1989,150-53), the existence of a 
Trajanic fort at Kirkbride and the pre-Wall sites I and III at 
Burgh-by-Sands shows that there was probably a road along this 
line before the time of Hadrian. Professor Jones also claims 
to have discovered evidence of an artificial linear frontier 
system of palisade type, running parallel to the road; and the 
sites of associated isolated watchtowers. 
To consider the evidence for artificial linear frontier 
installations briefly, from east to west: 
'Elements in the ditch system around Burgh-by-Sands I may 
... form part of a similar [running ditch] arrangement eastwards 
towards Powburgh Beck' (Daniels 1989,95). 
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Burgh-by-Sands 
Pre-fort activity: At Burgh-by-Sands Ia circular structure 
interpreted as a watchtower lies beneath the rampart of the 
reduced earliest fort (Daniels 1989,23; Goodburn 1979, 
281-83). 
Burgh-by-Sands I: an auxiliary fort 'enclosing' 2.80ha; later 
reduced to cl. 50ha (Daniels 1989,23-4). A linear ditch is 
said to have continued the alignment of the forts' north 
defences to the west: 'it was sectioned at two points well W of 
the fort: in one place it was 2.3m wide by 1.3m deep ... A 
further 65m down the hill-slope was a shallow ditch 1.4m across 
with a rounded profile. There was a row of palisade-pits on 
the N side*of the ditch, one of which was 42cm across by 36cm 
deep' (Goodburn 1979,283). 
Burgh-by-Sands III: confusingly, this site is the second of the 
two forts considered to be earlier than the known fort on 
Hadrian's Wall. It was of 2.07ha, enlarged to 3.35ha, and is 
said to have produced pottery of the first half of the second 
century (Daniels 1989,24). It lies clkm northwest of 
Burgh-by-Sands I. The large size (2.07ha increased to 3.35ha) 
and two period nature of Burgh III (Daniels 1989,23) could be 
taken to suggest that the early forts belong to activity on the 
Stanegate pre-dating the Hadrianic p eriod. 
I ... north of Far Hill [further west] a V-shaped ditch runs 
across a ridge from east to west apparently independently of a 
later farm' (Daniels 1989,95). 
Along Fingland Rigg [midway between Burgh-by-Sands and 
Kirkbride] 'a running palisade of substantial size was 
supported by verticals cl. 6m apart with smaller, double 
supports in the intervals. Further west the road was found to 
be flanked at a distance of 20m by a running V-shaped ditch' 
(Daniels 1989,95). 
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At Easton, north of Fingland Rigg, at either NY 276579 (Daniels 
1989,95) or NY 274579 (Grew 1980,361) or NY 281578 (Jones 
1982,285) a sub-circular enclosure, some 19m in diameter, 
bounded by a rampart and V shaped ditch, is claimed as a 
watchtower site-analogous to that'underlying Burgh-by-Sands I 
(Grew 1980,360-1). It has been interpreted as containing a 
timber tower and another rectilinear building. 
From this structure, a ditch 2m wide was traced for 300m 
west-southwest up onto Fingland Rigg. 'A timber palisade was 
located on the inside' (ibid. ). It is not clear whether this 
means on the'south side of the ditch, or literally within the 
ditch. 
On Fingland Rigg aerial survey is said (Jones 1982,285) to 
have located 'at least one' and probably two, other circular 
watchtowers'. 
Kirkbride 
This fort (Bellhouse and Richardson 1982), probably of Flavian 
origin, marks the terminus ofýwhatever pre-Hadrianic road 
system existed south of, the Solway, and presumably guarded an 
important sea-port and, possibly, supply-base. 
Discussion of the western Stanegate evidence 
It would in some ways be surprising if concrete evidence for an 
artificial running frontier upon the western Stanegate ever 
appeared, for no such evidence has ever emerged upon the 
well-known central sector, where, as we have seen, it is 
possible to understand the sites usually associated with a 
'Stanegate frontier' in terms of the security of a major 
military road. As it is, none of the evidence for an earlier 
artificial frontier system has yet been published in any more 
detail than is presented here. Until it is published in 
v 
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detail, it is not possible to accept without reservation the 
existence of a substantial artificial frontier of the sort with 
which this study is concerned. 
The evidence for the fort at Burgh-by-Sands I is convincing. 
On the published plan (Goodburn 1979,282), however, the square 
tower curiously placed in the rampart of the preceding 
'watchtower' looks suspiciously as if it belongs within the 
rampart of the later fort, with which it is exactly aligned. 
No clear evidence has been published to show that the preceding 
enclosure cannot have been a native, site, demolished to make 
way for the fort. The early second century pottery cited as 
dating evidence came from the postholes of the tower (as well 
as the fort) and so would only date the circular enclosure if 
the tower definitely belonged to it; even then it would only 
provide a terminus post quem for its demolition. In the 
similar site at Easton, it is hard to see how the 'tower', 
rather unconvincingly reconstructed from an irregular 
arrangement of, five postholes, can have been contemporary with 
the mound forming the enclosure. - The rectilinear building is 
no more substantial or rectilinear than those found by the same 
excavator at the native farm at Penrith (Higham and Jones 1983, 
48), which it will be noted, has a gateway of exactly similar 
type to that at Easton. At Easton also, the ditch that runs 
away from the site, interpreted as a frontier clausura, is 
highly reminiscent of the features that run away from the 
native farm at nearby Silloth (Higham and Jones 1983,57; 61) 
and interpreted there as being part of a field system. In 
general, the frontier 'clausural, of which no plans or sections 
have been published, cannot be accepted until it is clearly 
demonstrated that interpretations of the observed features as 
native field systems or boundary ditches (cf Dent 1983,40) 
have been satisfactorily eliminated. The report of the 
discovery of an auxiliary fort at Fingland Rigg, between Burgh 
and Kirkbride, may serve as an example of the way in which the 
interpretation of features presented in these interim reports 
may change. Here, in 1979, 'a section across the defences 
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revealed two ditches, an, intervallum, road and internal timber 
buildings' (Grew 1980,361); yet the site is not now considered 
by the excavator to be that of a Roman fort (Dobson 1986,27 
n. 27; Daniels 1989,92-93). 
What we are left with, then, on the 'western Stanegate', is a 
complex of predecessor sites to Burgh-by-Sands, and a terminal 
fort at Kirkbride, and good reason to believe in the existence 
of a road connecting these sites. -. To'this we may add the two 
suggested towers, which, even if accepted unequivocally, have 
never been suggested to be part of a frontier cordon. If'the 
claims of a continuous frontier barrier are ever substantiated, 
the question-would remain as to whether, 'such a system might 
have been a short-lived stage in the Hadrianic reorganisation 
of the frontier. 
It is necessary to mention here a-suggestion that has been made 
to the effect that certain elements of the Cumberland coast 
frontier system, and certain installations overlooking the 
Solway Firth, may be pre-Hadrianic in date (Jones 1982, 
295-96). The suggestion seems to be based on the belief that 
one of the Coastal milefortlet sites, MF17, Dubmill Point, 
shows an earlier phase of ditches; and that an earthwork 
interpreted as a camp apparently served by-the coastal 
patrol-road running behind frontier palisades at Silloth is 
'possibly pre-Hadrianic or early Hadrianic in date'. The 
significance of the 'early' features at Dubmill Point has not 
been confirmed by excavation (Bellhouse 1989,40), while the 
Silloth camp awaits investigation. The camp looks convincing 
on the published air-photograph (Jones 1982 plate 30A), and it 
is puzzling that what is probably the frontier road deviates in 
order to serve it; however this hardly proves'a system 
pre-dating the known milefortlet and tower cordon. - Marching 
camps abound in the vicinity of Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine 
Wall, yet these have never been linked with postulated earlier 
frontier lines. The same argument has been applied (Jones 
1982,296) to a small camp east of Bowness and north of 
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Hadrian's Wall. One of the reasons for thinking that this camp 
must be part of some early system is that it is situated to 
overlook the sea, like the Silloth example; but this does not 
necessarily suggest a pre-Hadrianic date, any more than the 
camps north of the Wall at Housesteads and Greatchesters 
suggest an earlier surveillance system than Hadrian's Wall in 
the central sector. 
The evidence here surveyed has suggested that there may well 
have been a road, and accompanying forts, passing from sea to 
sea by the Trajanic periodý It has also yielded no convincing 
indication that these installations were constituted to form a 
preclusive frontier line. It is easy to see why roads from the 
coasts would wish to link with the interior; both Kirkbride and 
South Shields almost certainly guarded ports. It is-important 
not, to allow the fact that a route ran from-sea to sea to*force 
us to think of it in the-same terms as the later Wall of 
Hadrian. 
2.4.2 The abandonment of everything north of the Isthmus t 
This is the second prevailing theory which influences 
interpretation-of the Stanegate as a linear frontier: the 
belief that no forts were held north of Tyne-Solway after c105. 
Pryce and Birley (1935; 1938) first saw the significance of the 
absence of Trajanic Central Gaulish samian from Scotland, and 
despite the vigorous counter-attack of MacDonald (1935; 1939), 
their view has held the field to this day. This view is fairly 
unassailable as far as Newstead, which has produced by far the 
most extensive pottery series, is concerned; here only two 
possible fragments of this type occurred; another is known from 
Dalswinton. This is taken as evidence that these sites were 
held into the Trajanic period, but not for long enough to 
receive substantial amounts of this ware. Newstead has tended 
to carry all other sites north of the isthmus with it; apart 
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from Dalswinton the northernmost occurrences of this samian 
type are on Hadrian's Wall and the Stanegate. 
However, not many sites south and east of the Newstead - 
Dalswinton line have been excavated to an extent which has 
provided a large and reliable pottery series; certainly the 
samples are a small basis for arguing for the complete absence 
of a pottery type. In any case, Central Gaulish Les 
Martres-de-Veyre does not occur as abundantly as its South 
Gaulish predecessors and the samian, types that predominated 
later. It is suspicious that it is little attested in the 
new-built forts on Hadrian's Wall, where South Gaulish samian 
(produced until cllO) frequently occurs residually (Hartley 
1972,13; 15)ý At Vindolanda, a site occupied continuously at 
this time, the ratio of residual South Gaulish to Les 
Martres-de-Veyre from the recent excavations within the stone 
fort was 26: 10 (Bidwell 1985,170). 
Obviously the near absence of this ware from Newstead is 
significant, but it is more difficult to place significance 
upon its absence from such sites as Cappuck, High Rochester, or 
Broomholm. There is so little recovered from these sites that 
there can be no certainty, based on the samian, that they did 
not continue to be held after the abandonment of Newstead and, 
Dalswinton. Not all hold on the area north of the Tyne-Solway 
was necessarily relinquished with the further withdrawals - 
whether or not in connection with the Dacian wars - which led 
to that abandonment. 
On the contrary, there are positive indications of occupation 
continuing here and there north of the isthmus after c105, and 
perhaps right down to the Hadrianic period (Fig 16). There is 
no published evidence, but Broomholm is said to have produced 
material that would not be out of-place in a Hadrianic context 
(Robertson 1975,280). The same is true of Low Learchild, 
where Richmond believed on the basis of the pottery that the 
fort had been held down to the time of Hadrian's Wall. The 
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only other installation known on the Devil's Causeway, the 
fortlet at Longshaws, is unexcavated; other forts on this road 
must await discovery. On Dere Street so little work has been 
carried out upon the early phases of the sites that their fate 
in the period c105-c125 must be guess-work. There is no clear 
body of samian evidence from Milton; there have been 
suggestions of Hadrianic occupation (Robertson 1975,280). The 
archaeological evidence may be supplemented by the suggestion 
of the activities of a censitor BrIttonum Anavionensum, 
probably in Annandale, c112 (Rivet and Smith 1979,249-50; 
Rivet 1982). 
The more the likelihood of continuing occupation north of the 
isthmus in the immediately pre-Hadrianic period, the less 
compelling seems the need to search for a linear frontier upon 
the Tyne-Solway in these years; the Stanegate, rather than 
forming the most northerly extremity of Roman dispositions 
could conceivably, on present evidence, have simply been an 
important east-west road within an albeit much reduced zone of 
occupation. 
2.4.3 Conclusion: a linear frontier system on. the Stanegate? 
The evidence as considered here provides no good reason, 
whether related to the circumstances of withdrawal towards the 
isthmus, or to the actual distribution of sites on the 
Stanegate itself, to view the forts on the isthmus at this time 
to be forming a 'limes' (cf. Frere et al. 1987,71) or formal 
linear frontier of any kind. The most convincing explanation 
of the road and its installations that emerges is of a 
carefully secured route through the Tyne and Irthing valleys, 
with communications to ports or supply-bases on east and west 
coasts; the whole forming an artery of communication within a 
zone of occupation which may well have continued to extend 
north of the Tyne-Solway isthmus. There is no overwhelming 
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circumstantial reason to believe in, or clear proof of, a 
frontier line on the isthmus before the reign of Hadrian. 
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Chapter 3 
FLAVIAN AND TRAJANIC LINEAR FRONTIER DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHWEST 
EUROPE: COMPARATIVE ASPECTS 
In this chapter detailed comparisons are made between some of 
the differing frontier developments of Flavian-Trajanic 
Britain, Germany and Raetia for which the evidence was 
described above. As we have seen, only certain frontiers 
possessed a truly linear character. Even where linear 
frontiers existed, they were instituted at different times, and 
developed at different rates. Once a greater understanding of 
the varied origins of the earliest frontier systems has been 
obtained, it is possible to appreciate better their intended 
purpose and actual function, and to discern what policy may 
have lain behind them. 
3.1 The first artificial frontiers:, Britain and the Taunus 
The very earliest artificially laid out frontier lines took the 
form of watchtower systems. At different points in time, 
although perhaps not at dates far apart, it was decided to mark 
out definitively, by means of a cordon of towers, strung along 
a cleared ride, track, or road, a frontier line, at the limit 
of the Roman military advance, in certain areas both in Britain 
and in Germany between the Rhine and Main. 
Our survey of the development of these earliest cordons 
revealed two distinct phases in the application of the linear 
frontier idea: 
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1. The establishment of the Gask frontier in Scotland, 
whether dated to c80-81 or c86-92, undoubtedly represents a 
short-lived watchtower'system of the Flavian period which may 
be compared to the Upper, German examples. The system covered 
only part of the northern frontier. The equivalent moment 
occurred on the Taunus ridge of Upper Germany c90; the , 
essential difference in the case of, Germany is that once the 
frontier line began to be established, the process of its 
development would never be halted-or reversed, as happened in 
Britain. -In this earliest stage of development on the Upper 
German linear frontier, the watchtowers on the Taunus ridge and 
western Wetterau were flanked by open dispositions of forts in 
the Neuwieder basin and the north and eastern Wetterau, where 
watchtower'systems had not yet been built. 
2. The next stage of the development of the Rhine-Main 
frontier sees the extension, of a watchtower system to close off 
the remaining open parts of the northern and eastern Wetterau, 
probably in'the years clOO-110. 
In one-important -'and characteristically early - respect the 
arrangements of Flavian Scotland resemble those of Upper 
Germany c90-100, implying perhaps a chronological development 
of the idea of watchtower systems. In neither system did the 
watchtower component form the whole length of the frontier. In 
the case of the Gask, the southern terminal of the watchtower 
system has been thought to lie on river Forth (Hanson 1987, 
153) or on the Teith (Maxwell 1989,112-14). Whether or not 
the towers extended this far, the frontier between the 
watchtowers and the Clyde, on the west side of the Isthmus, 
perhaps consisted simply of a distribution of garrison forts 
interspersed with the formidable mosses which will have 
hindered movement between the Highlands and the Forth-Clyde 
isthmus. Similarly, on the German frontier, the earliest 
watchtowers occur in only a limited sector between the Lahn and 
somewhere in the north Wetterau. In a manner strikingly 
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reminiscent of the arrangements argued above (2.2.5) to date to 
c87-92, in Scotland, the watchtower system then gives way to an 
arc of garrison posts - Butzbach, probably Arnsburg, Echzell 
and a series of smaller installations linked by a road running 
down to the Main (cf Figs 1 and 14). Whatever purpose the 
original, watchtowers in Britain and Germany were intended to 
serve, it was limited to specific sections of the frontiers. 
In contrast the secondary German towers of clOO onwards may be 
seen as deliberately closing a partially open system, so that 
the whole length of the frontier between the Lahn and the Main 
was covered. 
It is clear that the whole land frontier was not closed off at 
once, but rather in stages, and that, as we shall see, areas 
south of the Main lagged behind in this respect. While the 
general extension of the system after clOO is taken here to 
represent a conscious policy, it could also be taken to suggest 
that the very presence of the Roman army was triggering changes 
in the agricultural strategies and tendencies to movement of 
local peoples. In other words the extended linear frontiers 
were a reaction to an instability engendered by the presence of 
the army itself. This idea is discussed below (6.3.1.3). 
3.1.1 Differing intensities of border surveillance 
From the beginning variations may be noted in the spacing of 
installations and density of garrisoning between certain 
sectors, which may cast light on the differing problems-that 
they faced., In the Taunus no forts of full auxiliary size are 
known before the Hadrianic period. If troops were permanently 
based here as early as c90-100 (as opposed to being outposted 
from the road forts to the south), their. -largest installations 
were less than lha in size. In contrast,;, both the Gask and 
parts of the Wetterau enjoyed the presence of pre-existing 
full-sized auxiliary forts. The general spacing and provision 
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of forts and fortlets, as well as watchtowers, is closely 
similar on the Gask and eastern Wetterau stretches. 
The thinly garrisoned Taunus sector implies a very low 
intensity of military threat, but a potentially high risk of 
low grade infiltration: note the close spacing of the towers on 
the Taunus, which, although in part a product of topography, 
may compensate for the low numbers of troops involved. The- 
very absence of nearby auxiliaries suggests that the patrolling 
garrison using the towers was intended to intervene directly to 
interfere-with movement across the frontier. The Taunus ridge 
is thought to have been as afforested and intractable as today, 
and the landscape through which the frontier cut provided the 
classic hiding places for Rome's informal military opponents 
and the resistance fighters of a half occupied territory. With 
the very closely spaced towers, detached patrols could not be 
lost sight of, and overwhelmed, without nearby colleagues 
knowing. Soldiers would not have to cover more than c600m 
before attaining a defensible strong-point. 
Assistance could have been sought by means of warning signals, 
but that there were no major garrisons which could be alerted' 
shows that no large scale incursion was anticipated here. 
Nevertheless, the early application of a watchtower system to 
the Taunus ridge shows that the problem of infiltration through 
the afforested uplands must have been considered particularly 
acute. 
In the second type of watchtower system, as in Flavian Scotland 
or the Wetterau, a higher intensity of threat may have been 
anticipated. Movement over the flat or rolling landscapes 
through which these frontiers ran would have been easier for 
large groups, whether of raiders or of moving populations. The 
zones immediately protected by the watchtower systems - 
Strathearn and the Fife peninsula in one case, the Wetterau in 
the other - were fertile and alluring objectives, no doubt for 
raiders and unwanted settlers alike. This was the more so as 
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in both cases these areas were easily obtained from upland 
areas which harboured warriors unconquered by Rome. The edge 
of the Scottish Highlands broods on the skyline north of the 
Gask, while the watchtowers of the northeastern Wetterau look 
towards the Vogelsberg. Not surprisingly, it is in these areas 
that we see an early and substantial provision of auxiliary 
garrisons pre-dating the installation of a watchtower cordon. 
The'detachments in and patrolling between the watchtowers could 
still intervene directly against small scale raiders or 
unwelcome arrivals, but it is an indication that there was a 
greater pressure of some sort upon these frontiers (in contrast 
to the Taunus sector) that full auxiliary units were so readily 
available to move into action. Auxiliary units may have been 
based in such-zones from the beginning because there were both 
a considerable settled population to control and a 
correspondingly high risk of attack - or subversive assistance 
- from outside the Roman occupied area. - 
The two types of border surveillance outlined could be simply 
categorised as one type for remote frontier land and a second 
for settled agricultural frontier land. In both cases, 
however, the army was reacting to a problem of frontier control 
peculiar to the non-riverine frontiers of Europe. In each case 
the patrolled line cut through pre-existing patterns of 
afforestation, native movement, or settlement. There was no 
natural frontier to follow, no sudden change from one side of 
the line to the other. In contrast to, say, desert frontiers, 
there was no way of predicting the likeliest directions from 
which infiltrators might appear; the'Roman army had to cover 
all of the options. We may see the watchtower systems 
originating as a means of doing this by spreading out 
detachments of the army as thinly as possible along a well 
defined line, while keeping the small groups of men as safe as 
possible. But because of differences in the degree of 
infiltration encountered, this principle was applied in 
different ways, and at different times, from sector to sector 
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of the frontier, with some sectors enjoying a greater presence 
of auxiliary units than others. 
3.1.2 The continuing separation of linear frontier troops and 
units engaged in subjugation and occupation 
That frontier lines were seen in the first instance as a 
security device, whose operation was perceived as having little 
to do with the real military concerns of the army, is strongly 
suggested by the prolonged separation of the roles of 
frontier-manning and mainstream military occupation. Even when 
the cordon of towers between the Lahn and the Main had been 
completed, auxiliaries and their bases were not closely 
integrated into the watchtower system. 
In the Germany of the 90s, as in Flavian Britain, the bulk of 
units was still not on a linear frontier at all, but spaced 
along a major penetration road into the Wetterau. Wiesbaden, 
Hofheim and Heddernheim may be compared to Corbridge, Newstead 
and Dalswinton. At the limit of Roman control a large fertile 
area such as the Wetterau was garrisoned with large forts, as 
the Neuwied basin soon would be, and as perhaps were the 
valleys of the Forth and Teith at the time of the Gask 
frontier. This policy of garrisoning populous areas and 
corridors of communication with concentrations of more than one 
auxiliary unit, or parts of several unitsk seems a survival of 
the older, fluid approach to frontier control which pre-dates 
the general cessation of military advance and the notion of 
linear cordons. The policy did not long survive the 
fossilization of dispositions. In Germany there was soon a 
rapid shift towards placing units on the linear frontier, 
although this happened much more quickly in some areas than 
others. 
The general evacuation of units from the penetration roads of 
the hinterland, and their placing upon the linear frontier, was 
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a fairly rapid process north of the Main, where by the end of 
Trajan's reign, only Friedberg survived as a hinterland fort. 
This presents an obvious contrast to Britain, and may be an 
indication that the amenability of the native peoples of Upper 
Germany to Romanisation was greater than in Britain, and that 
the resistance of tribes in parts of, northern Britain 
correspondingly more fierce. The same contrast will-be noted 
even more graphically in the case of Raetia. In Upper Germany 
the ease with-which civitates, apparently running right up to 
the frontier, replaced the abandoned forts, is notable (Baatz 
1975,53-57; Schbnberger 1969,164-65). If an equivalent 
process occurred in Britain it was over a much-longer 
time-scale: the probable civitas of the Carvetii in the Eden 
Valley is not attested before the third century (Birley 1967, 
11-13), and even then there is no reliable evidence that forts 
in the hinterland of Hadrian's Wall were abandoned. 
The clear conclusion to be drawn from the preceding discussion 
is that, after the first frontier cordons had been introduced, 
in Britain and the Germanies military occupation still involved 
the imposition of garrisons upon peoples, where there were such 
settled peoples, and the basing of units for strategic movement 
against people from outside the province. In Germany, to a 
much greater extent than in Britain, the former policy was 
gradually run down in favour of placing troops on the border 
surveillance line. However the continuation in places of the 
older policy of placing garrisons among peoples and on 
communications routes shows that the frontier cordons were not 
in the first instance intended to symbolise or legally 
represent the edge of the Roman empire. They were a 
recognition that military advance had been indefinitely 
postponed in given sectors; but some time elapsed before the 
Romans felt able to apply them to all of their land frontiers, 
partly because active conquest or subjugation was still taking 
place in some areas. 
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On the Rhine-Main frontier of the first decade of the second 
century, a preclusive linear system was already being 
consolidated, when elsewhere linear arrangements remained 
unheard of (or, in the case of Scotland, had long been 
abandoned). This need not occasion surprise: this was a 
frontier of early origin (c90) and one whose development was, 
perhaps by, chance, allowed to proceed unchecked. The most 
noticeable feature here is the giving up of the forts on the 
old Wetterau penetration road. In the Taunus, the process of 
actually situating more, garrisons on the frontier line becomes 
apparent. However, the big garrisons-of the Wetterau 
penetration road did not move forward to the Taunus ridge; as 
might be expected from the foregoing, they were transferred to 
the areas of agriculture and population concentrated in the 
Wetterau to the east. The Taunus always remained relatively 
thinly garrisoned: the Saalburg was now part of a series of 
small (less than lha) forts spaced as follows: 
Marienfels 
Zugmantel 
Saalburg 
Kapersburg- 
30km 
26km 
7km 
These are the forts designated numeruskastelle by German 
scholars, on the basis of size and, in the case of Kapersburg, 
a known numerus as garrison at a later date. Their wide 
spacing in the Taunus is a conspicuous feature, and one that 
endured on this sector of the frontier. If these units were 
alone responsible for the approximately 150 watchtowers in 
Strecken 2,3 and 4 in existence by this date, -each will 
evidently have had to have permanently outposted more than one 
century to the towers. At a ratio of six men per-tower, each 
would have had to have provided some 120 men, which will have 
considerably depleted the sort of unit (generally estimated at 
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about 200)'which will have been able to fit in such a small 
fort. 
The alternative is that more sites of this period on the 
frontier await discovery. The early sites at Kemel and 
Alteburg-Heftrich do not seem to have been any larger than 
fortlet-size. An early fort of cO. 60ha at Feldberg, filling 
the gap between Zugmantel and the Saalburg, would be an 
attractive possibility, but no evidence has been discovered. 
While all Flavian-Trajanic 'systems' must'be treated with 
caution, as only partially known arrangements, it is notable 
that even in the age of stone fort building whose sites are 
much more readily detectable, the provision of stations along 
the Taunus ridge seems to have been very sparse. 
Here is an indication that the units on the Taunus ridge were 
frontier police specialists, raised'especially for the task and 
devoting much of their strength to it, in contrast to the 
regular auxiliary units, in which, as Trajan wrote to the 
Younger Pliny, at precisely this time (Ep. 10,20), as'few 
soldiers as possible should be called away-from active service. 
This was surely not a fortified frontier line, but rather an 
economic use of manpower to police predictable points of 
crossing; the highly irregular spacing of the sites shows that 
movement or infiltration could be anticipated at particular 
points where passage was traditional or difficult to detect in 
the upland landscape. All of this reinforces the impression 
that major garrisons were placed-where people were. The thinly 
populated, afforested Taunus did not warrant intensive 
garrisoning, but being a zone where unauthorised movement might 
well go unobserved, it required a system of policing. 
In the Wetterau, on the other hand, the-auxiliary forts did not 
form an integral part of the linear frontier system. Two 
roles, occupation of territory, and patrol of a frontier line, 
were evidently still'seen as separate. It is instructive to 
compare the first scheme for Hadrian's Wall. The auxiliary 
I 
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forts of the Wetterau lay 1-2km away from the patrolled 
frontier line. on the line itself the troops were perhaps 
based inýfortlets (probably holding detachments from the 
auxiliary forts) such as Butzbach, which lay right on the line; 
there may also have been troops on the line in a numerus-sized 
group at Inheiden (0.60ha), unless the pottery that gives this 
unexcavated site its early date really derives from an 
undiscovered fortlet. 
Even by cllO, when patrol track and watchtowers were laid out 
for the first time between Echzell and the Main, in two dead 
straight lengths of 18 and 16km respectively, fortlets were 
still largely used to house troops on the patrolled line, with 
manpower being supplied from garrisons to the rear. 
3.2 The possible functions of watchtower cordons 
Having achieved a clearer view of the partial development of 
the early linear frontiers,, and their variation from area to 
area, it becomes possible to see which suggested functions of 
the watchtower systems are more probable than others. 
3.2.1 Provincial Boundaries 
The partial use of watchtower systems along lengths of 
frontiers, at least in the earliest stages, indicates that they 
represent a military response to particular exigencies rather 
than an attempt to demarcate the boundary of a province in a 
political or symbolic fashion. For Tacitus, the terminus-in 
Britain was conceived of as lying between Forth and Clyde 
(Agricola 23), precisely where it appears that at this time 
military installations did not form a linear system of cordon 
type. The frontier of the province was no less clearly defined 
by any natural feature between Forth, and Tay, the sector to 
which the cordon of towers was restricted; therefore they 
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probably served some other function there. As an open 
disposition of garrisons existed in the eastern Wetterau at the 
same time as the earliest Taunus towers were in operation, the 
towers cannot originally have been intended to demarcate the 
provincial boundary of Upper Germany. 
This does not necessarily mean that watchtower systems did not, 
in time, become associated with the notional land boundary, or 
limes of a province (3.7 below). The important point is that 
this cannot have been the primary or practical function of this 
most distinctive of military arrangements. If indeed there was 
a link between the concept of 'watchtower system' and 
'provincial land boundary', it is likely to have arisen at the 
time, cllO, when the land frontier of Upper Germany had become 
completely delineated by artificial systems. 
3.2.2 Defensive lines 
It is difficult to see the earliest system of watchtowers in 
the Taunus serving as a defensive line against concerted 
attack. Not only did it lack substantial garrisons (cf the 
remarks by Dobson (1986,17) about the first scheme for 
Hadrian's Wall), but vulnerable and fertile areas to either 
side, the Neuwied basin and the Wetterau, were left unprotected 
by such a cordon of towers. Perhaps the area immediately north 
of the Taunus was a recognised source of raids into Roman 
occupied territory; perhaps observation of infiltration was 
more difficult in the afforested upland zone. At any rate it 
is likely that some local and practical consideration decided 
the first application of watchtowers to the German frontier. 
With the Gask frontier, the matter is more complicated, for the 
watchtowers here do in fact seal off a self-contained area 
(Strathearn and, beyond the Ochils, the Fife peninsula, home 
perhaps of the pro-Roman Venicones) which was not screened by 
impassable mosses as was the frontier to the west. In this 
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connection, it is significant that the distribution of 
installations on the Gask is similar to that on the German 
stretches of clOO onwards, when indeed all remaining gaps in 
the Upper German frontier were being closed. Does this kind of 
watchtower system represent a more defensive type than the 
anti-infiltration system seen in the more remote Taunus? 
Static defence would be difficult using such a system because 
such an open disposition of towers - with intervals of over lkm 
" as appears on the Gask and eastern Wetterau cannot have been 
held, as a static line of defence, against even small-raiding 
forces, who could have passed between the towers without 
interruption. However, the point is that the usual 
intervisibility of the towers would prevent intruders from 
passing through undetected, at least in daylight or in a force 
of any considerable size. Obviously, the inhabitants of 
watchtowers, having observed unwelcome movement, would not 
always themselves be in a position to intervene directly; which 
leads on to the controversial question of signalling as a role 
for these watchtower systems. 
3.2.3 Signalling systems 
The use of such systems of towers for signalling has long been 
assumed,. although it has become conventional to decry the 
notion of signals being sent along the lines of frontier 
towers; it has rightly been observed that the systems as they 
stand would render lateral signalling over a long distance a 
very time consuming and cumbersome process given the very close 
spacing of the-towers. In combination with this Donaldson 
(1985) has shown the impracticability of complex signal 
sending. If signals were not sent from tower to tower, were 
they sent back, to some rearward dispositions? Woolliscroft 
and Hoffmann (1991) have shown how at times the towers of the: 
northern and eastern Wetterau could have been used for direct 
signalling of early warnings to forts, -, which were mostly to the 
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rear in the former case, while signalling along the line would 
be necessary in the latter. They stress the-lack of a forward 
outlook for many of the towers. However, their interpretation 
of the system as a signalling device does not explain all of 
its characteristics. The close spacing of towers in Strecke 5, 
where it is admitted that signals would have to be transmitted 
along the line (1991,543) is excessive unless observation - 
with the possibility of direct intervention - is also seen as a 
major role. In the original Taunus arrangement, there would ý 
have been few garrison sites for the characteristic watchtower 
cordon to signal to, so it must have had some other purpose 
even if signalling formed one of its roles. Away from the 
sectors studied by Woolliscroft and Hoffmann, the Gask frontier 
provides a clear example of a watchtower cordon possessing no 
rearward installations to which it could send signals. 
These are difficult conclusions to arrive at, given the 
material evidence of a later date from at least one German 
watchtower which would strongly suggest that sound signals (if 
not visual ones) were sent. However, the close spacing of the 
watchtowers only remains a problem if we see signalling as 
being their only function. What we have to remember is that 
the towers probably served several roles, and that they had to 
form an effective means of observation and surveillance in 
order to discover any intrusion worth reporting. Even if 
lateral signalling were intended, unless the towers were 
closely spaced they would not be able to detect unauthorised 
movement. We are looking at a surveillance system within which 
a warning signal could be relayed to the nearest body of troops 
of adequate size to move to deal with the situation. Such a 
signal need not be complicated; as Southern (1990) has shown, 
it need only warn a unit to be on the alert and ready to move 
when more detailed intelligence about the presence of raiders 
has arrived., Nor would the distance over which the warning 
signal need to be transmitted often be very long. There is 
comparative evidence, ranging from the documents of the Han 
administration of China to sixteenth century plans for the 
96 
Border March of Northumberland, to show that it is possible for 
linear frontiers to employ this kind of intruder-alert 
signalling. % 
The individual signal or early warning tower connected to a 
particular fort, often providing an 'eye' in a blind spot, is a 
well-known type with close archaeological affinities to the 
watchtower of frontier cordon type. The Flavian fort of 
Fendoch in Scotland (not part of a linear frontier system, ý but 
one of the so-called 'glen-blocking' forts contemporary with 
the legionary base at Inchtuthil) was provided with a tower 
looking into the Smal Glen; later, Bewcastle, an outpost of 
Hadrian's Wall, was provided with two 'eyes' or 
signal-stations, Robin Hood's Butt and Barron's Pike (Topping 
1987). Despite their basic archaeological similarity, the 
frontier watchtowers deserve a separate classification to the 
individual signal towers, for the frontier towers had other 
roles which explain their distinctive cordon arrangement. The 
principal of these was that they-had to be sufficiently close 
together to observe any movement across the line. Pennant 
(1776,90) first perspicaciously remarked on this function with 
reference to the Gask towers: I ... between this [tower] and 
Innerpaffery are two other similar, placed as near that 
everything that stirred beneath, or at a certain distance 
around, could be seen. ' 
3.2.4 A Border Surveillance System 
It has been established that in certain circumstances static 
groups of soldiers may have signalled from tower to tower to 
alert larger forces nearby of an incursion. However, to see 
this as the only way in which the towers functioned would be to 
see the whole frontier operating in a formal and mechanical 
way. If the various operations which were no doubt regularly 
carried on outside the towers are remembered, it becomes 
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possible to see another way in which'they might have 
functioned. ,- 
It is highly likely that these earliest frontiers were 
patrolled lines as much as a series of static observation 
posts. The track and cleared way connecting the individual 
towers (a full scale road in the case of the Gask) may have 
been constantly patrolled. A (legionary) duty roster of 
roughly contemporary date from Egypt juxtaposes, the task of 
manning towers with that of patrolling roads (Watson 1969,72-3 
and Appendix B). In exposed tracts such as the earliest 
frontier lines of northwest Europe, small patrols or 
detachments of soldiers would not wish to travel very far 
without knowing of a refuge in case of surprise attack, and so 
the'towers may have served something of the same purpose'as did 
fortlets-and road stations along true military roads., 
Secondly, 'the soldiers in the'individual'towers may have had-a 
greaterýscope to interfere directly with the movements of those 
approaching the frontier than is usually thought. Obviously 
against a large scale incursion small detachments of soldiers 
in the towers would have been impotent. However, small 
detachments of men,, operating flexibly between the towers, 
would have been able to exert a curb upon large bodies of 
heavily laden refugees or illegal immigrants attempting to 
cross the frontier, or upon individuals, small groups of 
infiltrators or guerilla fighters either crossing the frontier 
or attacking a watchtower. The throwing stones and projectiles 
found in the towers bear witness to this just as a-sound 
instrument speaks of the functions of early warning and 
intercommunication (4.7S4 below). 
In conclusion, rather than representing political or fiscal 
lines, or mechanistic signalling systems, the earliest series 
of installations were responses to particular problems of 
border surveillance which varied from area to area. They were 
a improvised military response to a difficult set of 
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situations. As Petrikovits (1967) and Baatz (1976,31-35) have 
shown, there was a tradition of military building, in city 
defences and linear siege works, running back to the 
Hellenistic period, from which the idea of watchtower cordons, 
as well as the later continuous barriers, could easily have 
been drawn. 
3.3 The significance of the watchtower cordons: a demarcation 
of the border and an acknowledgement of military halt 
An obvious remaining question concerr 
, 
is the idea behind the 
drawing up of such obviously permanent linear systems of border 
surveillance. How did the actual lines come to be chosen, and 
why? Several opinions have been advanced, ranging from JC 
Mann's famous proposition (1974) that the frontiers of the 
empire congealed in default of effective military action, to 
the belief of EN Luttwak (1976) that the frontier lines were 
chosen to form a rational system of military defence which 
operated as a coherent whole. Closely allied to the former 
argument is a view which has become deeply entrenched in 
Romano-British military historiography, namely that the 
faltering of advance had little to do with any local 
circumstances, - perhaps least of all the resistance of 
indigenous peoples. 
More recently B Isaac (1990,416-17) has concluded: 'The choice 
of military frontier lines was hardly ever dictated by the 
desire to establish rational systems of defence. If they were 
chosen rationally atýall, they were meant to afford good 
communications and logistics. But often they were simply the 
frozen forward lines of advance that could be held following 
military campaigns'. Isaac writes (ibid., 389): 1 ... Movements 
backward and forward appear to be a function of the ambition of 
the commander and what could be held in practice'. 
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Both of these views carry the implication that an artificial 
linear frontier system came about as a result of the most 
chance circumstances, and that similar circumstances might see 
the abandonment or movement of a system of installations. 
Chance - in the form of the emergency on the Danube of c86-92 - 
almost certainly provided the immediate impetus to the 
construction of watchtower systems in Britain and Upper 
Germany. It is tempting to wonder whether the earlier of our 
two phases of development, where the watchtowers in neither 
province enclosed the whole length of the land frontier, 
corresponds, to a period before the halt was officially 
considered permanent. The sort of fluidity envisaged by Isaac 
could well still have had a place here. However, our analysis 
of-the origins of the Upper German frontier has also shown how 
rapidly - in no more than 20 years - the move took place 
towards a general closing off of the entire land frontier with 
watchtower systems. Where this happened, there was rarely any 
further advance, nor did the artificial frontiers usually get 
moved back. If such extended watchtower systems were decided 
upon at, a low level, and not from the first officially 
recognised as permanent, we ought to expect to find abandoned 
sectors and superseded lines at an early date. There are 
changes in watchtower alignments in Upper Germany, and there is 
the famous change of line taken by the stone wall which 
replaced the Turf Wall of Hadrian in Britain. But these must 
be seen as strictly local adjustments. On the contrary, it is 
remarkable how permanent, in the broad sense, once chosen, 
watchtower lines remained (The apparent exception of the 
Vorverlegung of the mid-second century, in which land to the 
east of the Odenwald and the Neckar was enclosed, is dicussed 
6.4.1 below). 
The abandonment of the Gask in Britain is the only example of a 
withdrawal from a watchtower system, and it may be explained by 
the special circumstances of additional troop transfers from 
Britain at a time of emergency. Significantly, the Gask was 
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not succeeded by another linear frontier until the time of 
Hadrian. In the years c92-cl22 there is no evidence that 
linear frontier'systems of any kind sprang up anywhere in 
Britain. The possible reasons for this are discussed below 
(3.4.1). In general, then, the rapidity of the move to a 
general watchtower frontier in Upper Germany, combined with the 
contemporary absence of any such-tendency in Britain, may lead 
us to suspect'that the delineation of the frontier in this way 
was a decision, taken at high official level. 
This finality of frontier'lines suggests that there was more 
conscious policy behind them, than is sometimes supposed. It 
also suggests that they may have been more influenced by local 
considerations than the advocates of the 'chance outside 
factor' would allow: frontier lines were generally located 
thoughtfully enough for them to remain permanently useful. The 
archaeological evidence shows that such watchtower building 
schemes were not considered lightly. Once established, and 
with the exception of the Flavian frontier in Scotland, these 
arrangements almost always formed the basis of the provincial 
border surveillance system until the late-Roman period. At the 
very least, it is'suggested, the decision to build an 
artificially demarcated frontier represents a recognition of 
the fact that further resources'or a new policy initiative were 
unlikely to be directed at that particular sector of frontier 
for the foreseeable future. The area which the available 
garrisons could effectively occupy and police was not infinite, 
and once it was considered to have reached its maximum or 
desirable extent, and only then, an artificial system of 
demarcation and surveillance was constructed. 
This is not to argue that the frontier lines were chosen as 
part of an overall grand strategy, as Luttwak (1976) has 
suggested; the partial and uneven nature of their development 
that has been traced in northwest Europe should disprove that. 
But it is reasonable to suggest that the army on the ground, 
having been far-sighted enough to accept that further advance, 
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was almost certainly not going to happen, would arrange the 
frontier lines in such a way that they tied together in a 
pattern that was effective for communications and supply, and 
Isaac (1990,417) does allow for this. 
However irrationally aggressive the Romans were capable of 
being, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the generality 
of military dispositions on the great frontiers was coming to 
be considered unlikely to be changed. Individual emperors 
might embark on military adventures, and might well wish, like 
Marcus with the Marcomanni and Sarmatians, to forge new 
provinces beyond the frontiers. And there may truly, as Isaac 
states, have been no rational search for defensible boundaries. 
For all this, after the Danubian crisis of c86-92, frontiers 
generally remained where they were, and may be seen as rational 
choices in their own terms. Those terms are not to do with 
wars of conquest: they are concerned primarily with the 
security of what was already held, and what continued to be 
held. This in spite of aggressive adventures, which, as Isaac 
himself is keen to remind us, were directed at peoples, not 
territory. Far from being unstoppable, the Roman army found it 
could advance no further than the lines up to which it was 
possible, with available manpower, to protect itself and not to 
succumb to disastrous revolt. Of course the army did not at 
first fear a strategic attack, and the artificial frontiers 
would be little use against one. Rather they were a system of 
security for an army of occupation (and those locals who 
accepted the occupation) in a remote and increasingly hostile 
frontier zone. Individual emperors might embark upon wars of 
conquest beyond the frontiers, but unless vast numbers of 
troops were made permanently available for the new areas, the 
limit of practical occupation would remain where it had been 
before. Such zones of practical occupation tended to stay 
roughly the same, irrespective of wishes and attempts of 
individual emperors to change them. The locations of the 
frontier systems have much more than antiquarian importance, 
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because they show us where the limits of these zones were 
perceived to be by those responsible for their security. 
But what of Britain, with its frontier that moved backward and 
forward? Does this not show, as Isaac (1990,389) claims, that 
mere fluctuations of military ambition determined the siting of 
the frontiers? We shall return to this point in section 6.4, 
but here it may be said that the oscillation of the frontier 
may be illusory. What the present study has emphasised is the 
crucial difference between artificial linear frontier systems, 
and mere forward dispositions of military sites. There are 
actually very few discernible moments in Britain when the 
decision was taken to build a linear frontier, i. e. to accept 
the permanence of the situation. One was in Flavian Scotland. 
That frontier was abandoned because troops were taken to the 
continent; the land running all the way to the Gask frontier 
could not be practically occupied. A revised frontier was not 
now built further south; whatever the fluctuations of military 
fortune, it was not until a generation later that, with a new 
policy decision, an artificial frontier, Hadrian's Wall, was 
built on the lower isthmus. It remained the frontier of the 
province until the end of Roman Britain, although an attempt 
was made in the Antonine period, ultimately unsuccessfully, to 
restore a linear frontier to the northern isthmus. If seen in 
terms of linear systems, the frontiers of Britain were not soý 
liable to chance movement. Once the complete conquest of 
Britain was frustrated, a rational line for a linear frontier 
became apparent. The holding of this line, and a later attempt 
to re-establish it, were frustrated by persistent crises in 
other theatres of war, leading to the persistent occupation of 
Hadrian's wall. Rather than a movement backwards and forwards, 
this represents a persistent falling short of a consistent aim. 
There is nothing necessarily indecisive or irrational about the 
frontier line decisions in Britain. 
To conclude: rather than being merely 'the frozen forward lines 
of advance that could be held following military campaigns' 
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(Isaac 1990,417), frontier lines of the artificial sort 
considered here represented a conscious realization that there 
was most unlikely to be any further advance, or withdrawal; the 
ý knew that it was to mark army, perhaps with dwindling numbersf 
time for the foreseeable future. The moment for that decision 
which best fits the archaeological dating evidence for the 
origin of the watchtower frontier in Upper Germany is the 
prolonged emergency on the Danube that drained northwestern 
Europe of troops after c86. The linear systems of border 
surveillance which resulted were the product of an army unable 
to extend further the occupied zone, and faced with practical 
problems of security on the ground. What may have begun as a 
temporary security expedient on the part of the army was 
applied, within no more than 20 years, to the entire land 
frontier of Upper Germany. 
3.4 The Failure of comparative linear frontiers to develop in 
Britain 
A clear characteristic of the frontier developments of these 
years, then, is that different provinces, and areas within 
provinces, were treated in strikingly different ways. It is 
probably this fact which has deterred efforts to compare 
directly and in detail the various, apparently randomly 
different frontier approaches of this period. What is to be 
gained by comparing the open British 'Newstead-Dalswinton axis' 
of c90-clO5 to the linear watchtower and fort system prevailing 
in the Taunus-Wetterau by the end of this period? Yet here it 
is argued throughout that what is really being seen is the 
development of frontiers at relatively different rates: it is 
apparent that the move to a formally demarcated frontier line 
was not generally made, but only at specific times (when 
further movement of military dispositions was not anticipated) 
and in specific areas. The various points of origin of linear 
frontier systems, and the different speeds at which they 
originated and developed, in fact-provide vital clues to the 
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operations being conducted by the army in these places, the 
varying problems that the Romans were faced with, and their 
success in solving them. 
3.4.1 A continuing fluidity on the British northern frontier 
In Britain, after the inchoate frontier of Flavian Scotland, we 
must wait until the building of Hadrian's Wall to see another 
formal linear frontier. The evidence examined in section 2.4 
indicated that with the Stanegate we are not dealing with a 
formal linear frontier of the sort that is clearly recognisabie 
by its standard types and arrangements of installations. 
Before the return to the Tyne-Solway, the frontier in Britain, 
in Collingwood's phrase (1927,17), 'petered out' rather than 
being marked by a definite line. The contrast is vital; if we 
are to establish what linear frontiers were for, we must 
attempt to understand why one may have been omitted in Britain 
at a time of intense frontier development in Germany. As 
argued above (3.3), formal frontier building indicates, in the 
first instance, a policy awareness that further movement was 
postponed for some considerable time; the extension of such 
building to an entire land frontier indicates that the 
situation had been accepted as permanent. Such a decision was 
evidently not arrived at in Britain between c90 and c105, and 
perhaps not until c120. As we see from the Newstead-Dalswinton 
dispositions, the situation remained fluid. 
These considerations suggest one possible explanation: that the 
dispositions between the Tyne and the Tweed of c90-cl2O were 
not at the time considered to be permanent, even if they lasted 
for over a quarter of a century. In other words it may have 
been felt, or even explicitly suggested, that sooner or later 
the frontier would have to fall back even further. A reverse 
of this proposition would be that further-advance was 
considered likely. Connected to this is imperial attitude; 
Trajan may have refused for some reason to countenance the 
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fixing of a frontier line in Britain; he may have wished to 
have been seen to pursueýthe war in Britain, even in a token 
manner. There is no other example in this period anywhere in 
the empire of the Romans withdrawing from an artificial 
watchtower frontier, as they had from the Gask: they may not 
have been-willing to accept this situation in Britain and 
philosophically build another frontier. 
A second possible explanation might be that the diplomatic 
situation in Britain may have been different from that in 
Germany. At some date after the close of the Chattan war, the 
Rhine-Main frontier may be said to have begun to crystalise at 
the extent of the natural area of Roman control. Even with 
unlimited troops, the Romans could not have increased the area 
of prosperous, agricultural land under their control without 
creating an even more irrational salient than the Wetterau; 
they were clearly not willing to undertake conquest of the 
Vogelsberg and the upland preserves of the Chatti north and 
east of the Wetterau and the Giessen basin. In Britain, 
however, the Gask frontier, on the edge of the highlands, 
probably demarcated the end of the natural Roman constituency, 
containing areas whose people were at least in part ready to 
enter into relations with Rome. The distribution of native 
settlements has been used to argue for a 'natural and political 
boundary' on the Tay (Maxwell 1989,124-6). This natural line 
was echoed in the Antonine period by the northern wall and its 
outposts; again in the Severan period Carpow hints at Roman 
interests as far north as the Earn or the Tay. The giving up 
of Roman forts running up to this recurrently used line is now 
commonly thought of as being a product of troop withdrawals, 
and does not necessarily imply the giving up of all Roman 
control. It may be that diplomatic control and influence 
substituted for formal frontier control of the cordon type, and 
that it was not considered desirable to isolate friendly 
peoples. A less charitable way of reading the situation would 
be to suggest that bitter, inconclusive warfare was being waged 
in southern Scotland; but in this case the effect would be the 
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same. No frontier line could be formed in such circumstances, 
for frontier lines were means of border surveillance, not means 
of fighting wars or protecting Roman forts against attack: as 
we have seen, the earliest linear systems lay away from troop 
concentrations. The likeliest explanation is that given 
insufficient troops to occupy the whole area, the Romans chose 
to exert, their direct power upon certain parts. 
This may go some way to explaining why the non-linear 
disposition of forts takes the form that it does. As was 
suggested above (2.3), the forts of-the-period c90-clO5 
surround the southern Scottish hills, looking into them from 
valleys and coastal plains. The Romans would have no desire to 
relinquish control over the fertile zones such as those where a 
Censitor might carry out his surveys, and taxes be levied. In 
these circumstances it would have been a clumsy solution to the 
problem to draw an arbitrary artificial frontier across the 
Scottish lowlands, excluding areas amenable to Romanisation as 
well as upland areas; yet there were insufficient troops to 
occupy the whole terrain between'Forth-Clyde and Tyne-Solway. 
The known disposition of sites in this period suggests that the 
Romans hit upon the solution of occupying the fertile areas and 
leaving the upland interior unoccupied but'carefully watched 
from the surrounding stations. A comparable expedient was 
employed in the occupation of Wales. This explains why 
Castlecary and Loudon Hill may have been occupied at this time: 
maritime routes were as important as communications across 
land, and outlying forts surrounding the northern part of the 
Lowlands could have been supplied by sea. 
These may all be hypotheses, but in the long run the 
explanation of the failure of the British frontier in these 
years to adopt a linear form must be sought in the particular 
relationship that Rome shared with local peoples. Uncertainty 
brought about by troop withdrawals cannot alone explain the 
circumstance, for the army in Germany, where the watchtower 
frontiers steadily evolved, was almost certainly subject to 
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similar depredations. Rather, the Romans wished to continue to 
treat with certain peoples north of the Tyne-Solway isthmus, 
and had to do so without-going to the expense of garrisoning 
the whole lowland zone. 
3.4.2 The Stanegate system and its parallels 
A frontier of possibly linear character - the Stanegate 
arrangement - is commonly suspected in Britain after cl05, and 
is conventionally linked with further troop withdrawals from 
southern Scotland. On this hinges much: are we right to 
compare the 'late' Stanegate (c105-c120) to dispositions on 
linear frontiers between Rhine and Main? Or was the British 
frontier! still 'open" , merely a garrisoned road with no 
delineation significance and security maintained by outposts 
and diplomacy to the north? 
Certainly, in recent years doubts about the IStanegate system' 
have grown, and from the evidence discussed above (2-4) it was 
concluded that the Stanegate has not produced the familiar 
paraphernalia of a patrolled watchtower system. So there have 
been expectations of a linear frontier, but it has never come 
to light. 
If the forts along the Stanegate did form a linear disposition, 
along a major road running along the edge of Roman occupied 
territory, then it is no surprise that scholars have attempted 
to see in it a defended linear frontier. But it was suggested 
above (2.4.2) that the evidence for the abandonment of all 
sites north of the Stanegate cl05 is unsatisfactory. On the 
contrary, there are indications that at least some of these 
sites may have continued to be held. If the Stanegate was, in 
fact, simply an (albeit important) route within Roman occupied 
territory, it is possible to make better sense of the stations 
that were placed along it, and to explain why the system of 
installations failed to develop the characteristics of a 
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watchtower frontier. Even without forts to the north the 
Stanegate could simply have functioned as a military road, as 
did a closely similar road of the 90s in Upper Germany, which 
predated the watchtower system between Ober Florstadt and the 
Main.. 
Here, the frontier running south from the group of big forts 
which probably existed in the 90s in the northern Wetterau - 
Butzbach, Arnsburg and Echzell - consisted of a line of 
somewhat smaller installations running down from Echzell to 
Hanau-Salisberg on the Main. There is no evidence for a 
watchtower system having existed on this line; when the towers 
and patrol track came to be laid out in this sector (clOO-110) 
it was 3-10km further to the east. lOkm south of Echzell was 
Ober-Florstadt, possibly a fortlet site at this time; lOkm 
south of that Heldenbergen, a small fort of 0.80ha; and 12km 
south of that Salisberg, probably a cohort fort (see 1.2 above 
for dating evidence). The sites were apparently linked by a 
road (ORLA 3-5 Map 7) and the forts lie at river crossings. 
The various sizes of these forts recall those of the Stanegate 
in Britain after c105, when smaller installations had narrowed 
the gaps between forts spaced at 20km intervals. 
Although there is a lack of information about some of-the 
sites, the spacing on the eastern Wetterau road and the river 
Main c90-100 was as follows: 
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Echzell 5.2ha 
lOkm 
Ober-Florstadt fortlet 
lOkm 
Heldenbergen 0.8ha 
12km 
Hanau-Salisberg fort? 
8km 
Hainstadt 0.9ha 
4km 
Seligenstadt ? 
9km 
Stockstadt 0.3ha 
9km 
Niedernberg ? 
9km 
Obernburg 7 
5km 
Worth small fort? 
The large fort at Echzell (5.2ha) recalls the very large early 
forts of c3ha known at Vindolanda and Nether Denton, and 
suspected at Carvoran, although these may have been much 
reduced in size after c105. With a fortlet after lOkm, and a 
small fort at Heldenbergen after another lOkm, not much smaller 
than, say, Brampton Old Church, and finally probably a fort at 
Hanau-Salisberg, a sequence of fort types emerges which is 
repeated on the Stanegate with Nether Denton, Boothby, Brampton 
Old Church and Carlisle, although the spacing is much closer in 
the British example. Although there is less information about 
the sites at this period, it seems that on the Main south of 
Salisberg there may also have been, a mixture of forts and 
smaller installations, fairly closely spaced. 
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The similarities between these two particular stretches of 
frontier may provide clues to their purpose, and may help to 
explain their obvious differences from those frontiers marked 
by watchtower systems. That the German road and the full 
Stanegate arrangement did not exist at the same time is not a 
problem: both predated the decision to draw up a formal 
artificial frontier. This simply happened much later in 
Britain than in Germany north of the Main. Both the Stanegate 
and Eastern Wetterau systems centred on a road. These were not 
penetration roadsýf but roads which the Romans would use to move 
right or left among their own dispositions; between Corbridge 
and Carlisle in one case, and between a major port and river 
crossing on the Main and troop concentrations in the northern 
Wetterau in the other. Unlike the penetration road in Scotland 
running north of Camelon, neither of these was a far flung 
appendage, protecting a projecting salient of Roman controlled 
territory, and using watchtowers so that troops could be spread 
along it as thinly as possible. Rather these were roads that 
remained in use as arterial traffic routes. 
Besides already being a garrisoned road, the Stanegate formed, 
at least in: its central part, an abnormally well garrisoned 
road. Already c90-c105 the Stanegate was characterised by a 
fairly closely spaced (c20km) series of forts, comparable in 
spacing to the series of Vespasianic sites along the Wetterau 
penetration road. It is clear, however, that at this time 
there were Roman forts running up to the Tweed. The road was 
obviously not now a fortified frontier, and the explanation for 
the generous garrisoning probably lies in the agricultural 
richness of the Tyne valley and the fact that on the major road 
traffic would need shelter and protection. Such protection on 
the road was evidently increased in the early second century 
with the addition of the fortlets and the fort at Old Church 
Brampton. It is most convincing to see the extra forts and 
fortlets added in the Trajanic period as being road stations 
for extra security on an increasingly exposed main route. It 
was argued above (2.4) that each of the added installations may 
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have had a specific purpose connected with the security of the 
road. While it is true that it cannot be known that guarding 
the river crossings was one of the functions of such forts as 
Haltwhistle Burn and Throp, as a hypothesis it is much easier 
to support than the notion that the sites controlled 
north-south movement, which is not supported by their 
positioning. All of the sites, large and small, on the road 
north of the Main to which we have compared the Stanegate, lie 
on river crossings. Conversely, a road is considered below 
(3.5) which the Romans used to penetrate the frontier area of 
Raetia. On this road major forts guarded river crossings: or 
so we assume from their position. Here some forts were built 
to monitor north-south movement. But significantly, they were 
placed well forward of the road, where that movement-could be 
best supervised; just as happened in the case of the Stanegate, 
when Hadrian's Wall was built. 
Considerations like these applied to, few of the sectors of the 
Rhine-Main frontier where watchtower systems developed. 
Military communications were always more vulnerable in Britain: 
the northernmost major route between the two halves of the 
occupying army ran through an exposed upland zone. This may 
well explain the close spacing of forts and fortlets along the 
central Stanegate. 
As a road, the Stanegate did not acquire a watchtower system. 
Yet the Stanegate has its known towers, which served not as a 
continuous chain, but rather, had individual purposes, Just like 
the isolated towers with specific roles related to particular 
forts (eg the 'eyes' of Fendoch and Bewcastle: 3.2.3 above), or 
known along roads and on the river and desert frontiers 
considered in Chapter 7. 
Thus it is not necessary to see the Stanegate as a frontier at 
all: especially so in the light of the possibility of military 
and diplomatic control north of the isthmus continuing after 
the traditional withdrawal date of c105. It is possible, of 
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course, that control over the lowlands did come to an end later 
than this but before the reign of Hadrian. Breeze (1982, 
66-67) has suggested that the withdrawal of the IX legion and 
other troops may have fallen at the'time of The Parthian war, 
c114. This may or may not have precipitated the building of 
additional installations on the Stanegate; but the fortlets 
could still be road stations added at any time, and the Solway 
installations could still be early Hadrianic. Even after c114 
there could still have been forts north of the Stanegate. 
Even if all forts north of the Stanegate were abandoned before 
the Hadrianic period, it might be a mistake to treat the road 
as a frontier. Although watchtowers should have been built 
along the Stanegate if it had been-known that no-Roman advance 
beyond the isthmus was going to take place, it is historically 
deterministic to seek a linear frontier on the Stanegate in 
these years, for we only know with hindsight that the 
withdrawal from southern Scotland would not be reversed. -The 
contrasted archaeological evidence from'Britain and Germany, 
then, rather than presenting two randomly different systems,, in 
fact reveals contrasting Roman assessments of the conditions of 
two frontiers. Between Rhine and Main it had been decided by 
the opening years of the second century - perhaps quite 
explicitly - that there would be no further advance. The 
gradual occupation of the area between Rhine and Main was 
perceived to have reached a rational conclusion. The 
introduction of watchtowers was delayed only slightly in the 
eastern Wetterau by the pre-existence of a garrisoned road. In 
Britain no such early decision was reached. This was the 
neglected province, Roman occupation up to a preferred line - 
at least the Forth-Clyde - being eaten away by troop 
withdrawals. The Stanegate perhaps shows us that it was 
believed, perhaps up to late in Trajan's reign, that the 
situation might be restored. What it may also be telling us is 
that the forts to the north had not all been given up in c105, 
or even perhaps by c115. 
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The evidence does not really suggest that the Stanegate 
'congealed' into a frontier. It did not have the opportunity 
to evolve into a linear frontier system. The decision that 
what had long been a main road should become a frontier zone 
came suddenly and late. And then the potential development of 
an artificial frontier along the Stanegate was anticipated by 
the decision to build a definitive frontier - Hadrian's Wall - 
on a slightly different line. 
3.5 Differences between Britain, Germany north of the Main, 
and Upper Germany south of the Main and Raetia 
The linear frontier which developed in the Odenwald forms a 
link between quite different frontier developments. To the 
north we have seen the gradual development of an artificial 
frontier'between Rhine and Main, stemming from an early 
appraisal of a static situation, and with its general outline 
fixed at an early stage. South of the Odenwald, however, in 
the area of the Neckar, and in the province of Raetia, there 
prevailed a situation much more reminiscent of that in Britain 
between c90 and cl05. In the militarily occupied frontier-land 
between Upper Rhine and Danube, advance was evidently not seen 
as concluded. As argued throughout, it is the absence of such 
a decisive appraisal at an early stage which accounts for the 
absence of artificial linear frontier systems at the same time 
as they were appearing north of the river Neckar. 
The Romans moved late into the Odenwald itself, in antiquity a 
remote and unpopulated zone. As in the connecting of the 
northern Wetterau and the Main, here at first sight it was the 
neatness of filling a gap, and connecting up two established 
series of installations - in this case the Main and the Neckar 
- which compelled the army into frontier building action in the 
Odenwald. Again the question arises: was there a change of 
circumstances which led to a greater need to block off gaps in 
the delineated frontiers, even if those gaps lay in remote and 
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inaccessible zones? The suggestion is considered below 
(6.3.1.3) that the permanent presence of the army of occupation 
may have had sufficient economic impact upon the local 
population to trigger increases in the amount of unpredictable 
population movement, to the detriment of settled agriculture. 
It has often been suggested that infiltration would be the main 
concern in-this sector, for the wooded Odenwald neither 
supported a local population requiring supervision, nor was 
vulnerable to invasion (Baatz 1975,153). 
Whatever the real reason, the Odenwald was incorporated into 
the frontier system by c110. Through the wooded heights of the 
northern Odenwald, and the rolling country of the southern- 
part, there was no natural obstacle or line of delineation, 
and, as was invariably the case when a definitive halt was 
decided upon in such circumstances, a cordon of watchtowers was 
built. As in the case of the earlier Taunus frontier, which 
was seen as a substitute for the surveillance provided by large 
garrisons, which the Romans did not wish to commit to so 
unpopulated an area, so in the northern Odenwald the army was 
certainly off the beaten track. From the start it was not 
considered worthwhile to garrison full-sized auxiliary units 
there, and the famous series of small forts, filled by lower 
grade numerl, was provided instead. 
In the more open, gently rolling landscape (capable of holding 
population) of the southern Odenwald, two full-sized auxiliary, 
forts were supplied, with a much wider spacing (15km) than that 
of the numerus forts in the rough country to the north (average 
spacing 5.50km). The provision of forts in the northern 
Odenwald was therefore much denser than that on the similarly 
remote Taunus. In addition, the southern Odenwald line of 
patrol track and watchtowers was surveyed in a dead straight 
line between Schlossau and the Neckar, arbitrarily cutting 
through the countryside and needing to take no account of local 
topography. This, of course, would hardly have been possible , 
in the wooded heights of the northern Odenwald, and there it is 
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possible to see how the patrolled line has followed a 
negotiable route, winding through the heights and still being 
followed for the most part by modern roads. The different 
behaviour of the two parts of the Odenwald frontier presents an 
interesting example of a general rule which applies to the 
frontier lines being compared: the earliest frontiers followed- 
topographic lines'. -Secondary additions to the frontier circuit 
also followed topographic features where necessary; dead 
straight surveyed alignments are always secondary, joining up 
pre-existing-dispositions. A further observation of interest 
is that the watchtowers in the northern Odenwald are more 
widely, spaced than those in the more low lying southern sector. 
The wider spacing of the towers may reflect the fact that the 
numerl were available for full-time patrolling. This may be a 
situation where a close concentration of other types of 
installation - in this case numerus forts spaced at 5.50km,, - 
rendered fewer watchtowers necessary. Unlike the numeri, who 
perhaps specialised in frontier police work to the exclusion of 
nearly everything else, the auxiliary units to the south would 
have had a wider range of duties, not least ofýwhich would have 
been the supervision of a local population. The smaller 
detachments of men who could have been spared for frontier line 
policing, being spread over a proportionally longer stretch of 
frontier, may have been, put in closer reach of each other for 
the sake of greater security. 
From the Neckar southwards the emphasis is quite different. It 
has long been recognised that in the late first and early -, 
second centuries, Roman interests extended beyond the Neckar. 
In the Flavian period a Roman imperial estate existed on the 
far side of the river. There were forts along the river line 
full-sized by cllO and quite closely spaced (3-9km) - and it 
has been conventional to think of them as forming a fortified. 
frontier line., However, perhaps it-would be more instructive 
to take the Stanegate in Britain as a, parallel. The primary 
inportance of each lay in its use as a transport route and 
communications corridor. On the Stanegate, as on the Neckar, 
116 
there was a linear disposition of sites, and Roman treatment of 
the land beyond as if-it were Roman territory, as testified by 
the censitor in Annandale. Yet, as has been argued, it makes, 
more sense to view the linear arrangement of sites along the 
Stanegate as supervising the route, and there is little reason 
to think that it was viewed as a definitive frontier line. The 
key to the situation appears to be the same in north Britain 
and on the Neckar: however permanent the arrangement of forts 
along the river was considered-, the-Romans had evidently not 
resigned themselves to advancing no further., 
If conquest was not still taking place, consolidation of 
conquest, in part by advance'into previously ungarrisoned 
areas, was still an active Roman pursuit. This seems to mark 
the crucial difference between the area under consideration and 
Germany north of the Neckar, and it means that there are no 
very early watchtower systems in the Neckar area or in Raetia. 
To'scholars seeking in Raetia a defended frontier against 
external attacks, the comparatively very slow development of a 
linear frontier system in Raetia has been taken to show, that 
'Der Grenzabschnitt nicht so sehr durch aussere Feinde bedroht 
war... '-(Baatz 1975,216). - 
Although similar in possessing open military dispositions and 
no definitive frontier line, there is a clear contrast between 
Britain c90-clO5 and Raetia in the same period: in the former 
case troop withdrawal resulted in-a gradual retreat of military 
installations, whereas what we see in Raetia, where there was 
no heavy concentration or increase in troops available, is a 
progressive pushing forward of the garrison posts. It is 
interesting to speculate whether this is the result of 
differing attitudes of local peoples to the Roman occupation, 
or whether there was simply a Roman will to push matters beyond 
Rhine and Danube to a rational conclusion, a will that was 
lacking in the neglected province of Britain. 
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A comparison of the size of the areas involved and the 
distributions of known military sites does not suggest that the 
Roman army was faced with a less formidable area of land to 
subjugate in Raetia, -or that it was-in aýnumerically much more 
advantageous position than its counterpart in Scotland (cf, eg, 
Figs 9 and 15). Raetia was one of only two frontier provinces 
in Europe not to possess a legion at this date; the ala 
milliarla placed at Heidenheim from the 90s onwards perhaps 
deliberately compensated for that omission. Furthermore, had 
the will been lackingýto find a rational terminus to occupation 
north of the Tyne-Solway isthmus, the Romans might be expected 
to have constructed an artificially defined frontier there 
sooner than they actually did. On the contrary they evidently 
still looked to a settlement of the problem north of the 
isthmus, even after cl05 when it must have been appearing less 
and less likely that this would be achieved. Finally it will 
be noted that in Raetia in this period the outermost screen of 
forts was able to move forward because old bases were given up 
(as had been the case during the conquest of lowland Britain). 
While there were some rearward holdings, such as a series of 
forts which survived for a time on the Danube, there was no 
continuous network of forts and roads left covering the land 
running back from the garrisons most recently pushed forward, 
as was generally the case with the Flavian occupation of north 
Britain. 
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the Roman 
occupation of Raetia may not have been as vehemently opposed as 
it must have been-in north Britain. ýNo doubt this in itself 
would have had an effect upon the Roman will to go on; if not 
the end, then one end, could be glimpsed in the most rational 
linking of communications between Upper-Germany and Raetia. No 
such end could easily be discerned in Scotland. Nevertheless, 
at a time when it is usual to emphasise the will of the Romans 
in frontier development (eg Breeze 1988), it is of interest to 
note that the archaeological evidence does suggest that the 
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army was faced with much more formidable opposition in one area 
than in another. 
It is usual to view the, Roman military advance in Raetia at 
this time as part of a rational process, with a series of more 
or less clear aims, normally characterised as defensive. The 
dispositions are seen as advancing to the places where they 
will best protect the provincial capital, and secure the 
interprovincial routes between Upper Germany and Raetia. As 
the actual development of the frontier is analysed, it must be 
remembered that now not all historians would as easily credit 
the Roman army with such a capacity for rational aims and 
defensive actions (Isaac 1990). However, without ostentatious 
wars of conquest, or notable setbacks, the Roman army in 
southern Germany can be seen to have spent many decades 
gradually adjusting the arrangement of its frontier 
installations, and it would be taking a very negative view 
indeed not to see in this frontier development a certain 
consistency and progression. Rejecting the idea of a 
masterminded grand imperial frontier strategy should not, as 
was concluded in relation to the choice of frontier lines 
further north, preclude the possibilityýthat the provincial 
armies on the ground assessed the problems of border security 
in a consistent and realistic fashion. 
With the forts of the Schwabian Alb, established from c90 
onwards the idea has come to prevail in recent years 
(SchOnberger 1985,387; Heiligmann 1990) that their main 
concern was with the safeguarding of the route between Upper 
Germany and Raetia, which now lay in advance of the old forts. 
on the Danube. Still usually referred to as the 'Alblimes', 
there is in fact no reason to view these forts as forming a 
delineation or a linear defence. It must come as no surprise 
that, so far, none of the paraphernalia of linear frontier 
systems, such as watchtowers, has come to light. The forts 
were positioned so that they could have monitored movement 
across the Alb, for they are placed on the most convenient 
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access routes, but as with the Stanegate,, they are as well 
positioned to protect a lateral communications corridor. On 
the analogy of'the British frontier of the same years, it may 
be that no artificial frontier line was developed because it 
was believed that it was likely that, there would be further 
advance - as in this case there actually was. Again we see 
that frontiers of the artificial and linear sort are not drawn 
up unless it is believed that advance has definitively halted. 
It is very likely that the possibility was considered that the 
Voralb, the fertile area on the north slopes of the Alb, would 
one day be occupied by the Roman army, if it was not already 
under Roman control, in the same way that Roman control without 
garrisons was postulated north of the Stanegate (3.4 above). 
The Voralb was very closely related to the area beyond the 
Neckar, also already-under Roman control. 
Intimately linked with this is the garrisoning of the 
Nbrdlinger Ries, to'the northeast of the Alb series of forts. 
Schbnberger (1985,388) has outlined the possible reasons for 
an early'Roman occupation of this circular basin, 25km in 
diameter, created by the impact of a giant meteorite. It is 
agriculturally very rich, and therefore probably supported a 
substantial population. Schbnberger suggests that it would be 
a vital corridor for manoevering forces to meet an attack from 
the north, aimed at the provincial capital. Thirdly, an ancient 
trade, route, a continuation of the Via Claudia, - probably ran 
north through the Ries from Augsburg-to cross the line of the 
later frontier. ' Like the Wetterau in Upper Germany, the 
Nbrdlinger Ries could not be left to peoples outside the empire 
if there were to be any Roman holdings beyond the Rhine and 
Danube at all, and just as the Wetterau determined the course 
of the Upper German frontier, so the Nbrdlinger Ries would 
basically define the course of the Roman frontier north of the 
Danube. 
The origins of the later frontier line lay in the road which 
struck out from an early date - at about the same time as the 
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Ries itself was occupied - from Pforring and Kbsching by the 
Danube towards, the area north of the Ries, with'Pfunz and 
Weissenburg established as large and important stations on the 
way by clOO. By cllO a series of forts of various sizes lay 
along a continuation of this road-skirting the north edge of 
the Ries and supervising the traditional north-south, route 
entering or leaving the Nbrdlinger Ries. Theilenhofen, 
Gnotzheim and Unterschwanigen are all clearly situated in an 
evident gap in the land above 500m which forms the Schwabian 
Alb and Frankische Jura, a gap which opens directly into the 
Nbrdlinger Ries and the route to Augusta Vindelicum. The early 
Roman concern here was obviously the control of movement 
through this gap. -,, 
At first sight this-might appear as a piece of grand strategy 
directed against a military threat; the Roman dispositions, 
with the, road leading from Eining on the Danube directly to the 
danger-zone north of the Ries, apparently allowing the rapid 
deployment of forces to deal with an attempted incursion ' 
through the gap. However, the road from the Danube may also be 
viewed as simply the usual sort of penetration-road into a 
newly garrisoned territory, necessary for the supply and 
safeguarding of an occupying force. It is an indication that 
the Romans were more concerned with regulating routine 
poulation movementýand discouraging small scale raids (rather 
than countering a strategic onslaught) that from the beginning 
the garrisons in and north of the Ries were scattered and 
widely spaced out so that each covered a place where passage 
was possible. In some cases they were very small posts. There 
was not a large mobile reserve, placed say in the Ries, with 
which strategically to counter an invasion. 
Raetia's milliary ala lay 50km southwest of the centre of the 
Ries, at Heidenheim, where it could more easily cover the road 
system crossing the Schwabian Alb. In the Ries itself'the 
forts founded in the 90s and lasting only until the early 
second century were only two: Munningen (2.70ha) and 
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Nordlingen, of unknown size. The former in any case owed its 
existence to the junction of the Via Claudia and the road 
running east from Oberdorf. North of the Ries, Gnotzheim held 
a cohort at the road junction where the road from Weissenburg 
met the entry into'the Ries; Unterschwanigen, supervising the 
ý70ha in size west side of the passage into the Ries, was only 0. 
(Baatz 1975,230). Theilenhofen, between Weissenburg and 
Gnotzheim, and 2.25km behind the later frontier line, may have 
originated by cllO. It clearly played a role in blocking the 
access corridor, but could hardly, having such a forward 
position, have contributed to'a mobile reserve. It is often 
suggested that-it replaced Munningen, in'the Ries (Baatz 1975, 
238; Schbnberger 1985,388); while this is possible, it might 
rather have replaced the Flavian site which might one day be 
found where the road from Weissenburg crosses the AltmOhl. If 
Ellingen's timber phase originated this early (cllO), its small 
size also implies a detachment or numerus engaged in frontier 
police work rather than a strategic placement in the gap into 
the Ries; this is also implied by its proximity to Weissenburg, 
only 4km to the'south-southwest. The larger fort overlooked 
the major arterial route from the Danube to the Foreland of the 
Ries; the unit in the smaller, on a spur of rolling land 
between two river valleys running north-south, presumably 
served an independent role of surveillance. In all of these, 
cases, then, 'the early forts seem to have been established 
either in relation to the road system, or to monitor movement 
in and out of Roman occupied territory. Their concerns seem to 
be the strictly local ones of occupying garrisons, more 
concerned with policing and surveillance than preparations for 
invasion. 
The road running from Kbsching to Weissenburg and beyond 
invites comparison with the Stanegate in Britain, for like the 
Stanegate this road was eventually supplemented by an 
artificial linear frontier lying a short distance to the north. 
As in the case of the Stanegate, the road itself hardly 
acquires the characteristics of a linear frontier. This should 
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come as no surprise, for there is even less reason to suppose 
that the Raetian road ever served as any kind of frontier 
delineation. The early fort sites associated with it, 
discussed above (1.6.2; 1.7.2), are not concerned with 
preventing movement across the road; indeed most do not lie 
upon-the road itself. They were apparently concerned with 
monitoring movements by greater, or lesser parties of people, as 
an occupying army might be expected to do. It was just in 
front of these sites that the artificial frontier was 
eventually provided. ý, But before the provision of the 
artificial-frontier, it must be assumed that the army in the 
foreland of the Nbrdlinger Ries had not ruled out further 
advance. 
The distribution of sites along the Stanegate after c105 is not 
exactly similar to that in the foreland of the Ries, but there 
are resemblances: in both arrangements forts occur on both 
sides of the road (the discovery of a pre-Hadrianic site at 
Chesters would increase the resemblance still). Nevertheless 
the impression gained of the sites along the central Stanegate 
is that they are most closely concerned with the supervision of 
the road. It may be possible to account for this: it has 
already been-postulated that the comparative frontier 
development suggests that in north Britain local resistance to 
the Roman presence was more fierce, and that therefore the army 
found itself in greater danger, than in Raetia. Hence a 
greater provision of stations along an important road. 
A closer parallel in Britain would be provided by a road and 
accompanying system of forts that have not here been considered 
in detail, precisely because they did not function as a linear 
frontier. The road in question is the penetration road that 
runs north from Camelon via Ardoch and Strageath. It started 
life, like the Raetian road, as an invasion route which ran 
around the northern fringe of fertile territory which the 
Romans wished to protect. The British road may have linked the 
armies marching up through central, Scotland with-Roman 
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dispositions (which await discovery) at the mouth of the Tay in 
much the same way as the Raetian road linked troops lower on 
the Danube with those operating in the NOrdlinger Ries. There 
was a brief interval when the Gask linear frontier was 
established on this line, but this was a coincidental use of a 
convenient line: the road would not at this time have 
functioned as an arterial or penetration route. Probably just 
before this episode, the road operated as an important route 
with auxiliary forts stationed along it at intervals (just as 
on the road running from Eining), but now forts were also 
pushed forward of the road into the mouths of the highland 
glens, perhaps to monitor movement in much the same way as the 
sites that have been considered north of the Raetian road. The 
presence of a legionary fortress in Scotland suggests that this 
arrangement anticipated the final conquest of the highlands. 
In Raetia, when the Ries was secured, no further advance may 
have been contemplated. But before that stage was reached, 
there is no reason to believe that the military dispositions in 
Raetia were forming any kind of demarcated linear frontier. By 
about cllO the process by which the outermost dispositions 
north of the Ndrdlinger Ries began to coalesce into a linear 
frontier arrangement, with patrol track and watchtowers, had 
begun. Having started so much later than other stretches of 
frontier in Upper Germany north of the Neckar, the development 
in Raetia now proceeded at a much more gradual pace. Once 
again this suggests that the problems which faced the Roman 
troops in Raetia, and which provoked the construction of a 
preclusive frontier, were of a lower order of intensity, or 
were slower to develop. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The above study has shown greater variation in what was 
happening in different frontier provinces at various times than 
is often supposed. To a large extent this has been explained 
in terms of natural limits of occupation. In Germany and 
124 
Raetia these comprised the areas beyond Rhine and Danube which 
needed to be occupied in order to allow for effective 
communications between provinces and to prevent the provinces 
from being threatened. To have gone beyond these limits would 
have involved a large scale offensive beyond the lower Rhine 
and the central Danube, reviving the policy of the Augustan 
age. It is hoped that it is not historically deterministic to 
assert that this was out of the question. In Germany and 
Raetia these natural limits of conquest had, by the 
late-Trajanic period, for the most part (though not entirely) 
been reached. 
In Britain the natural extent of the Roman constituency, the 
edge of the Scottish Highlands, was achieved only briefly. 
Circumstances, probably troop withdrawals precipitated by the 
emrgency of c86 onwards on the Danube, made practical 
occupation of all of that territory impossible. This led to 
the eventual building of a frontier (Hadrian's Wall) at the 
edge of what could be occupied; but it took the Romans a 
generation to accept this. All this time, frontier systems had 
been elaborated in much of Upper Germany. In Britain there are 
no intervening frontier systems, at least of the linear type, 
to be found. 
Thus artificial linear frontiers were built where there were no 
natural lines of demarcation and security; in Britain, because 
conquest was incomplete; beyond the Rhine,, in the places where 
there were no substantial rivers to mark the frontier line. 
Once constructed they tended to stay where they were, 
permanently. It is suggested, on the basis of the above study, 
that their extension into entire frontier systems (after the 
first use of watchtower systems in localised areas) was the 
result of a conscious decision. They did not spring up 
accidentally, or by reflex response to military, setback; least 
of all were they temporary expedients of warfare or 
campaigning. It is suggested here that the most likely context 
for the decision to plant watchtower frontiers in Britain, 
I 
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Upper Germany and Raetia is the Danube crisis of c86-92, which 
decisively tipped the balance of military concern away from the 
northwest. These frontiers grew out of the realisation that the 
lines they marked were probably going to be there for as long 
as anyone'could forsee; of course there were instances where 
this was not the case, but they are really exceptional. 
While the linear systems did evolve from the congealed 
dispositions of troops which had ceased to advance, as Mann 
clearly saw,, this did not happen automatically. A conscious 
decision had to be made, at some level. It was not made in 
north Britain for a generation after c86; the building of a 
frontier under Hadrian represented a new policy and cannot 
convincingly be shown to be a continuation of a process which 
had begun under Trajan. In the eastern Wetterau the 
dispositions which immediately preceded the building of an 
advanced line of towers had none of the elements of a linear 
frontier. Here also the frontier line came suddenly; and this 
was long before Hadrian's accession. 
The watchtower systems, with their garrison forts, were not 
provincial boundaries. Nor were they a coordinated system of 
defence against invasion; they were decided upon in piecemeal 
fashion to form a system of border surveillance. Such security 
was necessary because large communities of free peoples 
remained outside the zone of practical occupation. Some 
sections faced threats of greater intensity than others; all 
were concerned with local interception of raiders and 
infiltrators. The choice of location of the various frontier 
systems in relation to one another (while to a great extent 
influenced by natural features such as rivers) was entirely 
rational. 
In Upper Germany, frontier lines were adopted at an early 
stage, and for the most part were presumably effective in their 
role of border'surveillance. In Britain, the Romans were 
forced backfrom one line to another (the unique and formidable 
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wall of Hadrian) over-a generation of warfare. In-the area of 
the Neckar and in Raetia over an even longer period the Roman 
army progressed gradually and leisurely towards a definitive 
frontier. With the exception of the Sibyllenspur, -which in any 
case can be argued not to have been a border surveillance- 
system of the type here considered)-no temporary linear 
frontiers were built on the wayý- Although troops were probably 
drained from Britain, there was always a much greater 
proportional number of troops there than in Raetia. This seems 
clear evidence, for a more formidable local resistance to Roman 
occupation. Like the development of the Roman frontiers, the 
resistance of local peoples was far from uniform throughout 
northwest Europe. 
So it was the inability to overcome resistance with available 
resources (crises on-the Danube generally draining the 
resources) and the inability to extend conquest indefinitely, 
which led to the invention of the artificial linear frontier, 
in different ways at different times. It has long been 
lamented that the Roman army began to lose its way; that 
momentum was lost; that this, happened without people 
particularly realising it. What is-suggested here is that to 
the individuals responsible for decision making on the 
frontiers, much of the trend of what was happening must have 
been perfectly clear; that the frontier systems consequently 
constructed in the Flavian-Trajanic age were self-conscious 
institutions, and not chosen and built without a large measure 
of rationality. 
3.7 A'note on terminology: the use of the term limes 
Until five years ago, few writers setting out to describe the 
military works considered in this thesis would have hesistated 
to use the term limes to describe them. However, B Isaac, in 
an article published in 1988, has suggested that the term limes 
was never used in antiquity in the sense of a defensive system 
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of military installations (even though in modern usage it has 
become synonymous with the defensive and administrative systems 
known to students of Roman frontier studies). In earlier, 
writing, he argued, it was used in the sense of a military road 
or a demarcated land boundary; in the late Roman period it 
acquired the sense of a garrisoned zone. 'The common 
translation of the term as "defended border" is incorrect for 
every period' (Isaac 1988,125). 
Isaac's point that there is no evidence for the word limes 
being used in reference to specific military installations must 
be accepted. Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine Wall in Britain 
were both always referred to as a vallum in inscriptions. On 
the Continent individual towers are referred to by such terms 
as burgus. ' As Isaac says, all of the references in the sources 
to limites being constructed or laid out almost certainly use 
the term in the sense of a road. 
It is possible to suggest, however, that in the few sources 
which refer to 11mites in the sense of land boundaries of the 
empire (a sense about which there is no disagreement in these 
examples), the concepts of 'frontier system' and 'demarcated 
boundary' are rather more blurred than Isaac allows. 
In the following passage from SHA v. Hadr. 12: 
In plurimis locis, In quibus barbarl non fluminibus sed 
limitibis dividuntur, stipitibus magnis In modum muralls saepis 
funditus lactis atque conexis barbaros separavit 
Isaac claims that limitibus cannot refer in any sense to 
military installations, because the passage refers to something 
-a notional, demarcated boundary - that existed before 
Hadrian's palisade. 'From the wording it is clear that it was 
called limes before Hadrian built a permanent structure to mark 
it as such' (Isaac 1988,128). However, as we have 
established, Hadrian's palisade was merely an augmentation of a 
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continuous frontier line physically demarcated by watchtowers 
and patrol track since the Flavian'period. The passage could 
be taken literally as saying 'where not rivers, but watchtower 
systems, existed, Hadrian added a palisade'. 
There are two major difficulties with seeing the limes as an 
abstract entity or'notion with no relation to the military 
installations except coincidence of site. Firstly, apart from 
the watchtower systems of Upper Germany and Raetia, or the 
three discernableýlinear frontier systems of Britain, there was 
nothing else to demarcate the boundary that was the limes. 
Surely, a writer with the notion of limes, in his mind, seeking 
to place it in a real setting, would think first of these 
linear arrangements of military installations, just as Aelius 
Aristides did when he sought to express the nature of the 
frontiers by referring to forts, walls and garrisons in a ring 
around the world. Secondly, as was suggested by our review of 
the earliest development of linear frontier systems, the, 
decision that there would be no further advance, and thus the 
definition of the boundary of a province such as Upper Germany, 
were both intimately linked with the building of artificial 
frontier systems. Once the decision had been made, it was the 
army that demarcated the boundary on the ground, in its own 
way, for purposes of security. There is no example of a land 
frontier said to possess a limes where the very earliest , 
demarcation of the provincial boundary was not carried out by 
the military. 
Thus it seems impossible to rule out the possibility that in a 
passage such as the following, -the term limes carries 
undertones of a line physically demarcated by the military: 
[The emperor] per limitem Raetlae ad hostes extirpandos 
barbarorum terram Introiturus est (ILS 451). 
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The same association of limes in the surveyor's sense and the 
concept of a border marked by a military installation is seen 
in the Antonine Itinerary: 
Iter Britanniarum... A limite, Id est a vallo, Praetorlo 
In Britain the whole frontier system was evidently referred to 
as 'The Wall', just as it is today by archaeologists. In 
Germany, especially before the construction of the paling, or 
on the Gask, there would have been no such convenient catch-all 
term, and in fact we have no idea how Romans on the ground, if 
they did not use the term limes, could have referred to a 
system of installations forming an interconnected linear 
frontier. 
An observation of Isaac's may help to support the possibility 
that frontier installations could be-included in the concept of 
limes. On the basis-of SHA Hadr. 12 he points out that limes 
refers strictly to land boundaries, and not to rivers. This is 
reminiscent of the conclusion that has been arrived at in this 
thesis: that formal linear frontier systems do not occur on the 
great river frontiers (where there are chains of forts, but the 
river itself takes the-place of a cordon of watchtowers). The 
only provinces in the empire with demarcated land boundaries 
(Isaac's limites) are Britain, Upper Germany, Raetia and Dacia; 
precisely where archaeologically distinctive continuous 
frontiers occur. This again suggests that the land boundary or 
limes was seen as demarcated by the early watchtower frontiers 
and the systems into which they developed. In Britain the 
limes or demarcated boundary had no separate existence from the 
military works, for presumably it lay on the Tyne-Solway where 
previously it had been laid out on the Gask in Scotland. Is it 
not futile to argue that in either case the towers or the Wall 
had nothing to do with the concept of limes in onlookers' 
minds? Conversely, there is no example of a source referring 
to a limes in the sense of a boundary in circumstances where 
the frontier remained unsettled, or military installationsýhad 
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not yet formed a linear disposition -as, for example, in north 
Britain between c95 and c120. 
None of this is to deny the primary meaning of the term limes 
as 'land boundary', however, and it follows that the suggested 
connection of the term with systems of installations must be 
rigorously confined to those land frontiers which were laid out 
as demarcated boundaries in strictly linear fashion. Their 
distribution is restricted to northwest Europe. 
In Dacia, watchtower systems and barriers were interspersed 
with the natural obstacles provided by the Carpathians; 
mountains also dominated the Cappadocian frontier north of the 
Euphrates. Mountains, like river frontiers, did not attract 
the term limes. For the porous systems of military control in 
the East and Africa, the term limes would be quite 
inappropriate. As we shall see (7.3-4 below), here there were 
no demarcated boundaries, or truly linear systems of military 
installations. Even though these are frontiers where in theory 
there could have been a land boundary to the province, the word 
limes is never used to refer to these areas in the Principate 
(except for limes Tripolitanus in the Antonine Itinerary, for 
which an explanation is advanced in 7.4.4). 
The suggestion made here, in short, is that although limes was 
never used on the ground to refer to particular installations. 
such as Hadrian's Wall, or the German palisade, in those 
provinces where military setback led to the delineation of a 
land boundary or limes, this, and the artificial works which 
defined it, were in practice inseparable. The two things may 
have become blurred into one concept when the whole system was 
viewed from outside. 
Thus the term limes is used in the title of this work, which 
sets out to consider military installations, for these reasons: 
firstly, it is a contention of this thesis that linear 
frontiers were a product of policy rather than organic growth 
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on the ground. Thus they were intimately linked with the 
demarcation of the limes of a province. Secondly, the emphasis 
is on these frontiers as linear systems, and not mere 
collections of individually named parts. There is no other 
word known which generalizing commentators (as opposed to 
soldiers on the ground erecting inscriptions on individual 
installations) could have used to refer to the whole system of 
a fortified land boundary. Thirdly, the special linear 
frontiers considered in this thesis had a highly restricted 
geographical distribution which coincides with the use of the 
word limes in the sense of a land boundary in the sources. The 
over-extensive modern use of the word limes criticised by Isaac 
finds its exact parallel in the tendency to see preclusive 
linear frontier systems where in fact quite different frontier 
arrangements prevailed (eg in Africa). If the word limes is 
retained here - pace Isaac - in an archaeological sense, it is 
also retained in a highly restricted one. 
Chapter 4 
SECOND CENTURY FRONTIER DEVELOPMENT IN UPPER GERMANY AND RAETIA 
Much of the first two chapters of this work was spent in 
questioning the linear character that has been attributed to 
certain dispositions of Roman military installations of the 
Flavian-Trajanic period, and isolating those that can be seen 
to have been deliberately arranged as linear frontier systems. 
As soon as the student turns to the second-century frontiers of 
northern Britain and Germany and Raetia, much of the ambiguity 
of the earlier military dispositions evaporates,, as the age of 
the self-evident linear frontier is entered. From the reign of 
Hadrian onwards, our task, is less to identify linear frontiers, 
than to compare the various developments of the great 
preclusive linear systems that had become a feature of the age. 
This, at any rate, is the case for the land frontiers of 
northwest Europe; as we shall see, in other parts of the 
empire, even in the second and third centuries, the very 
existence of formal linear frontier systems may still be 
questioned. 
This chapter attempts to trace the development of the formal 
linear frontier systems of Upper Germany and Raetia after the 
late-Trajanic period. Close attention will be paid to the 
problem of chronology, for it is only by attempting to refine 
the dating of the completion of various sectors that it can be 
established that it took much longer to arrive at a definitive 
frontier line in some areas than in others. The problem of the 
purpose of the second century systems is left to the 
comparative analysis of Chapter 6. For the present, it remains 
to chart the process by which the Romans between Rhine and 
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Danube moved, at different rates in different areas, towards 
the notion of a definitive linear frontier, and began to 
construct ever, more elaborate running barriers to mark such 
lines. II 
The Hadrianic period-saw the enlargement of certain Upper 
German fort sites to auxiliary size, and the addition of 
several Inumerus-sized' forts, but it is no longer considered 
that in one fell policy swoop 'Hadrian discontinued Domitian's 
excellent scheme of three, lines of defence in Upper Germany by 
moving his, cohorts forward to the limes itself from many of the 
forts to the rear, which he abandoned' (Brogan 1935,17). That 
was the view of Schleiermacher (1967,218-21). As the 
foregoing account should have made clear, now 'Man glaubt 
ausserdem nicht mehr an eine 'Limesreforml Hadrians in 
Obergermanien' (Schbnberger 1985,393). The road forts (except 
for Friedburg) had been given up by cllO-115; the eastern 
Wetterau frontier and its forts established by cllO. Under 
Hadrian we see the continuation of a process of increasing the 
number of units stationed upon the linear frontier which had , 
begun in the Flavian period and which had been carried on under 
Trajan. If Hadrian's reign saw the decisive general 
application of a running barrier in this sector, in terms of 
the distribution of forts, there were only limited additions 
and alterations left to that ruler. If anything, Hadrian's 
reign saw a lull in the process of intensifying garrisons on 
the linear frontiers, which were to receive more new sites 
after the mid-second century. 
4.1 The early development of continuous frontier barriers 
Already by Trajan's reign - sometime in the period clOO-c120 - 
the first lengths of timber fencing had been arranged along the 
northern Wetterau frontier (1.3). The general application of a 
timber palisade to the Rhine-Main frontier is traditionally 
dated-to Hadrian's reign on the evidence of SHA Hadrian 12.6 
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(quoted in 3.7 above). In general the uniform nature of the 
palisade has tended to support the belief that it was provided 
as part of a general building programme, although there were 
variations in the techniques of construction used. At the 
time when the Vorverlegung, or replacement of the 
Odenwald-Neckar frontiers with a dead-straight frontier line 
advanced up to 30km to the east, took place, the palisade still 
stood alone as the continuous frontier barrier. The same is 
true in Raetia: the barrier, was extended towards the west at 
various dates, culminating in the construction of the final 
stretch north of the Rems, east of Lorch, in the mid-Antonine 
period. But at that final stage of completion the only running 
barrier to be supplied was the palisade (or other kinds of 
fencing). The general addition of the earthwork known as the 
Pfahlgraben in Upper Germany, and the ' 
Raetian stone frontier 
wall, are events that did not take place until after the whole 
frontier system had taken its final form. 
4.2 Outposts beyond the Odenwald and Neckar before the later 
frontier advance? 
'Hier muss aber die endgültige Vorlage des Fundstoffes und die 
Interpretation im einzelnen noch abgewartet werden' (Planck 
1988,267). 
Schbnberger, originally in 1957 (Schdnberger 1957,74-80), then 
in modified form (1969,168-69), expressed the view that 
certain sites on the later outer frontier, established under 
Pius between the Main and Lorch, had originally been occupied 
as outposts beyond the Odenwald and Neckar frontiers under 
Hadrian-. The sites claimed, on the basis of the presence of 
samian stamps identical to examples recovered from the 
demolition levels of the Saalburg Erdkastell (demolished before 
139), were Miltenberg-Altstadt, Osterburken and Ohringen-West. 
These sites had also produced tiles of the XXII Legion thought 
to date to the Hadrianic period; so had Jagsthausen on the 
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outer line, although the last site had produced no earlier 
samian. Baatz (1976b) has shown, however, that this group of 
tiles does not indicate occupation before the mid-second 
century., The places which Schbnberger (1985,395) still 
believed in 1985 to have been held in this way were 
Miltenberg-Altstadt and (not one of the original candidates) 
Welzheim-Ost. 
The reason, for discarding Ohringen-West and Osterburken from 
the series of proposed outposts stems from excavation which has 
taken place at these sites since Schdnberger's 1969 article. 
At 6hringen prolonged excavations by Schbnberger have failed to 
provide clear proof-of which of the attested units - Cohors I 
Helvetiorum and several numeri - resided in which of the two 
known forts, 6hringen-West (Burgkastell) and Ohringen-Ost 
(Rendelkastell). It is generally felt, however, that the 
western fort, c2.20ha with an initial timber phase, was most 
probably the base of cohors I Helvetiorum upon its move from 
Bbckingen, and that this is the earlier of the two forts (Baatz 
1975,196-97). No evidence for earlier occupation was found 
here (Schbnberger, 1972); the conclusion drawn was that cohors I 
Helvetiorum was the earliest garrison involved at 6hringen, and 
that as the unit is still attested in Bbckingen in 148, 
6hringen can no longer long pre-date the Vorverlegung. 
6hringen-West was notably well defended from the beginning with 
three ditches: the possibility has been raised that 'hat man es 
als Basis vom Neckarlimes her in die regio translimitana 
vorgeschoben, um von diesem wichtigen Verkehrspunkt aus die 
Massnahmen fOr die Errichtung der vorderen Limeslinie zu 
treffen' (RiBW, 463). Osterburken (stone from the outset, 
2.10ha), similarly formerly cited as, an outpost site, has 
produced no further evidence of pre-mid-second century 
occupation, and also seems to have received a unit directly 
from the old line, cohors III Aquitanorum from Neckarburken 
(2.20ha). 
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Turning to the sites still claimed as outposts by Schbnberger, 
problems surround the fort at Miltenberg-Altstadt. Here too 
the fort received a unit from-the former line, cohors I 
Sequanorum et Rauracorum from Oberscheidental. Slight traces 
of a timber predecessor to the 2.70ha stone fort at 
Miltenberg-Altstadt have been detected (Schbnberger 1985,479). 
Five samian stamps from the site are also known in the Saalburg 
Erdkastell demolition levels. Recently, Beckmann (1986) has , 
argued., despite this, that in general the'pottery from Altstadt 
is not older than that elsewhere on the outer frontier. 
At Welzheim-Ost (stone, 1.60ha; not one of Schbnberger's 
original candidates) it seems clear that the smaller, east fort 
originated earlier than its western counterpart, a short time 
before the middle of the second century (Schbnberger 19801,545; 
RiBW, 616); ie probably in the late-Hadrianic or early Antonine 
period, 'before the rest of the Vorverlegung. This conclusion 
is reached on the basis of the samian from the site. There is 
no certainty at Welzheim which unit, if any, came directly from 
the rearward frontier; it is often said to have been ala I 
Scubulorum (eg RiBW, 613), but an ala inscription from Welzheim 
is incomplete and does not name the unit (ORLB 45,13-14). 
In only one case, then, is there a really firm suggestion of a 
foundation date earlier than the general move to the outer 
frontier under Pius. Welzheim-Ost can be accepted as the site 
of an early outpost, and it is notable that its relationship to 
the running outer frontier strongly suggests that the fort 
might pre-date the laying out of the line (Baatz 1975,205). 
There is; 'of course; the incidence of the Erdkastell-type 
samian at some of the other sites to be reckoned with. It may 
be noted that in every case we are dealing with a unit moved 
wholesale and directly from an existing base less than 30km 
away. The Vorverlegung is thought to have been a bloodless 
advance. In these circumstances, it is easy to imagine the 
units transporting existing stocks, or personal possessions, of 
pottery to their new residence; if the units moved in c155, the 
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samian in question would only have been residual by about 
twenty years, and it need not occasion surprise to-find pottery 
of--this age'still in use at these sites. 
4.3 Second-century frontier development in Raetia (Figs 10, 
11; 12) 
11 
In dealing with the development of the network of military 
occupation-in*Raetia after cllO, it is tempting to look for a 
distinct Hadrianic frontier development, as is-seen in 
Hadrian's Wall in Britain and possibly in the general provision 
of a palisade on the land frontiers of Upper, Germany. Yet such 
a development is difficult to detect. There is merely 
continuous slow development-, of the military network throughout 
this period; Hadrian's reign marks no special watershed but, as 
in the development of fort dispositions in Upper Germany, is 
merely a stage in a process of development which had begun long 
before, and which, in the Raetian case at least, would not 
approach completion until after Hadrian's death. 
For this reason, it is not possible to present a series of 
really closely dated maps of the frontier dispositions of 
Raetia; rather the developments must be presented as taking 
place in a series of very broadly dated phases. So after C110 
there is a map representing the situation as it had generally 
developed in Raetia by the time of the early part of Hadrian's 
reign, ie a picture, very broadly, of dispositions as they 
might be cllO-cl2O. Secondly the situation as it had developed 
by the end of Hadrian's reign; ie covering the developments, 
very broadly, of the period c120-c140. 
4.3.1 Developments in Raetia c110-c120 (Fig 10) 
In, contrast to the land frontiers of Upper Germany, the 
frontier east of the Neckar remained open under Hadrian; its 
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evolution was still taking place. As in Lowland Scotland 
between c90 and c105, the Roman army evidently perceived that 
its dispositions would not last forever more as they were; in 
this case further advance here and there'to rationalise the-, 
situation was to take place. 
A fort'(2.20ha), discovered from the air at Eislingen in 1966, 
cannot at present be closely dated. But it is thought to be 
early-second century, and its position, probably as a post on a 
road linking Kbngen (or Stuttgart Bad-Canstatt) and Heidenheim 
(RiBW, 276-77), suggests its role, although the actual road and 
other installations to complete a supposed system of 
Trajanic-Hadrianic date, forming a new forward disposition 
linking the Neckar to the Alb, have not yet come to light 
(Schbnberger 1985,469). Such a disposition would have been a 
garrisoned route, not a formal linear frontier. 
Associated with the same advance may be the installation 
discovered in 1976 at Deggingen (Planck 1988,262-64) in 
Landkreis G6ppingen (0.30ha). - Planck uses similarity of size 
to argue that this site was associated with the 
Sibyllenspur-associated fortlets of Dettingen and Donstetten, 
although it might be considered unlikely that the Sibyllenspur 
was still functioning with such an installation so far in 
advance of it. 
Probably by this time the forts in the Nbrdlinger Ries at 
Nbrdlingen and Munningen had been given up (Schbnberger 1985, 
471), although'a rather later date of 120-130 ' 
has been 
suggested (Planck 1976,445); the third Ries fort of Oberdorf 
may well have outlived the other two. Meanwhile various 
alterations took place on the sector of the frontier north of 
the Ries, where a natural north-south access corridor ran 
through the Alb. The fort at Ruffenhofen, where the earliest 
known fort is of stone (3.70ha), is thought to date to the 
earlier second century, although any foundation date must be 
extremely vague given the lack of evidence (Schdnberger 1985, 
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471). Baatz (1975,227) has suggested that it was built for 
the unit that must previously have lain in the western Ries, at 
Nbrdlingen. The fact that the Ries forts were given up and an 
equivalent number established at some date on the frontier to 
the north is here taken to imply a sequence, with Ruffenhofen 
and Dambach being established later than other northern Raetian 
forts (Ellingen, Theilenhofen, Gnotzheim, Gunzenhausen, 
Unterschwanigen) upon'the abandonment of the Ries sites. These 
developments may have been substantially complete-by the 
beginning-of Hadrian's reign. 
The final element in this screen of forts was Dambach, where 
the earliest known installation is stone (0.97ha). Here again, 
the foundation date is obscure (Schbnberger 1985,471), and in 
theory, if the site had a timber predecessor, it could be as 
eýirly as the forward sites of Theilenhofen and Ellingen. 
But-again there is a possible sequence to be glimpsed. Dambach 
lies 5km northwest of Unterschwaningen, a similar (only two 
gates) fort of timber, and somewhat smaller at 0.70ha, and may 
have been its successor, Unterschwaningen having only a very 
brief period of occupation at the beginning of the second 
century (Ulbert and Fischer 1983,66). It is unfortunate that 
the foundation date of Dambach is unclear, for this fort, hard 
up against the frontier line, and seemingly aligned upon it, 
would surely provide a terminus ante quem for the establishment 
of the watchtower system in this sector. 
West of Ruffenhofen the frontier system remained open and 
porous: well into the Hadrianic period there was no linear 
frontier in the formal sense. A road probably descended from 
Ruffenhofen, via Oberdorf (which had existed on the northwest 
fringe of the Nbrdlinger Ries since about the turn of the 
century) to the neighbourhood of Eislingen and Heidenheim, and 
thence to the Neckar (Planck 1988,260 Abb. 3). 
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4.3.2 -Development in Raetia cl20-cl4O (Fig 11) 
Several forts on the Danube, Unterkirchberg, Burgh6fe and 
Oberstimm, had apparently survived into the Hadrianic period 
(whether fully garrisoned or not until the end is unclear) but 
must have finally gone out of use in'these years (Schbnberger 
1985,396). On the emerging frontier line itself, the 
numerus-sized, forts at Gunzenhausen and Ellingen would 
conventionally be dated to these years, but the case for'an 
earlier foundation has been-examined above (1.7.2)'. 
At this time, the forward system of frontier forts began to be 
extended towards the west. Halheim, where the known site is 
stone, 0.67ha. is thought to be mid-second century (Planck and 
Beck 1987. - 149),, although on no clear dating evidence. The- 
stone fort at Rainau-Buch (2.10ha) is usually seen as being a 
successor to Oberdorf in the northwest entry to the NOrdlinger 
Ries. 
The fact that Oberdorf was not at any time rebuilt in stone has 
been taken to indicate that the site must, haveýbeen abandoned 
at least a decade before Heidenheim, which was rebuilt in stone 
before its final abandonment in c155-60 (Baatz 1975,216). 
This is not an entirely logical argument: it assumes that all' 
forts in a-sector of a frontier will tend to have been replaced 
in stone at about the same time. It is possible, in fact, to 
envisage the important ala milliarla fort at Heidenheim 
receiving stone treatment earlier than others. Nevertheless, a 
preponderance, of earlier second century coin-issues and the 
presence of Souih Gaulish samian has led to the suggestion that 
Buch was founded earlier than Aalen (Heidenheim's successor 
site), and that the foundation of Buch lay in the years before 
140 (Planck 1976,444-45). 
If this evidence is accepted, it has important implications for 
the development of the frontier for, as Planck succinctly 
proposes, it means that Buch and Halheim had nothing to do with 
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the later frontier between Aalen and Schirenhof, but were 
essentially an extension of the system formed by Ruffenhofen, 
Dambach and Theilenhofen, forts pushed forward to supervise 
routes into the Nbrdlinger Ries. 
It seems probable that the frontier developed in three main 
stages, with the Halheim-Buch sector being added sometime after 
the earliest (cllO-cl2O) sector of linear frontier but before 
cl40,, and a full twenty years before the Aalen-Schirenhof 
sector to the west. Evidence for-a possible dislocation in the 
watchtower system is provided by two abnormally closely spaced 
towers at 13/22-23 near Ruffenhofen. 
By the 140s at the very latest, then, the linear system of 
patrol-track, watchtowers and even a running barrier had been 
extended as far west-as Buch. The most likely place for this 
linear system to have terminated is the valley-of the, river 
Kocher, 4km southwest of Buch. - It is possible that the line 
if that is the right word - of Roman military control 
descended, perhaps demarcated by the Kocher valley, to 
Heidenheim and the Fils valley fort at Eislingen. 
4.4 The vorverlegung: The second century completion of the, 
frontier in Upper Germany (Figs 7,12) 
The date of the Vorverlegung has been much debated. The 
watchtowers in the Odenwald were still in use, 'and being 
replaced in stone, in 145-6 by numerl Brittonum. It is 
probable that about the same time the Odenwald auxiliary forts 
were generally being rebuilt in stone (Schbnberger 1985,394), 
while two inscriptions of ala I Helvetiorum at 
Heilbronn-Bbckingen (CIL 13.6469; 13.6472) date to 148. 
Clearly in 146, when towers were being rebuilt, this frontier 
was still seen as a permanent fixture, and in 148 cohors I 
Helvetiorum did not contemplate its move to Ohringen. So mucb 
for the terminus post quem. 
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The terminus ante quem is provided, traditionally, by the 
outer-frontier fort of Jagsthausen, occupied by 161 at the 
latest-as an inscription of Antoninus Pius (CIL 13.6561) 
proves. Strictly, of course, Jagsthausen does not date the 
establishment of the whole frontier line; and if, as has in the 
past been suggested (see 4.2 above), it originated as an 
outpost of the Odenwald-Neckar system, its value as a terminus 
ante quem for the whole of the outer system would be much 
diminished. But the evidence of stamped tiles once--used to 
date Jagsthausen to an earlier period is now discredited (4.2' 
above), and we have seen how thin is the evidence for outposts 
in the period before the construction of the outer line. 
Furthermore Jagsthausen seems to respect the running line, 
lying just to the rear of it, in the same manner as the other 
forts. By far the most convincing interpretation is that with 
the exception of Welzheim-Ost all of the outer forts were built 
after the frontier line has been laid out. The epigraphic 
evidence from Jagsthausen therefore makes it highly probable 
that it was within the date range 148-161 that the construction 
of the new frontier in Strecken 7-9 took place. 
The traditionally accepted date for the move, - argued for by 
Fabricius in 1931 (ORLA 7-9,51), is 150-155. This view is 
reinforced by the argument of Alfbldy (1983), on the basis of 
the epigraphic evidence, that C. Popilius Carus Pedo, governor 
of Upper Germany cl5l-cl55, was most likely to have been 
responsible for the advance. This view is based on the 
description of Pedo (CIL 14.3610) not only as Pius' legate of 
Upper Germany, but also of exercitus In ea tendentis, implying 
that Pedo must have ledýa large scale military action which 
went beyond the scope of the normal military duties of a 
provincial governor. 
However, the discovery of an inscription in 1982, showing that 
the Brittones Elantlenses were still present at the numerus 
fort at Neckarburken on the old line under the Governor 
Calpurnius Agricola in 158, has cast1doubt upon the traditional 
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dating (Schallmayer 1984b), raising the possibility that the 
Vorverlegung occurred as late as 158-161. However, it is 
possible that the Brittones Elantlenses stayed behind on the 
old line after other units, including its companion cohort, III 
Aquitanorum, had been transferred. Indeed Schallmayer (1984, 
121-3; RiBW, 283-84) has argued that Neckarburken may have 
continued to be garrisoned'after the advance from the old line 
precisely because-its'situation on the Neckar placed it on a 
vital supply route between the Rhine and the outer frontier, 
with the fort at Heidelberg-Neuenheim possibly acting as. an 
intermediate post between Neckarburken and the Rhine. 
If the possibility is accepted that the late presence of the 
Brittones Elantlenses on the old line is an exceptional one, 
then the general advance may have occurred at its traditional 
date before 158 after all, and the Neckarburken inscription of 
158 may not really pose the difficulty that it appears to. 
Rather than simply returning to the traditional suggestion of 
c150-155, however, it will be noted that, whatever the 
strengths of Alfbldy's arguments, the somewhat more abundant 
dating evidence for the similar advance on the Raetian frontier 
suggests that the decision was taken there in the period 
155-60. If the two advances were simultaneous and 
co-ordinated, the possibility must remain that the Vorverlegung 
did not occur until very late in Pius' reign. 
One further indicator of the possible complexity of the move 
from the Odenwald to the outer line isýprovided by WP 10/37 on 
the old line. Here, in addition to the usual single stone 
watchtower, another tower existed which had a flight of steps 
leading into it and which functioned as a temple. Although 
this was formerly considered to have happened while the old 
line was still held, with the conversion of a tower into a 
temple necessitating the building of a second tower, certain 1 
stylistic details of the temple-sculptures have been linked 
with later-second century examples in nearby forts; there are 
also similarities between the Victoria statue of the temple and 
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one found in the old-line fort at Oberscheidental (Schallmayer 
1984,103-5). Furthermore, 10/37 lies immediately by the pass 
(controlled by Kleinkastell Seitzenbuche) across the Odenwald 
which most directly links the Neckar and Main areas; this is 
the route which cohors I Sequanorum et Rauracorum would have 
had to take to get to their new base, Miltenberg on the Main. 
The existence of this temple and the possibility of its later 
second century use might point to a more complex relationship 
between Oberscheidental and Miltenberg than one simply being 
abandoned in favour of the other; the same sort of complexity, 
with perhaps some residual activity on the rear line, that is 
hinted at by the Neckarburken inscription. 
4.5 The completion of the frontier in Raetia 
The extension of the towers and palisade east to the Danube 
The eastern part of Strecke 13 and the western part of 14 had 
received the earliest towers (Trajanic? ) and palisade 
(Hadrianic? ) in Raetia, and this was not extended to the Danube 
until later (above, 1.7). BOhming, the only fort forward on 
the actual frontier line in the eastern part of Strecke 14 or 
Strecke 15, and which ought therefore to provide a terminus 
ante quem for the layout of this section of frontier, has 
produced no pottery earlier than the mid-second century 
(Schbnberger 1985,487). The general alignment of the frontier 
line - from WP14/56 its course seems determined by the decision 
to follow the most direct route to the beginning of the Danube 
ravine, and runs on the same alignment west and east of the 
AltmUhl - suggests that the eastern part of Strecke 14 and 
Strecke 15 were laid out at the same time. 
The institution on the Raetian frontier of the Plechtwerkzaun, 
an irregular arrangement of two rows of timber uprights in a 
shallow trench (ORLA 13,13-14; ORLA 14,24-26; ORLA 15,17), 
did not take place everywhere at the same time, although 
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throughout these Strecken (ie east of 13/22) it post-dated the 
palisade. In places (14/6; 14/12; 14/15; 14/17; ORLA 14, Taf 
3; 5; 6) the Zaun was evidently built while timber towers were 
still standing; elsewhere (14/22; 14/25; ibid., Taf 7) it 
clearly postdates the stone towers, suggesting piecemeal 
replacement of the palisade in the 140s and 150s. Had it taken 
place any, later, a palisade matching that provided in Strecke 
12 and the western part of Strecke 13'in the 160s might have 
been expected. Elsewhere, presumably in the oldest stretches, 
which required the most replacements of the running barrier, 
the Flechtwerkzaun was preceded by a Bretterzaun (also known as 
the Bohlenzaun), probably a wall of planks, secured in a 
shallow trench by rows of flat packing stones on-either side, 
(ORLA 14,26). In the valley of the Felchbach, by 14/34, was 
recovered a remarkable sequence of continuous barriers: the 
palisade; Bretterzaun 1; Bretterzaun 2; the Flechtwerkzaun; and 
finally, the Raetian Wall (ibid., Taf 8). In Strecke 15 (ORLA 
15,17) the Plechtwerkzaun is little attested, supporting the 
idea that the palisade here was provided later than in the 
central sector of the Raetian frontier, and therefore did not 
need such extensive replacement before the provision of the 
stone Wall. 
From 13/22-3 to Buch 
It was suggested above (4.3.2) that the linear frontier of 
watchtowers was extended to the west, as far as the Kocher, 
with the construction of Halheim and Buch, perhaps by the 140s. 
The excavation at Dalkingen (12/81: 4.7. S12 below) produced two 
phases of a timber fence, or Zaun, pre-dating the palisade 
identifiable with that known from dendrochronology to have been 
supplied in Strecke 12 in the 160s. Furthermore, a 
dendrochronological date obtained from a timber barrier on the 
south edge of Scwhabsberg, near Buch, in 1975 was 139-140 
(Schdnberger 1985,397). Thus it seems probable that the Zaun 
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in this sector represents the earliest provision of a running 
barrier, perhaps by or in the'140s. 
West of Buch 
The dating evidence available at present makes it seem highly 
likely that-the final closure of the Raetian frontier west of 
Buch was undertaken after c155; the process may have been 
protracted. The series of, forts, still without any continuous 
frontier line connecting them, Heidenheim, Urspring and perhaps 
Eislingen, were abandoned and replaced with the series Aalen, 
Unterbbbingen and Schirenhof. The coin series from Urspring 
ends in 153-4 and this and the other Alb forts were probably 
given up in the period c155-60 (Schbnberger 1985,397; 
Heiligmann 1990,182-87,198-99). 
Timber from the forehall of the new stone fort at Aalen has 
produced a dendrochronological date of 160 +/- 10, but this was 
from aýsecondary, consolidated phase, following on rapidly from 
a temporary timber roofing over the via Principalis in-front of 
the headquarters (Planck and Beck 1987,122). A timber well in 
the courtyard yielded aýdendrochronologicalýfelling date of 168 
+/- 10-for its timbers (Planck 1988,268). The date had 
earlier been given as 179-+/- 10 (Planck and Beck 1987,124). 
Finally, the recently discovered building inscription recording 
the-completion of the Aalen principla is dated to 163-64 
(Planck 1988,268; Alfbldy, 1986,69). This inscription., 
however, might, notýhave been erected until after the temporary 
timber forehall had been rebuilt in its permanent stone form. 
These dates would suit admirably a first occupation of the site 
in the mid-150s leading to a formal completion of the fort, 
with full, second-phase forehall, by 164.4 
Aalen, 'then, was-complete by 164; and at exactly the same time, 
it seems, came the construction of the running barrier, the 
palisade, in the vicinity. Again the evidence is 
147 
dendrochronological. A felling-date of 163-4 has been obtained 
for the palisade in the Rotenbachtal (90m from the beginning of 
the Teufelsmauer, - at-12/22-23 (Planck and Beck 1987,107) and 
of c165 from the Jagsttal south of Schwabsberg, just north of 
Buch (Planck and Beck 1987,140-42). These dates seem rather 
late to be connected with a frontier advance instigated at the 
end of Pius' reign. No Zaun preceding the palisade has yet 
been found west of the Buch-Dalkingen, area, so it is probable 
that although the advance of the forts began c155, no running 
barrier west of Buch was constructed until early in Marcus' 
reign. 
The sequence that emerges, then,, is of a system of watchtowers 
extending as far west as the Kocher,, possibly pre-dating the 
middle of the century, and with a Zaun being constructed along 
all or part of the frontier east of the Kocher before the 150s. 
Then, c155, the decision was taken to move Heidenheim and its 
sister forts forward, and the frontier was closed, perhaps in 
two stages. At first, perhaps, a series of timber towers was 
built running west of the Kocher, but ending just by 
Unterbbbingen, where the most westerly timber tower (12/45) is 
known, and with the Rems itself serving as the frontier 
delineation west of that point. It is interesting that the 
frontier line running from the northeast does not attempt to 
stay to the north of the Rems at this point, but heads in a 
dead straight line for the valley bottom and the river itself. ý 
When the frontier was later extended west to Lorch, this 
resulted in the completed line making a curious steep descent 
into, and ascent from, the Remstal. The explanation for this 
would seem to be that originally the frontier was intended to 
terminate here and the river take over as the demarcated 
frontier line; hence the way the frontier line almost runs into 
the river here. 
Then, in the early 160s, came the consolidation of the whole 
system, with the recently or not so recently completed early 
Zaun everywhere being replaced with a substantial new palisade, 
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which coincided in date with the completion of Aalen and the 
other new forts and perhaps even with the construction of the 
stone watchtowers and, therefore, the final closure of the 
frontier between the Rems and Lorch. 
Thus the available dating evidence allows at least the 
possibility that the advanced Neckar frontier and the closed 
Raetian frontier were planned and constructed at the same time 
and met in deliberate synchronisation. Obviously, this cannot 
be proved, but it is a possibility that has been denied in the 
past. The date range for the Upper German Vorverlegung is 
strictly 148-161; for the Raetian advance 154-164; the 
resulting overlap, and the date range within which the advance 
must have taken place - if it was simultaneous on both 
frontiers - is therefore 154-161. . 
149 
12/1-Rems 
C110 
c120 
c130 
C140 
Rems-Kocher Kocher-13/22 13/22-14/50 14/50-Danube 
c150 
c155 timber towers 
cl60+ stone towers. paliBade 
palisade 
c170 
towers 
palisade 
towers. Bretterzaun towers, 
Zaun or Zaun palisade? 
Zaun 
palisade Zaun? 
c180 -' Wall Wall Wall ý wall Wall 
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4.6 Later development of the continuous frontier works 
The Pfahlgraben 
This, along with the term Wall und Graben, is the most commonly 
used term to describe the great continuous earthwork with which 
the palisade barrier of the Upper German frontier was augmented 
at some date after the mid-Antonine period. It was supplied 
throughout the length'of the German frontier, with the 
exception of various localised breaks and interruptions listed 
in the detailed Strecke descriptions below. 
The barrier consisted of a mound of earth upcast from, and 
placed to the rear of, a steep-sided V shaped ditch. The 
average total width of the work is some 19m, some 11.50m 
comprising the rampart, and the ditch generally being between 
6m and 7.50m wide, with a very small berm between the two, so 
that the outer face of the earth wall descends to form the 
inner face of the ditch, creating a steep and formidable 
ascent. In fact, these dimensions vary widely from sector to 
sector. There was no use of turf in the earth wall, nor is 
there any evidence for timber structures of any kind, whether 
to form additional obstacles, walkway or breastwork. It is 
clear, however, from the structural sequence at Feldberg (4.7S3 
below) that the palisade remained in use on the outside of the 
ditch, at least in certain places. How widespread was this 
survival of the palisade in front of the Pfahl is uncertain; 
perhaps it was only retained where it proved useful. In 
several places the Pfahl follows changes in the course of the 
palisade so closely as to suggest that the latter was still 
extant and determined the siting of the earthwork. Some 
evidence will be considered below (eg 4.7. S2) for openings 
through the Pfahl which may have been used by soldiers 
servicing the palisade; such openings have only been observed 
in limited areas. 
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The Raetian Wall 
In Raetia, instead of, the Pfahlgraben, a stone wall was built 
throughout Strecken 12,13,14 and 15. Its average width was 
only 1.20m. It was built of crudely dressed, mortared stone 
and not provided with a ditch. It was only broken, at rivers or 
steep stream valleys - where-a palisade was always. maintained 
as a substitute - and gateways and otherwise provided (unlike 
the Pfahlgraben) without interruption, east of the Rotenbachtal 
where it began (ORLA 12,42). Apart from at stream crossings, 
the palisade was not maintained in use as it was in conjunction 
with the, Pfahlgraben. Between WP 14/3 and 14/4 a collapsed 
portion of the Raetian wall showed that in this sector it must 
have stood to a height of at least 2.57m (ORLA 14,53; Ulbert 
and Fischer 1983,72). 
Dating 
The, mid-Antonine advance in Upper Germany and final closure of 
the Raetian frontier-provides a terminus post quem for the 
provision of the Pfahlgraben and the Raetian wall. Although 
that much is clear, there is no good evidence for the exact 
date at which these structures were provided, or indeed for - 
whether they are contemporary in date. The Pfahlgraben has 
conventionally been dated to the time of Caracalla (ORLA 3,37; 
cf Schbnberger 1969,174), but apart from circumstantial 
historical association this belief is based upon a single coin 
of 194 stratified under part of the Pfahl near the Saalburg; as 
Schdnberger points out (1985,409), this part could easily have 
been repaired or rebuilt. 
More recently an earlier date in the last quarter of the second 
century has come to be favoured (Schbnberger 1985,409-10), 
though not on the basis of much new evidence. It was long ago 
realised that a section of Pfahlgraben east of Zugmantel was 
built in conjunction with towers that had not been replaced in 
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stone (4.7. S3 below); only when the line at this point, which 
is double, was moved forward did stone towers appear: but this 
need not necessarily give a general early date for the 
earthwork, as here, in the Idsteiner depression, an isolated 
section may have been provided (as in the case of the 
Sibyllenspur) before its general provision elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, scholars in Germany have rightly suspected that a 
stretch of continuous frontier displaying such affinities with 
the remainder of the Pfahlgraben, yet associated with only- 
timber towers, should indicate that the installation of the 
whole frontier work cannot have long post-dated the 
mid-Antonine period. 
The-construction date of the Raetian wall is similarly obscure, 
although again there. is a traditional, and quite unfounded, 
association with the activities of Caracalla (ORLA 14,43-45). 
Some light may have been shed upon this matter by the recent 
excavation of the structure on the Raetian Wall at Dalkingen 
(12/81). Here a construction level of Phase 4A, which is of 
one build with the initial construction of the Raetian Wall, 
produced an unworn coin of 161-169 (Planck 1976,437). As it 
would seem likely that an interval might elapse before the 
replacement of the palisade in Raetia with the Wall, and as an 
earlier date than a third century one seems ever more likely, 
it is becoming increasingly attractive to seek a context in the 
aftermath of the Marcomannic wars for the construction of the 
Raetian Wall. 
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4.7 Second century development and the nature of the 
continuous frontier in Upper Germany and Raetia 
Strecke 1 The Neuwied basin: from the Rhine to the Lahn 
Topography 
This first section of the Upper German frontier wove sinuously 
around the edges of the fertile Neuwied basin. Leaving the 
Rhine at Rheinbrohl, some lOkm north of the Neuwied basin, the 
original line of towers - here, it will be recalled, perhaps as 
late as the second century - climbed straight away into the 
Mittelgebirge, or area of mountains of middling height, on the 
far side of the Rhine. Strecke 1 always ran through extremely 
broken country, only briefly contacting the fringe of the 
fertile lowland basin between 1/22 and 1/36, where the fort of 
Niederbieber would eventually be provided. 
The nature of the continuous frontier 
The palisade and Pfahlgraben went through their orthodox 
building sequence'throughout this sector. However, the 
mountainous country affected the course of the frontier: in 
deep gorges to the north of Bendorf (for 1.50km between 1/47 
and 1/50 and between 1/52 and 1/54) the earthworks of the 
Pfahlgraben were not supplied in the deep-ravines. The 
palisade was provided (ORLA 1 Taf 14). At one point between 
1/52-and 1/54, however, so steep was the slope before the 
frontier that even the palisade was omitted. In the hard rock 
opposite WPl/8 the Pfahl ditch narrowed to a shallow gully. 
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Gates and passages 
At 1/8 the Pfahl narrowed to form a crossing in front of one, of 
two stone towers. The palisade was not interrupted (ORLA I Taf 
4.2). Where an ancient route is said to have crossed the 
frontier (ibid., 70-71; Taf 5.2), a gap'of 3.50m occurred in 
the, Pfahl opposite the postulated tower 1/13a; a road 1.40m 
wide crossed the Pfahl, but the palisade was uninterrupted. 
Another, passage through the Pfahlgraben (but not the palisade) 
at-1/18 was considered to be a late addition, also associated 
with a stone tower (ibid. Taf 6.3). At WP1/23, an llm wide 
passage occurred in the Pfahlgraben; again, there was no 
discernible break in the palisade, and the passage occurred at 
a stone tower (ibid. Taf 7.2). At 1/26 a passage 3.60m wide 
occurred in the 'Palisadenzaun'. At stone tower 1/56 there was 
a break of over 30m in the Pfahl, but not the palisade (ibid. 
Taf 16). A 10m break occurs in the Pfahl, but not the 
accompanying ditch, at WP1/59 (ibid. Taf 17); it has been 
suspected that a timber bridge will have negotiated the ditch. 
In front of the tower'1/65 occurs what must have been a very 
early passage through the frontier; a 2m opening in the 
palisade was flanked by extra-large posts; behind, the 
Phalgraben was broken by a gap 14m wide (ibid. Taf 18.3). This 
is the only example of an absolutely clear, permanent passage 
through both Palisade and Pfahlgraben known in Strecke 1. At 
WP 1/73 an interruption in the Pfahl has been suspected (ibid., 
128),, - but it is not clear whether this is due to the 
precipitous slope rather than representing a gate. Certainly 
the Pfahl was broken for 460m in the Kalterbachtal above 1/74, 
but the palisade here was continuous (ibid., 129). Finally, a 
crossing of the frontier by an old road running to the Rhine 
valley has been suspected (Klee 1989,49) near the 
exceptionally large WP1/78, although no passage through the 
continuous frontier is known. 
t 
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Forts and minor installations 
North of the Neuwied basin, the numerus-sized fort of Arzbach 
(0.70ha) and the fort at Ems (1.30ha when rebuilt in stone 
later in the century; possibly smaller to start with; 
Schbnberger 1985,460) may be late-Trajanic or Hadrianic. Ems 
is also usually considered a Inumerus fort', though on no hard 
evidence. The situation of Arzbach right up against the 
frontier line is such to suggest that the watchtowers in this 
sector had already been established when the fort was built. 
In this connection we may recall the relationship between the 
low-grade numerl and frontier police-work proposed above 
(3.1.2). Bendorf was probably given up in Hadrian's reign 
(Pferdehirt 1986,269-70). The fort at Niederberg, in the 
Neuwied Basin some distance behind the frontier, continued in 
occupation. 
Before the construction of the new fort of Niederbieber in the 
later-second century, the two auxiliary forts here were placed 
by the Rhine, well back from the sinuous frontier line itself. 
The frontier never came closer than 3km to Heddesdorf or 6km to 
Niederberg. These forts were widely spaced: 14km as the crow 
flies, but travel between them would have been made longer by 
the intervention of the Rhine. At the eastern end of the 
Neuwieder salient, in contrast, the two numerus-sized forts of 
Arzbach and Ems were placed close up against the frontier. The 
former has no commanding outlook, but sits in a pass, which has 
been suggested, though not proven, as the site of a crossing of 
the frontier (Klee 1989,50). Ems was evidently situated to 
oversee the point where the frontier is broken by the river 
Lahn. 
Minor installations can also be ascribed particular roles in 
this sector. They were generally not much larger than the 
milecastles of Hadrian's Wall. The fortlet on the Forsthofweg 
(1/14: 0.07ha, containing small timber structure 6.25m square) 
was placed where, a number of old tracks crossed and ran 
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parallel to the frontier; a notable density of watchtowers was 
also provided in the sector 1/13 to 1/15 (ORLA 1,70-74). 
Anhausen (WPl/41) is without such an obvious reason for its 
siting, but it would have been well-placed to supervise the 
level area of the Heimbacher Wald, where an approach could have 
been made to the frontier between the deep ravines of the 
Aubach and the Saynbach (in the latter, significantly, the 
Pfah1graben would be omitted). The fortlet was reduced in size 
at some time from 0.17 to 0.07ha (ORLA 1 Taf 12). 
At the fortlets of Fehrbach and Hillscheid natural passes and 
the possible presence of old routes are reflected by modern 
roads. Fehrbach (WPl/63) was situated mid-way between two 
passages through the frontier at 1/59 and 1/65. Hillscheid 
(1/71), surveys a complex of modern, and possibly ancient, 
crossings of the frontier to the east. 
As the fortlets seem so often to have been placed with a 
particular ancient route or topographic peculiarity in mind, 
their spacing is naturally irregular and sometimes very wide: 
Forsthofweg 
14km 
Anhausen 
12km 
Fehrbach 
4.50km 
Hillscheid 
Yet the watchtower provision on Strecke 1 was quite intensive; 
not only is there a close average spacing of towers (taking 
into account postulated sites), but there are instances where 
stone towers have been replaced on three separate occasions, 
showing that they were an enduring type of installation, for 
example 1/18 lauf der Wurzel' (ORLA 1 Taf 6.3) and 1/48 lauf 
dem Hormorgen' (ibid. Taf 14). 
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Strecke 1 would not seem, therefore, to have been a sector 
where large scale, mobile raids from unexpected directions were 
anticipated. The small provision of troop accommodation on the 
frontier itself recalls that of the Taunus in the 
Flavian-Trajanic period. In the Neuwied basin, however, there 
was an immediate'fertile prize for any raider who did penetrate 
the frontier, and perhaps for this reason the two equitate 
cohorts were retained on the northeast side of the Rhine rather 
than being moved to the frontier. 
Strecke 2: From the Lahn to the Aar 
Topographyý 
In this sector the frontier cut across broken country, its 
course dictated by the simple need to draw a line running along 
the north side of the corridor of territory north of the Rhine 
and Main which reached from the Lahn to the Taunus ridge. The 
role of Strecken 2 and 3 was to join the two great salients of 
fertile land, the Neuwied Basin and the Wetterau. Across the 
broken uplands of Strecke 2 the frontier adopted a twisting 
course, including certain commanding heights but leaving others 
just outside the line. This is reminiscent of the behaviour of 
the Antonine Wall in Britain towards its western end. It is 
possible that such a lack of concern about outlook was a result 
of the frontier passing through a densely afforested landscape. 
In two long stretches (WP 2/4-14 (Becheln-Dornholzhausen) and 
2/23-31 (Pohl-Holzhausen) the frontier follows the lines of two 
routes of pre-Roman origin; the first occupies a pass running 
southeast from the Lahn valley, and is lined with a number of 
prehistoric burials (ORLA 2 Map 1; Klee 1989,52; 54). The 
frontier also follows a prehistoric route east of 2/15 (east of 
the MUhlbachtal). 
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The nature oUthe continuous barrier 
While in general going through the orthodox sequence of 
palisade and Pfahlgraben, this Strecke displays one 
peculiarity; between towers 2/35 and 2/47, for a distance of 
6.40km, the earth wall and ditch were never supplied; although 
excavation has shown the presence of the palisade (ORLA 2, 
72-8; Baatz 1975,97). 
Gates and passages 
At all of the following points, the palisade was not 
interrupted, but an opening through the Pfahl was associated 
with a stone, not a timber tower: 
2/5 ORLA 2 Taf 2.5 
2/8 ORLA 2 Taf 3.1. A 
2/10 ORLA 2 Taf 3.2 
2/11 ORLA 2 Taf 3.3 
2/12 ORLA 2 Taf 3.4 
2/13 ORLA 2, 13 
2/14 ORLA 2 Taf 4.1 
2/17 ORLA 2 Taf 4.2 
2/20 ORLA 2 Taf 5.1 
2/21 ORLA 2 Taf 5.2 
2/25 ORLA 2 Taf 6.1 
2/26 ORLA 2 Taf 7.1 
2/27 ORLA 2 Taf 7.2 
At 2/28 one of several successive paths passing through the 
Pfahl cut an early phase of the palisade, but was blocked by a 
second palisade. The path was only lm wide, and was perhaps 
intended to give access to the space between Pfahl and 
palisade; a similar situation to 1/13A. There is another break 
in the earthwork of 12m in front of 2/29; another is known at 
2/52 (1.50m), again in front of a stone tower. 
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What characterises the series of openings in the Pfahlgraben 
just listed is that they lie opposite the stone and not the 
timber towers; it is possible that when the Pfahlgraben was 
provided these openings were left so that access could be 
gained from the towers to service the palisade. Interestingly 
in this connection at 2/35, where there was no break in the 
Pfahl, a stone track existed on the outside of the earthwork, 
perhaps leading from a crossing some distance away. Here the 
palisade had been renewed at some time (ORLA 2,71-2 and Taf 
9.3). 
Forts and minor installations 
Here, compared to Britain, or any other part of the German 
frontier, garrisoning was very thin in the second century; the 
operation of these remote frontiers described above for the 
Flavian-Trajanic period (3.1.2) obviously prevailed here. In 
the mid-second century the only forts, Hunzel and Holzhausen, 
probably held numerl. At Hunzel this is based on the size of 
the fort (0.70ha). At Holzhausen the known fort of 1.40ha 
seems to have originated under Commodus (RiH, 358; Pferdehirt 
1976). The known third century garrison, cohors 11 Treverorum, 
is usually thought to have been promoted from a numerus 
Treverorum which may have garrisoned an earlier fort (Southern 
1989,107). 1 
It is interesting that this part of the frontier, like that 
around the Neuwied basin, had to be considerably strengthened 
during the second century. Here not only was Holzhausen built 
under Commodus, but one fortlet, 'auf dem Pohl bei Kemell at 
2/48 was replaced by a new numerus fort, Kemel (0.70ha) at some 
unknown date in the later second century. Whether this was 
linked with the activity at Niederbieber and Holzhausen under 
Commodus, or occurred earlier, is uncertain. A fortlet at 
Pfarrhofen (2/28: stone 0.15ha), which does not possess rounded 
corners, has been thought (Schleiermacher 1962,202-3) to be a 
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late addition, and has been related to a distinctive type of 
late, square cornered fortlet encountered on the Raetian 
frontier. 
Apart from the numerus-size forts and Holzhausen, there was 
also a provision of fortlets, as elsewhere in Strecken 1-3, 
much more-widely spaced than milecastles on Hadrian's Wall. 
Between Holzhausen and the fortlet at Adolfseck, at the 
beginning of Strecke 3, the fortlets occur at 4.50km intervals, 
which may indicate a spacing of three Roman miles: 
HOLZHAUSEN 
4.50km 
Dbrsterberg 
4.50km 
Kemel 
4.50km 
Adolfseck 
This was, in fact, perceived by Fabricius, who proposed (ORLA 
3,38-40) a regular spacing of installations, with intervals of 
about 4.50km, and alternating forts and fortlets, between Kemel 
(2/49) and the Saalburg (3/66). This scheme necessitated the 
assumption that at least two fortlet sites, at 3/8 and 3/24, 
awaited discovery. They have never come to light, and it may 
be doubted whether such a regular arrangement existed. 
In fact, particular local circumstances seem to have determined 
the siting of fortlets. It is notable that Becheln and An der 
Ecke bei Pohl are both situated at points where the course of a 
pre-Roman route falls in with the frontier (Klee 1989,52-54). 
Pfarrhofen (2/28) may be a late addition. Auf dem Dbrsterberg 
(2/43) overlooked a valley (the Dbrsbachtal) which crossed the 
frontier and in which a passage might have existed. Auf dem 
Pohl bei Kemel was placed, as its name suggests, upon a notable 
eminence which provided extensive views over the area between 
the Lahn, the Taunus and the mountains on the east side of the 
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Rhine; here also the Bgderstrasse, the pre-Roman route 
elsewhere utilised by the frontier, intersected its line. The 
importance of this point for surveillance is confirmed by the 
later addition here of the numerus fort of Kemel. 
Strecke 3: The Taunus 
Topography 
In this, sector, asýin Strecke 2, -the meandering course of the 
second century frontier was essentially determined by the 
course that had been taken by the first cordon of timber 
watchtowers arranged after c90. Theýline ran across the hilly 
country that lies to the north of the Taunus ridge, crossing 
many small passes formed by rivers on the way, and eventually 
converged with the main Taunus ridge near Feldberg. 
The nature of the continuous barrier 
In this sector there are a number of notable divergences 
between the line of the original watchtowers and the later 
continuous frontier works, in a way rather comparable to the 
relationship between the Turf Wall of Hadrian in Britain and 
its stone successor. There is a clear pattern by which the 
oldest watchtower cordon adapts itself to the topography, while 
the later continuous works occur in longer, straighter 
stretches (Baatz 1975,100-104, ORLA 3,16-19). On the later 
line (where there are two) the watchtowers, now always of 
stone, are more closely spaced. In general, the continuous 
earthworks - the Wall and Graben - do not occur on the 
superseded, older stretches, except where, between 3/18 and 
3/29, the frontier crossed the Idsteiner depression. This must 
have been an important route for traffic - or hostile 
penetration - in all periods, and it is interesting that it 
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seems that extra protection was deemed necessary at this point 
from an earlier date than on the rest of Strecke 3 (Baatz 1975, 
104; cf.: Schbnberger 1985,388; 409). The presence in the 
Idsteiner depression of the Phalgraben on the older line, whose 
towers were never rebuilt in stone, suggests that the general 
application of this continuous feature cannot long post-date 
the mid-second century, while its exceptional early presence in 
the Idsteiner corridor has been compared to the blocking of the 
Lauter Valley by the Sibyllenspur between Kbngen and Donstetten 
at a much earlier date (Planck 1987,421). A further 
realignment of the frontier took place in the region of 
Feldberg. Here, on the straighter, secondary alignment of 
Pfalgraben, it was observed, first of all by Fabricius (ORLA 3, 
34) that the palisade had also been supplied, suggesting that , 
this feature may have been maintained elsewhere on the frontier 
after the addition of the Wall and'Graben. 
Climbing over the hard rock of the Klingenkopf at 3/55, the 
mound and ditch were omitted in favour of a dry stone wall. 
This was only supplied at some date after the mid-second 
century; first of all the timber palisade had been supplied 
here as normal. At the foot of the hill the Pfahlgraben was 
resumed. The same thing happens after 3/58 on the Rosskopf, on 
whose heights is a famous sequence of two timber towers 
replaced by two stone towers (3/59) (ORLA 3,37; Taf 8; 9). 
For the lkm east of the Rosskopf the Pfahlgraben did-not follow 
the crest of the Taunus ridge, but ran to its southeast in such 
a way to be commanded by it throughout: a clear demonstration 
that the frontier line here could never have been defended in 
any military sense. 
Gates and Passages 
Two breaks or passages occur in the Pfahlgraben immediately in 
front of the fort at Feldberg (3/46); another, smaller, break 
occurs 175m to the southwest (ORLB, 10; Taf 1). The passages 
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by the fort only occur on the inner part of the double Pfahl 
line there, so that the outer line in effect acts as a titulus 
in front of them. At Kleinkastell Heidenstock 3/57) a break of 
over 40mýis visible, in the Pfahlgraben today, though it is not 
clear whether it is of ancient origin (RiH, 391). An 
interruption of 200m occurs in the frontier wall as it runs 
down the east side of the Hollerkopf after 3/62. A further 
passage is known near the Saalburg (ORL3, plate 10,3), 
presumably to allow passage or access through the pass here; 
near by it are known two (Klee 1989,85) superimposed 
trapezoidal small timber buildings, described as WachthaUser. 
Forts and minor installations 
In accordance with the character of this frontier sector 
described above (3.1.2-3), the garrisoning of this stretch was 
extremely light to begin with: yet it is clear that a need to 
intensify the numbers of troops actually based on this part of 
the line was felt as the second century wore on. At the 
beginning of the Hadrianic period there were no auxiliary units 
here, only numeri, or at least soldiers occupying forts no 
larger than numerus-size. At some date by the mid-second 
century a fortlet at Alteburg-Heftrich was replaced by a fort 
of 0.70ha, ý home by the third century of numerus Cattharensium. 
At Feldberg the numerus-sized fort was base in the third 
century of exploratio Halicanenslum. Before these sites were 
promoted to numerus fort size, the only numerus forts in this 
sector may have been at Zugmantel and the Saalburg, each of 
which was enlarged to a cohort fort by the end of Hadrian's 
reign. Zugmantel was timber, and 1.10ha in size (Schbnberger 
1985,461). The Saalburg, now timber and 3.20ha, was built in 
time to house cohors 11 Raetorum c. R., attested in 139 (CIL 
13.7462). Zugmantel sat on an old route, the HOnerstrasse, 
which crossed the frontier and in antiquity linked the 
Wiesbaden area with the Limburger basin; close control of this 
route would be vital for the protection of the fertile area 
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around Wiesbaden. The Saalburg similarly controlled one of the 
best passes across the Taunus ridge. 
As remarked in the previous Strecke, Fabricius imagined a 
regular system of alternating Kleinkastelle and Numeruskastelle 
between the forts of Zugmantel and the Saalburg. What is in 
fact known of the system gives us an interval of 9km between 
Adolfseck, a stone, -Kleinkastell of milecastle size which 
secures the'crossing of the Aar (Klee 1989,65) and the fort at 
Zugmantel, then an 8km gap before an enclosure (0.25ha) at 
Eichelgarten (3/29) which has the-appearance of a temporary 
work (ORLA 3 Taf 6). In fact the distance between Zugmantel 
and Feldberg was in mid-second century covered by a 
Kleinkastell after lOkm (Heftrich) and after another 4km by 
Maisel, 4km from Feldberg. Alteberg-Heftrich was succeeded by 
a, numerus-fort. Mid-way between Feldberg and Saalburg (10km 
apart) were two Klelnkastelle, ýeach about milecastle size, 
separated by only 1.8km (Altes Jagdhaus and Heidenstock); there 
is no clearly discernible reason for their particular situation 
here. In general, however, the placing of the installations 
throughout this sector would seem to have less to do with any 
regularity of measurement than with the surveillance 
requirements of particular locations. This is well illustrated 
by the occurrence, only 1.75km east of the Saalburg, of 
Kleinkastell LochmUhle (0.04ha), which blocked the Kdppern 
Valley, an obvious route across the frontier but, presumably, 
in antiquity as now, a less easily negotiated one than the pass 
guarded by the Saalburg itself (Baatz 1975,122). 
Evidence from watchtowers 
Stone tower 3/23 possesses a neighbouring building, perhaps a, 
barrack (ORLA 3,78): it is situated just where modern road and 
rail routes pass through the Idstein depression. A further 
small building (7.20m by 6m) is known to lie 56m from by 3/31 
(Ibid., 89). Another stone structure of unknown significance, 
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which has produced tiles stamped by the XXII Legion, sits on 
the frontier in the bottom of the Emsbachtal and is designated 
3/43A (ibid., 98). 
Communications 
Apart from the usual minor road or patrol track linking the 
individual installations, there-is no evidence for major 
lateral road movement along this sector of the frontier. 
Indeed, -topographic considerations would have rendered such a 
route, which would have had to cut at right angles across the 
spurs and deep valleys of the southern Taunus slopes '- 
impossible. Rather, the individual major sites were approached 
by branch roads which stemmed from the original Wetterau 
penetration road (ORLA 3-5, Map 7). It has already been noted, 
for example, how the early fortlet at Ockstddter Wald appears 
to be aligned upon a road leading from the rearward fort of 
Friedberg (ORLA 4,64). 
Strecke 4: East Taunus and the Wetterau 
Topography 
After crossing the Kbppern valley, the line'ascended the Taunus 
ridge once more. The frontier is placed predominantly on the 
outer slope of the ridge on its way to the Usa valley, guarded 
by the fort of Langenhain. From, the Usa the frontier traversed 
rolling country, leaving higher peaks outside the line. 
Gradually the line ran into more and more open country, curving 
around to the east to follow the natural boundary of the 
fertile extent of the Wetterau. In this ever more open 
country, as we have seen (1.2; 3.1.2), large auxiliary forts 
had been placed at an early date. Until the deep valley of the 
Wetter crosses the frontier in the neighbourhood of Arnsburg, 
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the line is arranged in long, gentle curves, following the 
landscape. After the Wetter it is laid out in long, carefully 
surveyed dead-straight stretches; this difference appears to be 
associated with the change between the earliest and slightly 
later layouts of towers. 
It is possible that the area ofýthe Wetterau traversed by the 
frontier had been largely cleared of wood in antiquity. 
Although there has been insufficient palynological analysis to 
prove the point, it has been observed (Woolliscroft and I 
Hoffmann 1991,543) that the intervisibility of frontier towers 
with rearward forts suggests a clear landscape. In the 
southern part of Strecke 5, in contrast, where all sites are 
arranged along a line, a cleared track through woods may be 
implied. 
The nature of the continuous barrier 
The continuous barrier in this sector seems almost everywhere 
to have had a conventional history, the palisade being 
supplemented by the Pfahlgraben at some date in the second 
century. A pre-palisade barrier, known either as a 
Flechtwerkzaun or Zaungrabchen,,, makes an appearance in many 
places, usually running about 30m in frontýof the earliest, 
smaller timber towers (ORLA 4,32-3). The later timber towers 
are accompanied by the later palisade and Pfahl, as seen at 
4/14 (ibid. Taf 4.1). There are places, however, where the 
Zaungrabchen appears to correspond to the later-type timber 
towers. At 4/33 and 4/52 the Zaun is clearly cut by the 
palisade and Pfahl. 
In a rocky area near Arnsburg, a mound or wall of dry stone was 
substituted for the earth mound: a ditch was still provided 
(ibid., 112-18; Taf 9). At Kleinkastell Hunnenkirchkof 
(4/28-30) the Pfahl cuts across the defences of the first 
timber fortlet, while the stone fortlet lies just to the rear 
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of, but not on the same alignment as the frontier earthwork 
(ibid. Taf 5.2). 
In the area of Butzbach lie two successive lines of 
watchtowers. In the earlier scheme, as in earlier Strecken, 
the towers had been placed in close relation to the topography. 
In the superseding arrangement a more direct and arbitrary line 
was drawn, with the towers upon it more closely spaced. The 
earlier line continues north of Butzbach, where at 4/40* there 
were two successive timber towers. The successor tower on the 
later line (4/40) was of stone. Timber towers are not known at 
other tower sites on the later line here, suggesting that the 
rearward line was not abandoned until the period of stone tower 
building in the mid-second century (ibid., 93-99). 
Forts and minor installations 
At some time in the early second century Inheiden was rebuilt 
with stone defences to an area of lha (RiH, 363); although its 
garrison is unknown it is considered to be a numerus fort on 
the basis of its size. Echzell was probably rebuilt in stone 
at this time (Schbnberger 1985,463). Altenstadt was also 
enlarged to numerus-size (timber 0.90ha). As on the two 
previous Strecken, by the mid-second century a notable series 
of fortlets supplemented the auxiliary sites here. The early 
establishment of a fortlet at Degerfeld on the frontier line 
and 0.75km from the auxiliary fort of Butzbach itself, was 
noted above (1.3); something similar was proposed for the fort 
at Ober-Florstadt. By the middle of the second century, 
fortlets had proliferated on this sector of the frontier (even 
where dating is inexact, the presence of a timber phase at a 
number of sites suggests that they must have been in existence 
by the middle of the second century). 
No regularity can be discerned in the spacing of the 
Kleinkastelle; rather, individual installations appear to have 
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been sited where there was a local need. Kaisergrube, at 4/15, 
was situated where a route may have crossed the East Taunus 
ridge in antiquity; situated close by the Kleinkastell was also 
the tower on the Gaulskopf (4/16) which, unlike other towers on 
the frontier-, may have'acted as a long distance signal station. 
It possessed extensive views, as far as Feldberg in the Taunus 
and Echzell and Arnsburg in the Wetterau. A tower behind-the 
frontier, 6.50km to the east, may have allowed communication 
with the fort at Friedberg, the one fort that remained in 
occupation behind the frontier (RiH, 238). Only 2.20km further 
north, the Eichkopf was surmounted by a fortlet-of 0.25ha with 
extensive views which commanded both the southern side of the 
Usa valley, and the valley of a lesser stream, a tributary of 
the Usa, which crossed the frontier lkm south of the main 
river. The auxiliary fort of Langenhain was situated on the 
north side of the Usa penetration of the frontier. 
The next fortlet to the north, Hunnenkirchhof, has no such 
obvious reason for its siting. It occurs 5.50km from 
Langenhain. This interval, wide for Strecke 4, may reflect the 
difficulty of passage across the mountains, the Hausberg and 
the Heidelbeerberg, which were left just outside the line of 
the frontier to the north of Langenhain. 
The fort and fortlet at Butzbach were placed in a natural 
topographic break, where modern road and rail routes still pass 
into the Wetterau as ancient routes almost certainly did (ORLA 
3-5 Map 7). Although it had started life only somewhat larger 
than a milecastle, at 0.10ha, Degerfeld was burnt between 160 
and 175 and replaced in stone at a size of 0.30ha (Schbnberger 
1985,492). After 3 and 4km respectively, occur the 
Kleinkastelle of Dicker Wald (4/40) and Holzheimer Unterwald 
(4/46-47). These are very small sites - milecastle sized - at 
0.038 and 0.036ha. Only stone construction is known at these 
fortlets, which has prompted the suggestion (Baatz 1975,133) 
that they may be of later origin than those frontier sites 
which originated in timber. Certainly there are no obvious 
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topographical reasons which would have led to the placing of 
detachments in these places, as there were at Butzbach. Behind 
the latest frontier line here, however, -runs an earlier 
frontier layout, which includes, at 4/40* a small timber 
fortlet which is presumably a predecessor to Dicker Wald. The 
earlier fortlet, being adjacent to two successive timber towers 
is itself presumably an addition, perhaps a sign of a growing 
infiltration problem which eventually led to the resiting of 
the frontier, line here. This suggests a pattern by which 
fortlets placed with obvious topographic reason are older, 
while fortlets placed without obvious reason may be later, a 
response to a growing perceived threat. 
A further 3km to the north (of Holzheimer Unterwald) the place 
of tower 4/50 was taken by Kleinkastell Hainhaus bei GrUningen. 
The known fortlet is of stone, and larger than those just 
considered at 0.30ha. A timber predecessor is suggested by 
finds of early date (Baatz 1975,135). Hainhaus fortlet seems 
to have been equipped with its own baths (ORLA, 107-8; Taf 
7.6). -It is highly-probable that the-frontier 
- 
was crossed by 
at least two ancient routes in this vicinity, leading to the 
fertile Giessen basin, just outside the Wetterau, and beyond 
(ORLA 3-5, Map 7). Here the frontier beyond the Rhine reached 
its northernmost point. 5km to the east, a fortlet has been 
postulated in the Wetter valley, to fulfil a similar role in 
relation to Arnsburg as did the fortlet at Degerfeld in 
relation to Butzbach. 
5.20km East of Arnsburg occur two fair sized (0.10ha) stone (as 
far as knowledge of them extends) Kleinkastelle, 2km apart, at 
Langsdorf and Feldheimer Wald. No obvious reasons suggest 
themselves for their exact siting; they may have been connected 
with the presence of pre-existing routes across the frontier in 
the gap between Arnsburg and the numerus fort at Inheiden. 
Beyond Inheiden, now lha, the Kleinkastelle were placed on the 
tops of small-hills, and presumably date from the earliest 
arrangement of the frontier, which is. laid out in straight 
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lines between these eminences. The sizes of the structures on 
the Wingertsberg and on the Massohl are unknown, but they are 
known to be of stone; that at Unter-Widdersheim-is postulated, 
on the strength of the excellent site, seemingly carefully 
accommodated by the frontier line. 
At Haselhecke ((4/85) a large stone fortlet of 0.40ha replaced 
a timber tower (ORLA 4 Taf 10.7). There was clearly originally 
no Kleinkastell situated here. Like Hainhaus, Haselhecke 
possessed an external bath-house. The stone fortlet seems to 
have the same relationship to the adjacent (1.30km distant), 
rearward fort of Echzell as does the Degerfeld fortlet, 
similarly enlarged in stone in the second-century, to Butzbach. 
Between Echzell and Mark6bel, besides the fort of 
Ober-Florstadt, lay Altenstadt, which had already been enlarged 
to numerus size, perhaps under Hadrian. It was again enlarged 
in stone, possibly under Pius, to 1.50ha (Schbnberger and Simon 
1983). Fortlets lay between Echzell and Markbbel. Two, 
Lochberg (4/89) and Buchkopf (4/102) occur on the hill-tops so 
commonly used by Kleinkastelle in this sector of the frontier. 
As usual with these hill-top installations, they are small, the 
former being of about milecastle size, and Buchkopf tiny at 
0.012ha. In between them a much larger fortlet, Staden 
(0.40ha) is situated at the point where the river Nidda crosses 
the frontier. Again, its proximity to Ober-Florstadt is 
reminiscent of the relationship between Degerfeld and Butzbach. 
No obvious topographic factor explains the siting of the 
remaining small (0.036ha) fortlet at Stammheim, but it may have 
been intended to supervise the interval of broken but passable 
country between the Nidda and the crossing of the river Nidder, 
guarded by the successive installations at Altenstadt. 
The general pattern throughout Strecke 4, comprising the 
easternmost part of the Taunus and the whole arc around the 
Wetterau as far as Markbbel, is for the fortlets to vary in 
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spacing and in individual size to suit particular 
circumstances. This is true both on the oldest (western) and 
slightly later, (eastern) parts of Strecke 4. The average 
spacing of installations was less than on Strecken 2-3; it 
works out at less than 3kmý(including the auxiliary forts in 
the, spacing) over the whole of Strecke 4, compared to an 
average spacing of 4.50km, including forts, in Strecken 2 and 
3. There is also a notable tendency for larger fortlets to 
occur in Strecke 4. The clearest examples are of stone and 
therefore either upgraded or originated no earlier than the 
mid-second century (Degerfeld, 0.30ha; Staden, 0.40ha; 
Haselhecke,. 0.40ha). Each occurs in the same close 
relationship to an auxiliary fort. 
Evidence from watchtowers 
On the older frontier line, by 4/39*, a ring-ditch surrounded a 
barrack-like building measuring 14 by 15m, which, on the basis 
of its finds, possibly continued in use longer than the 
neighbouring tower (ORLA 4,97; Taf 7.1). 
Additional, small stone buildings - "NebengebaUde" - lie in 
relation to timber towers at 4/5 and 4/8 (ibid. Taf 3.3-4). At 
4/8 is also an irregularly shaped enclosure or fortlet which, 
however, is overlain by the Pfahl, so is probably of early date 
(ibid., 58-9; Taf 3.4). 
WP 4/18 (in the Vogeltal) has produced from its stone tower the 
mouthpiece from a bronze instrument supposed to have been used 
for signalling from tower to tower (ibid., 75). 
A barrack-like structure was attached to the timber tower at 
4/105 (ibid. Taf 11.4). , 
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Communications 
The Roman military road system of the East Taunus and Wetterau 
(ORLA 3-5,229-78; Map 7) shows that the frontier line itself 
did not develop in-association with a pre-existing arterial 
road. The minor installations of the frontier were themselves 
only linked by minor roads or patrol tracks; occasional branch 
roads are known from the main road system. The main roads 
which linked the auxiliary forts were set back on average about 
2km from the actual frontier line, as, of course, were so often 
the forts themselves. Even these roads are not well attested; 
the immediate impression is that routes fan out from the 
rearward military centre of Friedberg to the individual major 
frontier garrisons, without there being any real emphasis on 
major lateral communicationýalong the frontier. 
Strecke 5: From Mark6bel to the Main 
Topography 
b 
The origins of this line were treated above (1.2; 1-3). Being 
an artificial line drawn to link a pre-existing system in the 
Wetterau to the river Main, Strecke 5 took the most direct 
route through a landscape which offered no obvious feature for 
the frontier to follow. As far as RUckingen, where the Kinzig 
crossed the frontier, the line ran through open, rolling 
country, known to have, been settled in pre-history (Baatz 1975, 
143). Between the Kinzig and the Main the frontier crossed a 
flat, marshy and afforested expanse. 
The nature of the continuous barrier 
The sequence is quite orthodox in this sector. Between WP5/11 
and WP 5/12 the frontier crosses a waterlogged area, the 
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Doppelblersumpf. on either side of this, the Pfahlgraben ended 
with an inward turning terminal, and the interval was blocked 
with a timber fence construction. Similarly the service road 
behind the frontier gave way to a road of corduroy construction 
for the duration of the Doppelbiersumpf (ORLA 5,164-9; Taf 
15.1). 
Gates and passages 
A break occurred in the Pfahlgraben, and probably the palisade 
also, in front of 5/11 (ibid., 164; Taf 15.1. B). 
Forts and minor installations 
The small installation at RUckingen, formerly a suggested 
outpost of Hanau-Kesselstadt, was now (upon the abandonment of 
the latter), probably between cllO and c125, enlarged to a fort 
of 2.50ha for cohors III Dalmatarum (Schbnberger 1985,463-64). 
By the mid-second century this sector was well provided with 
garrisons. The auxiliary forts of Markbbel, RUckingen and 
Gross-Krotzenburg were spaced with-intervals only 7.50km and 
8km respectively. Only 1.50km north of RUckingen a large 
fortlet (0.40ha) at Langendiebach, probably with both timber 
and stone phases, guarded an ancient east-west route across the 
frontier (RiH, 411). 4.75km south of RUckingen and 3.25km 
north of Gross-Krotzenburg was a further fortlet of 0.10ha, 
Neuwirthaus., held in the mid-Antonine period. This is also 
thought to have secured a crossing of the frontier (RiH, 413), 
the so-called 'Birkenhainer Strassel (ORLA 5,170). The 
unusually formidable double ditch system surrounding this post 
was explained (ibid. ) as being a product of the inaccessibility 
of the fortlet from the neighbouring auxiliary forts at certain 
times owing to the intervening marshes. On the face of it this 
would suggest that small isolated posts were expected to defend 
themselves against attack at certain times. 
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The average spacing of installations in Strecke 5, including 
the forts, is 3.90km; something between the 5km average of the 
Taunus and the close average spacing of 3km around the 
Wetterau. Again, no regularity can be discerned, with two of 
the three forts being situated by major river crossings (and 
therefore east-west routes) and the fortlets also thought to be 
related to routes. 
Communications 
It was argued above (1.3) that this sector of the frontier was 
built in advance of a pre-existing road between the Wetterau 
and the Main. If this was the case, the route does not seem to 
have continued in use after the construction of the outer 
frontier. The usual service road is known to accompany the 
frontier line here, but what is known of the system of major 
roads suggest that individual important frontier sites were 
served by branch roads from the interior (ORLA 3-5,229-78; Map 
7). 
Strecke 6: The Main from Gross-Krotzenburg to Wdrth 
The location of this section of the frontier was determined 
solely by the course of the river Main. It was established 
above (1.5) that it was probably not until the Hadrianic period 
at the earliest that full-sized auxiliary forts became the 
standard type of installation along this part of the river. 
Once established, these forts alone delineated the frontier 
line; this state of affairs remained unchanged until the third 
century abandonment of the frontier beyond the Rhine. The only 
fortlet sized installations known seem to be early predecessors 
of the cohort forts. 
Watchtowers - of stone only - have only been proved between 
Obernburg and Wbrth (Schallmayer 1984,58-59; ORLA 6,8-9), and 
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although it has been suggested (Brogan 1935,21-22; Baatz 1975, 
148) that they may have extended along the whole length of, the 
river frontier, the evidence of other river frontiers would 
suggest that these are probably not part of an early timber 
watchtower cordon but rather, merely isolated examples, or 
groups provided for a special local purpose. This would be 
supported by the very extensive views commanded by the more 
northerly of the towers near Obernburg (Schallmayer 1984,58), 
suggesting that rather than belonging to the cordon class of 
watchtower, this was an isolated 'eye' for the fort, 2.50km to 
the north, with which it was intervisible. Neither the 
palisade nor the Pfahlgraben were provided anywhere along the 
river, frontier. 
The importance of the Main as a communications route may be 
indicated by the large number of stations for consular 
beneficiaries known along its length: at Obernburg, Stockstadt 
and Seligenstadt, as well as at Gross-Krotzenburg on the north 
bank of the Main in Strecke 5. 
Strecke 10: The Odenwald 
Topography 
Given that its essential task was to draw a linear frontier 
between two pre-existing dispositions of military installations 
- on the Main and Neckar - the Odenwald frontier adapted itself 
closely to the topography of the country through which it ran. 
In its northern part, it traversed hilly and afforested 
country, and adopted the top of a long ridge of hills. This 
entailed little undulation, but many changes of direction, and 
on a number of occasions the line had to cross valleys running 
through the broken uplands. 
South of Schlossau the frontier line ran out onto a gently 
rolling limestone plateau. From here on to the Neckar the 
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frontier had to cross a number of east-west flowing streams and 
rivers. There was no obvious natural line of demarcation for 
the frontier to follow: it was cutting arbitrarily across the 
rolling landscape, ' and accordingly from the beginning the line 
of watchtowers here was surveyed in dead straight stretches in 
contrast, to the meandering nature of the northern part of the 
Odenwald frontier. 
The nature of the continuous barrier 
Although the palisade was built along the Odenwald sector, the 
Pfahlgraben had not been supplied when the move to the outer 
frontier took place. There is commonly evidence in the 
Odenwald for palisades as well as earthworks surrounding, the 
earlier timber towers ORLA 10, -18). Such devices are not 
always present in the stone replacements, the palisade now 
presumably rendering them less necessary, but they do still 
occur, as around stone WP 10/30. Between-Zwing fortlet and WP 
10/34, for a distance of 112m, the place of the palisade is 
taken by a stone wall. Of dry sandstone block construction the 
wall-is 0.90m wide, and calculated to have been 2-3m high 
(Schallmayer 1984,99-100). Here numerous semicircular coping 
stones from the top of the wall have been discovered (ibid., 
32). 
Gates and passages 
Only at one point in the Odenwald sector is an interruption in 
the palisade known, where a break of 4.30m occurs 60m north ofý 
Schlossau fort (ORLA 10,93). Traces of the road passing 
through the gap were noted. Schallmayer (1984,32) says: 
'Sicherlich gab es mehrere Limesdurchgänge, wohl zumeist in 
Ndhe der Kastelle'. 
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Forts and minor installations 
The origins, probably about cllO, of the well known series of 
similarly designed numerus forts, and the two major auxiliary' 
forts on the southern part of the Odenwald section were 
discussed above (1.5)'. The original timber defences of 
Hesselbach, the excavated type-site of Odenwald numerus forts, 
were rebuilt twice in stone before the abandonment of the 
Odenwald frontier in favour of the outer line (Baatz 1973, 
13-21). It is assumed that the two southern cohort forts, 
Oberscheidental and Neckarburken-West, where only stone 
defences are known, are early-mid second century rebuildings of 
timber predecessors (Schbnberger 1985,467). 
The Odenwald provides a most instructive example of the use of 
different types and sizes of unit and installation in differing 
landscapes. In the rough country to the north the famous 
series of numerl, apparently raised in Britain, sufficed. 
Brittones are actually attested at the forts of Schlossau (CIL 
13.6502) and Neckarburken-Ost, the fortlet at Trienz (CIL 
13.6490) and WPs 10/19,10/22,10/33 and 10/35. However, 
inscriptions from WalldUrn (CIL 13.6592) and Ohringen (CIL 
13.6542 and 6543) on the outer frontier record Brittones who 
had presumably, transferred from numerus forts on the old 
Odenwald line. - 
i 
Interspersed with the numerus forts are three Kleinkastelle. 
These fortlets are all of very small size - no larger than 
British milecastles - and each is clearly sited with a view to 
local conditions; Windlilcke (0.017ha) probably controlled an 
east-west track through a depression between hills; Zwing 
(0.035ha) and Seitzenbuche (0.04ha) both guarded small passes 
through the ridge. The pass at Seitzenbuche provides the most 
direct route connecting the Main and the Neckar valleys. All 
of these fortlets were eventually built in stone. 
On the plateau of the southern part of Strecke 10 there is a 
quite different use of Kleinkastelle. Again there is no 
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regularity of spacing. South of Oberscheidental Kleinkastell 
Robern (0.04ha) was placed at a small pass which would have 
allowed an approach to the frontier. After a very short 
interval of 2.75km occurs the large fortlet of Trienz (0.20ha) 
at an important valley crossing. This installation was built 
by the numerus Brittonum Elantlenslum from nearby 
Neckarburken-Ost (CIL 13.6490),. 
It has been noted (above, 3.3; Baatz 1975,153) that in the 
northern Odenwald the proportionately light garrisoning of the 
sector is also reflected in a wider spacing of the watchtowers 
than that seen in the Taunus and Wetterau. The timber towers 
had characteristic foundations ofýinterlaced stone and timber, 
without mortar bonding, a technique seen, in places in Strecke 
3. The Odenwald towers were replaced in stone before the 
frontier was advanced (4.4 above), and in most cases there had 
not been time for a sequence of more than one timber tower to 
occur, before the stone reconstruction of the 140s. 
For all of the similarities in the terrain and the intensity of 
garrisoning between the northern Odenwald and the Taunus 
sector, it will be noted that compared to the Taunus in the 
mid-second century the numerus forts of the Odenwald are very 
closely spaced, at an average of only 5-6km. The cohort forts 
of the southern Odenwald, on the other hand, display a wideness 
of spacing which far exceeds anything seen in the comparable 
fertile and negotiable tracts of the Wetterau frontier. 
Communications 
As elsewhere, both a service track for the minor installations 
and a more direct route linking the forts have been detected. 
The service track - 'Begleitweg' or 'Llmesweg' - only properly 
built of stone here and there, runs for the most part 
immediately behind the palisade. At a varying distance from 
this track runs a better built road - 'Grenzstrasse' - which 
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joins the individual forts by the shortest possible route. In 
places it appears to have taken over the role of the service 
track. Approaching the Trienz valley the frontier road 
diverges from the frontier line south of Robern and skirts the 
valley, while the palisade and service track continue in a 
dead-straight line and have to cross the winding valley twice 
(ORLA 10,31-2; Schallmayer 1984,33; Baatz 1975,170). 
Strecke 11: The Neckar 
The course of the linear arrangement of installations along the 
river Neckar whose origins, probably in the 90s, were 
considered above (1.4) was determined solely by the river 
itself. A certain amount of consolidation work at the major 
fort sites is discernible, such as the enlargement and 
rebuilding of Stuttgart Bad-Canstatt in stone; the rearward 
fort of Gross-Gerau was probably given up cl20-cl3O 
(Schbnberger 1985,393). The rearward fort of 
Heidelberg-Neuenheim was not, as might have been expected, 
given up now; it may have continued to have a special role in 
the mid-second century. Planck (1988,266-67) dates to this 
period the rebuilding in stone of the remainder of the forts on 
the Neckar: Benningen, Walheim, Heilbronn-Bbckingen and 
Wimpfen. 
This arrangement of forts was in use until the mid-second 
century advance to the outer frontier line. We are dealing, 
then, with a system with a life of some 50-70 years. There is 
no reason to believe that these forts formed a linear frontier 
in the sense of system to impede movement across the river: 
rather their role was one of the protection and control of a 
communication route running along the Neckar. As was noted 
above (1.4) the road between the forts could run on either side 
of the river. The river was easily crossed at several points 
by fords. No watchtower system developed. Good land suitable 
for settlement lay on either side, and an Imperial estate is 
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known to have existed on the east side. one notable 
characteristic of the Neckar forts is the frequently attested 
presence of beneficlaril consulares. When the forts were 
abandoned in favour of those on the outer line in the 
mid-second century, extensive'civil settlements continued to 
flourish at some of the old fort sites, still accommodating the 
stationes of beneficarli. 
Strecken 7 and 8 as far as Osterburken: The northern part of 
the outer frontier 
Topography 
From Miltenberg on the Main the frontier (advanced from the 
northern Odenwald line) ran in a series of long, straight, 
surveyed alignments across a rolling, rather barren upland 
plateau, today heavily afforested. It left behind it, to the 
west, a series of deep north-south running valleys and a large 
area of the same relatively impenetrable terrain that the 
predecessor frontier in the Odenwald had traversed. 
The nature of the continuous barrier 
In Strecke 7 the system possessed the palisade and stone 
watchtowers from the beginning, and henceforth enjoyed the 
usual sequence. However, between Miltenberg and WalldUrn, 
although the palisade had apparently everywhere been supplied, 
there is a notable series of gaps in the Pfahlgraben, often up 
to 200-300m in length; elsewhere the structure was unfinished, 
the ditch not fully dug or the-rampart incomplete (ORLA 7-9, 
29-30). In general the Pfahl in this sector was Iselten so 
tief und so sauber ausgehoben wie weiter südlich (ibid., 29). 
It was noted that these variations were in part associated with 
areas of hard rock which had to be traversed. 
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In the northern part of Strecke 8, between WP 8/18 and WP 8/19, 
in the area of Bofsheim, the final phase of the continuous 
frontier was represented by a stone wall between 1.20 and 1.85m 
wide (ibid., 31-3). In structural sequence this was shown to 
be later than the abandoned Pfahlgraben. The wall was not 
physically connected to the pre-existing watchtowers, as in 
Raetia, but rather ran in front of them, and was interrupted in 
front of each tower, perhaps'to allow passage through (Planck 
and Beck 1987,49). Still to the north of Osterburken the , 
stone frontier wall has been traced as a foundation north of 
WP8/26, ending just south of that tower. The wall ran some-20m 
behind the Pfahlgraben. At this point the wall abutted the 
sides of the stone tower, allowing it to project. 90m north of 
8/26 a trapezoidal stone foundation projected from the wall at 
a point of easy approach to the frontier; this has been 
described as an artillery position. It overlay the earthworks 
of the Pfahlgraben (ORLA 7-9,30; Taf 8.5). 
Forts and minor installations 
The spacing of forts and fortlets in Strecke 7 and the northern 
part of Strecke 8 was wide when compared to that which had 
prevailed in the northern Odenwald and the Strecken north of 
the Main considered above. Moving south from the two forts at 
Miltenberg, where both a cohort (Miltenberg-Altstadt) and a 
numerus (Miltenberg-Ost) were quartered, there was an interval 
of 17.25km before the next, numerus-sized fort at WalldUrn. 
This interval was broken, after 1Okm, by a fortlet at Haselburg 
(WP 7/24: the known structure stone, 0.20ha). 3.60-4km south 
of WalldUrn, at WP 7/48, occurs a sequence of two stone 
fortlets, the better situated, Hbnehaus (stone, 0.20ha) 
probably replacing a short-lived Kleinkastell An der Altheimer 
Strasse (also stone, 0.20ha). Hbnehaus was situated on the 
Rehberg, and possessed extensive views to north and south over 
the broken landscape. The famous dead-straight alignment of 
the outer frontier had begun just north of here, so it is 
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probable that the eminence of the Rehberg served as one of the 
surveying points for the new frontier (Planck and Beck 1987, 
49). 3.10km further on, now in Strecke 8, a fortlet at 
Rinschein (WP 8/7:, stone 0.20ha) occurred, lOkm before the fort 
at Osterburken. 
Between Miltenberg and Osterburken, then, the spacing of 
installations, including both forts and fortlets, is on average 
6.87km, which is considerably wider than on those parts of the 
frontier running around the Taunus-Wetterau. It is possible, 
of course, that further sites await discovery in this sector 
(Baatz 1975,187). Also of note is the special type of fortlet 
employed in Strecke 7 and the northern part of Strecke 8. The 
four known examples are large'fortlets, at 0.20ha each. 
Evidence from watchtowers 
Nearby buildings associated with towers have been noted at 7/6 
(ORLA 7-9 Taf 3.1); 7/13 (ibid. Taf 3.5); and 7/31 (Planck and 
Beck 1987,, 43). 
The remainder of Strecke 8 and Strecke 9: The central and 
southern parts of the outer frontier 
Topography 
The section from Osterburken, via Jagsthausen to Ohringen, runs 
over an undulating plateau of limestone, cut through by rivers 
and streams, particularly, in the region of Osterburken, the 
Tauber valley, and further south, between Jagsthausen and 
Ohringen, the Jagst and Kocher. These valleys are the areas of 
richest modern land use; they were settled, and formed 
important routes, in antiquity (Baatz 1975,49, Abb 29). South 
of 6hringen begins the Mainhardt forest and the Keuper steppe 
I 
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lands of the south. The Keuper is not conducive to 
agriculture, and it is probable that afforestation was denser 
here, and settlement correspondingly sparse, in antiquity. The 
same situation prevailed for a considerable distance beyond the 
frontier. The same can probably be said of the last part of 
the dead straight stretch of the outer frontier, where it runs 
over the Lias high-plateau of the Mainhardt, Murrhardt and 
Welzheim forests. The plateau here is deeply cut across by 
cavernous river-courses, but the frontier runs arbitrarily- 
across these without deviating at all in respect of the 
topography. 
The nature of the continuous barrier 
The usual outer-frontier sequence of stone towers and palisade, 
supplemented by the Pfahlgraben, prevailed here; as in the 
previous sector, there was an exceptional late development. 
The stone wall which occurs north of Osterburken was noted in, 
the previous section. Between Osterburken and the 
neighbourhood of Jagsthausen-the stone wall, with some 
interruptions, continued to run parallel to, and some 19m 
behind, the earlier Pfahlgraben. The wall varies in thickness 
between 0.75m and 1.20m, and rarely abuts the walls of the 
pre-existing stone towers (ORLA 7-9,31-3). Rather, it leaves 
a gap on either side of the tower, although sometimes of only 
0.20-0.50m. Further foundations of stone outworks (like the 
feature interpreted as an artillery platform described north of 
Osterburken), projecting from the wall to the Pfahlgraben, and 
measuring up to 9 by 13.50m, are known along this sector. A 
total of six are known (ibid., 32). 
A six-sided tower of exceptional size occurs at 9/51; it has 
been thought that owing to its extensive view, up to 45km along 
the frontier to the north, it must have served some special 
signalling function (ibid., 40). Immediately south of this the 
Pfah1graben, with accompanying palisade, made its only 
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diversion from the dead-straight outer line, in order to avoid 
a precipitous ravine, through which the palisade had originally 
run. Here is a further indicator that the palisade was 
retained in-use with the Pfahlgraben (ibid. Taf 15.5). 
At 9/71, slightly beyond the frontier lay a further mound and 
ditch, of unknown purpose. The peculiar concentration of 
towers on the 'Linderst' - 9/97 and 9/98 are separated by only 
100m, and 9/98 and 9/99 by only 80m - 'wohl in Zusammenhang mit 
der Überwachung des Tales und der direkten Verbindung zum 
Kastell Murrhardt zu sehen' (Planck and Beck 1987,82). At 6m 
by 6.50m 9/99 also, forms the largest tower on the outer 
frontier (ORLA 7-9,176). 
Gates and Passages 
The Pfahl, where this feature remained the principal barrier 
and was not replaced by a stone wall, is not known to have been 
interrupted at stone towers (in the manner of Strecke 2), 
except at 9/116, where a large tower, 9/116 (6m by 6m), is 
reckoned to be the southern survey point for the layout of the 
straight outer line. Here, when the Pfahlgraben was supplied, 
there was originally an earth causeway opposite the-tower. 
Later, the ditch was dug through, ý and the mound terminated to 
the north and south of the tower. After destruction in the 
first half of the third century, the tower was crudely restored 
and this time the mound built up to its north and south sides 
(Planck and Beck 1987,88). 
At 8/44 excavation by PF Mauser in 1970 revealed a sequence of 
two stone towers. The earlier, exceptionally large, was 
surrounded by a ditch from which the late stone frontier wall 
has been laid out to north and south. 12m south of the first 
tower there occurred a gap of some 7-8m in the frontier wall; 
immediately to the east of the gap there stood a stone tower of 
normal size (Planck and Beck 1987,59). This has been 
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interpreted as a passage through the frontier, and associated 
with concentrations of native population beyond this part of 
the outer-line (Schnurbein 1992,74). But the association of 
this opening with a stone tower gives it a close resemblance to 
the numerous openings in Strecke 1 and 2 which may better be 
interpreted as service passages. 
Forts and minor installations 
In this more southerly stretch of the dead-straight outer 
frontier, troop provision was quite different from the 
successor to the northern Odenwald last described. Between 
Osterburken and Welzheim the emphasis was more on the use of 
normal cohort forts rather than numerl, and these were 
interspersed with fortlets of small, milecastle size, in 
contrast to the large fortlet type prevailing in Strecke 7 and 
the northern part of Strecke 8. Spacing was still wide, at an 
average of 6.21km, but this seems to have been compensated for 
by a correspondingly close spacing of the watchtowers. 
An interval of 13km separates the forts at Osterburken and 
Jagsthausen, with no known intervening fortlets. The fort at 
Osterburken exhibits a famous double arrangement, dating from. 
the reign of Commodus, traditionally (but with no firm 
evidence) for the accommodation of a numerus alongside the 
cohort based in the main fort. The double fort overlooks the 
wide, shallow Kirnau valley. This route led from the Tauber 
valley, a populous communication route and settlement area 
beyond the frontier. 
A major river valley - the Kessach - crosses the frontier Bkm 
south of Osterburken and 5km before the Jagst, but it is 
guarded by no known fort or fortlet. Presumably a small site 
could await discovery here, but hardly a full-sized fort. The 
cohort fort at Jagsthausen seems situated to block the winding 
valley of the Jagst, which the straight frontier line crosses 
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800m to the northeast of the fort. After a further 3.40km, at 
WP9/11-12, the frontier is crossed by the major valley of the 
Kocher. Here, rather surprisingly, there was no cohort fort; 
however, the remains of a Kleinkastell have been discovered 
beneath the church in the village of Sindringen, commanding the 
valley 650m behind the frontier line. It is thought to have 
been small, of Rdtelsee type (Planck and Beck 1987,64). 
5.75km south of Kleinkastell Sindringen occurred the fort of 
Westernbach. At only lha in size, and possessing only two 
gates, it is considered as a possible numerus type; its date of 
origin is uncertain, and one as late as the third century has 
been postulated, as has the possibility that the fort formed 
accommodation for detachments outposted from Ohringen 
(Schdnberger 1985,481). Only 3.35km further on to the south 
lies the major double fort complex at 6hringen, at point where 
modern rail and road lines still cross the frontier in a 
well-settled area. 6hringen itself was obviously situated in 
relation to the natural communication route provided by the 
valley of the Ohrn, which probably accommodated an old road 
coming in from the Hohenlohe plain (Schbnberger 1969,168-89). 
6hringen itself, acquired a flourishing civil settlement: vicus 
Aurellanus, a civitas capital. Here was one of the few points 
on the Strecken we are considering where it is possible to 
imagine a constant traffic and trade across the frontier: a 
guild of traders - colleglum convenarum - is attested. 
There is no simple pattern, then, by which garrison forts are 
simply or regularly situated in river valleys crossing the 
frontier. This is the case with Jagsthausen, but not with the 
Kessach to the north and the Kocher to the south. Only a 
fortlet is known, supervising the latter valley. On closer 
scrutiny it can be seen that there are two different types of 
valley crossing the outer frontier in this sector. There are 
the wide, natural communication corridors and settlement areas, 
such as the Tauber valley and the valley of the Ohrn, and the 
broad, flat topped ridge running from Welzheim to the north. 
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As might be expected, these corridors have attracted major 
military complexes consisting of multiple forts, at Osterburken 
and Ohringen. Between these-two, the valleys of the Kessach, 
Jagst and Kocher are rather different in character; they are 
cavernous and meandering in comparison to the broad corridors 
of the Tauber and Ohrn. The distribution and types of the 
Roman military sites would suggest that the cavernous river 
courses were more densely afforested and less easily passable 
than today; one cohortýon the central of these river courses, 
at Jagsthausen, was perhaps considered sufficient garrison (in 
conjunction with fortlet(s) and towers) to supervise all three. 
If the central three river courses were considered to present 
less of a threat of unauthorised movement, this would also help 
to explain why the possible numerus fort at Westernbach was 
situated not in the Kocher valley, but much further to the 
south, only 3.25km from Ohringen. The upland plateau which the 
frontier crosses on the way to Ohringen would be a natural 
bypass route for anyone wishing to cross the frontier but avoid 
the intensively garrisoned passage by Ohringen. In contrast,, 
the Kocher valley was perhaps a much less inviting corridor of 
approach than it might appear to be on a modern map. 
To the south of Ohringen, where the frontier transects the 
afforested uplands of the Mainhardt and Murrhardt areas, the 
country was again largely intractable; natural corridors were 
provided by river valleys which were blocked by forts at 
Mainhardt, 13.25km from Ohringen, and Murrhardt, 11.50km 
further on. 11.50km from Murrhardt lay the complex of forts at 
Welzheim. Here the use of small fortlets, is more evident. One 
lay c300m east of Mainhardt fort, 30m behind and oriented upon 
the frontier line. This fortlet, Mainhardt-East (0.054ha), 
excavated in 1975, 'has been taken, on the basis of its finds, 
to belong late in the history of the outer frontier, while 
being recognizably of the same type as Rdtelsee and others in 
this sector (RiBW, 439). No regularity can be discerned in 
their distribution; rather, as with the forts themselves, 
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topographical features seem to have decided their siting. 3km 
south of Mainhardt, HankertsmUhle was situated to control the 
small valley of the river Rot. 6km south of Murrhardt was 
Kleinkastell'Ebnisee; this, like Rbtelsee, 4.45km further on 
and only 1.50km from Welzheim, lies on an elevated, easily 
negotiable and fertile plateau along which the frontier ran 
between Murrhardt and Welzheim. Just as the numerus fort at 
Westernbach may have been placed to intercept movement across 
the tractable plateau'north of 6hringen, so these, fortlets may 
have fulfilled the same role to the north of Welzheim. 
The pattern seems to be one of units based to block the obvious 
routes of penetration, with a broken country in between which 
received very sparse garrisoning, with very few fortlets. On 
the outer frontier the towers were more closely spaced than in 
the Wetterau; and, as in the case of the remote Taunus, this 
might be a reflection of the problems experienced by very small 
detachments operating in broken country. Fortlets were 
occasionally placed where small rivers crossed the frontier, or 
to provide extra supervision on the areas of flat plateau where 
major garrison sites such as Ohringen and Welzheim could easily 
have been by-passed. In general, however, the average spacing 
of fortlets and forts between Osterburken and Welzheim was very 
wide. - At 6.21km the average interval, while not as wide as on 
the most northern section of the outer frontier, is 
considerably wider than in the Wetterau, and still wider than 
the 4.50 average of Strecken 2-3. This is because there was 
less use of small forts and fortlets; here the military 
concentrations were embodied in the cohorts placed where 
infiltration or movement was expected; it was not expected in 
the upland tracts between the valleys and plateaux. In the 
Taunus, in contrast, points of infiltration must have been less 
predictable, and therefore the small garrison was more evenly 
spread along the system. 
189 
Evidence from watchtowers 
The quantity of pottery found in 1971 at 9/71 and 9/77 has been 
taken (Planck and Beck 1987,78-9) to show that the towers 
continued to be supplied, and therefore continued in 
occupation, for a long time. 
Strecke 12: The junction of the Upper German and Raetian outer 
frontiers, and the Raetian frontier as far as Halheim 
Topography 
e 
Between Welzheim and Lorch the dead straight outer frontier 
gives way to a sinuous course which follows the topography of 
the valleys and ridges before turning just east of Lorch to run 
in long straight lengths north of the Rems. Here, as we have 
seen (4.5 above), the frontier line all the way to the Kocher, 
just west of Rainau-Buch, did not originate until the 
mid-Antonine period; the length between Unterbbbingen and Lorch 
was probably the latest part of all. The dead straight lengths 
in which it was laid out are perhaps a reflection of its late 
origins. Certainly the course of the frontier seems to pay 
very little attention to the landscape; although it seems to 
have been decided to keep the line on the north side of the 
Rems, otherwise its course seems arbitrary and takes it down 
into three valley bottoms, including, at one point, that of the 
Rems itself. An explanation for this - that the Rems at this 
point originally took over as the frontier line - was offered 
above (4.5). No attempt is made to follow the topography of 
the crest of the north side of the Rems valley; outlook to the 
north must frequently have been poor. The impression gained is 
that the line was arbitrarily driven to close the gap between 
Lorch and the original termination of the frontier near 12/45, 
and that any sort of tactical command of the topography was not 
considered necessary. 
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Leaving the Rems, the frontier continues in long straight 
stretches in a northeasterly direction; at 12/54, just north of 
Essingen, it swings sharply to the northeast and begins a 
straight courseýwhich takes it all the way to the presumed 
early Antonine termination of the frontier at the Kocher, near 
Buch. Baatz (1975,209-10) has suggested that in this part the 
line was dictated by the geological division between Lias and 
Keuper, beyond which the land is poor and afforested, and 
little pre-Roman settlement known. The fertile Vorland of the. 
Alb, in contrast, was enclosed by the frontier. While this may 
be true in a general sense, it is hard to see the frontier,, in- 
its dead straight layout, following with exactitude such a 
natural change, and it is important to remember that its 
general course will have been determined by the location of the 
pre-existing military arrangements to the north of the 
Nbrdlinger Ries, and the need to connect them with the forts 
advanced into the Alb Vorland. 
From the Kocher northeastwards, the remainder of Strecke 12 
generally follows a dead'straight course over the gently 
rolling Lias plateau. There are deviations around the forts at 
Buch and Halheim which show that the watchtower line post-dates 
the establishment of these sites. ' At Freihof, northeast of' 
Halheim, the frontier reaches the edge of the Lias-plateau, and 
climbs onto the more pronounced Keuper uplands, aiming directly 
for the prominent landmark of the Hesselberg. 
The nature of the continuous barrier 
The Pfalhgraben was supplied only as far as Lorch; yet the 
Raetian Wall did not begin until the-presumed border of the 
provinces of Upper Germany and Raetia at the Rotenbach, between 
12/22 and 12/23. West of the Rotenbach the Pfahl was never 
provided and the palisade stood alone as the sole continuous 
barrier on this last part of the Upper German frontier. 
Despite the range of different dates at which various parts of 
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the Raetian frontier in Strecke 12 originated, a palisade in 
some form was everywhere supplied before the building of the 
Raetian Wall; evidence for the dating of various parts of the 
palisade was discussed above (4.5). 
Gates and Passages 
No gateways through the palisade or Wall are known in Strecke 
12, with the exception of the suggested frontier gate at 
Dalkingen (12/81). Here five principal phases of activity were 
elucidated in excavations in 1973-74 (Planck 1983); the first, 
a Zaun, or fence, of individually set posts, about lm apart and 
displaying two phases; associated with them was a timber 
watchtower. Presumably this early activity is associated with 
the first layout of a linear system here after the building of 
Buch and Halheim by the early Antonine period. The second 
phase saw the installation of the major palisade in its 
continuous trench; it is tempting to associate this activity 
with the completion of the Raetian frontier in the 160s, at 
which date dendrochronology has shown such a palisade to have 
been supplied in the nearby Jagsttal. Now for the first time a 
timber structure, 13.30m by 14.50m, was attached to the rear of 
the palisade. Phase 3 saw a free standing stone tower built to 
the east of the timber structure; and then, in Phase 4A, the 
Raetian Wall was brought up to abut the front corners of the 
tower. As part of the same building operation, a stone 
building 12.60m by 9.30m incorporated-the tower and replaced 
the former timber structure. The entrance into the south, 
inner site was found, together with the impression of a 
threshold stone that had lain in the entrance leading out to 
the north. In a final phase, 4B, dated to the early third 
century, the structure received an elaborate facade which, 
however, would only have been visible from within the frontier. 
Although the excavator saw the successive structures at 
Dalkingen as an impressive frontier-gate, elaborately decorated 
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at the time of Caracalla's expedition across the Raetian 
frontier, some other German scholars (Baatz, pers. comm. ) have 
doubted this, interpretation. They prefer to see the Dalkingen 
structure as a fortlet attached to the running barrier in the 
manner of a British milecastle. The narrowness of the entrance 
to the north is stressed, and the suggestion made that its 
elaborate decoration may indicate its conversion into a temple, 
in the same manner as WP 10/37. 
Forts and minor installations 
Strecke 12 displays one of the lowest proportional densities of 
garrisoning on the whole of the Upper German and Raetian - 
frontier. The average spacing of the known installations - and 
the frontier line does not pass through areas so affected by 
modern building or agriculture as to lead to the suspicion that 
many fortlets have been lost or await discovery - is some 
8.50km, and that includes the short interval between Lorch and 
the cluster of installations near Schirenhof at the beginning 
of the Raetian Wall; in that part of Strecke 12 east of the 
beginning of the Wall the average is nearer 9.20km (not 
counting the distances between the clustered installations of 
Kleindeinbach, FreimUhle and Schirenhof). 
Fortlets, then, are hardly at all used in this sector; there 
can, therefore, be no question here of them being regularly 
spaced, and the few examples, known can be seen to have been 
situated in relation to local needs and circumstances. 200m 
west of the beginning of the Raetian Wall, taking the place of 
12/22, Kleinkastell Kleindeinbach (stone, 0.06ha) sat upon a 
flat-topped spur, overlooking the Rotenbach. Very near by, 
Kleinkastell FreimUhle (stone, 0.3ha) was also situated to 
overlook the Rotenbach, but the situation of this larger 
fortlet is otherwise puzzling. The frontier line, 0.75km to 
the north, runs on a level 100m higher than that of the 
fortlet, blocking any outlook over the frontier or to the 
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north. It has been suggested (ORLA 12,45) that this rearward 
fortlet may have supervised a road running through the Rems 
valley, orý(Planck and Beck 1987,108) that the fortlet may 
have had an independent role related to the provincial boundary 
between Upper Germany and Reatia, which is commonly supposed to 
have lain on the Rotenbach, where the Raetian Wall begins. 
6km beyond the fort at Schirenhof, at 12/33, lay the fortlet of 
Hintere Orthalde (stone, 0.022ha). This very small 
installation was situated to overlook the valley of the 
Sulzbach, today full of industrial plant, which runs 
northeast-southwest across the frontier into what is now, 
Schwabisch Gmund. It was situated immediately behind the 
continuous frontier. The fortlet is one of a series compared 
by Schleiermacher (1962) to the centenaria of North Africa, and 
supposed to be a late addition. 
This, is the last known fortlet in Strecke 12. After a 7km 
interval follows the fort at Unterbbbingen. The garrison of 
this place in the second or third centuries is unknown, but at 
2ha the fort would have been large enough to accommodate a 
whole auxiliary unit. It sits at a nodal point of 
communication corridors, still used by modern railways; this 
fort would also have been well situated to guard the original 
termination of the linear frontier at the Rems (proposed 
above). 
After another lOkm comes Aalen; after lOkm Buch; and finally, 
after an interval of 13km, Halheim. The great ala milliaria 
fort of Aalen (6ha), and Rainau-Buch (stone, 2.10ha) both lie 
back from the frontier line, some 4km distance in the case of: 
Aalen, and about 1.25km in the case of Buch; each is obviously 
situated with regard to a major river valley which crosses the 
frontier; the Kocher (Aalen) and the Jagst (Buch). The placing 
of Aalen behind the frontier at the intersection of a 
north-south route and the natural corridor of communication, 
the extension of the Rems valley, which runs behind and 
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parallel to the frontier, between it and the mountainous 
Schwabian Alb, shows that the potential mobility of ala II 
Flavla, and the need to guard the roads running behind the 
frontier, wereýborne in mind as much as any policing role on 
the frontier line itself. Buch, although placed in the 
Jagsttal, presumably predated the watchtower system here, which 
deviates to pass around the fort; we may suspect that, like 
Aalen, Buch was more concerned with the protection of roads 
behind the later frontier line. Halheim, filling a long 
interval of 26km between Buch and Ruffenhofen, was very small 
at only 0.67ha, and only possessed two gates (ORLB 67A, Tafel 
1); although the fort is described as numerus-sized (Planck and 
Beck 19B7; 149), its garrison is unknown. Southern (1989, 
123-4) has shown that there is no reason to believe it actually 
was a numerus. Like Buch, Halheim presumably predated the 
frontier line, which deviates to pass around it, and therefore 
its siting may be more concerned with the earliest garrisoning 
(in the early Antonine period? ) of and the road running through 
the area between Ruffenhofen and the Kocher, and may not 
indicate any local peculiarity or weakness of the later 
continuous frontier here. 
Evidence from watchtowers 
Excavation at Mahdholz (12/77) in 1969, besides revealing a 
sequence consisting of a typically (for this sector) large 
stone tower (6.50 by 5.50m) followed by a stone (5m by 5m) 
successor which became incorporated into the Raetian Wall, also 
produced evidence to show that the length of occupation had 
been considerable, and that the wall and tower here had been 
decorated with red painted plaster (Planck and Beck 1987,140). 
At 12/13, instead of a normal tower, occurred a building 10.50m 
square, described as a Feldwache, or very small fortlet, in ORL 
(A 12,19; 34-5). 
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Communications 
'Nach dem Begleitweg, der zur Verbindung der Wachtposten unter 
sich und als Patrouillenweg entlang dem Limes geführt haben 
muss, ist nicht gesucht worden. Spuren von ihm sind nicht 
bekannt' (ORLA 12j, > 20). 
Despite, the failure to find much evidence for the frontier 
patrol-track or service road, there is evidence for arterial 
roads linking the area of the Nbrdlinger Ries with the area of 
the Upper, Neckar. As suggested above, the forts at Aalen and 
Buch may-have been closely associated with one such road, which 
ran from Aalen, via Bbbingen, and along the south side of the 
Rems valley, usually staying at least lkm behind the watchtower 
line, converging with it near 12/14 and Lorch,, and-then passing 
straight on'to join the Upper Neckar (RiBW, 147). Aalen1ay at 
the point where two roads , one from-the northeast and one from 
the south-met and became the single Neckar-bound road under- 
discussion. The road coming down from the northeast, via Buch, 
was in fact a continuation of the 'Rdmerstrasse', the original 
penetration road north of the Nbrdlinger Ries which continued 
in use as an important route some distance behind the Raetian 
frontier in Strecken 13 and 14. 
It will be clear then,, that the original purpose-of the forts r 
in the eastern part of this sector (Ruffenhofen, Buch, Halheim) 
was to safeguard a road system; the location of the later 
linear frontier was determined by the forts, and not vice 
versa. Even though a linear frontier was provided immediately 
- or almost immediately - upon the provision of forward forts 
further west, those forts still seem intimately linked with the 
road system, rather than the linear frontier to the north. 
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Strecke 13: Ruffenhofen to Gunzenhausen 
Topography 
From Halheim as far as WP 13/22-23, north of Ruffenhofen, as 
suggested above, the frontier line was probably a late 
addition, originating, with Buch and Halheim, between c120 and 
c140. As far as 13/10 its course was aligned exactly upon the 
summit of the Hesselberg. At 13/10, the frontier line swung 
north to enclose the Hesselberg and to join onto the previously 
established frontier line east of 13/22-23. 
Here we enter upon the earliest sectors of the Raetian frontier 
to receive a system of watchtowers and, at some stage, a 
palisade. It was suggested above (4.3.1) that its date of 
origin would be indicated by the foundation date of Dambach, 
and thus may have occurred as early as cllO-cl2O. Its exact 
location was presumably determined by the forts - Ellingen, 
Theilenhofen, Gunzenhausen - pushed forward, perhaps in the 
early Trajanic period, to secure entrances into the Nbrdlinger 
Ries. 
In either case, rather than being determined by exact local - 
topography, its siting was a continuation of an existing policy 
being carried out to secure the Ries by placing sites north of 
the penetration road from the Danube. The one local factor 
which may have, influenced the course of-the frontier was, the 
evident decision to enclose the prominent Hesselberg mountain 
within it. Even this has been interpreted by Baatz (1975,223) 
rather as a drive to enclose as much as possible of the fertile 
Vorland of the Alb within the protection of the frontier. The 
frontier line in Strecke 13 thus has no natural feature to 
follow, and cuts straight across the gently rolling country on 
the northern edge of the Vorland. 
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The nature of the continuous barrier 
The palisade in this sector, which may have dated from the 
Trajanic or Hadrianic period, was presumably in a state of 
decay by the mid-second century, for, some time before the 
building of the stone Raetian Wall it was replaced in much of 
the sector by a timber Flechtwerkzaun (ORLA 13,13-14), itself 
sometimes structurally later than the stone replacements of the 
original timber towers. The stone towers of Strecke 13 are 
generally of a larger size than those found-on the Upper German 
frontier, sometimes measuring as much as 6m by 7m (ibid., 
14-15); the earlier timber towers - the so-called BlockhaUser - 
had also been of large size and surrounded by distinctive 
square ditches (ibid., 11-12; Taf 2; 3; 5; 7). 
Gates and Passages 
At 13/5 there were possible openings through the stone wall on 
either side of the tower, of 2m and 2.50m respectively (ORLA 
13,23; Taf 2). At 13/22, where the frontier line kinks 
towards the east to pass around the Hesselberg, two gaps were 
left in the Raetian Wall, of 1.70m and 2.30m wide 
respectively, 7m apart. One of the gaps was formed by stopping 
the Raetian Wall short of the east side of the stone tower 
(ibid., 35; Taf 3). At 13/43 a gap was found in both palisade 
and Raetian Wall. The opening in the palisade was 2.30m wide; 
that in the Raetian Wall 2.85m wide, again formed simply by not 
continuing the Wall all the way to abut the east side of the 
tower. It is also possible that here there was an opening in 
the Plechtwerkzaun; this barrier was not continuously traced. 
At this opening there was evidence for bronze lettering from a 
gate inscription, and a timber door (ibid., 47; Taf 6). 33m 
east of stone WP 13/50 there occurred a gate through the 
Raetian Wall: a gap 8.50m wide with an inward projecting 
extension of the Wall on either side, and evidence for a road 
(ibid., 54; Taf 7). At WP 13/54, just by the fort of 
198 
Gunzenhausen, and where the AltmUhl crosses the frontier, an 
opening over 7m wide occurred in the palisade. It was occupied 
by some poorly understood remains which may have represented 
the structure of a timber gate (ibid., 47-8; Taf 2.5). The 
Raetian Wall was almost certainly crossed here too, but the 
evidence is confused by the fact that it was interrupted in any 
case to make way for the river AltmUhl. The 
Relchs-Limeskommission believed the Wall to have been 
interrupted here for 50m (ibid., 46). But Ulbert and Fischer 
(1983,68-9) prefer to see the Wall resuming after a gap of 
10m, then running down to the river on timber piling. The 
paved road running immediately behind the Raetian Wall also 
formed a ford across the AltmUhl (ibid., 46). 
Forts and minor installations 
Strecke 13 contains not a single known fortlet. Ruffenhofen, 
base of an unknown auxiliary garrison, was followed by an 
interval of 11.50km along the frontier, or 9.50km as the crow 
flies, before the next fort site, Dambach; 'here the earliest 
known small fort (stone, 0.97ha) was enlarged at some time in 
the second century into a cohort sized fort of 2.20ha. This 
activity may possibly'be dated by a Commodan inscription, (CIL 
3.11921), but could just as easily have occurred earlier 
(Ulbert and Fischer 1983,64). It is notable that neither of 
these forts is situated at an obvious incursion point on the 
linear frontier. This is even the case with Dambach, which was 
evidently sited after the choice of the frontier line. 
Although a minor depression crosses the frontier at this point, 
it hardly represents the natural corridors so often surveyed by 
installations elsewhere on the Upper German and Raetian 
systems. 4.75km from Dambach, but lying over 6km behind the 
frontier line, the fort at Gnotzheim (2.20ha) continued in 
occupation throughout our period. By 144 it had become the 
base of-cohors III Thracum, probably still its garrison in the 
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third century (by which time a numerus may-have shared the 
fort: Schbnberger 1985,472). The concerns ofýthe garrison of 
Gnotzheim presumably had as much to do with the intersection of 
east-west and north-south routes upon which it sat, as with 
surveillance of the frontier line. 
Two aspects therefore characterise the distribution of garrison 
posts in Strecke 13: the absence of posts smaller than full 
cohort size, and the almost general failure (Dambach, perhaps 
not increased to, full cohort size until the later second 
century, is the exception) of posts of any size greater than 
the watchtowers to appear upon the frontier line itself. It is 
clear that much of-the role of the cohort forts continued to be 
concentrated upon the road system to the rear of the frontier. 
On the frontier the towers were widely spaced and often of 
unusually large size: this suggests that on the line itself 
very small detachments of frontier-police troops could safely 
operate for long periods away from larger troop concentrations, 
and without near recourse to any installation larger than the 
characteristic 'Blockhaus' towers of this sector. 
The lower order of infiltration or threat foreseen on this-part 
of the Raetian frontier is well illustrated by the average 
spacing between larger installations on or near the frontier 
itself. Omitting Gnotzheim, over 6km distant, the average 
spacing between the forts of Halheim, Ruffenhofen, Dambach and 
Gunzenhausen is some 12.30km. No-installations larger than 
watchtowers lay in the intervals. 
Evidence from watchtowers - 
Some of the large stone towers have produced ground floor 
entrances, usually on the south side, as in the turrets of 
Hadrian's Wall (eg 13/8,13/43). WP13/8 also produced evidence 
for a stone floor, and a milling stone, taken to suggest a long 
period of occupation by the individual detachment manning the 
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tower, and illustrating that corn rations were distributed to 
the towers so that the inhabitants could prepare their own food 
there (Ulbert-and Fischer 1983,58). 
Communications 
The continuing importance of the Rdmerstrasse, the main Roman 
road running south of, and parallel to, the continuous 
frontier, has already been referred to. 
Strecke 14: from Gunzenhausen to Kipfenberg 
Topography 
As in the stretch last discussed, the siting of the frontier 
line in Strecke 14 was determined by, the early Roman attempt to 
secure the northern entrance into the fertile NOrdlinger Ries 
by planting garrisons around its northern fringes. As we saw 
in Chapter 3, the origins of the Roman military dispositions in 
this area lay in a road pushed out from the Danube, across the 
northward projection of the Fr8nkische Jura, towards the 
Nbrdlinger Ries. 
From Gunzenhausen as far as the area of Weissenburg and 
Ellingen, the frontier line continues to separate, still today 
in fairly clear fashion, the fertile, Alb Vorland from the 
unproductive Keuper land to the north. It runs for the most 
part across gently rolling and intensively cultivated land, 
taking advantage of slight eminences and ridges where they 
exist. In the Weissenburg area, however, the frontier 
encounters the northward projection of the mountainous Alb 
which is the Frankische Jura. For the frontier to have 
deviated to the north, to continue taking in the Vorland to the 
north and west of the Jura, would have entailed absorbing vast 
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tracts of land, and this was never attempted. Instead, the 
frontier line was cut directly across the beginnings of the 
Frdnkische Jura towards the Danube. Because it was designed to 
take the most direct route possible, it did not follow the old 
penetration road from the Danube, but ran by a more direct 
route some distance to the north. This course also had the 
advantage of not excluding a fertile area on the eastern side 
of the Alb, and of continuing the general line followed by the 
Danube in eastern Raetia, and therefore not creating an 
indentation into Roman territory which would have been created 
had the road line been followed. After Weissenburg the 
frontier achieves a slight ridge which runs across the fertile 
high plateau of the Alb. 
Rather than following a straight course between Weissenburg and 
Bbhming on the AltmUhl, the frontier line in fact runs in two 
straight stretches forming an indentation; the angle at which 
they meet is by Petersbuch, at 14/56. The indentation was 
dictated by a decision to avoid the valley of the river 
Anlauter, and to leave that river outside the frontier. To 
have included any of the Anlauter valley would have 
necessitated two difficult river crossings. As it is, the 
frontier has to cross only. minor tributaries of the Anlauter as 
it approaches Bbhming and the AltmUhl. 
For all that the frontier line in Strecke 14 was taking a 
direct route to the Danube, and even though this was done by 
means of two long, generally straight stretches forming an 
indentation, there was little of the dead-straight surveying 
which characterised the outer frontier of Upper Germany. 
Lengths of the frontier in Strecke 14 were surveyed straight 
for many kilometres at a time, but with a large number of 
slight kinks and changes in direction, showing that some 
attention was paid to the topography. 
t 
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The nature of the continuous barrier 
As in Strecke 13, large towers predominated in both timber 
('Blockhaus') and stone phases; the Raetian Wall was generally 
brought up to abut the fronts of the stone towers in orthodox 
fashion. The editors of ORL (A 14,18-21) attempted to 
differentiate between timber towers and 'BlockhaUser', but 
there was not always a clear distinction in their form or size, 
(eg Ibid., Taf 8.1). 
Gates and passages 
Several openings in the continuous barriers are known in 
Strecke 14. Just west of 14/4 was discovered a passage through 
both palisade and Raetian Wall (ORLA 14,54-5; Taf 3). At 
nearby 14/5 was a gap through the palisade, 5m wide, but 
apparently no passage through the later Wall (ibid., 58; Taf 
3). The two towers, 14/4 and 14/5, are abnormally closely 
spaced. Further reason for thinking that the Schlossbuck, the 
elevated spur of land along which the frontier runs having left 
the AltmOhl valley, was a favoured area for crossing the 
frontier may be seen in the presence of the Kleinkastell auf 
dem Hinteren Schlossbuck. Just as the frontier leaves the 
Schlossbuck, an unparalleled structure is attached to the rear 
of the Raetian Wall at 14/8. It resembles a shallow tower with 
chambers attached to either side, but did not possess the 
characterstics of a gate (ibid., 61-2; Taf 3). At 14/12, which 
was placed on a notable height, the Raetian Wall left a gap of 
4m on the west side of the stone tower (ibid. Taf 5). A paved 
road passed through this opening. The Zaun here had also had' 
an opening at a timber tower. 
It is thought that the frontier must have crossed an earlier 
paved road at 14/15 (Ulbert and Fischer 1983,77), although it 
appears (ORLA 14,68) that the road crossed the frontier in the 
Plechtwerkzaun period - it passes through an opening in that 
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feature, but was blocked when the Raetian Wall was supplied 
(ibid. Taf 6). A 2.50m passage through the Raetian Wall 
existed at 14/22, one side of the passage, as so often, formed 
by the (east) side of the stone tower (ibid., 74). At 5.20 by 
4.70m the tower was typical of the large type encountered in 
this sector. At 14/25 a possible opening in the Zaun, some 
2.50m wide, has been noted (ibid., 76-77). A passage was 
provided through the palisade, but not the Wall, opposite 4/56, 
near Petersbuch (ibid. Taf 10). Finally, a 4m break in the 
palisade was noted at 14/78, just above the AltmOhl at the end 
of Strecke 14 (ibid., 113; Taf 7). 
Forts and minor installations 
This section of the Raetian frontier shows a clear pattern of 
rearward auxiliary forts complemented by forts of smaller size 
- conventionally thought of as numerus forts - closer to, or 
actually upon, the frontier line itself. 
Thus the stone fort at Gunzenhausen, situated to supervise the 
entry of the AltmUhl into the fertile Vorland enclosed by the 
frontier, was only 0.70ha in size; its garrison is unknown 
(Schbnberger 1985,486). A considerable distance south of the 
frontier line the AltmUhl valley was flanked by the forts at 
Gnotzheim (see Strecke 13) and, to the east of the valley and 
7km from Gunzenhausen, at Theilenhofen. Here a stone fort of 
2.70ha (the early occupation of the site was discussed in 1.7.2 
above) was garrisoned from the Antonine period into the third 
century by cohors III Bracaraugustanorum eq. 
Similarly, the ala fort at Weissenburg lay well back (5.75km) 
from the frontier, while 1.75km from the line itself, and 4km 
north of Weissenburg, lay the 0.72ha stone fort of Ellingen. 
Here too, the garrison is unknown, despite its conventional 
designation as a numerus fort. The recently discovered 
inscription of 182 recording rebuilding by pedites singulares 
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of the provincial governor's staff is not thought to shed light 
upon the permanent garrison of the place. (Schbnberger 1985, 
486); it has been suggested (Dietz 1983) that the fort was 
manned by detachments from Weissenburg. 
A further fort is postulated at-Oberhochstatt, 6.5km east of 
Weissenburg, where bronze letters from an elaborate dedicatory 
inscription are known (ORLA 14,89-90; Schbnberger 1985,487). 
Little is known of the site, but its small size has led to it 
being spoken of as suitable for a numerus (Ulbert and Fischer 
1983,87). Such a, site would have had a similar relationship 
to Weissenburg and the frontier line as Ellingen. Apart from 
the well-known fortlet - the Burgus in der Harlach -a third 
Roman military site is known nearby. Immediately south of the 
Rdmerstrasse, aerial photography has revealed what is either a 
temporary work or an auxiliary fort. There is no knowledge of 
its exact nature or date, however, and on present evidence it 
may as well be an early installation connected with the 
penetration road rather than a permanent part of the second and 
third century frontier system. I 
There is now a very long interval of some 26km before the next 
fort site on the frontier line, at Bdhming on the AltmUhl. The 
known fort at Bbhming (stone, 0.70ha) is numerus-sized; like 
the original fort at Dambach, it only possessed two gates. But 
it illustrates the danger of indiscriminate use of the 
Inumerus' label, for the evidence of inscriptions suggests that 
in the third century it was garrisoned by detachments of Cohors 
I Breucorum, whose base was at the 2.50ha fort of Pfanz, lOkm 
behind the frontier at the point where the old penetration road 
- the Rdmerstrasse - crossed the AltmUhl (Southern 1989,123). 
The fortlets found along the frontier line in Strecke 14 are 
generally of the smaller, milecastle-like size; there is no 
regularity in the spacing of the known examples. 1.75m from 
Gunzenhausen and the AltmUhl, lay the Kleinkastell auf dem 
Hinteren Schlossbuck (WP 14/6: stone, 0.04ha). This is a 
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further structure with a square shape, and possible internal 
court, leading Schleiermacher (1962) to compare it to African 
structures. It is therefore possibly a late addition. The 
presence here of several passages through the continuous- 
barriers, has been noted, and it seems likely that the role of 
the fortlet-here was to supervise the routes across the 
frontier which went over the Schlossbuck - following an old 
route - and not through Gunzenhausen and the AltmUhl valley 
itself, where boggy, ground to the north would have made passage 
difficult. The route over the Schlossbuck proceeded in the 
direction of the rearward fort of Theilenhofen (Baatz 1975, 
237). 
5km further on lay Theilenhofen, some 2km behind the frontier 
line; then, after another 7.50km, the Kleinkastell bei 
GUndersbach (WP 14/26: stone, 0.036ha: not in ORL). The 
fortlet-was placed to survey the valley of the Rezat, which 
crossed the frontier, 750m to the east. A further 3km 
intervenes before Ellingen - well detached from the frontier 
line - and then a further 4.50km before the site of a 
postulated (Ulbert and Fischer 1983,85) fortlet at 14/38. 
Such a fortlet, if it existed, would have surveyed the 
approaches of the Felchbach and the Rohrbach to the frontier. 
2km further on comes the postulated Oberhochstatt fort site, 
and shortly after that the well-known Kleinkastell in der 
Harlach. 
The Harlach structure is without parallel on the German or 
Raetian, frontier; it is stone, cO. 10ha, with a plan featuring 
rooms attached to the insides of the defensive wall forming 
four ranges around a central court. It is dated. to the third 
century. It has been compared to the centenaria of North- 
Africa (Schleiermacher 1962). It is not clear that this 
structure is closely linked with the linear frontier 
installations and fortlets of more orthodox type; its location 
immediately beside the main Rdmerstrasse, running behind the 
frontier and continuing in use as a separate arterial route, 
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suggests that the Harlach structure may represent a late road 
station. 
4km from the postulated Oberhochstatt fort, and 6km from the 
postulated fortlet at 14/38, lay Kleinkastell Raitenbuch 
(WP14/49: stone, 0.036ha). After a further 4.50km occurs 
Kleinkastell Petersbuch (WP14/55-56: stone, 0.04ha). The 
latter site has sharp rather than rounded corners, which may 
indicate a late date. 
Neither Raitenbuch nor Petersbuch are situated in relation to 
any topographic feature or known route which the frontier 
crosses to explain the exact reason for their location. 
However, they are placed at the one place where the 
Rdmerstrasse, running up from PfUnz to Weissenburg, comes close 
to (1.50km), and runs parallel to, the frontier line for a 
distance of only 6km. It is possible that these fortlets'were 
located to provide extra protection for traffic on the road at 
the one point where it passed very close to the frontier 
itself; it is significant that the late fortified Harlach 
structure, occurring in close connection with the road, is 
located in the same sector. 
The earthwork known at WP14/66, the Kleinkastell Biebig of ORL, 
is now no longer thought to be of Roman date; the next fortlet 
is therefore Hegelohe, (WP14/67: stone, 0.04 ha). This fortlet 
is of exactly the same size and type as Petersbuch, with single 
gateway and sharp external corners. They are both therefore of 
the-Icentenaria' type classified by Schleiermacher (1962), and 
this may indicate a late origin. Hegelohe is placed right on 
the edge of the more easterly of two valleys cutting south 
across the frontier from the Anlauter valley. This is the last 
fortlet before the AltmUhl crossing at Bbhming and the end of 
Strecke 14. 
The average spacing of installations larger than watchtower 
size along the actual frontier line in Strecke 14 is therefore 
207 
about 5km (not including Weissenburg, far behind the frontier, 
and the Harlach structure). Because there are notable clusters 
of installations in the Strecke - such as the closely 
associated Gunzenhausen fort and Schlossbuck fortlet, or the 
closely spaced postulated sites at WP14/38 and Oberhochstatt 
the average spacing figure in fact disguises some quite 
remarkable intervals, such as that between Petersbuch and 
Hegelohe, where for many kilometres at a time no installations 
were provided to supplement the chain of large, but relatively 
widely-spaced towers drawn across the generally level 
landscape. 
Evidence from watchtowers 
As usual, finds-from the watchtowers have been scarce; another 
example of a-hand milling-stone is known from the stone tower 
at 14/24 (ORLA 14,75), while the timber tower at 14/25 
produced a coin of 166/167 (ibid., 76) which may provide a 
terminus-post quem for the tower's replacement in stone. In 
the large, 6.45m by 5.77m stone tower of 14/64 were discovered 
two hearths; the same was true of WP 14/65,14/75 and 14/77 
(ibid., 101-112). 
Strecke 15: from B6hming to the Danube 
Topography 
The frontier line in Strecke 15 ran in two long stretches - 
surveyed with more dead straight accuracy than in Strecke 14 - 
across fairly level, gently undulating country, broken by only 
a few valleys. The artificial frontier joins the Danube at 
that point where the precipitous walls of the Danube ravine 
begin: in other words, from this point onwards it was 
considered that the river alone could fulfil the role that had 
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elsewhere necessitated the construction of an artificial land 
frontier. 
Beyond, the frontier in this sector ran the steep-walled valley 
of the AltmUhl; behind it, the broad, marshy valley of the 
Danube. The exact siting of the course of the running frontier 
seems to have been decided by the need to draw a direct line to 
the point where the Danube ravine begins, and by the desire to 
place the frontier to the north of, and clear of, the rich, 
open land immediately north of the Danube, traversed by the 
Rdmerstrasse. 
Evidently the original scheme was to circumvent the Schambach 
valley completely, leaving it beyond the frontier. A change of 
plan during the layout of the frontier had the result that 
where the two straight stretches meet, the frontier was 
projected forward in a notable salient which has to make two 
crossings of the Schambach. The reason for this was apparently 
the need to secure and protect a bridgehead, a crossing of the 
river leading to the north. Baatz (1975,262) has remarked 
that there are iron ore deposits immediately to the north of 
the frontier here, and that this may have been the point where 
an old route had gone out to the north. 
The nature of the continuous barrier 
Strecke 15 displays the conventional sequence of palisade, 
Flechtwerkzaun, at least in places (ORLA 15,17), and Raetian 
Wall. The Flechtwerkzaun, however, is recorded at very few 
points, and it may be that because of a late provision of the 
palisade in Strecke 15, it never required replacement to the 
same extent as in Strecken 14. The timber towers continue to 
be of the large Blockhaus type. 
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Gates and Passages 
Not so much evidence for passages through the barriers has been 
recorded in Strecke 15. At WP15/5 the large timber tower was 
overlain by the Raetian Wall; the stone successor just to the 
east of the timber tower, of rather unusual plan, had, 
immediately upon its east side, a 3m passage through the 
Raetian Wall. This had been blocked at some time. The 
palisade had been uninterrupted (ORLA 15,29-30;. Taf 5). To 
the east of 15/5 occurs the odd phenomenon of two stretches of 
stone wall, running on different alignments (ibid.; Ulbert and 
Fischer-1983,99-100)., 
Forts and Minor installations 
In terms of garrison posts placed upon the actual frontier line 
Strecke 15 represents one of the most lightly manned sectors of 
the Upper German and Raetian frontiers. The two large ala 
forts of Kbsching (4ha) and Pf6rring (3.90ha) lay far behind 
the frontier line, and, were more intimately linked with the 
road system to the north of the Danube. On the frontier 
itself, 13.50km from Bbhming were two Kleinkastelle separated 
by only 3.50km: GQssgraben (15/18: stone, 0.04ha) and Am 
Hinteren See-Berg (15/23: stone, 0.04ha). The latter of these 
posts has sharp external corners, and is thus a possible late 
addition. These are the only known fortlets on Strecke 15. 
Although GUssgraben is near a dry stream-bed or valley, 
crossing the frontier 500m to the east (Baatz 1975,267), both 
of these fortlets may be better explained in terms of a general 
provision of supervision in the broken landscape of the 
Kbschinger Forest, where an outlying spur of the Jura is 
crossed by the frontier. Here there must have been a number of 
potentially clandestine approaches to the frontier. Again 
then, there is no regular provision or, spacing of fortlets: two 
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are provided in close proximity where special circumstances 
necessitate them. 
A distance of 2km further on from the See-Berg, a site to guard 
the crossing of the Schambach valley possibly awaits 
discovery. Baatz (1975,262) has suggested a numerus-sized 
fort. This point is still approached by modern routes crossing 
the frontier, and was mentioned above as a possible bridgehead 
allowing access to the north. A further 14km intervenes 
between the Schambach and the end of the frontier on The 
Danube. Even taking into account the postulated site, the 
average spacing of known installations in Strecke 15 is very 
wide: some 8.25km. For this reason, and because the auxiliary 
forts lay so far back from the line, Baatz (1975,263) has 
suggested that further Kleinkastelle must await discovery. 
Despite this intriguing suggestion, the over-riding impression 
from this final sector of the Raetian land frontier before the 
Danube is reached is of a very lightly supervised line. 
Beyond, to the north, was the Frankische Jura. Here no 
important concentration of native settlement or German tribal 
area is known to have existed. The flat fertile area to the 
north of the Danube was watched directly by the mobile alae of 
the two auxiliary forts, which could move swiftly to intercept 
any raiders who had arrived in large enough numbers not to be 
impeded by the light anti-infiltration screen placed to the 
north of the settlement zone; such raids were evidently not 
expected to be frequent. 
Evidence from watchtowers 
The excavated examples of stone towers exhibit the general 
characteristics of the Raetian type, possessing the same 
general size, rearward ground floor entrances and internal 
hearths as in the previous Strecke. For example: 15/11 and 
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15/15, which also contained five steps of a staircase (ORLA 15, 
32-3). 
Chapter 5 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH LINEAR FRONTIERS IN THE SECOND 
CENTURY 
In Chapter 2 we followed linear frontier development in north 
Britain up to the decision, under Hadrian,, to build a Wall on 
the Tyne-Solway Isthmus. It is not-proposed here to examine 
closely the evidence for the exact date of commencement of 
Hadrian's Wall. Given the vague dating of the Continental 
developments with which the British Wall systems are to be 
compared, the date of the Wall decision may simply be accepted 
in this context as early-Hadrianic. 
In this Chapter the broad'development of Hadrian's Wall and its 
attendant installations will be sketched up to the early 
Antonine period, when advance into Scotland took place, and the 
Antonine Wall was constructed on the Forth-Clyde Isthmus. The 
development'and installations of the Antonine Wall are 
described. Then follows'a detailed study of the problem of 
Antonine chronology in the north, centring on the problem of 
how many periods of Antonine activity should be ascribed to 
Roman sites in'Scotland, and'reviewing the evidence for the 
date of, the abandonment of the Antonine Wall. In a final 
section the development and nature of Hadrian's Wall, as 
restored upon the abandonment of the Scottish Wall, will be 
considered. -I 
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5.1 Hadrian's Wall: the first scheme (Fig 17) 
5.1.1 The topography of the linear frontier 
The Hadrianic-running barrier was designed from the outset to 
follow different kinds of alignment in differing sorts of 
landscape. From Newcastle to the beginning of the Whin Sill, 
around Milecastle 33, the Wall was laid out in long straight 
stretches, evidently carefully surveyed-over many miles. 
Although the siting of the Wall displays a decisive move to 
place the patrolled frontier north of the river Tyne, 
throughout this eastern sector there was no obvious ridge or 
high commanding line for the Wall to seize. Therefore it ran 
from high point to high point through an uneven, rolling 
landscape. Often the Wall did not often possess, in this 
sector, a commanding view to the north. .', 
In the central sector, on the great Whin Sill, the Wall seized 
the precipitous volcanic ridge. It ran a different kind of 
course here, weaving to maintain the crest of the crags. 
However, it is notable that the-Wall did not sacrifice its 
directness of line in order to maintain a commanding view to 
the-north; Greatchesters, for example, looks north to a higher 
ridge of land than that occupied by the fort itself. 
As it descended from the Whin Sill at Carvoran, the Wall 
resumed a course of predominantly straight stretches. Between 
the Irthing and Castlesteads, the course of the Wall was 
determined by the well defined narrow east-west running ridge 
north of the Irthing, and here ran in shorter stretches 
obviously constrained by the topography. Between Castlesteads 
and Carlisle, there was once again no obvious feature for the 
Wall to follow as it cut arbitrarily through the landscape, and 
it once again adopted straight stretches surveyed over a long 
distance. 
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From Carlisle to the Solway, the Wall was laid out partly in 
long curving sectors, and partly in straight stretches. There 
was no obvious ridge of elevated ground for the Wall to follow, 
and its curving course immediately West of Carlisle suggests 
that it may have been sited in relation to the course of the 
river Eden. Further west it ran in short straight stretches 
overlooking the coastline. 
5.1.2 Forts, garrisons and their spacing 
In the first scheme there was no provision for whole, 
permanently based alae or cohorts on the line of the Wall 
itself. 
5.1.3 Minor installations and their spacing 
The first scheme relied upon milecastles and turrets, linked by 
the Great Wall and ditch, and by whatever rearward 
communication existed in the pre-Antonine period. On those 
parts of the Wall where there is sufficient knowledge of the 
remains to know the disposition of the minor installations, 
they have a famous and striking regularity. The milecastles 
occur at intervals of roughly one Roman mile, with minor 
adjustments to suit local circumstances or for reasons that are 
not fully understood. Between every pair of milecastles were 
generally two turrets (watchtowers). 
5.1.4 Wall, ditch and Building Materials 
As is well known, the project commenced in the east with a 
stone Wall built to a uniform gauge of ten feet - the Broad 
Wall. Many of the minor installations all the way from the 
Newcastle to the Irthing were built first with 'Broad' wing 
walls ready to receive the curtain when it arrived. The Broad 
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Wall was actually only completed between Newcastle and about 
Milecastle 22 before the revised building scheme for the Wall 
was instituted, although the broad foundation occurs in places 
all the way to the-Irthing. 'West'of the Irthing the Wall, 
milecastles and forts were built of turf, with, the turf curtain 
abutting stone turrets. A great ditch accompanied the Wall, in 
front of a berm of c6m on the stone Wall, less than 2m on the 
turf Wall. The ditch varied, between 8m and 14m in width, and 
was between 2 and 3m deep, cut, like the Vallum,, into bedrock 
where necessary. The ditch was only omitted for any 
considerable length where rendered superfluous by the 
positioning of the Wall on precipitous crags in the central 
sector. 
5.1.5 The'existence of a wall-walk 
That the top of the Wall was finished with a walkway and 
parapet is often assumed, but cannot be proved. The evidence 
of linear frontier barriers on the Continent has been taken to 
indicate that a wall-walk might not have existed. Conversely, 
some points of difference from the Continental frontiers -- 
especially the declining importance of watchtowers (turrets) on 
Hadrian's Wall - may be taken to imply that the wall-top was 
patrolled (see below, Chapter 6). Here it will suffice to list 
briefly the main indicators in the archaeological evidence from 
Hadrian's Wall that a wall-walk existed. 
1. The occurrence at a number of locations (listed in Bidwell 
and Holbrook 1989,135) of chamfered stones from the north side 
of the Wall curtain, possibly from a string course beneath a 
parapet. 
2. The blocking of the recesses at the site of demolished 
turrets, suggesting that a wall-walk needed to be carried over 
the recess (Bellhouse 1969,86). 
0 
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3. The repositioning of the northeast-angle-tower of 
Housesteads, so that it coincides with the point where 
Hadrian's Wall meets the fort, may suggest that there was 
access from the tower onto the Wall-top. It may be noted that 
the Wall invariably meets forts at points where towers could 
have allowed, such access. 
4. -The relationship of the replacement Stone Wall to Turf Wall 
turrets. When brought up to abut the sides of the turrets, the 
Stone Wall, was set back from the front of the turrets by c1m. 
This may indicate the'continued use of a door leading from the 
turret, its position necessarily set back from the front 
because of the battered face of the original Turf Wall 
(Bellhouse 1969,88-9). If accepted, this evidence also points 
to the continued use of the wall-walk after the Turf Wall was 
converted into stone. 
5. The nature, of the stone bridges at Chesters and Willowford, 
which, in their-first form, carried not a road, but the Wall 
itself, over the rivers North Tyne and Irthing (Bidwell and 
Holbrook 1989)., Such an arrangement is unknown on any other 
frontier (the Raetian Wall, for example, is simply discontinued 
at river crossings). The need to continue Hadrian's Wall 
across the rivers suggests the use of a Wall-walk. 
6. The great thickness of the Stone Wall, both in its original 
Broad form and later reduced width, is not fully explained by 
any factor except the existence of a wall-walk and parapet. In 
the same way it significant that The Turf Wall (and the 
Antonine Wall) were structures built of coursed turves in the 
manner of, a fort Wall, and not earth, mounds, like the German 
Pfahlgraben. It could be argued that Hadrian's Wall was so 
thick simply for the sake of impressiveness, but then that 
would be as unique a phenomenon (inýan empire-wide context) as 
a wall-walk. 
t 
217 
Otherýevidence which has been advanced for a wall-walk, a 
flight of-steps in Milecastle 48, does not show that the Wall 
as well as the milecastle walls was patrolled. The Rudge Cup 
and Amiens skillet depict Hadrian's Wall with crenellations, 
but the representation may be stylised; the merlons are 
depicted only on towers that rise higher than the curtain in 
between. No merlon caps or stones from crenellations have been 
found associated with the curtain, although they do occur at 
forts, turrets and milecastles (Crow 1991,61). This does not 
show that the curtain did not possess a parapet. Crenellations 
on the curtain may. simply have, been less elaborate than those 
at the installations, being capped with rough flags or cement. 
5.1.6 Communications system 
The basic evidence that the Military Way did not exist in the 
Hadrianic period is its relationship to the Vallum, which it 
frequently overrides. It may be presumed that a track of some 
sort linked the minor installations which in the first scheme 
sufficed to serve the Wall, although no trace of it has been 
found, except perhaps at Tarraby Lane (Smithý1978,23-4). A 
similar metalled-track immediately behind the Wall at West 
Denton may be relevant, but it-survived in use into the third 
century, ie it was not superseded by the Military Way (Daniels 
1989,73). 
In the central sector, access to such a track must have been 
from the Stanegate, by, ýmeans of branching-routes similar to 
those that would later serve the forts eventually to be planted 
on the line of the Wall. The same is true of the western 
sector of the Wall, between Carlisle and Milecastle 80, where 
the pre-existing road was never far behind the Wall-line and 
branch roads (of unknown date) connecting the two are known 
(Bruce 1978,258). However, between Carlisle and Willowford 
(where the Wall crossed the river Irthing). - all of the 
Stanegate forts are separated from the Wall system, first of 
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all by the river Eden, and then by the Irthing. Access to the 
service track would have to be gained from Carlisle, and there 
is no further known point of access across the rivers for the 
next 17 Wall-miles; even at the end of this stretch, there is 
no clearly observable way in which wheeled traffic could have 
reached the Wall at Harrow's Scar from the Stanegate: the first 
bridge at Willowford was not a road bridge, but carried only, 
whatever walkway the'Wall possessed acrossýthe river (Bidwell 
and Holbrook 1989,50-77). 
Thus it is possible that all routine service journeys to the 
Wall at any point west of the Irthing may have had to set-out, 
from Carlisle. This probably applies to building gangs also. 
The fact that builders on opposite sides of the Irthing may 
have had to come from widely separated points underlinesýthe 
possibility of a separation of commands lying behind the 
building of the Wall in different materials on either side of 
the river. 
One further possible river crossing that has been suggested, 
however, is at Irthington, by the fort of Brampton Old Church. 
Traditionally, this would be seen as the point where the 
Stanegate crosses to run north of the Irthing and Eden to 
Carlisle. It was accepted above, however, that the Stanegate 
is more likely to have remained wholly south of these rivers on 
its approach to Carlisle. The road that has been detected in 
the'vicinity of Crosby, south of the Vallum, running to 
Carlisle, has now been suggested, by Bidwell and Holbrook 
(1989,152) to be a Hadrianic service road (an extension of the 
Stanegate) to supply the second-scheme Wall forts north of the 
rivers (cf Bruce 1978,243). A possible role for the fort at 
Brampton Old Church would be the control of the point where 
such a road, branching from the Stanegate, crossed the Irthing, 
to allow access to Birdoswald and Castlesteads. Even if the 
Stanegate itself remained wholly south of the Irthing, Brampton 
could possibly have had a pre-Hadrianic role guarding a 
crossing of the Irthing which allowed access to the towers at 
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Pike Hill and Birdoswald, if they are indeed earlier than the 
Wall. 
There would also have been considerable difficulties in 
operating an isolated service track east of the North Tyne, if 
our knowledge of the sites which existed at the time of the 
first scheme is anywhere near reliable. Access might be gained 
easily enough from Corbridge and Dere Street, but there is no 
further point of access from south of the Tyne until Newcastle, 
18 Wall-miles away. Here the name of the place has long been 
taken to suggest a bridge of Hadrianic date, but the pottery 
from the known fort suggests a mid-Antonine origin. It is thus 
by no means certain that a bridge existed at Newcastle as early 
as the Hadrianic period; the epithet Aelius could as well apply 
to Antoninus Pius. Even if an undetected Hadrianic crossing 
exists at Newcastle, halving the furthest distance from a point 
of access from 18 Wall-miles to 9, it still means that a 
considerable distance, almost a day's march, had to be 
traversed to reach the furthest flung milecastles and turrets 
from the nearest garrison base. That the 18 mile separation of 
river-crossing access and furthest installation might obviously 
be considered unsafe, is perhaps the strongest argument for the 
existence of a bridge at Newcastle in the Hadrianic period. 
Although the known fort at Newcastle is unlikely to have 
originated so early, it is always possible that an undiscovered 
Hadrianic fort to mark the terminus of the Wall existed on the 
south (Gateshead) side of the Tyne. 
It will be necessary to compare this degree of isolation and 
inaccessibility of certain stretches of the first scheme for 
Hadrian's Wall with the continental parallels; within a purely 
British context, however, it becomes possible to see one reason 
why the decision may have been taken so soon to site the 
garrisons amongst the milecastles and turrets. Rather than 
being a matter of strategic mobility, liberating the Stanegate. 
garrisons now prevented by the Hadrianic barrier from operating 
freely to the north (Breeze and Dobson 1972,190), the decision 
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may have been a response to the practical - and not quite as 
predictable - problem of supplying and safeguarding widely 
dispersed detachments in milecastles and turrets which in 
certain-sectors were difficult of access. 
5.2, Hadrian's Wall: -as, completed (Fig 18) 
5.2.1 The topography of the frontier 
The addition of the Wall-forts does not seem to have affected 
the general course followed by the Wall. It is now known that 
in places in the central sector the completed narrow Wall (the 
narrowing of the gauge thought to be precipitated by the fort 
decision) was not built upon the broad wall foundation already 
prepared, but rather on a completely separate alignment. This 
implies a considerable interval between the initial broad 
foundation laying and the building of the Wall superstructure. 
5.2.2 Forts, garrisons and their spacing 
The change of plan in the construction of Hadrian's Wall saw a 
decisive shift from the notion of a rigorously separated line 
of frontier security and disposition of garrisons. 'From the 
moment of the decision to build a series of fairly regularly 
spaced (Swinbank and Spaul 1951) auxiliary forts on the line of 
the Wall itself, the process of military occupation and 
garrisoning, and that of frontier patrol and police, became 
inextricably intertwined. Hadrian's Wall in its first two 
conceptions allows us to examine two distinct models of linear 
frontier control. 
On the line of the Wall itself, there are anomalies. Wallsend 
is often thought to be part of a, later-Hadrianic extension of 
the Wall east of Newcastle (but see Breeze and Dobson 1972, 
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193). The known fort at Newcastle would seem to be 
mid-Antonine. Carrawburgh overlies the Vallum, and is 
therefore later than the primary forts; however, its 
attribution (Swinbank'and Spaul 1951,227- n. 22) to the 
governorship of Sextus Julius Severus (clý8-132) is based upon 
a highly ambitious restoration of RIB 1550. Indeed, the name 
... ]1o Nepote appears on this building stone of cohors I 
Aquitanorum, and it is perhaps only the curious relationship 
with the Vallum that has prevented this fort from being thought 
to be built within the term of Nepos, who may well have 
governed until c126. Similar doubts surround Greatchesters, 
although J Bennett (1984) has shown that RIB 1735 need not 
necessarily, as is usually thought, be later than 128 in date. 
This stone, however, splits Hadrian's-name across two lines in 
a manner unlike that of the Platorius Nepos building stones (as 
does a Hadrianic slab from Moresby). The early histories of 
forts on the turf-section of the Wall west of the Irthing 
remain obscure. 
The building of the Wall forts did not mean the abandonment of 
every fort on the Stanegate line. It is traditionally thought 
that the forts on the old road at Corbridge and Vindolanda were 
given up during the Hadrianic period., In the case of the - 
former, this was a view heavily influenced by the epigraphic 
evidence, which describes much Antoninexeconstruction at the 
site. At neither site is there in fact any reason to believe 
in an Hadrianic abandonment, and at Vindolanda there may be 
epigraphic evidence of stone building at this time (Bishop and 
Dore 1989,140; Bidwell 1985,9-10). Elsewhere, the Stanegate 
fort of Carvoran probably continued in use, being replaced in 
stone in the 130s (RIB 1816; 1818; 1820). There is evidence 
(Bruce 1978,210-11) of activity at Nether Denton continuing 
into the second century, although it is not clear whether this 
represents military activity. After the building of the fort 
at Stanwix on the Wall, there continued to be a fort on the 
Annetwell Street site in Carlisle, only lkm to the south, which 
continued in use into the fourth century (Daniels 1989,27-9). 
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In every case where there is reasonable knowledge of the size 
of a Wall fort in the Hadrianic period, the fort is 
sufficiently large to have held an entire auxiliary unit. The 
Hadrianic garrisons of very few of the Wall forts are known for 
certain: at Chesters (2.30ha) it was ala Augusta ob virtutem 
appellata (Austen and Breeze 1979). The recent discovery at 
Vindolanda of a diploma of this unit dated to after 144 has 
been taken by M Roxan to suggest strongly that cohors I 
Tungrorum moved from Vindolanda to form the Hadrianic garrison 
of Housesteads (Bidwell-1985,97). Other attested Hadrianic 
garrisons are cohors I Hamlorum, rebuilding Carvoran in 136-38 
(RIB 1778), and the milliary ala Petriana, placed at Stanwix 
from the'outset onýthe basis of-the fort's size being suitable 
for this uniquely large British cavalry unit (milliary by the 
time of a diploma of 122). The completely recovered Hadrianic 
plan of Wallsend suggests accommodation for a cohors 
quingenaria equitata (Daniels 1989,79). 
It is therefore-clear that although few individual Hadrianic 
garrisons are known, there is no reason to believe that each of 
the forts was not intended to hold a single and complete 
auxiliary unit. There is no combination of the archaeological 
evidence of fort-size and epigraphic evidence to suggest the 
widespread use of detachments; there are no records of 
irregular units that can be dated this early in Britain. If 
the physical situation of garrisons upon the line of the Wall 
means that those garrisons were responsible for the routine 
manning or maintenance of the Wall, that should mean that this 
work was carried out by normal auxiliary cohorts and alae, or 
detachments therefrom. 
5.2.3 Minor installations 
The milecastles and turrets correspond to two classes of 
installations, fortlets and watchtowers, familiar from the 
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Upper German and Raetian frontier, although the relative 
regularity of their spacing is quite peculiar to Britain. 
The interiors of very few milecastles have been fully explored. 
There seems to have been a variation in the amount of, internal 
accommodation offered. Either a pair of barracks faced each 
other across the internal street (in-a way reminiscent of-many 
German fortlets) or a small two roomed building occupied one 
corner of the enclosure. This variation occurs as follows in 
the milecastles whose interiors are known. Where the evidence 
certainly relates to the primary period, it is in bold. In 
certain of the 'small building' milecastles the accommodation 
would later be extended and longer blocks provided. 
small building barrack pair 
9 
35 
37? 
397 
47 
48 
50TW 
51 
79TW? 
A most important point to note is that both milecastles and 
turrets were retained in use after the decision to site the 
auxiliary forts on the line of the Wall. Most turrets, where 
excavated, have produced Hadrianic and later pottery from their 
early occupation levels, and go on to have a history extending 
until at least the later second century; they formed an 
integral part of the Hadrianic 'Wall as built' scheme. 
Milecastles were invariably occupied into the fourth century. 
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5.2.4 Building Materials 
The decision to narrow the gauge of the Wall may have been 
connected with the difficulty of transporting materials to 
provide its core once the clay capped sandstone bedrock of the 
eastern coastal plain and Tyne valley had been left behind for 
the Whin Sill; however, there is no evidence that the Narrow 
Wall decision had an immediate effect on the materials used in 
the Turf Wall sector. The pottery from Stone Wall Milecastle 
50, and Stone Wall turrets 49b, 50a and 50b, however, shows 
that this sector of the Turf Wall was replaced in stone - on a 
celebrated different alignment - within the reign of Hadrian 
(Bruce 1978,213-14). 
5.2.5 The Vallum 
The Vallum itself still defies obvious explanation. As it has 
tended to be viewed in terms of a demarcation, it may be 
appropriate here to re-emphasise the formidable nature of its 
construction. Running without interruption from Newcastle to 
the Solway the huge ditch and associated mounds were hardly 
less impressive than the works of the Wall itself, and surely 
not a project lightly undertaken. The only complete section 
excavated in recent times, at West Denton in 1987, showed that 
the flat bottomed ditch, 6m wide, had been cut 2.44m into the 
sandstone bedrock, (Daniels 1989,73). The excavators were left 
with the impression that this was no mere tripwire-equivalent 
or hurdle against delinquent civilians. 
Whatever its true function, the Vallum had the immediate effect 
of reducing points of access through the Wall from about 90 to 
a mere 14 or so, where either fort access road causeways 
crossed the Vallum, or (presumably) where roads running north 
of the Wall crossed it (the only such passage through the Wall 
certainly known is at the Portgate). Naturally this 
restriction wouldýnot have affected the ability of the Roman 
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military stationed on the Wall to use the milecastle gates; but 
for any general north-south traffic of a non-military nature, 
the addition of the Vallum had the effect of turning the Wall 
system into a much more preclusive barrier. Whether the 
preclusive effect of the Vallum was its main intended purpose, 
or merely-a by-product of the real'intentions behind the 
feature, must remainýuncertain; however, this preclusive nature 
is an interesting pointer to the way in which the Wall 
operated, and was intended to be treated by the local 
population, in its-early days. 
5.2.6 Communications system 
Clues to the working of the completed Hadrianic linear system 
may be gained from its road system. Although it has long been 
appreciated that the Stanegate continued in use as an arterial 
route, with branch roads going off to supply the Wall forts of 
the central sector, it has only recently been argued in detail 
that with the addition of the forts to the Wall, roads must 
have been extended to the east and the west from the Stanegate, 
north of the Tyne and the Irthing\Eden respectively; in order 
to supply and service the new forts (Bidwell and Holbrook 1989, 
150-53). 
West of Carlisle (where there is very little evidence) this 
'Hadrianic service road' may have coincided with the 'Western 
extension' of the Stanegate argued for above, just as the 
Stanegate in the central sector could continue to serve as the 
'Hadrianic service road'. Elsewhere, however, the Hadrianic 
road will have taken a new line, if we are right in thinking 
that the pre-Hadrianic road ran wholly south of rivers Eden, 
Irthing and Tyne. An ingenious explanation for the 'lesser 
military way' to either side of Carrawburgh is thatt because 
there was no branch from the Stanegate to this fort, access was 
gained from Chesters and Housesteads, the recipients of the 
nearest branch roads from the, Stanegate: thus an access road 
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had to be built from each of these neighbouring sites (Bidwell 
and Holbrook 1989,153). 
Presumably the Hadrianic service road co-existed with whatever 
track-there-was to provide direct passage from turret to 
turret, and milecastle to milecastle, along the line of the 
Wall'itself, a division of functions that would not be seen on 
the slightly later Antonine Wall system. 
The track and the road were separated by the Vallum, the Wall's 
rearward earthwork, which seems to have been commenced as soon 
as the fort decision was taken. The undug Vallum causeways 
presuppose not only the existence of the Wall forts, but also 
of a communication route to be reached by the roads running out 
of the south gates of the forts to cross the Vallum: this would 
be the Stanegate or, north of the rivers, the Hadrianic service 
road. There is a suggestion at Turf-Wall milecastle 50 that 
when the Vallum was supplied it had to be squeezed right up 
against the Wall and milecastle in order not to interfere with 
a pre-existing route, which may have been the Hadrianic service 
road running behind the Wall (but very close to it because of 
the precipice to the south) (Bidwell and Holbrook 1989,152). 
5.2.7 Outpostý 
Birrens, Netherby and Bewcastle are generally considered to be 
the outpost forts established under Hadrian; the latter two 
sites have each furnished Hadrianic building inscriptions (RIB 
974; 995) while there is strong structural evidence-, for a, 
Hadrianic fort at the former (Robertson 1975). Perhaps, 
because they do not furnish inscriptions earlier than the 
Antonine period, it is not customary to see the later eastern 
outposts, Risingham and High Rochester, as being rebuilt under 
Hadrian, or held during his reign. However, there has been 
insufficient excavation at either site to demonstrate that it 
was empty for any period before the 140s. Although High 
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Rochester saw rebuilding under Pius (RIB 1276),, it may well 
have been occupied under Hadrian. 
5.3 The Cumberland Coast Frontier 
As is well known, however, a linear series of installations 
continued to run, from Bowness-on-Solway, the western terminal 
of the Wall, down the Cumberland coast. 
5.3.1 Topography 
The topography of the frontier is everywhere defined by the - 
coast, which it follows and closely overlooks; the milefortlets 
were situated on cliff-edges or as close to the sea as could be 
safely managed. The installations did not, however, as was 
once thought, run around the Moricambe estuary. 
5.3.2 Forts, garrisons and their spacing 
In contrast to the Wall, there is no absolutely clear sequence 
by which the auxiliary forts relate to the minor installations. 
The forts in question are Beckfoot, Maryport, Moresby and 
Ravenglass, of which only the first two need have any direct 
connection with the system which, on present knowledge, ends 
just south of Maryport (the fort at Burrow Walls, between 
Maryport and Moresby, is perhaps not part of the original 
system: Bruce 1978,279). Moresby (RIB 801; pater patriae) and 
possibly Maryport (RIB 851) have produced Hadrianic building 
inscriptions. - At none of these places is there evidence for 
pre-Hadrianic occupation on the known site (although the 
possibility of an earlier base away from the known site, 
especially at Maryport, must be borne in mind: Jarrett 1976, 
87-8; Potter 1978,493-5). 
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There is no reason to think that Beckfoot and Maryport (the 
forts forming part of the linear coastal frontier) were not 
designed to accommodate whole and single auxiliary units, in 
the manner of the Hadrian's Wall forts. At Maryport this 
garrison was the milliary cohors I Hispanorum equitata. As far 
as spacing is concerned, this is somewhat wider than'the usual 
lOkm between the forts on Hadrian's Wall; Maryport is some 14km 
from Beckfoot, which is situated over 18km from Bowness. 
5.3.3 Minor installations and their spacing 
The system has been traced from Bowness for c35km to the south. 
Equivalents to milecastles (milefortlets) are numbered from MF1 
(Biglands), one mile west of Bowness, where the Wall ran into 
the Solway. Pairs of watchtowers are known between the 
fortlets. Thus was the regular arrangement of minor 
installations on, Hadrian's Wall replicated. On this numbering 
system, the installations have been traced as far as Tower 26b, 
just south of Maryport: milefortlets 6-9, once thought to have 
run around Moricambe, are not now thought to have existed 
(Bellhouse 1989,31). 
The Milefortlets appear to, have been generally the same size as 
the Wall milecastles, but on the north side of the Moricambe 
estuary, which no auxiliary fort is known to have closely 
overlooked (Kirkbride was probably abandoned by this time), 
MF5, Cardurnock, was of exceptionally large size. of the three 
sites whose interiors have been explored, Cardurnock (MF5) and 
Swarthy Hill (MF21) (Frere 1992,271) have produced pairs of 
barracks, those in the latter facing each other across a 
central street in milecastle-fashion; Biglands (MFl) in its 
first phase has produced smaller detached buildings to either 
side of a street, interpreted as very small barracks (Potter 
1977,163), as occur at some milecastles. The pattern, then, 
is highly reminiscent of that of the milecastles. 
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The freestanding stone watchtowers, at some 6m square, are 
comparable to the turrets on the Wall. 
Some have maintained that the system must extend further to the 
south than Tower 26b, as far as St Bees Head, or beyond, 
although intensive searching has failed to find any trace 
beyond the last known tower (Bellhouse 1989,57). Of 
candidates suggested for milefortlets further south, the 
crop-mark at Harrington (Jones 1982,296), if it represents a 
site at all, has been shown by Bellhouse to lie 300 yards from 
the cliff-edge, an unusual distance from the sea in terms of 
the known series; similar objections have been brought 
(Bellhouse 1989,63-4) against the inclusion (Potter 1979, 
14-18) of a ditched enclosure preceding the auxiliary fort at 
Ravenglass in the milefortlet series. Besides being situated 
at least 60 yards from the sea, the Ravenglass structure 
possesses no gate giving out on the direction of the coast, ' 
and commands no view of the sea itself, but only a river 
estuary: it is as well interpreted as a proto-installation on 
the fort site. In similar circumstances in the Moricambe 
estuary the system was omitted. 
5.3.4 Evidence for running barriers and a communications 
system 
In the northern part of the system elements of running barriers 
have been claimed to complete the frontier works. From Bowness 
to the west the system of fortlets and towers is said to have 
been enclosed between two parallel V shaped ditches, which 
where sampled were 1.50m across by 0.80m deep (rear) and 2m by 
0.60m deep (front). These ditches were 32-46m apart (Jones 
1982,286-87; Bruce 1978,261-62). More of the double ditch 
layout was said to be located at NY 204616, west of Biglands. 
Aerial survey is said to have suggested that between MF 3 and 5 
'simply a single forward ditch was involved' (Jones 1982,287). 
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'At the position of T4b evidence for a cobbled patrol road has 
been noted' (Jones 1982,287-88). At this point also, a 
sequence was claimed: first a palisade trench, 0.50m-l. Om wide, 
backed by a clay platform 3. Om by 2.20m in area and surrounded 
by what sounds like a-clay or turf wall; -these immediately in 
front of the claimed cobble track, and set some llm back from 
the single ditch. Second, these features were superseded by a 
second, narrower (0.30m-0.40m) palisade slot which cut through 
the clay platform. Thirdly, a stone tower, some 4.30m square 
overall, built over the filled in forward ditch. No clear 
reason was given why these three phases might not be reduced to 
two, and the stone tower may be contemporary with the second 
palisade. 
South of the Moricambe, at Silloth, aerial photography and 
excavation have suggested a coastal road or patrol track, 3.80m 
wide and flanked by ditches, with, between it and the sea, two 
(successive? ) not quite parallel palisade slots; the more 
westerly 0.40m deep and 0.45m-0.50m wide, the eastern 0.55m 
wide and 0.35m-0.40m deep. Each revealed post-impressions in 
pairs 'designed to hold together a wattle fence rammed between 
the two uprights' (Jones 1982,292-94). South of Silloth, to 
either side of Beckfoot fort, aerial reconnaissance is claimed 
to have found further traces of the coastal frontier road, 
identifiable by its distinctive double ditches (Jones 1982, 
295)., South of Silloth the running palisade has not been 
claimed. 
It is only fair to say that many aspects of these observations 
have been doubted in certain quarters (Bellhouse 1989, passim). 
Most of the work described still awaits definitive publication-, 
and in the meantime it is difficult to arrive at a simple 
assessment of what has been established. The existence of the 
parallel ditches associated with the frontier system between 
Bowness and Biglands is generally accepted; but doubt remains 
about how far beyond Biglands the ditch system has really been 
seen (Bellhouse 1989,12-18). Bellhouse (1989,18-22) has 
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seriously questioned the observations made at the T4B 
excavation (centring principally upon the identification of the 
stone tower), without, however, advancing a convincing 
alternative explanation for the palisade features. The 
palisades at Silloth seem difficult to explain in any other 
way. In short, there is clear evidence for running barriers,! 
of more than one phase, associated, with the coastal system, but 
no, sure knowledge yet of how the individually observed sectors 
relate to one another, or to the other installations: the 
picture that has sometimes been advanced of a unitary double or 
single ditch'system uniting all of the installations is a 
premature one. Similarly, the coastal road or patrol track, 
reported by the antiquaries, seems to have powerful indications 
in its favour, especially at Silloth, but there is no way of 
making a general statement of knowledge about its whole course 
or unitary character. 
5.4 The Antonine Wall (Figs 19,20) 
Per legatos Suos plurima bella gessit. nam et BrIttanos per 
LoIllum Urbicum vicit legatum allo muro cespiticlo summotis 
barbaris ducto (SHA Pius 5,4) 
After the death of Hadrian the decision was taken to advance 
once again, and to establish a linear frontier on the 
Forth-Clyde Isthmus. The commencement of the Antonine Wall 
system is firmly dated archaeologically by RIB 2191 and 2192, 
mentioning the name of Lollius Urbicus (governor cl39-cl43: 
Birley 1981), both from Balmuildy, one of the-primary forts, 
which was constructed with stone wing-walls in expectation of a 
stone frontier wall being brought up to join the fort. The 
reasons for this abrupt change of policy in the early years of 
Pius will be pondered in Chapter 6. The purpose of the 
following section is to examine the principal changes that are 
evident in the way that the Antonine Wall was built and 
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operated, in comparison, to the Hadrianic frontier established 
only two decades previously. 
The curtain itself was built of turves on a cobble foundation 
throughout, the width of the base varying between 4.30m and 
4.90m. Beyond a berm of c6-9m it possessed a formidable ditch 
on its northern side, of varying dimensions but generally 
larger (cl2m wide by c3.60m deep) in the central sector of the 
Wall than east of Falkirk and west of Kirkintilloch (7-9m 
wide). In the eastern sector additional defensive features in 
the form of Illia on the berm between Wall and ditch have 
recently been discovered (Bailey, 1990), and raise the 
possibility that the famous Illia north of the Wall ditch at 
Rough Castle form part of a wider fortification of the frontier 
curtain rather than being specifically associated with the 
fort. These features, like the formidable size of the barrier 
itself, serve to emphasise that during the short occupation of 
Antonine Scotland the army went to extraordinary lengths to 
make the frontier difficult to infiltrate or attack. 
The question of whether the Antonine Wall possessed a patrolled 
walk must remain open. In the absence of direct evidence from 
the Wall itself, the evidence for a wall-walk on the turf and 
stone walls of Hadrian becomes the most important that we have. 
5.4.1 The topography of the new linear frontier 
At first glance the course of the Antonine Wall is much more 
topographic than that of Hadrian's Wall: the Scottish Wall 
weaves across the landscape, employing a number of re-entrants 
and sudden turns. Much of this can, in fact, be explained by 
the different topographical situation. The Wall commences with 
long and fairly straight stretches as it leaves the Forth, but 
soon it climbs to run along the front of a ridge of land 
overlooking the valley of the Carron. The deviations in the 
Wall's course allow it to adhere to the commanding ridge; this 
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also had the effect of making the Wall prominently visible from 
the north. Similarly, the Wall twists and turns in its central 
sector because of the ridge of hills (Croy Hill, Bar Hill etc. ) 
to be followed and eventually in order to keep itself poised 
immediately above the valley of the Kelvin. Between the 
crossing of the Kelvin at Balmuildy and the western terminus of 
the Wall at Old Kilpatrick, matters are less easily explained. 
Increasingly in its course west, the, Wall is overlooked by the 
towering Kilpatrick Hills to the north, but this should not 
explain local peculiarities in its course. Here there was no 
obvious; meandering eminence of land for the Wall to follow; 
the landscape is-broken and hilly, but in the absence of a 
clear natural ridge to follow the Romans might be expected to, 
have cut arbitrarily through-the landscape. Rather the Wall 
follows aý-very sinuous course which takes in some hill-tops 
(Crow Hill, Castlehill, Golden Hill) but actually leaves out 
some eminences (just north of Hutcheson Hill). This is 
reminiscent of the behaviour of the Taunus frontier in Upper 
Germany. In the German case'the possibility that dense 
afforestation on either side of the frontier rendered a 
commanding view over the landscape-unnecessary has been 
suggested (4.7S2 above). 
It has been pointed out that here and there in all sectors the 
Antonine Wall, however adapted to the topography, ý, its course 
could have made more effective tactical use of the terrain if 
defence against concerted attack had been the main 
consideration (Hanson and Maxwell 1983,162). Rather than 
commanding the very front of eminences, the barrier sometimes 
lies back, allowing a force having climbed the eminence to 
regroup before approaching the Wall. 
5.4.2 Forts ;t 
It has been generally accepted, since the suggestion was first 
made by John Gillam (1975), that some installations of the 
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Antonine Wall were originally intended to replicate the 
arrangement'arrived at on Hadrian's Wall as built. As on 
Hadrian's Wall, in the first scheme for the Antonine Wall (Fig 
19) there were to be auxiliary forts at roughly-12km intervals. 
Of the 'primary' forts, those envisaged in the first scheme, 
Old Kilpatrick, Balmuildy,, Castlecary and Mumrills are all 
evidently structurally earlier than the curtain. The eastern 
terminal, fort of Carriden is not attached to the Wall, so that 
its relationship is unclear. Spacing dictates that the 
remaining primary fort will have been either Bar Hill or 
Auchendavy. The relationship of the latter with the curtain is 
unknown. Bar Hill stands detached behind the Great Wall. It 
has been argued (Hanson and Maxwell 1983,106) that this 
indicates that Bar Hill is a secondary fort, on the grounds 
that had the curtain post-dated the fort it would have been 
brought up to join its northern corners, thereby saving the 
duplication of the length of the fort's northern rampart. 
However, at 1.30ha, Bar Hill would be the largest of the 
'secondary' series; at some 1.10ha, Auchendavy would fit better 
into the generally smaller forts of the secondary series. Bar 
Hill also has two epigraphically attested garrisons, which, as 
we shall see (5.5.2 below), is a characteristic of other 
'primary' forts. II 
Between the primary forts, at intervals of roughly one Roman 
mile, it seems likely that there were placed fortlets allowing 
access through the Wall itself, in a way reminiscent of the 
milecastles of Hadrian's Wall. More work is required before 
the regularity of the series can be proven. Where 
investigated, these fortlets have always proved to be earlier 
than, or contemporary with, the curtain of the Wall. 
The materials utilised were different from those on Hadrian's 
Wall, of course; although two of the primary forts, Balmuildy 
and Castlecary, were built in stone (and the former in 
expectation of a stone frontier wall), the others, like the i 
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Wall itself, were built of turves, with their principal 
buildings only of stone. 
The structural evidence suggests that it must have been early 
in the building programme-that a dramatic change of plan (Fig 
20) brought about the addition of a series of smaller forts to 
the line of the Wall, in several cases superseding or 
incorporating one of the earlier series of fortlets. At Rough 
Castle, although the fort's foundations were structurally 
secondary to those of the Wall, an undug gap in the Wall ditch, 
although not directly opposite the fort's north gate, suggests 
the expectation of a fort here (Hanson and Maxwell 1983,107). 
The same is true of Croy Hill, where a culvert from the fort 
predated part of the Antonine Wall, although the defences of 
the fort were secondary to the Wall (MacDonald 1932,247-258). 
Cadder also exhibits a break in the Wall ditch, opposite its 
north gate (Clarke 1933,16). The walls of the fort itself 
were clearly secondary to the Antonine Wall (Clarke 1933, 
9-10). The implied sequence is that the foundation and all or 
part of the superstructure of the Antonine Wall were built 
first, and that the ditch was dug later, either in the 
expectation of the fort being sited here, or even after 
building work had begun on the fort. At Duntocher, a clear 
sequence was revealed: first, a free-standing fortlet, built 
with squared northern corners ready to receive the Antonine 
Wall; second, the fort, which incorporated the fortlet into one 
of its sides; thirdly, the Antonine Wall was brought up to 
incorporate the fort (Robertson 1957). The evidence from these 
forts is particularly important in showing the likelihood that 
all of the smaller, 'secondary' forts on the Wall were probably 
occupied from the date of its initial construction; their 
addition cannot-have taken place in, some second period on the 
Antonine Wall. 
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5.4.3 Garrisons 
The primary forts on the Antonine Wall would each have been 
large enough to contain a single, whole auxiliary unit, 
although Castlecary was too small to accommodate the whole of 
either of the two milliary units attested there. At three 
forts, Mumrills, Castlecary'and Bar Hill, inscriptions record 
two separate auxiliary units. The order and period at which 
these should be placed in the forts is discussed below (5.5.2). 
Briefly, it will be argued that in each case the change of 
garrison mayýbe associated with the reorganisation of garrisons 
brought about by the 'secondary fort' decision. 
Of the secondary forts, or at least those whose dimensions are 
known, only three out of eight can possibly have been large 
enough to hold an entire unit: Cadder (1.10ha), Auchendavy 
(cl. 10ha) and Castlehill (clha). At Castlehill the whole of 
what is known at other times to have been an equitate unit, 
cohors IV Gallorum, attested at the site, could perhaps not 
have fitted into the fort. Hanson and Maxwell (1983,166) make 
the suggestion that the cavalry element might have been 
outposted to Bearsden. 
The remaining forts can only have held detachments: at Rough 
Castle (0.50ha) part of cohors VI Nerviorum was commanded by a 
legionary centurion. The presence of a legionary centurion at 
Westerwood (0.80ha) implies'-a similar situation. Croy Hill was 
only 0.60ha in size, Duntocher only 0.50ha. 
Several Antonine Wall forts have produced legionary building 
inscriptions, altars and tombstones. The possibility of 
legionary detachments garrisoning Wall forts at some time is 
now usually dismissed (Hanson and Maxwell 1983,153), and the 
inscriptions ascribed to the period of the forts' construction. 
The evidence is as follows: 
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Rough RIB 2144 
Castle Legionary centurion in command of auxiliaries 
Castlecary RIB 2146 altar to Fortuna in baths by VEX II and VI 
RIB 2148 altar by soldiers of VI (170s? -Mann 1963) 
RIB 2151 altar by soldier of VI 
RIB 2147 altar by VEX... 
Westerwood Wright 1968 tombstone of wife of centurion of VI 
Croy Hill RIB 2160 by VEX VI to Nymphs 
RIB 2161 VI building inscription 
RIB 2162 VI building inscription 
RIB 2163 VI building inscription 
Bar Hill RIB 2171 VEX II and XX building inscription 
Auchendavy RIB 2174-7 series of altars by Cocceius Firmus, 
centurion of II 
RIB 2179 11 tombstone 
RIB 2180 VEX II building inscription 
RIB 2181 11 tombstone 
Balmuidy RIB 2191-2 Lollius Urbicus Building inscriptions, 
legio II 
Old Kilpatrick Barber 1971 Centurion in charge of cohors I 
Baetasiorum 
I 
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The evidence from Balmuildy and Bar Hill can be adequately 
explained in terms of the original construction of the forts. 
At Old Kilpatrick, the attested centurion is explicitly 
attested as in command of auxiliaries. This is also clearly 
the case at Rough Castle. The presence of the Westerwood 
centurion's wife has been taken to imply that he was acting in 
the, role of commanding officer. 
However, at the three remaining forts with legionary evidence, 
there'are notable concentrations of inscriptions. At 
Castlecary soldiers of the VI legion, severally and 
individually, dedicated altars; detachments of the II and VI 
dedicated to Fortuna in the fort's bathhouse. There are no 
legionary building stones here, only an auxiliary record. 
At Croy Hill, a. vexillation of legio VI dedicated to the 
Nymphs; the three legionary building inscriptions are also of 
this legion. At least one legionary, seems to have ended his 
days here (Coulston 1988). 
At Auchendavy, a centurion of II Augusta, Marcus Cocceius 
Firmus, who dedicated a series of altars, is sometimes seen as 
in charge of auxiliaries. The altars fail to specify this, 
however, and it is remarkable that a further building 
inscription and two tombstones that occur at this site are of 
the same legion. 
In theory these records could all have left behind by building 
parties, who might, perhaps, have to occupy the fort for a 
short time while awaiting the arrival of its garrison, but they 
invite an alternative interpretation. The possibility must be 
considered that, at these three forts at least, legionary 
vexillations were in garrison at some time. 
Taking into account the arguments in 5.5.2 below, the suggested 
garrison pattern of, the Antonine Wall is not divided here into 
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two periods, Antonine I and Antonine II, but rather into pre- 
fort decision and post-fort decision periods: 
Suggested garrison types before secondary forts added: 
Carriden 1.63ha 
7.7 Roman miles 
Mumrills 2.60ha 
9.2 
Castlecary 1.40ha 
6 
Bar Hill 1.30ha 
9.3 
Balmuildy 1.60ha 
9.2 
Old Kilpatrickl. 70ha 
cohors quingenaria 
ala I Tungrorum 
detach. coh I Tungrorum 
cohors I Baetasiorum 
cohors quingenaria 
cohors quingenaria 
Suggested garrison types after addition of secondary forts: 
Carriden 1.63ha 
5.3 Roman miles 
Inveravon ? 
2.4 
Mumrills 2.60ha 
2 
Falkirk ? 
3.3 
Rough Castle 0.40ha 
3.9 
Castlecary 1.40ha 
cohors quingenaria 
detachment 
cohors XX Thracum 
detachment 
detach coh VI Nerviorum 
detach. coh I Vardullorum 
legionary vex. later? 
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2.1 
Westerwood 0.80ha 
2 
Croy Hill 0.60ha 
1.9 
Bar Hill 1.30ha 
2.2 
Auchendavy 1.10ha 
2 
Kirkintilloch ? 
2.6 
Cadder 1.10ha 
2.5 
Balmuildy 1.60ha 
3 -' 
Bearsden 0.90ha 
1.6 
Castlehill lha 
2.1 
Duntocher 0.20ha 
2.5 
Old Kilpatrickl. 70ha 
detachment 
legionary? detachment 
coh I'Hamlorum, 
legionary? detachment 
cohors quingenaria? 
cohors quingenaria? 
detachment 
detach cohors IV Gallorum 
detachment 
coh I Baetasiorum 
The resulting spacing and density of troops, as has often been 
observed, provides a proportionally much denser coverage than 
on Hadrian's Wall, where an average lOkm interval between 
Hadrian's Wall forts was punctuated by six, or seven evenly 
spaced milecastles, for very small detachments. Different 
patterns emerge on the Antonine Wall as completed. In the 
eastern sector there tend to be two small, secondary detachment 
forts between every pair of primary, whole unit (or in the case 
of Castlecary, bulk of a unit) forts. on either side of Bar 
Hill, one of the detachments may have been legionary. From 
Cadder westwards, the pattern of units is even more heavily 
concentrated; not only may there be two adjacent whole units, 
only 4km apart, at Cadder and Balmuildy, but from there to old 
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Kilpatrick the pattern seems to be one of whole unit or bulk 
detachment alternating with single small detachment. Just as 
the western sector of the Antonine Wall seems to have been , 
treated differently in its building, so it seems to have been 
rather more heavily garrisoned in the final scheme. This 
differential treatment may in part be associated with the 
existence of an outpost system north of the eastern part of the 
Wall. On the west side,, not only was there'no controlled zone 
to the north, but higher land - the Kilpatrick Hills - loomed 
very close. 
5.4.4 Minor installations and their spacing 
It is not clear whether the fortlets continued in use after the 
decision to build the secondary forts on the Wall, but one 
possibility suggested below is that the interiors of at least 
some were, cobbled over as a result of the addition of the 
closely spaced secondary forts. They may have simply become 
defended watchtower enclosures or points of access to the 
Wall-top, if the Wall-topýcarried a walk. 
No equivalents of the turrets of Hadrian's Wall have yet been 
discovered, but certain smaller installations are known to have 
been attached-to the rear of the Antonine Wall. These include 
the three irregularly spaced enclosures, known near Wilderness 
Plantation fortlet. One excavated example was 6m square, 
enclosing a slight rampart; no structure was discovered within, 
nor can the three installations be shown to form part of a 
regular series, although the excavated example was reckoned to 
have been built at the same time as the Wall (Hanson and 
Maxwell 1983b). 
Known for longer are the three pairs of 'expansions', or turf 
projections from the rear of the Wall,, 5-6m square, founded on 
a cobbled base. Pairs lie to either side of Rough Castle, and 
a further pair west of Croy Hill. Their spacing is irregular, 
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their purpose unknown, and their relationship to the original 
Wall-building ambiguous: the Bonnyside East expansion seemed to 
be of one build with the Wall (Steer 1957,164), while one of, 
the Croy Hill pair was secondary (AWR 1899,79). 
Although the irregularity of spacing of both sets of features 
has been taken to show, that they cannot have formed a regular 
series (Hanson and Maxwell 1983,98), it may be recalled that 
installations on other frontiers, such as the German 
watchtowers, were not spaced according to any regular scheme. 
Until more examples are discovered, however, it is impossible 
to say whether the installations in question formed part of a 
regular series along the Antonine Wall, or even whether there. 
was any such system of minor installations at all. The point 
has been made that timber towers incorporated into the 
superstructure of the Antonine Wall could have escaped 
detection, -and in the absence of archaeological evidence this 
must remain a matter of uncertainty. 
5.4.5 Communications system 
In contrast to the system we have surveyed in the earliest 
stages of Hadrian's Wall, on the Antonine Wall a substantial 
road was built, from the beginning, to run along the actual 
frontier line. Its early place in the sequence is established 
by the sealing of a quarry pit for the Military Way by an 
expansion bonded with'the Wall curtain near Rough Castle (Steer 
1957,164). 
The reason for the failure ultimately to replicate the 
Hadrianic system probably lies in the different topographical 
situation and circumstances'of development of the Scottish 
Wall. This frontier was builtýall in one go, a novo; in 
contrast Hadrian's Wall had inherited the pre-existing 
communication line provided by the Stanegate. Similarly, the 
Stanegate followed one clear line, the valleys south of Eden, 
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Irthing, Whin Sill and Tyne, while Hadrian's Wall, by its very 
nature, took the high land and the line north of these 
landmarks. On the Antonine frontier, Wall and road alike 
followed the most obvious line from coast to coast across the 
Forth-Clyde Isthmus. 
The relationship of the road to particular, forts makes it clear 
that there was both traffic which passed from fort to fort 
(presumably of a service, supply and ceremonial nature) and 
also arterial traffic which needed to move rapidly along the 
frontier without stopping at all forts: at Cadder, for example, 
while the Military Way comes up to the south gate of the fort, 
a loop branches off to by-pass it to the south (Clarke 1933, 
7-8). 
5.4.6 Outposts I 
The old road which had been held in Flavian times, running 
north via Camelon, Ardoch and Strageath, and following the line 
of the Gask between the Highland fringe and the fertile 
Strathearn and Fife peninsula, was held again as a road running 
to outpost forts north of the Antonine Wall. The Antonine 
structural history of the three forts is discussed below. The 
northernmost known Antonine outpost lay at Bertha, on the Tay. 
5.5 The Chronology of the British Frontier Walls 
Two of the most trustworthily dated archaeological events on 
the northern frontier in the second century are the building of 
Hadrian's Wall in the 120s and-of the Antonine Wall in the 
140s. The establishments of these successive frontiers form 
the essential datum points of the first half of the second 
century, possessing, in matters such as pottery-dating, an 
importance not confined to frontier studies. It is with regard 
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to the relative chronology of the two walls after c140 that 
problems set in. 
Recent views about the role of the British walls have been 
influenced as much by the relationship between the two walls as 
by the archaeological evidence of the individual installations. 
The generally held view is that Hadrian's Wall was abandoned 
c140 in favour of a heavily garrisoned Antonine Wall, then 
reoccupied about 158 upon withdrawal of troops from Scotland 
and the Antonine Wall. Almost immediately, however, troops 
returned to Scotland, though the northern garrison was thinner 
than before. This second, brief occupation of the Antonine 
Wall is now generally supposed to end at some date early in the 
reign of Marcus Aurelius, Hadrian's Wall then being reoccupied. 
5.5.1 Two Antonine Periods in Scotland 
The basic evidence for the theory of two distinct Antonine 
occupations of the Antonine Wall, and Scotland in general, is 
archaeological and epigraphical: 
'Most of the Roman forts in Scotland which have been examined, 
including those on the Antonine Wall, have provided evidence of 
two distinct periods of occupation... These are attested either 
epigraphically ... or structurally... I (Hanson and Maxwell 1983, 
137). 
This was a state of affairs universally accepted by Macdonald's 
time. The origins of this idea are now largely forgotten, 
though fascinating to reconstruct. This will be deferred until 
the archaeological evidence lying behind the belief in two 
general Antonine periods in Scotland has been thoroughly 
re-examined. In what follows, all investigated Antonine sites 
in Scotland, on or away from the Antonine Wall, will be taken, 
one by one, and the evidence for multi-period occupation, and 
gaps in occupation, or destruction or abandonment between 
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periods of occupation, carefully reconsidered. Only sites 
where sufficient excavated evidence to form a judgement of the 
site's history has been recovered are considered. ** denotes a 
site definitely showing two Antonine structural periods; * 
denotes a site with less clear cut structural evidence of two 
periodsýor two successive Antonine garrisons. 
5.5.1.1 Sites South of the Antonine Wall 
Barburgh Mill 
Breeze (1974,143-4) showed that there was evidence for only 
one structural period in this Antonine fortlet. He concluded 
that, this single occupation must have lain within Antonine I. 
**Birrens 
James Barbour's excavations of 1895 produced evidence of 
'primary' and 'secondary' periods (Barbour 1896,113-199); it 
was left to Macdonald (1923,80-81) to, associate these with the 
epigraphically attested units at Birrens, using RIB 2110 to 
argue that cohors 11 Thracum had reconstructed the fort in 158 
when replacing the preceding unit, cohors I Nervana Germanorum. 
Further excavation in 1936-37 and 1962-67 (Robertson 1975) 
confirmed that the Antonine fort at Birrens had been burnt and, 
in a distinct second period of occupation, wholly replanned; 
occupation continued at least into the late second century. 
Thus the evidence for two Antonine periods at Birrens is 
unequivocal; their duration however, long exceeds the time when 
- according to the orthodox chronology - the Antonine Wall was 
still being held. 
246 
Bothwellhaugh 
The results of excavations at this fort by JM Davidson in the 
1930s were taken to show two periods of Antonine activity: a 
rampart-back oven was found to have been overlain by a 'ramp'' 
whose make-up contained much broken tile from a demolished 
building. This was the sole support for the statement that 
Bothwellhaugh, 'as at other forts in southern Scotland' may 
have had two Antonine occupation periods separated by a 
destruction (Miller 1952,187). Later excavation in 1967-68 
showed a localised extra revetment of turf on the northeast 
rampart (Maxwell 1975,24-5) and other localised repairs to the 
rampart; two Antonine periods were postulated on the basis of 
an internal timber building (1975,27-8) and a resurfacing of 
an internal street (1975,25-27). However, no general 
alterations were found to have occurred in the ramparts or 
ditch systems, and the areas examined were'tiny. The ramp of 
material seen by Davidson over the back of the southeast 
rampart was interpreted as an ascensus (RCAHMS 1978,121). 
While this material - which had derived from a hypocaust - may 
have come from the external baths, there is no warrant for 
assuming that this happened at the end of an 'Antonine V 
period. The external baths, once thought to display 'two 
structural phases' (RCAHMS 1978,121) proved upon complete 
excavation rather to show a complicated multiplicity of 
alterations, falling into three main phases of activity (Keppie 
1981,68-70). 
Broomholm 
On the basis of excavation in 1961-64 an Antonine occupation of 
this site is not thought likely (Wilson 1965,202; pers. comm. 
CM Daniels). 
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Burnswark 
The Antonine fortlet at Burnswark is not known to have had two 
periods of occupation. The later use of th4 
military training ground could have been of 
and therefore would not fit easily into the 
'Antonine III; it could as well go with the 
as an outpost fort of Hadrian's Wall (Jobey 
Breeze 1982,145). 
**Cappuck 
3 hillfort as a 
extended duration 
supposedly brief 
holding of Birrens 
1978,78-80; 98-99; 
This site was apparently reoccupied during the Antonine-period 
of activity in Scotland; it is said that in the course of the 
Antonine period the fortlet was reduced in size from 0.73 to 
0.61ha. Modifications were made to the ditch system and to 
internal buildings (Stevenson and Miller 1912,46; Richmond 
1953). Here, then, is an Antonine fort unmistakeably 
displaying two distinct periods; it was concluded, however, 
that occupation had extended beyond the mid-Antonine period. 
The epigraphic evidence (RIB 2117; 2118) from nearby Jedburgh 
Abbey, if associated with Cappuck, hints at use of the site 
during the third century. 
Carzield 
The report on the small-scale excavations undertaken at 
Carzield just before the second World War shows that by this 
time excavators were approaching Antonine forts in Scotland 
with the expectation of findina two Antonine periods. At 
Carzield, despite the efforts of theýexcavators, the evidence 
for two distinct periods failed to come convincingly to light. 
A section through the eastern defences revealed 'ditches and 
rampart... and an Intervallum road. The road, however, had two 
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distinct levels, though it was not clear that these marked a 
definite break in occupation'. A further section on the 
southern defences revealed a 125 foot Intervallum road of river 
cobbles' in which no evidence for more than one level was 
noted. Exploration of a stone barrack within the fort revealed 
no evidence of more than one period (Birley and Richmond 1942, 
158-60). The possibility of two Antonine periods was therefore 
later proposed in rather muted tones: 'Either Carzield was 
abandoned circa 160, after an occupation of only twenty years 
at the outside... or, like most other Antonine sites in 
Scotland, it was re-occupied (after a break of indeterminate 
duration) shortly after the middle of the second century, and 
the higher road level represents the sole surviving structural 
evidence of that break'. The possibility had to be conceded 
that 'Carzield fort... shows only one main structural period, 
and no later re-occupation' (Birley and Gillam 1946,69; 78). 
Castledykes 
It has been said that 'After a brief period of abandonment at 
some time in the decade AD 150-160 ... the fort was reoccupied 
with only minor alterations to the defences and a certain 
amount of internal reconstruction or repair' (RCAHMS, 1978, 
127). 
In fact, none of the results of the excavations of 1937-1955 
provides direct evidence for two distinct and general Antonine 
periods; no evidence, direct or indirect, has provided the 
remotest support for the notion of a period of abandonment 
within the Antonine history of the fort. The only activities 
that could be ascribed to Antonine II, after the supposed brief 
period of abandonment, were: a reduction in the rampart opening 
at the north gate; the laying of a new Intervallum streetf the 
rebuilding or strengthening of limited parts of the 
headquarters and granary; and possible alterations to the 
ditched enclosure or annexe on the east side of the fort. No 
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other changes to the defences or the layout of the internal 
buildings were noted (Robertson 1964; RCAHMS 1978,124-27). 
None of these recorded alterations would be out of place within 
the routine upkeep and maintenance of a fort under continuous 
occupation in a single period. 
Cramond 
As a result of excavation in 1954-66, it was stated that: 
'First construction was of the time of Antoninus Pius, C140. 
There was a second Antonine occupation' (Rae and Rae 1974, 
163). A third major, Severan, period was suggested for the 
site. 
It is worth examining the evidence for two distinct Antonine 
occupations in detail. It was found that 'Wherever cut 
through, all Intervallum roads had two separable phases of 
construction. In the earlier they were surfaced with small 
blue cobbles... In the later they received an additional 
thickness of about 6 in. of a much coarse cobble mixed with 
stone fragments and sometimes broken flagstones... I (ibid., 
173). However, as the later of these surfacings should 
represent the Severan occupation, it is clear that only a 
single general period of Antonine activity could be observed in 
these roads. The via principalls had been widened by c3m in 
the coarser (Severan) second general street surfacing. 
Crucially for the excavators' argument for Antonine I and II, 
the street had been widened 'To incorporate and cover walls, 
gutters and floors of two earlier phases' (ibid., 174). 
In the headquarters building, 'the north wall displayed two 
periods of construction... If the primary wall is Antonine I, 
the repair is presumably Antonine II, since it follows the 
usual pattern of a repair of the existing public buildings' 
(ibid.,, 176). Three successive mortar floors within the 
headquarters were assigned to Antonine I, Antonine II and 
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Severan. There was no dating evidence to support this 
supposition, and no reason was advanced to preclude a single 
Antonine phase in the headquarters being followed by a Severan 
reconstruction, bringing with it two successive mortar floors. 
If the fort was empty between the Antonine and Severan periods, 
Severan reconstruction in the headquarters might be expected; 
but this cannot be the case if both of the major observed 
periods are confined to Antonine times. 
A store-building west of the headquarters, said to be the 
earliest structure on its site, showed no signs of 
modification; nor did a neighbouring fragment of a building, 
possibly the praetorium, which, while said to be the first on 
its site, contained a drain which was contemporary with the 
second ('Severan') via principalls. The only other 
central-range building investigated, a granary, displayed no 
more than one period (ibid., 178-80). 
In the praetentura, a workshop (Block B), standing at the end 
of the life of the fort in the early third century, was seen to 
overlie two earlier periods of activity, which accordingly were 
assigned to Antonine I and Antonine II. The earlier two phases 
occupied a wider area than the 'Severan' building, and had in 
part been sealed by the Severan widening of the via 
principalls. Only the second phase was represented by observed 
walling; the first consisted of an area of flagging associated 
(without direct stratigraphical relationship) to features of 
workshop type, which may just have well related to the observed 
Severan Block B. The walling overlying the flags 'is therefore 
secondary in the fort's history; and ... may be called second 
Antoninel (Ibid.,. 183). While it is of great interest that 
earlier features on a different alignment from the latest 
buildings were observed, it may be questioned whether the fact 
that, within this particular building plot they exhibited at 
least two phases of activity, really warrants the application 
of a general Antonine I and II period division to the whole 
fort. 
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In Block A, which looks as if it should be a back-to-back 
contemporary of its Severan neighbour Block B to the south, but 
is said to be the earliest building on its site, it is simply'' 
said that 'two levels of Antonine occupation were distinguished 
in places' (ibid., 186). The building was not seen to have had 
two clear structural periods before it was reconstructed and 
part of it sealed by the enlarged 'third period' (ie Severan) 
Intervallum street (ibid., 186-87). 
Of other areas investigated, a latrine, while-showing several 
phases,, was not interpreted in terms of Antonine I and II. In 
the westýpraetentura, a, bath-suite was encountered, but nothing 
was understood of its date or history. In the retentura, two 
parallel barrack-like buildings were investigated and thought 
to show the expected three phases (Antonine I, Antonine II, 
Severan); however, although the walls of the building showed 
evidence of repair, it appears that the same structure was in 
use throughout. As elsewhere in the fort there was no 
structural indication of an interval between Antonine and 
Severan occupations (ibid., 187-190). 
*Crawford 
It was established in excavations in 1961-66 (Maxwell 1974) 
that in the Antonine period, this fort, showing Flavian and 
Antonine occupation, was increased in size from 0.80ha to 
1.10ha, by rebuilding its north and south ramparts some 
distance further out, over filled preceding northern and 
southern ditches. The north and west entrances of the 
superseded ditch system related to the Antonine rather than the 
Flavian street system of the fort, proving that the expansion 
of the fort superseded an earlier Antonine arrangement rather 
than a second Flavian period. 
It was reported (Maxwell 1974,176) that 'In general the layout 
of the fort was unchanged [in Antonine II], but whereas the 
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earlier Antonine principal buildings remained in use, with only 
minor modifications, the barracks were now extended' to a 
length of c25m. The lengthened barracks were used to postulate 
a change of garrison. - 
Thus Crawford has produced unequivocal evidence of a change in 
the Antonine period. Two observations are necessary, however. 
The second Antonine phase did not amount to a, general 
replanning or reconstruction of the fort; all of the buildings, 
remained in-use, with no alterations in the central range. 
There was no hint of the briefest of abandonments between 
Antonine I and Antonine II. There is nothing to preclude the 
possibility that the enlargement of the Antonine fort and its-. 
barracks represented a change of plan during the construction 
of the site. 
Durisdeer 
This Antonine fortlet of 0.19ha on the road from Nithsdale to 
Crawford was excavated by J Clarke in 1938. The only evidence 
which could be adduced for the expected', two structural periods 
was 'the overlapping of some of the [internal building] 
post-holes, along with differences of size and irregularity of 
spacing... ' (Miller 1952,126); nothing necessarily signifying 
more than the routine alterations and maintenance to be 
expected within a major occupation period. 
Glenlochar 
Trenching shortly after the second World War (Richmond and St. 
Joseph 1952; 11-12) revealed three periods in the fort's 
defences. 'While the second and third forts are plainly a 
modification of one another, there is the clearest evidence 
that the first and second forts are separated by a disaster'. 
The Intervallum street was seen to have two structural phases, 
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coinciding with phases 2 and 3 of the defences (Richmond and 
St. Joseph 1952; 6-7). It was no doubt tempting to associate 
the second and third 'periods' with Antonine I and II; however, 
trenches cut into the interior told a different story. Here 
(Richmond and St. Joseph 1952,6-11), only two major periods of 
fort buildings could be found: Flavian, and a single Antonine 
period. A third level alluded to in the fort's interior on 
p. 12 seems to refer to some non-regular fort buildings which 
preceded the known Flavianýfort. Against this background the 
modifications to the defensive system interpreted as a third 
phase may simply have represented repair or maintenance during 
the Antonine occupation, as at Bothwellhaugh. 
Inveresk 
The fort at Inveresk was investigated in a series of keyhole 
trenches by Richmond in 1946-47. It was revealed that a 
(stable? )-building 'was not the first structure on the site. 
The masonry of the wall was laid without the normal foundation, 
directly on top of a road surface ... the west wall [of the same 
building] also covered earlier structural remains' (in fact the 
foundations of a stone-built granary] (Richmond 1981,286-304). 
The established fort was stated to be 'purely Antonine', the 
presence of Flavian finds being taken to suggest Flavian 
occupation away from the known site. 
Here is apparently unequivocal evidence for two clear and quite 
distinct Antonine periods, or at least two periods of later 
than Flavian date. But the degree of difference between 
periods in the small area examined is itself of great interest; 
it is quite unusual in comparison to the normally claimed 
Antonine I and Antonine II distinction, where it is usual for 
the general plan and many of the buildings within it to be 
considered to have survived into the second period. The 
evidence from Inveresk begs the question whether rather than 
two mid-Antonine periods, the fort (like, for example, Birrens 
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or Newstead) in fact went into a major second Antonione period 
which ran down into the late second century - or beyond. There 
is one tantalising piece of evidence to support this: the 
pottery from the fort was said (Richmond 1981,302) to be all 
Antonine, yet included (Richmond 1981,301) a BB1 cooking pot 
with slightly (100 degrees) obtuse angled lattice; the earliest 
context for pottery of this type elsewhere are the construction 
levels of stone fort 2 at Vindolanda, c223-5 (Bidwell 1985, 
174-76). In general, given the minute amount of material 
recovered from the fort at Inveresk, there seems nothing to 
preclude the possibility of a long or resumed later second 
century or Severan occupation of the sort attested at Cramond. 
Recent excavations in the extra-mural settlement at Inveresk 
have not, been published in detail. One area of the settlement 
examined was said in 1977 to show two Antonine periods (Frere 
1977,365-67), but by the following year (Goodburn 1978, 
416-18) three phases had emerged. All of the dating evidence 
was said to be Antonine. 
It is clear that there is much to be learned about this 
important and possibly long-lived site, and that the very 
limited knowledge of it that there is gives little warrant for 
assuming a simple two-period sequence confined to the 
mid-Antonine period. 
Loudon Hill 
Excavation between 1938 and 1946 revealed that a cl. 20ha 
Antonine fort had succeeded a Flavian fort of several periods. 
The Antonine buildings were partly explored and found to 
represent only one period. 'The relatively small quantity of 
Antonine pottery suggested that the occupation was not 
prolonged' (Taylor 1947,165-66). 
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Lyne 
Excavation between 1959 and 1963 showed unequivocally that the 
Antonine fort at Lyne was of single period. 'Nowhere [in the 
investigated buildings] was there any hint of more than one 
period of occupation'. The defences told the same story. -The 
excavators concluded that 'the fort was built at the time of 
the late Antonine re-occupation of Scotland, immediately 
following the Brigantian revolt of AD 155-81 (Steer and Feachem 
1962,213). Immediately next to the fort, however, a fortlet 
is known; Steer and Feachem reckoned that it perhaps 
represented the 'missing' Antonine I occupation, preceding the 
Antonine II fort. More recently, the fortlet has been seen as 
an Antonine II successor to the fort (Hanson and Maxwell 1983, 
148). In, fact, beyond its Roman character, nothing is known 
about the date of the fortlet. It has produced no finds and 
there is no knowledge of its internal structures. Its Antonine 
date is based solely upon the known use of fortlets in southern 
Scotland in the Antonine period; there is nothing to preclude a 
Flavian date for this example (Steer and Feachem-1962,215-17). 
Given this lack of knowledge, it would seem dangerous to assume 
that fort and fortlet necessarily represent (in whatever order) 
the respective Antonine occupations of Scotland; even if it is 
an Antonine site, the fortlet may have had a short-lived 
occupation; the change of site-type here could easily have 
stemmed from some local factor unconnected with other sites in 
Scotland. 
Milton 
This key site in Annandale was first excavated in 1938-39, 
evidently in the expectation of finding Antonine I and II 
occupation periods. South of the Flavian forts was found a 
fortlet of Antonine date, assigned two periods on the basis of 
cobbles with associated post-holes sealing timber features on 
Antonine date, and two levels of cobbling in the gateway 
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(Miller 1952,105-6). However, the difficulty in assigning 
these phases to Antonine I and II-is illustrated by the fact 
that in the south side of the fortlet it was thought that there 
were three phases of occupation (Miller 1952,106-7). A 
further complication is provided by the fortlet to the north, 
lying within the Flavian forts, supposed to display two periods 
and dateable to the second century on the basis of what would 
now be recognised as either BB1 or BB2 associated with its 
occupation deposits (Clarke 1949,140-47). Thus, all that can 
be said of Milton is that it enjoyed a complex second-century 
history, making successive use of at least two multi-phase, 
fortlet sites. 
**Newstead 
Unequivocally of-two Antonine periods, the important military 
complex at Newstead has been a 'type-site' for Antonine I and 
II. Here Richmond made the famous observation (1950,14) that 
there cannot have, been a long gap between the two Antonine 
occupations of the site. As at Birrens, the second Antonine 
fort at Newstead had a history running down to the end of the 
second century. 
**Outerwards 
Excavation of this fortlet associated with the supervision of 
the western coastal flank south of the Antonine Wall carried 
out in 1970 appeared to show unequivocally that the defences 
and buildings within had enjoyed two general structural 
periods. The first period evidently ended in a fire. 
Furthermore, evidence of several superimposed lines of 
vegetation growth intervening between the two periods of 
activity led the excavator to estimate that the fortlet must 
have lain empty for between five and ten years (Newall 1976, 
117). 
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F. Newall (1976,121-22) rightly observed the intimateý 
connection between this coastal fortlet and the Antonine Wall 
system. He wrote: 'It follows that the history of the outlying 
fortlets essentially reflects that of the main barrier. 
Outerwards ... evidences two periods of occupation. Hence the 
Antonine System, as primarily conceived, should also have been 
twice occupied ... On the assumption that Antonine I ceased cAD 
154 reoccupation-cAD 163 would seem possible'. 
There are, however, obvious difficulties with this simple 
reading of the history of the Antonine Wall from the structural 
history of one fortlet. It is highly suspicious that the 
evidence for a prolonged gap between occupations-is paralleled 
neither on those Antonine Wall sites which show two periods or 
on other two period Antonine sites in Scotland; one possible 
conclusion to draw is that Outerwards simply had, a history 
which did not reflect that of-all other sites. The dateable 
pottery from the site occurred in very small quantities and 
provides no indication of how long the site was held. Of 
course, there is no way of proving that the two structural 
periods observed do not reflect a general Antonine I and II in 
Scotland; but it must be conceded that other possibilities 
remain. One would be that the fortlet was abandoned as 
superfluous shortly after the building of the Antonine Wall 
system, and later found necessary and re-occupied. 
Raeburnfoot, 
Excavation in 1959-60 showed that the visible fortlet (0.64ha) 
was Antonine and of single period. This was enclosed within an 
outerwork encompassing 2.12ha, previously thought to be an 
earlier (Flavian) fort. The 1959-60 excavations showed that 
the outer work did not include buildings, was irregularly 
planned, and included marsh land; it was suggested that it was 
a construction camp, annexe or outwork of some other kind 
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connected with the small Antonine fort, which was unequivocally 
of single period (Robertson 1962,45 6). 
Wandel 
Excavation of this Antonine fortlet (RCAHMS 1978,136) produced 
no evidence for more than the briefest of occupations. 
*Whitemoss 
Excavations here between 1949 and 1954 have never been 
published in detail. From the interim reports, however, it 
seems that, as at Outerwards, the excavator (F. Newall) found 
clear evidence for more than one Antonine period. The fort had 
at some time perhaps been reduced or enlarged in area (Taylor, 
1950,9-10); at some time, in the retentura of the fort, a 
complete replanning took place (Taylor 1955,123). The 
headquarters building was observed to have three timber 
structural phases (if we discount an earliest phase consisting 
'only of pits'), the second ending in destruction by fire 
(Taylor 1954,86). Elsewhere, the excavator has associated the 
final of these phases with a Severan occupation (Newall 1976, 
122), but this seems merely an attempt to conform to the now 
unfashionable notion of a brief Severan re-occupation of the 
Antonine Wall. More significantly, despite the observed 
rebuildings, the headquarters seems to have retained the same 
plan throughout. 
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5.5.1.2 Sites on the Antonine Wall 
MF Kinnell 
Completely excavated in 1981, this fortlet has produced no 
evidence for more than one period of occupation (Keppie 1982, 
97-98). 'I 
*Mumrills 
Two separate auxiliary units are attested here: 
ala Tungrorum (RIB 2140), on an altar; cohors 11 Thracum (RIB 
2142), on a tombstone. 
Besides the epigraphic evidence, there are structural 
indications, derived from the excavations of 1923-28 and 
1958-60, often put forward to argue for a two (formerly three) 
period history of the site: 
l. - The first headquarters to be built was replaced by another, 
considerably smaller (Macdonald and Curle 1929,426-28). To 
Macdonald (1934,202), this signalled the general destruction 
which Antonine Wall sites were supposed to have suffered at the 
end of the first Antonine period; the headquarters was 
considerably altered in a third phase. 
2. The first, timber, commanding-officer's house was found to 
have been destroyed by fire and to have been replaced by a 
larger stone house (Macdonald and Curle 1929,436-38). 
3. Trenching revealed several structural periods within the 
barracks; no overall, plans were recovered (Macdonald-1934, 
199). 
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4. The defences seemed to have been completely rebuilt at 
certain points, ýa culvert running under the fort rampart, for 
example, containing re-used material. The outer of the four 
ditches south of the west gate of the fort was said to contain 
'three occupation layers, each separated from the one above it 
by a sprinkling of pottery fragments... at one point a cobbled 
road had been laid across it' (Macdonald 1934,198). 'It is 
thus clear that the fort had been twice abandoned and twice 
re-occupied before the final withdrawal, and that on neither of 
the occasions when it was re-occupied had it seemed worthwhile 
clearing the d6bris out of this particular ditch' Macdonald and 
Curle 1929, -420-21). 
Steer's excavations of 1958-60 resulted in, -the following 
conclusion: 'Macdonald concluded that the Antonine fort was 
twice destroyed and twice rebuilt before it was finally 
abandoned towards the end of the second century. The results 
of the 1958-60 excavations seem to be entirely in accord with 
this opinion' (Steer 1961,97). Steer could, of course, draw 
no direct stratigraphical links between his work and the 
buildings inside the fort, but he saw the first break in 
occupation as marked by possible recuts of the primary inner 
ditch on the east and west sides of the fort, first observed, 
but not understood, by Macdonald (Steer 1961,. 92-3), and linked 
this with the destruction of the earliest central range 
buildings. Re-excavation of the outer of the quadruple ditch. 
series on the west side of the fort showed that the three phase 
sequence recorded by Macdonald represented nothing more than a 
series of tip-layers in a ditch that had been filled in a 
single operation (Steer 1961,91)ý As this was part of a 
general slighting of all four ditches here, and therefore later 
than the 'secondary recut' Steer saw this as the destruction at 
the end of the, second period, prefacing the third. By 1964 
(Steer 1964,30-31), Steer had dismissed the evidence for the 
third period (Macdonald's road over the slighted west ditches, 
and gravel-quarrying there) as mere preparations for a third 
period that was not executed. 
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I An overall view of all this structural evidence should make 
clear the difficulty of associating events in one part of the 
fort with events in another. The recuts of the defensive 
ditches, and provision of culverts through the rampart, could 
represent routine maintenance at any time during the fort's 
life. It is very dangerous to assume that observed 
ditch-recuts at-points around a defensive circuit are 
contemporary, and it is salutary to remember Macdonald's 
description of these ditches: 'The most striking feature about 
the fort ditches was the lack-of uniformity they displayed, - 
there were considerable variations in dimensions and 
occasionally in design'. In fact, the feature seen by 
Macdonald, and reinterpreted by Steer as a recut of general 
significance for the fort's history,, was stated to run 'along 
one stretch, but nowhere else on the whole enceintel (Macdonald 
1934,198). 
The slighting of the ditches on the west side could represent 
simply the end of the life of the fort, or, if the road 
recorded running over them is to be taken at face value, they 
could have been destroyed in order to make way for the 
well-known annexe on this side of the fort, a possibility 
considered by Steer (1961,99 n. 1). If this had entailed 
clearing part of a vicus, the evidence of a fire, and pottery 
in the ditch that had been broken before being burnt, might be 
explained without recourse to hostile destruction. 
This leaves the structural evidence of the internal buildings. 
The alterations to the commandant's house, as Steer later 
recognised (1964,30-31), could all have fallen within one 
period; the earliest timber structure seems too small to have 
served as the earliest praetorlum in a fort of this size, and 
so perhaps represents an initial temporary structure. The 
alterations in the headquarters, which certainly seems to have 
been reduced in size, and the inscriptions the two garrisons, 
remain as the only good evidence from Mumrills of two distinct 
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periods of activity. None of the evidence need indicate a 
break in occupation at the site. 
Camelon 
At this important Flavian and Antonine site less than a mile 
north of the Antonine Wall, straddling the major route north to 
the outposts and suggested (Tatton-Brown 1980) as the principal 
port of supply for the Wall system, extensive excavations took 
place at the turn of the century (Christison and Buchanan 
1901). They did not provide evidence for more than one period 
in the Antonine fort. More recent excavation in its annexe 
('the South Camp') has revealed various phases of Antonine 
activity, but no evidence for interruption in the history of 
the site (Maxfield 1979,32). 
Rough Castle 
Following-the excavations of 1903 at Rough Castle, Macdonald 
(1934,219-26) deduced a three-period sequence in the fort's 
elaborate annexe. Steer later (1964,31) dismissed this as 
'largely hypothetical'. The 1903 excavations did not otherwise 
provide indications of two separate Antonine periods within the 
fort, beyond there being walling of more than one distinct type 
(Macdonald 1934,228). Further excavation in 1957-61 disproved 
the three period structural history of the fort rampart 
postulated by Macdonald. The more recent excavators were also 
working with the clear expectation of finding two or three 
distinct Antonine periods, and were baffled by their own 
failure to do so. The presence of three phases of Intervallum 
street behind the west rampart was 'the most unequivocal 
evidence of different periods of work within the areas 
examined' (MacIvor et al. 1980,238). In the praetentura there 
had been an initial semi-permanent occupation of tent-like 
structures; these were followed by timber barracks. There was 
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an 'absence of evidence to indicate a second substantial period 
of barracks' (ibid., 241). To account for the absence of 
Antonine II, the excavators were driven to postulate that 
stripping of the barrack area in 1903 'could have removed all 
traces of a later set of structures' (ibid. ). They conceded 
that at Rough Castle there may have been no break between 
Antonine I and II. 
MP Seabegs Wood 
Insufficient excavation has been carried out here to be sure 
whether or not the fortlet has more than one period, though 
there is a hint that, as at Wilderness Plantation, its interior 
may have been cobbled over (Keppie and Walker 1981,143-49; 
160). - 
*Castlecary 
The old excavations at Castlecary (stone 1.40ha) produced no 
structural evidence for re-construction that could not easily 
be assigned to piecemeal repair, maintenance or changes within 
limited areas of the fort (Christison and Buchanan 1903,304-6; 
Macdonald 1934,241-52). Consequently, the only evidence for 
the assertion that there was more than one Antonine occupation 
of the site has been the occurrence of inscriptions naming 
different auxiliary units: 
RIB 2155: Antonine building inscription of cohors I Tungrorum: 
it may specify-their milliary strength 
RIB 2149: Undated altar to Neptune of milliary (specified) 
cohors I Vardullorum under a prefect I 
In addition there are altars (RIB 2146; 2148; 2151) dedicated 
by legionary vexillations, and one (RIB 2152) dedicated by 
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I ... Brittones'. Of the two milliary auxiliary units, 
Hanson 
and Maxwell (1983,153-55) have preferred to place the Vardulli 
in the 'first' period, on the assumption that primary building 
work would be legionary, and that the Tungrians must therefore 
have been involved in an 'Antonine III rebuild; this goes back 
to a point originally made by Steer (1964,26). In truth no 
overall re-building programme in the fort was detected; there 
is no reason why an elaborate building inscription such as RIB 
2155 may not belong to the initial building of the fort. 
Croy Hill 
Excavation by Macdonald in the 1930s was claimed to have 
revealed the then generally expected three Antonine periods 
(Macdonald 1936) in headquarters, granary and via principalis. 
In fact, the headquarters (preceded by two post-holes) had 
undergone limited rebuilding. An adjacent stores building had 
undergone alteration at some time; later its site was cobbled 
over. The via principalis was resurfaced on at least two 
occasions. It will be evident that these alterations could, in 
theory, be confined to the span of a single occupation period, 
and do not amount to proof of a general destruction of, or 
abandonment of, and then later re-commissioning of Croy Hill. 
*Bar Hill 
As at Castlecary, the weight of evidence for Antonine I and 
Antonine II at Bar Hill rests upon the epigraphic record of two 
auxiliary units: 
RIB 2167; 2172: cohors I Hamlorum. 
RIB 2169 (altar); 2170 (Antoninus Pius building inscription): 
cohors I Baetasiorum. 
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Bar Hill was'excavated at the turn of the century (Macdonald 
and Park 1906), and more recently; in particular the 
headquarters building has undergone careful re-examination. 
While this building clearly underwent alteration, it was never 
replanned, and there is no evidence for any break in its 
occupation (Keppie 1985); this conclusion rests for the fort in 
general. As Hanson and Maxwell (1983,139) state: 'Indeed, 
were, not two units attested at Bar Hill, the structural changes 
evident would barely warrant the assertion of two distinct 
periods of occupation'. 
The order in which the two attested units garrisoned the fort 
has long been disputed. The Baetasians have been seen as the 
earlier unit on the strength of their building inscription, but 
it has been conversely argued that a legionary building stone 
(RIB 2171) marks the original construction of the fort and that 
the Baetasians' tablet must therefore represent reconstruction 
within the reign of Pius (Steer 1964,26-7). The Baetasians' 
building inscription and an altar from the aedes naming that 
unit was deposited in the headquarters well at the time of the 
final demolition of the fort, but this need not necessarily 
show that they formed the final garrison (see below). 
Cadder 
Excavations at Cadder in 1929-31 (Clarke 1933) were taken to 
show clear evidence of the three then expected Antonine 
periods. Looking again at the excavation report of this now 
lost fort, it is clear that the site had undergone complex 
changes and certainly displayed more than an obvious short 
single period of occupation. It was in the area identified as 
that of the commandant's house that Clarke recovered a clear 
sequence of three buildings, one of'stone succeeded by two of 
timber (ibid., 44-48). Whether these remains really 
represented three successive praetoria is questioned below. 
Clarke believed he had uncovered a parallel sequence in the 
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fort baths (Ibid., 53-60); it is now generally recognised that 
bath-houses were prone to modification and need not reflect the 
structural history of a fort (Steer 1964,34). Elsewhere, 
there had been at least two periods of building in the 
barracks, although the layout of the buildings themselves did 
not seem to have changed (Clarke 1933,49). 
North of the granary (which displayed only one period), in the 
central range, building IV, of uncertain purpose, had undergone 
much alteration (ibid., 43) before being riddled with pits 
associated with an adjacent workshop (Building X) which itself 
had experienced at least three phases. 
All of this amounts to a fort whose timber buildings had to be 
altered on various occasions, but whose alterations need not 
necessarily be associated with each other in general phases. 
One stone building was demolished to make way for timber 
successors. Most telling of all is the headquarters. In order 
to obtain the three requisite Antonine Periods, Clarke 
postulated (ibid., 36) a first [Antonine I] headquarters which 
had completely disappeared; the only surviving features he 
could associate with this period were some pits which predated 
the visible principla. Steer (1964,33) rightly saw that these 
pits are more likely to have been pre-fort or 'proto-Antoninel, 
quarry pits or such-like. But Steer was determined to cling to 
Antonine II (his intention being, by disposing of one of 
Clarke's periods, to-show that there was no evidence for a 
third period): 'In this case the signs of reconstruction 
observed must relate to Antonine II... I However, Clarke's 
original account makes it quite clear that the evidence for 
Antonine II in this building is equally chimerical: 'Except 
where subsidences had taken place into previous pits ... no 
traces of reconstruction were observed. Elsewhere the 
footings... showed no differences of masonry and lay 
consistently on the same level' (1933,35-6). It was this 
evident single period character of the building which persuaded 
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Clarke that there must have been an Antonine I predecessor that 
had completely vanished. 
Thus, while some building plots saw successive rebuildings, 
there is no evidence that Cadder ever had a break in its 
occupation, or that there was ever a general rebuilding of the 
fort., Nor is there convincing evidence of disaster overtaking 
the fort between the supposed occupations. Much was made of 
the burnt masonry which packed the post-holes of the 
second-phase timber building on the commanding officer's house 
site; however, this could easily have derived from a demolished 
hypocaust in the preceding building. The burnt daub noted in 
the barrack areas was deposited only at the end of'the life of 
the fort. 
If a general change in the fort is to be suspected, it must be 
that it was, largely turned over to industrial activity, a 
conclusion hinted at by'Clarke (Ibl&, 89). - Not only was there 
the unusually extensive industrial activity in the area of 
sites IV and X by the end of the life of the fort; the same was 
true now or earlier in the northern half of the praetentura 
(ibid., 51). The headquarters was turned over to industrial 
use, as the presence of a feature in the courtyard, intepreted 
by Clarke as a cistern but obviously a large, hearth or kiln, 
shows (ibid., 37). Finally, the buildings replacing the stone 
praetorium, while conforming to a courtyard plan, had several 
anomalies which raise the suspicion that here also we may be 
dealing with fabricae. These include an absence of partitions; 
an open range on the north containing pit or water tank and 
burnt areas; an unexplained drain in'an open area in south 
range of the building (ibid., 47-48). Thus far from being a 
fort which shows abandonment and reoccupation within the 
Antonine Period, Cadder may be interpreted as a site of a 
single major period which was at some time denuded of some or 
all of its garrison and turned over to industrial use. 
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*MF Wilderness Plantation 
I 
Excavation in 1965-66 showed that in a second phase the timber 
structures inside the fortlet had been cobbled over. Two 
hearths apparently remained in use in the second period of 
occupation; no alterations were noted in the ditches or the 
excavated gate (Wilkes 1974). 
Balmulldy 
Excavated in 1912-14, Balmuildy was taken to show the expected 
three periods (Miller 1922,104-5). The evidence for the 
sequence of three periods separated by two destructions was, 
however, drawn exclusively from the internal bath-house of the 
fort (Miller 1922,41-47). There was no evidence of more than 
one period in the defences, and the other buildings excavated 
within the fort were essentially of single period: the 
headquarters and commanding officer's house showed only minor 
alterations. It is interesting that Steer (1964,34), 
dismissing Antonine III but still anxious to find evidence for 
Antonine I and II, selected that part of Miller's report which 
gave the Commandant's House I ... two periods, separated by a 
destruction'. Reference to the original report (Miller 1922, 
31) shows that this 'destruction' was an inference based solely 
on the fact that a room had been enlarged: 'It is highly 
improbable that such fundamental reconstruction would have been 
undertaken merely to gain a few feet of extra space. Here it 
looks as if occasion for rebuilding had been given by the 
destruction of this part of the building'. Similarly in the 
headquarters, 'destruction' is inferred from the insertion of a 
storehouse and the fact that the front wall of the rear range 
did not sit squarely upon its foundation: 'The rebuilding of 
this wall upon the original foundation implies destruction and 
not mere alteration of plan' (1922,25). The fort's street and 
drainage system (1922,40-41) was also taken to show evidence 
of more than one period; although there was apparently nothing 
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that might not be the product of routine repair and maintenance 
within a given period of occupation. More recently, L Keppie 
(1976) has shown that a gate inscription at Balmuildy will have 
stayed in place during any supposed break between Antonine I 
and II. 
Bearsden 
The recent excavation by DJ Breeze, of this secondary Wall fort 
is not yet published in detail, but it has been clearly stated 
that the fort had only one period of occupation (Breeze 1984). 
*Duntocher 
Excavation in 1947-51 (Robertson 1957) revealed that this small 
secondary fort's internal buildings had enjoyed more than one 
phase. There was no evidence for a general abandonment and 
rebuilding, and all of the observed structural alterations 
could be accounted for in terms of repair, maintenance and 
change during a single general occupation. 
*Old Kilpatrick 
Excavated in 1923-24, the most western of the 'primary' Wall 
forts was supposed to produce evidence of the usual three 
Antonine Wall periods (Miller 1928,55-59). On-close scrutiny, 
however, the evidence for this assertion is open to question. 
The clearest evidence for two structural. periods which could be 
advanced was from the headquarters building. Here a lower, 
earlier cobble foundation underlay parts of the cobble 
foundations in the rear range of the known, -and therefore 
supposedly second period, headquarters (Miller 1928,25-6). At 
the southwest corner of the headquarters (1928,27) the 
'secondary' foundation was overlain by a further cobble 
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foundation which was the sole evidence'that could be adduced 
for a third period. However, it does not seem that three , 
levels of foundation were seen here, so perhaps the same-two 
stage'sequence seen in the rear range was being observed. 
Taken at face value, this evidence should mean that the 
headquarters was at some stage rebuilt from its foundations 
(although it may be noted-in passing that multi-stage cobbled 
foundations are an attested structural technique, while 
examples of aborted foundation, layouts are well-known). In 
support of the theory of rebuilding, the excavator-associated 
the second, stage foundation with the raising'of the forecourt 
surface and the doing away with a timber colonnade there (1928, 
25). All of this could as well be accounted for by a routine 
rebuilding programme during the life of the fort, as may have 
happened if a timber headquarters (on-stone sill-walls) had 
been rebuilt with a wholly stone superstructure. 
The same could'be said of the barracks, where two different 
construction techniques, - sleeper-beams and post-holes - were 
taken to signify two periods of construction (Miller 1928,16). 
The excavators failed, however, to distinguish two separate 
plans; such variations in construction technique might easily 
represent piece-meal repair or rebuilding and in any case it is 
not unknown for them to occur in the same building. 
Significantly, however, clear evidence was recorded that two 
barracks had at some time gone out of use and their areas 
become covered with metalling (1928,16-17). 
1 
The latrine in-the southeast corner of Old Kilpatrick was also 
seen as providing 'an index to the structural periods, of 
the... fort' (Miller 1928,28). The original walls of this 
building were overlain by the foundations of an enlarged 
building which had superseded the latrine. The excavator 
thought in terms of a violent destruction of the phase 1 
latrine; however, it is noticeable that the succeeding building 
seems to have been used for occupation rather than as a latrine 
(1928,29). The original latrine had been founded below the 
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level of the rampart, presumably in order to tap into the drain 
exiting the fort at this point; the building may simply have 
been raised because its function had changed and it no longer 
needed to be, at the same level as the culvert. 
As at other Antonine Wall sites, then, there is clear evidence 
of much activity, building work and alteration at Old 
Kilpatrick, but it is not possible to show that the alterations 
are all related and belong to a second general building period. 
Rather the picture is one of a site with much activity taking 
place, where certain buildings (not necessarily at the same 
time) changed their functions or were done away with. 
5.5.1.3 Sites north of the Antonine Wall 
Of the known outposts north of the Antonine Wall, Ardoch, 
Strageath and Bertha, only the former two have received 
sufficient excavation to shed light upon the nature of their 
Antonine occupation. 
Ardoch 
Ardoch, occupied in both Flavian and Antonine times, is 
conventionally explained as having had two distinct Antonine 
periods (after Crawford 1949,38); the visible defences of the 
fort are said to be too constricted to be contemporary with 
internal timber buildings, detected in the excavations of 
1896-97 (Christison et al. 1898), which must therefore have 
belonged to a larger Flavian fort. Thus, the visible defencesý 
were Antonine; as they showed signs of having been reduced in 
size - leaving the Antonine I north rampart cut off by the 
latest Antonine ditch system - two Antonine periods were 
deduced. There were at least two phases of timber buildings 
inside the fort and a single stone building which, unlike the 
timber structures, did leave room for an, intervallum between 
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itself and the Antonine rampart, and was therefore considered 
to be Antonine in date. 
There are, however, difficulties with this interpretation. G 
Maxwell has recently argued that there is reason to believe 
that the 'detached' north rampart of the 'Antonine V fort may 
actually be an annexe: this explains why the second and third 
('Antonine I)' ditches on the east side of the fort do not 
continue around the detached portion, but appear to respect an 
entrance on its eastern side - an anomalous position for a fort 
gate (Maxwell 1989,167-68). It may also explain the curious 
attachment to the west side of the detached portion. If this 
was the case, within the Antonine period we would merely be 
seeing the passing out of use of an annexe or outwork. 
In the interior of the fort there was no clear evidence for two 
periods of Antonine structures. As stated above, the timber 
buildings were considered to be Flavian because of their 
relationship to the rampart. Maxwell (19891 - 115-16) has in 
fact also argued that there is sufficient space for a narrower 
Flavian fort rampart to have been roughly co-extensive with the 
rampart of the visible fort. 
If one looks at the buildings that were recorded by the 
excavators of the 1890s in an attempt to isolate Antonine 
structures, several points are striking. There is a single 
stone building; if there had been others, surely these would 
have been seen. Of the timber buildings, there are two types: 
post-hole and sleeper-beam construction. It is the post-hole 
period that runs right up to the (Antonine) rampart and must 
therefore pre-date it. The beam-trench period does not 
encroach upon the rampart in this manner. In the plan, the 
headquarters, commanding officer's house and possibly part of a 
granary are visible in beam-trench construction; the post-holes 
do not make coherent sense. All this would be explained if the 
beam-trench construction represents the Antonine period, with 
the I Flavian post-hole period glimpsed obscurely below it. The 
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stone building could beýan isolated rebuilding in stone, or 
building of special function, contemporary with the timber 
Antonine buildings. This hypothesis'has the attraction of 
actually being able to see evidence for'Antonine occupation 
within the fort. The weakness of the traditional exposition 
was always that although two periods of Flavian timber 
buildings were well-preserved, apart from one stone building, 
all evidence for the Antonine occupation had, apparently 
disappeared. Nor need it occasion surprise that the Antonine 
central range buildings were of timber; this would seem to be a 
peculiarity of outpost forts, for Strageath was almost entireiy 
timber in each of its Antonine periods. 
Until'further excavation takes place at Ardoch, it is therefore 
impossible to be sure that the evidence has been interpreted 
correctly in ascribing two separate Antonine occupations to 
this fort. Although, on any reckoning, there would have to 
have been much alteration in the Antonine period, there is 
nothing in the evidence at present available which necessitates 
a break in the Antonine occupation of the site. 
**Strageath' 
If the evidence for Antonine I and II at Ardoch can be seen as 
less than unequivocal, the excavations which have recently 
(1973-86) taken place at Strageath demonstrate that the fort 
was wholly replanned within the Antonine period (Frere and 
Wilkes 1989). - The number of buildings interpreted as barracks, 
was increased from eight to twelve. It was also observed that 
the rampart had been considerably enlarged. On the evidence 
available it was not possible to date the rebuilding of the 
fort closely within the Antonine period. 
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5.5.2 The Antonine occupation of Scotland reconsidered (Fig 
22) 
It will be apparent-from the above, that the statement that the 
majority of excavated forts in Scotland show two distinct 
periods of Antonine occupation is false. Until the 1960s, 
Macdonald's view that three distinct periods were clearly 
visible on Antonine Wall sites prevailed. Steer (1964) showed 
that there was little real evidence for the-third period; this 
ought to have raised suspicions about the generality of 
Antonine I and II, which was often based on very similar 
evidence to that for 'Period IIV. Nor has the belief in two 
clear Antonine periods been much shaken by the exploration, in 
more recent years, of Antonine sites in Scotland, such as 
Bearsden and Barburgh Mill, which turned out to be single 
period. 
Of the 36 Antonine sites in Scotland which have been excavated 
sufficiently to shed light upon the nature of their Antonine 
history, only five have produced unequivocal evidence for a 
complete rebuild of the fort or two separate occupations within 
the Antonine period. These have an interesting distribution 
(Fig 22). Three, Birrens, Cappuck and Newstead, were replanned 
as a prelude to their role as outpost forts of Hadrian's Wall 
after the abandonment of Antonine Scotland. Conventional 
wisdom would associate the building of Antonine II Birrens with 
a reoccupation of, the Antonine Wall in c158; however, no-one 
will deny that Antonine II Birrens went on to have a much 
longer history than the Antonine Wall. If we momentarily put 
aside these three sites as having a history not necessarily 
identical to that of Antonine sites further north and west, and 
turn in that direction, we are left with two sites with 
unequivocal evidence of two periods. These are Strageath, and 
the fortlet at Outerwards. To these must be added a series of 
sites on the Antonine Wall which have epigraphic evidence for 
two garrisons: Mumrills, Castlecary and Bar Hill, or structural 
evidence of rebuilding in the principal buildings: Mumrills and 
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Old Kilpatrick. Finally, there is the fort at Whitemoss, where 
much Antonine alteration is reported, but no details published. 
Even if it is considered that the, two-period evidence from some 
sites considered above has been'unfairly dismissed, and sites 
such as Ardoch, Cramond and Crawford are included, it does 
little to change the overall numerical picture. 
Both on the Antonine Wall and elsewhere north'and, west of 
Newstead, expectation-of-two (formerly, on the Wall itselff: 
three) Antonine periods has strongly influenced interpretation 
of excavated remains. In many forts resurfacing of streets, 
often the Intervallum street, has been taken to indicate a 
re-occupation (eg Bothwellhaugh, Carzield, Castledykes, 
Glenlochar, Rough Castle, Croy Hill, Balmuildy and Old 
Kilpatrick)., However, experience of the excavation of any 
Roman fort occupied for more than a very brief period shows 
that resurfacing of streets and maintenance and replacement of 
their accompanying drainage systems was a constant activity, 
whose various phases are not found to occur in general 
synchronisation from one part of a fort to the other, let alone 
from site to site. 
The same may be said of'alterations and changes in plan within 
timber barracks, a phenomenon claimed to indicate the 
rebuilding of 'Antonine III in a number of the Antonine Wall 
forts. Timber structures on any military site occupied for a 
considerable time are prone to repair and alteration, 
irrespective of their having been any break in occupation or 
change in garrison. For example, in the legionary fortress at 
Exeter, occupied for only about twenty years, timber barracks 
were rebuilt to the same plan on two separate occasions 
(Bidwell 1980,35). At South Shields, the current excavations 
(conducted by the writer) in the barracks of'the first period 
of the supply-base (used for a period of between 15 and 25 
years) have shown that the timber portions of these buildings 
were completely rebuilt sometimes on three occasions, even 
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though there is no evidence for a break in occupation or change 
of function during this period. A further example would be the 
successive replacements of timber barracks in the mid-first 
century Valkenburg. It is in this light, then, that the 
recorded alterations to barracks at such sites as Old 
Kilpatrick, Duntocher, Cadder and Mumrills must be viewed. In 
no case, has evidence ever been put forward for a distinct 
change of plan, break of occupation, or any activity that need 
not be a product of routine maintenance. There are cases, as 
at Cadder and Old Kilpatrick, where some of the barracks seem 
to have passed out of use; this hardly constitutes renewed I 
activity after an occupational break. On the contrary, at a 
number of sites on the Antonine Wall, even where two distinct 
Antonine periods have been claimed, it has had to be admitted 
that the same barracks may have continued in use in both 
periods (eg Bar Hill, Rough Castle, Cadder: Hanson and Maxwell 
1983,139). 
Some of the recorded evidence for successive periods of 
occupation in Antonine Wall forts now seems the product of 
pre-conceived ideas or wishful thinking; for example, 
Macdonald's interpretation of a ditch at Mumrills (shown by 
Steer to have been filled in one operation) as displaying three 
'occupation levels'. The attempt to associate minor 
alterations in the central range buildings of Balmuildy to the 
expected general Antonine periods is a notable example, as is 
the interpretation of the excavations at Croy Hill. Cadder is 
a striking and interesting example. Here is a fort which at 
the end of its life has had its barrack accommodation 
drastically reduced, and much of its area, including its 
headquarters, turned over to industrial use. The praetorlum 
was demolished and replaced by two successive timber structures 
which may, as argued earlier, have been workshops. Here is a 
fort of no more than one general period, changing in function 
upon the departure of most of its garrison. There is no 
evidence of re-occupation or reconstruction in a second 
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Antonine period. Yet, to the excavator, this was'all clear 
evidence of Antonine I, II and III. 
Looking along the Antonine Wall, it is interesting to isolate 
the forts which, upon a more sober assessment, really have , 
evidence - whether epigraphic or structural -for more than one 
Antonine period. As we have seen, these are Mumrills, 
Castlecary, Bar Hill and Old Kilpatrick. It seems, then, that 
the best evidence for two Antonine Wall periods comes from the 
series of 'primary' forts (taking Bar Hill to-be, primary). 
Even in the primary forts, however, the evidence suggests not 
so much a wholesale reconstruction, but rather a 
re-organisation involving the movement of a different unit into 
the existing fort. 
It could be suggested that this re-organisation was associatedý 
with the''secondary fort' decision: that certain units were 
originally allotted to the primary forts, but replaced by 
others, or detachments of others, upon theýdecision to add the 
smaller secondary forts to the Wall. 
Thus the original garrison of Mumrills will have been ala 
Tungrorum, who must have been present long enough for the altar 
which records their presence to have been dedicated. The 
structural evidence also suggests that their stay will have 
been more than ephemeral, for it was presumably this unit which 
built the large praetorium, which itself succeeded a 
(temporary? ) timber building. The rebuilding at-a reduced size 
of the principla could then have been-carried out on the 
arrival of cohors I Thracum. 
As we shall see (5.5.6 below), Mumrills has produced possible 
evidence of a longer occupation than the rest of the Antonine 
Wall forts. Should further such evidence come to light, an 
alternative possibility will have to be considered: that the 
second unit (probably the Thracians) garrisoned the fort as an 
outpost after the abandonment of most of the Wall system. This 
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is not to revert to the idea of Antonine II for the whole of 
the Wall, but simply to accept the possibility of continued 
occupation at one or two sites. 
At Castlecary the building inscription of cohors I Tungrorum 
presumably denotes the originally intended garrison, with the 
Vardulli moving in upon're-organisation; as a unit of similar 
status, there was no need for the Vardulli to change the plans 
of the interior buildings. -Neither unit can have been at full 
milliary size to fit into this 1.55ha fort. Here also ceramic 
and epigraphic evidence has been taken to indicate a later 
occupation, perhaps running down to the late 170s, suggesting 
an alternative explanation for the duality of attested 
auxiliary units, as at-Mumrills. -' However, if there was such an 
extended period of occupation of the fort-as-outpost, this 
would seem the most likely context for the garrisoning by 
legionary vexillations suggested above. 
At first sight, the sequence of garrisons at Bar Hill argues 
against the notion of the 'first' primary fort garrisons being 
part of a short lived original arrangement. The Hamian archers 
are shown by their inscriptions - naming two prefects - 
probably to have been in garrison for more than a brief period. 
Yet it is cohors I Baetasiorum that is named on an altar and 
building inscription found in the filling of the principla well 
which marks the final destruction of that building and 
abandonment of the fort. However, it is conceivable that the 
inscriptions of the Baetasii belong to the original 
construction of the fort, and were survivals into the period 
when the Hamii were in garrison, as L Keppie has suggested 
(Robertson et al. 1975,26-7). On their arrival the Hamii 
would neither automatically deface a building inscription 
which, while naming another unit, also carried the full titles 
of Antoninus Pius, nor remove the previous garrison's altar, 
which, probably being placed in the aedes, may have been 
closely associated the Imperial cult (the inscription itself 
carries no dedication, and, as Macdonald pointed out (1934, 
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424-5), must have made self evident reference to context in 
which it was set). Conversely, atýthe final demolition of the 
fort, the Hamians might be expected to dispose of the 
Baetasians' altar, while taking away with them for re-use their 
own dedications from the aedes. 
At the primary fort of Balmuildy, nothing is known of the 
garrisons, or whether, there was a similar re-organisation. At 
Old Kilpatrick, a similar sequence to that at Mumrills may be 
glimpsed; reconstruction in the principla, and the presence of 
a unit smaller than that for which the fort should originally 
have been built: in this case most probably cohors I 
Baetaslorum. It is-tempting to see the arrival of this 
detachment at Old Kilpatrick as following the postulated 
departure of the Baetasians from Bar Hill. 
It is significant that it is the principla at both Mumrills and 
Old Kilpatrick which shows the clearest evidence of structural 
alteration. Although it is suggested here that at Mumrills 
this is most likely to be a result of a unit of different size 
replacing the unit which built the headquarters, at Old ,- 
Kilpatrick the overall size of'the building was not changed in 
the alterations. Here the situation might be explained if 
building had only got so far when the unit re-organisation took 
place, producing a dislocation in the building programme which 
resulted in the laying, of two sets of foundations in a rather 
mixed up fashion. A good parallel for this can be found in the 
aborted set of foundations for a stone aedes and flanking rooms 
which underlie the first mid-Antonine stone headquarters at 
South Shields (Daniels 1989,85). It is notable that no such 
dislocation is visible at Balmuildy or Castlecary, which, as 
stone forts, may have been, started earlier in the building i 
programme than Old Kilpatrick, allowing their principal' 
buildings to be completed while the 'first' garrisons were 
still present. At the turf fort of Bar Hill, however, the 
principla was certainly completed while the Baetasians were 
still in garrison. 
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Naturally this is only one of many possible ways of 
interpreting-the evidence, and it must remain a possibility 
that these primary forts entered some kind of 'Antonine IV 
period. However, the recognition that evidence for two periods 
of occupation on the Antonine Wall is confined to the primary 
forts begs the question of whether there is any remaining 
evidence compelling us to continue believing in two distinct 
Antonine periods, with the Romans abandoning - or largely 
evacuating - Scotland,; and just as'quickly re-occupying it. If 
the evidence for two units at three primary forts is 
interpreted in the light of re-organisation caused by the 
secondary fort-decision, then there is in fact no reason why 
the Antonine Wall-should not simply have been occupied for the 
duration of a single period; that is, built, occupied for a 
time, abandoned and never re-occupied. There is no structural 
evidence from the Wall itself that can be brought against this 
suggestion. 
It remains to relate the evidence from Antonine sites away from 
the Wall to this conclusion. As we have seen, there is no 
evidence from the great majority of these sites to support the 
idea of two occupations. Of those where the structural 
evidence is compelling inýspeaking of two periods of building 
or occupation, it is interesting to see whether their evidence 
necessarily contradicts the model outlined above, ie a single 
occupation of the Antonine Wall. As suggested above, the 
second periods at Birrens, Cappuck and Newstead could easily 
relate to the holding of the remaining area north of Hadrian's 
Wall after the abandonment ofýthe Scottish Wall. 
This leaves the sites of Whitemoss, Crawford and Strageath. 
Whitemoss and Strageath are-intimately linked with the Antonine 
Wall system, and were no doubt occupied from its beginnings. 
It is possible that the re-organisation that affected the Wall 
at an early stage in its construction also left its mark at 
these sites; the enlargement of the garrison at Strageath could 
be a counterpoint to the reduction in garrison sizes in the 
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primary: Wall forts. There are no published details of the 
alterations at Whitemoss, but, as at Strageath, there is 
nothing to show that alterations to the fort could not have 
taken place very early in the Antonine period. 
One suggestion has already been advanced to explain the 
structural enlargement of the fort at Crawford and its barracks 
within the Antonine period - namely that this could well have 
represented a change of plan during the initial construction. 
Even if this suggestion is mistaken, and the fort was actually 
enlarged a considerable time after its original Antonine 
building, the point remains that the principal buildings within 
the fort were unequivocally of a single period, and never 
rebuilt, and that there was no evidence that there had ever 
been a break in the Antonine occupation of the site. 
The only remaining apparently two-period Antonine sites to be 
considered are fortlets forming part of the Antonine Wall 
system. There is evidence that the interior of Wilderness 
Plantation milefortlet was cobbled over. If this and other 
milefortlets went out-of use, this, like a change of garrisons 
in the primary forts, could be part of the reappraisal which 
brought the secondary forts onto the line of the Wall. Their 
arrival may have meant that occupation of all of the 
milefortlets was no longer considered necessary. If 
Outerwards, on the west coastal flank, was evacuated as part of 
this re-organisation, but after some years found, because of 
its coastal position, to be an installation worthy of a 
garrison after all, the evidence for its abandonment and later 
re-occupation within the Antonine period would, be explained. 
The conclusion'is, therefore, that re-organisation, complex 
changes, routine maintenance and building within the Antonine 
period, taking different forms, at different times, have tended 
to be forced into the mould of Antonine I and II at whatever 
site they have occurred. There is no way of showing that any 
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of these phenomena occurred at the same time, or that they have 
any general significance. 
There is nothing in the recorded changes of garrison, and 
rebuildings (confined to the primary forts) in forts on the 
Antonine Wall that cannot be explained by the dislocation and 
re-organisation caused by the decision to increase the number 
of forts along the Wall line. Such early Antonine 
re-organisation may have extended to sites, 'such as Strageath,, 
away from the Wall itself. However, the majority of Antonine 
sites in Scotland do not show more than one period of -I 
occupation. There is no evidence for a general abandonment and 
re-occupation of forts in Scotland or on the Antonine Wall in 
the Antonine period. Newstead and its associated forts form 
the only exceptions. The 'Antonine III of Newstead and other 
outposts in Lowland Scotland long outlasted the reign of Pius 
and the tenure of the Antonine Wall. The Antonine occupation 
of Scotland had been a single episode. ' 
5.5.3 The'ancestry of Antonine I and Antonine II 
If the actual structural evidence speaks so negatively about 
the supposed two Antonine occupations of Scotland, it will be 
of great interest to search for the origins of an idea which 
has become so deeply entrenched in all thought on the subject. 
The belief in a general Antonine I and II is intimately 
associated with the 'Brigantian revolt' of the 150s - an event 
more or less established in the-modern literature (Frere 1987, 
136-37;, Hanson and Maxwell 1983,146-47), but invented by 
Haverfield in 1903 as a means of interpreting some old and some 
newly discovered evidence for the mid-second century (Heslop 
and Haverfield 1904; Haverfield 1904). 
An inscription (RIB 1322) had recently been dredged from the 
Tyne at Newcastle, which Haverfield read as recording the 
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arrival from Germany of reinforcements for the three British 
legions during the governorship of Julius Verus. This Verus 
was immediately identified with the governor recorded at 
Birrens in 158, when the fort there was rebuilt (RIB 2110) 
after having been fired. At Netherby, too, rebuilding under 
Verus was thought to'be attested (RIB 977), while Brough on Noe 
was rebuilt under the same governor (RIB 283). Meanwhile, 
rebuilding had taken place on Hadrian's Wall, perhaps near 
Heddon, in 158 (RIB 1389). To Haverfield, and the generation 
of scholars that followed him, all this amounted to a Roman 
response to some momentous occurrence: a revolt in Brigantia. 
This would explain a need to move back from the Antonine Wall, 
re-commission Hadrian's Wall, and re-occupy and rebuild 
abandoned or destroyed forts in the Brigantian homeland. RIB 
1322, ''in this view, represented the meeting of Roman needs, or 
losses sustained while crushing the revolt, with extra troops 
from Germany; and the vision was born of rebellion and 
destruction from Birrens to Brough on Noe., For Haverfield, the 
evidence of Pausanias (Descr. Greece 8.43), regarding Pius' 
seizure of Brigantian territory in Britain (formerly an enigma: 
how could Lollius Urbicus' war in the north have deprived the 
Brigantes of land? ) clinched the event. 
From an early date, the postulated 'Brigantian revolt' was 
closely tied to the hunt for two periods in Scottish Antonine, 
sites; it was standard to cite 'the revolt of about 1551 in the 
Antonine Wall fort excavation reports of the 1920s as the 
explanation for the first of the observed 'destructions' or 
'disasters'. As we have seen, these observations were usually 
delusory; but, the expectation was there. It can, in fact, be 
traced back to Birrens, whose excavation stands at the head of 
the list of the influential turn of the century Scottish fort 
excavations, some of which did happen to produce two Antonine 
periods. This can be seen from the following table, which 
shows the dates of excavations of sites (**) showing two 
Antonine structural periods, and of sites (*) which at the time 
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were interpreted as providing stronglievidence for two such 
periods: 
Birrens 1895 
Cappuck 1886,1911 
Newstead 1905-10 
Old Kilpatrick 1923-24 
Mumrills 1923-28,1958-60 
Cadder 1929-31 
Durisdeer 1938 
Duntocher 1947-51 
Whitemoss 1949-54 
Crawford 1961-66 
Wilderness Plantation 1965-66 
Outerwardsý 1970 
Strageath 1973-86 
It is notable that with the, exception of two examples too 
recent to have influenced the ideas of the early excavators who 
saw everywhere evidence for Antonine I and II, the sites which 
did produce the requisite structural evidence occur in a row at 
the beginning of the list. 
Birrens, with its rebuilding after violent destruction, was 
central to Haverfield's invention of 'the Brigantian Revolt'. 
Then Macdonald, in his Roman Wall In Scotland (1911) 
incorporated into Antonine Wall Studies the expectation of two 
periods separated by the Brigantian revolt of c155; 
paradoxically Macdonald used the evidence of excavations at 
Rough Castle (1902-3), Castlecary (1902) and Bar Hill (1902-5) 
in support of this conclusion, although these sites are amongst 
those with the weakest structural evidence for two periods. 
The epigraphic evidence for two units at Castlecary and Bar 
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Hill', reminiscent of that of two units at Birrens, must have 
tipped the scale. 
Thus it was that the spate of investigations of Antonine Wall 
forts and otherýmilitary sites in-Scotland occurred in the wake 
of the excavation of a few key sites which showed two Antonine 
periods, and immediately followed the invention of an 
explanatory model which was at once convincing and attractive 
and which suggested that a break in'Antonine occupation might 
be found on other northern sites. In the'urbane and assured 
prose of Macdonald,, the signs of Haverfield's revolt came to be 
seen in every-fort on the Antonine Wall. 
The recent changes in thought based on pottery studies have led 
to the continued respectability of Haverfield's revolt. Now 
that-it is widely agreed that the Antonine Wall was abandoned 
by-the. 160s (Hartley 1972), the casting around for a context 
for the break between the-two Antonine Wall periods has again 
lighted on the 'Brigantian revolt'. Hanson and Maxwell, for 
example (1983,146-47), cautiously accept the idea. The 
process has become circular: it is thought likely that there 
was a Brigantian revolt because of a break in the occupation of 
the Antonine Wall; the evidence for that break (if it exists at 
all), was gathered as a result of expectations raised'by the 
theory, of a Brigantian'revolt. In truth, of course, there is 
no direct evidence whatsoever that such a rebellion occurred in 
Brigantia during the 150s. This has repeatedly been pointed 
out (Gillam and Mann 1970, Dobson 1972; Gillam 1974). It is 
not necessary here to rehearse the point that the evidence 
thought to indicate such a revolt, whether gathered in 
Haverfield's time or since, may be read in more than one way. 
It will suffice to say that the above survey has made it clear 
that there is little basis for one of the strongest 
circumstantial supporting arguments for there having been a 
Brigantian revolt: namely that the Romans briefly abandoned the 
Antonine Wall, re-occupied the Pennines, and then moved north 
to re-occupy the Scottish Wall. In fact, both the Brigantian 
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revolt and Antonine I and II are modern ideas, and their roots 
are closely intertwined. 
5-. 5.4 The abandorunent of Antonine Scotland 
Having argued that the Antonine Wall was held for a single 
period only, - it is necessary to discuss the possible dates at 
which the abandonment of the Wall might have taken place. It 
is not pretended here that one of the candidate dates can be 
selected, argued for and proved; the available evidence is 
still too fragmentary and apparently contradictory for such a 
neat solution; however, the various possibilities may be 
surveyed. - 
The basic datum is provided by Hartley's (1972) analysis of the 
samian, which indicates that there should have been no 
widespread occupation on sites north of Newstead after the 
mid-Antonine period. Although his samian could never allow 
such exactitude, -Hartley settled on the date c163 for the final 
abandonment of the Antonine Wall and re-commissioning of 
Hadrian's Wall: this date was derived from a building 
inscription of Calpurnius Agricola at Corbridge. The 
association of Calpurnius Agricola with the re-occupation of 
Hadrian's Wall was first made by John Gillam 19 years earlier; 
the difference was that Gillam (1953) still envisaged a later 
re-occupation of the Antonine Wall. 
The year 163 has accordingly passed into a number of text- 
books. Only recently has a later date for a mid-Antonine 
abandonment of Scotland been strongly argued for: C Daniels 
(1991) has shown that it is just as reasonable to argue that 
the withdrawal may have occurred as late as 168/9. Meanwhile 
there are others who persist (eg Mann 1988) in arguing for a 
late second-century re-occupation of the Antonine Wall after a 
temporary return to Hadrian's Wall in the mid-Antonine period. 
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Every one of these models proceeds with the assumption, 
implicit or explicit, that there are two distinct periods of 
occupation on the Antonine Wall. The assumption is central to 
the latter, split-chronology model. It is suggested here that 
the conclusion from the analysis above, that there is no 
evidence for more than one general Antonine Wall period, or for 
any interval between occupations, is fatal to the thesis that 
after a break of about twenty years the Romans returned to 
re-occupy the Antonine Wall. JC Mann's recent restatement of 
the argument for a split chronology (Mann 1988) is essentially 
based upon a dismissal of the value of ceramic dating evidence 
and an acceptance of two 'facts': first, that there is evidence 
that Hadrian's Wall was being re-commissioned in-cl58; second, 
that there is evidence for the occupation of the Antonine Wall 
after 158 (Mann 1988,132). Mann goes on to argue, from 
literary and other circumstantial evidence, that a 
re-occupation of the Antonine Wall took place c184-c195. 
Structural evidence'for two Antonine Wall periods, which should 
be the key to such an argument, is in fact not addressed, 
presumably because the frequently repeated assertion of the 
general structural existence of two Antonine periods is thought 
to be well-established and beyond question. That the 
acceptance of the existence of 'Antonine V and 'Antonine III 
may now be questioned, allows a different light to be shed-upon 
the split chronology solution; in particular it shifts the 
whole weight of the argument onto the supposed evidence for 
occupation on the Antonine Wall after 158. 
The Hartley and Daniels, and all other modern suggestions have 
all, in contrast, taken on board the idea that any break 
between Antonine I and II must have been very brief: this is 
not really based on a scrutiny of the structural evidence 
(which apart from the later Hadrian's Wall outposts provided no 
evidence any way for any sort of break), but rather on an 
acceptance, forced by the pottery dating, that both Antonine 
periods must be confined to the reign of Pius or first few 
years of Marcus' reign. The increasing tendency to see the 
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break between Antonine I and II as a brief one is viewed here 
as the beginning of a suspicion, fully borne out by the 
structural evidence, that at most Antonine sites there was no 
break in occupation at all. 
When was Antonine Scotland finally abandoned? The range of 
possibilities which fall in the Period c158-c169 will be 
considered one by one. 
1. C158 
One problem which the view of Antonine Scotland as a single 
period causes for the generally advanced abandonment dates, is 
that it allows an earlier date, about 158, to be introduced as 
a possibility for the final abandonment of Scotland. Of course 
this is the date when everyone accepts that the Antonine Wall 
had been abandoned for the first time; could this in fact be 
the date of the final withdrawal? 
This model has the virtue of taking the epigraphic evidence at 
face value. RIB 1389, dated to exactly 158, appears to record 
rebuilding on Hadrian's Wall. It is usually taken as coming 
from the curtain itself. There are problems with this; the 
exact provenance is unknown and the stone does not resemble 
other inscribed building stones from the curtain. At the very 
least, however, it should indicate rebuilding at a fort or 
milecastle. This stone ties in attractively with several other 
inscriptions; Birrens was rebuilt in the form that it would 
take down to the late-second century in 158 (RIB 2110). It is 
more difficult to associate other stones with events on the 
northern frontier. Brough on Noe was rebuilt and re-occupied 
in 158 on the basis of RIB 283. The discovery of the famous 
RIB 1322 in the Tyne in 1903, supposed to record the arrival of 
reinforcements for the British legions from the two Germanies, 
and dated to this period by the name of Julius Verus, known 
from the Birrens inscription to have been governor in 158, led 
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Haverfield to combine these pieces of evidence to suggest the 
'Brigantian revolt' in the 150s, leading to a re-occupation of 
the Pennines. Now that it is clear that there is no evidence 
for a re-occupation of the Antonine Wall, it is tempting to 
wonder whether the re-organisation implied by these 
inscriptions in fact represents the beginning of the permanent 
re-commissioning of Hadrian's Wall and its outposts and 
hinterland. In support of this early date, we might list two 
building inscriptions (RIB 1460; 1461) from Chesters, on 
Hadrian's Wall, undated'(contra RIB; see Mann 1988,132 and 
n. 2) within the reign of Antoninus Pius. These could have been 
set up between 158 and 161 as part of the rebuilding of 
Hadrian's Wall. 
The only way to disprove such an-early date for the permanent 
re-occupation of Hadrian's Wall would, as Mann points out, be 
to find evidence for occupation of the Antonine Wall after 158. 
Although there are a number of coins later than this date from 
the Antonine Wall, none is from a recorded archaeological 
context (except perhaps the coin of tucilla, no earlier than 
164, 'found in granary' (Miller 1928,34) at Old'Kilpatrick). 
It is difficult to assess the significance of the scattering of 
coins of Marcus and Commodus from the Antonine Wall. Stray 
coins of the fourth century are well-known in Scotland; but in 
this period coinage was more abundant than in the later-second 
century. If the post-158 (or, for that matter, post-160s) 
coins are to be dismissed, it may perhaps be asked why these 
rare coins do not occur alongside strays of a later date. On 
the other hand, if this coin evidence was taken at face value, 
given the single period occupation of Antonine Scotland which 
we have established, a continuous occupation of the Antonine 
Wall down to 176 (the earliest date of the latest coins: Mann: 
1988,132) would be necessitated. 
It is possible that these coins indicate that the Wall, or 
simply selected sites on the Wall, continued in occupation into 
the 160s. This does not necessarily invalidate the theory that 
290 
the permanent return to Hadrian's Wall began in c158; it is 
possible to envisage a complex process of transfer from one 
frontier to another, in which some sites continued to be 
occupied on the old line while the new one-was completed. 
There are hints of something similar happening when the Upper 
German frontier was moved beyond the Neckar. This might be the 
explanation of coins of 164-183 at Old Kilpatrick and 160 at 
Cadder. Later coins of the 170s from Mumrills, and doubtfully, 
Bar Hill and Kirkintilloch, could have arrived at the sites 
during the long period of persistent Roman military and 
diplomatic interest in this part of Scotland which followed the 
end of the Antonine occupation. They may also be associated 
with the possibility of outposts being held in the 170s at 
Castlecary and Mumrills (see 5.5.6 below). 
c163 
The possible significance of the Calpurnius Agricola 
inscriptions (of which RIB 1149 is restored-as dating to 163) 
as referring to a restoration of Hadrian's Wall was first 
seized upon by JP Gillam in 1953, although of course it was 
still believed that the Antonine Wall was later re-occupied. 
Hartley took up the c163 date, seeing it as the time of the 
final withdrawal from Scotland north of Newstead. The 163 date 
allowed just enough time for a brief re-occupation of the 
Antonine Wall after the supposed break, and momentary return to 
Hadrian's Wall, of c155-58. Now that we have seen that for the 
bulk of Antonine Wall sites the evidence for occupational break 
was illusory, the case for 163 is rather-weakened. A general 
mid-Antonine conclusion to the Antonine Wall-system may as well 
coincide with the-hint of rebuilding work beginning on 
Hadrian's Wall in 158. 
I 
In favour of the 163 date, however, it might be argued that an 
abandonment of the Antonine Wall during the reign of Pius is 
inherently unlikely, while such a policy review may more 
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probably have been undertaken after the new emperor's 
accession. This is a line of argument however, that takes much 
for granted, above all the centrality and importance of the 
details of a remote frontier to the Imperial court and the 
Roman public; to argue thatthe Antonine Wall could not be 
abandoned before the death of Pius may be to exaggerate the 
importance which our present subject of study possessed for 
contemporaries outside the immediate region. It is also an 
argument which returns to the presupposition that the advance 
of the Antonine frontier in Scotland was primarily politically 
motivated, a notion challenged in Chapter 6. 
Besides best-fitting the mid-Antonine date for the withdrawal 
implied by Hartley's study of the samian with the model of two 
Antonine-occupations of Scotland, the 163 date was also based 
upon the literary evidence of the pressures mounting on the 
continental frontiers at the beginning of Marcus' reign. 
However, as CM Daniels has recently (1991) shown, these 
pressures did not perhaps become decisively acute until the 
late 160s; while there may have been serious unrest in Germany 
- and there almost certainly was re-organisation of the Upper 
German and Raetian frontier - before 158 (Speidel 1987, 
236-37). It is well before 163 that we have our only direct 
evidence of troops travelling from Britain to the Germanies, or 
vice versa, under Julius Verus (RIB 1322). Thus the 163 date 
has no special claim as a, time of military crisis on the 
continent, although as ever it is always-possible that it forms 
the context for the withdrawal. For Britain, we learn from SHA 
that war was threatening early in Marcus' reign and that as a 
result Calpurnius Agricola was sent against the Britons. The 
source is silent on the subject of frontier building; it in no 
way states that Calpurnius abandoned one frontier or 
constructed another. If anything, the implication that a 
formidable general undertook effective measures might seem 
difficult to square with his abandoning Antonine Scotland upon 
arrival in the province. On the other hand, it is easy to 
envisage unrest on the frontier occurring in the aftermath of, 
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the abandonment of the Antonine Wall, precipitating Calpurnius 
Agricola's dispatch to the Province. 
Finally, it may be noted that the Calpurnius Agricola 
inscriptions have a remarkable distribution; five (RIB 1703; 
1809; 1792; 1137; 1149) out of seven occur at sites on the 
Stanegate: Vindolanda, Carvoran and Corbridge; there is none 
from the forts on Hadrian's Wall. This, of course, is of 
ambiguous significance; it has been variously-taken to mean the 
reconstitution of the Hadrianic frontier (Gillam 1953; Hartley 
1972), or that a forward policy was still being pursued and 
Hadrian's Wall itself was unoccupied (Daniels 1991). 
c168-9 or later 
The weight of Daniels' recent (1991) argument for a later date 
for the abandonment rests primarily upon the circumstantial 
point that the military crisis assailing the continental 
frontiers did not become sufficiently acute to necessitate 
draining Britain of troops until after c166. The argument for 
a date later than c163 is an attractive one, if the withdrawal 
must lie within the reign of Marcus; however, it takes little 
account of the possibility that the Antonine Wall-as a formal 
linear frontier had been abandoned as early as c158. Daniels 
cites the numismatic evidence for occupation after 163, but as 
argued above, coins of the 160s at two sites could have 
resulted from the retention of some forts in the north while 
the new frontier was being completed. I 
Otherwise much weight is placed upon the inscriptions of 
Calpurnius Agricola-from Corbridge: 'Building activity at 
Corbridge during the second century and opening decade of the 
third seems to have gone hand in hand with a forward policy in 
Scotland rather than retrenchment on Hadrian's Wall' (Daniels 
19910,49). Furthermore the Mithraic dedication of one of these 
inscriptions is used (1991,50) to suggest that it was not cut 
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before 166, the worship of Mithras having been acquired by a 
vexillation returned from Lucius Verus' Parthian War which 
ended in that-year. The problem with this argument is that it 
is known that a kind of forward policy was continued north of 
Hadrian's Wall after the abandonment of the Antonine Wall; the 
forward policy-in Scotland, running on well after c163, to 
which these inscriptions may well refer, could simply be that 
connected with the holding of forts all the way up to Newstead 
or beyond; as the Severan activity at Corbridge shows, building 
work at this site need not necessarily be linked with permanent 
occupation in central Scotland on the scale of the early - 
Antonine period, or be incompatible with activity on Hadrian's 
Wall. 
5.5.5 An earlier date for the abandonment of the Antonine 
Wall? 
The Antonine Wall could have been abandoned at any-of the dates 
suggested above; there is insufficient evidence to prove or 
disprove any of these suggestions. However, each of the later 
possibilities has the difficulty that it fails to explain fully 
and convincingly the suggestion of reconstruction on Hadrian's 
Wall in c158; or rather these suggestions, like the split 
chronology solution, tacitly explain the 158 evidence by 
assuming two structural periods of activity on the Antonine 
Wall. We have seen that the evidence for this long-held 
assumption is unsatisfactory. 
In the light of the above scrutiny of the structural evidence 
from Antonine Scotland, an alternative hypothesis is offered 
here. It can no more be proved than any of the others, but it 
may-be felt that it at least takes account of the various, 
apparently contradictory, pieces of archaeological evidence. 
The brief and single period nature of several of the excavated 
Antonine sites in Scotland, including many on the Antonine 
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Wall, suggests the possibility that they were given up after a 
brief holding, perhaps as early as c158. About this time, 
restoration of the Hadrian's Wall system began, explaining RIB 
1389 and the building-inscriptions of Pius from Chesters. 
Birrens wasýthus rebuilt for a new garrison in 158 as an 
outpost fort of Hadrian's Wall; the same would explain the 
rebuilding of Newstead. 
Although it is often - and probably sensibly - held that the 
two Walls would not have been held simultaneously, it is quite 
possible to think of a, number of the Antonine Wall forts being 
held for a further six or seven years while building work on 
Hadrian's Wall was being undertaken; it is perhaps implausible 
that all troops would be, withdrawn from the Antonine Wall in an 
instant once the decision had been made to re-commission the 
southern Wall. This-would explain the coin of 160 reported 
from Cadder, (Clarke 1933,82) and perhaps the coin of 164 or 
later from Old Kilpatrick. But the basic proposition is that 
the two periods of Antonine Scotland, where they exist, 
represent a, withdrawal to the Tyne-Solway line that began in 
c158 and which was never reversed. 
This line of argument has been anticipated: 
'It might be argued that the reoccupation of the [Hadrian's] 
Wall was begun in 158 and continued as a gradual process. 
This... represents a return to the doctrine of simultaneous 
occupation of the two Walls which is both a priori unlikely and 
totally at variance with the analysis of the samian ware' 
(Hanson and Maxwell 1983,148). 
While accepting that the samian analysis precludes any 
prolonged or intensive occupation of Antonine Scotland after 
the return to Hadrian's Wall (as suggested in Frere 1967) it 
ought to be obvious that if the samian can accommodate the idea 
of a full return to Scotland in the years 158-163, then it can 
also accommodate some residual occupation of the Antonine Wall 
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during a handover period-in the years c158-165. Indeed, as 
Hanson and Maxwell earlier state: 
'A comparison of the samian pottery from the two Walls shows 
only a5 per cent overlap in the distribution of potters' 
die-stamps... In other words, the occupation of the two Walls 
overlapped sufficiently for the repair of one prior to the 
occupation of the other, but no longer' (1983,140). 
5.5.6 Outposts north of Newstead after the abandonment of the 
Antonine Wall? 
Apart from the coins already discussed, two further pieces of 
evidence may be taken to indicate late activity on the Antonine 
Wall. The first is the occurrence of round rimmed BB2 bowls at 
Mumrills (Macdonald and Curle 1929,536-9). These are 
typologically later than the triangular rimmed BB2 bowls 
ubiquitous on the Antonine Wall. But the round rimmed bowls 
have been recorded at no other site on the Wall. 
The second is the altar from Castlecary (RIB 2148) suggested by 
Mann (1963) to date to the period 175-90; further-epigraphic 
evidence has been used, less convincingly, to the same effect 
(Frere 1987,152-53, n. 34, Mann 1988,134-35). This raises the 
possibility that Castlecary continued in use during the 160s 
and 170s as an outpost: this may have been a repeat of the role 
the fort may have served as part of the Flavian disposition of 
forts surrounding and looking into Lowland Scotland. 
The survival of Castlecary into the 170s seems compatible with 
the ceramic evidence as analysed by Hartley. Hartley stressed 
the very low incidence of stamps in Scotland in common with the 
Wroxeter Gutter deposit (dated by him to 160-200, and probably 
165-75) and the absence of stamps in common with the Pudding 
Pan Rock wreck (dated by him to 160-200 and probably 175-95). 
Needless to say, these events in southern Britain could have 
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occurred later in their possible date ranges than earlier; and 
even on the dates that Hartley suggests, a continuing activity 
on certain sites into the 170s would be-permitted. One of his 
Wroxter Gutter stamps is marked (1972,28) as appearing at 
Castlecary; Hartley also notes that Castlecary produces the 
only example of late-Antonine 79/80 in Scotland outside 
Newstead. 
Thus it appears that Hartley's observations are compatible with 
the suggestion that after a final abandonment of the Antonine 
Wall as a linear system starting about 158, an outpost fort or 
forts, north of Newstead continued to be held-during the 160s , 
and beyond. The evidence from Castlecary and Mumrills may mean 
no more than this and does not necessarily indicate that the 
whole Antonine Wall system was still in use in the 170s. 
There are other possibilities for outposts north of Newstead at 
this time; it was noted above that the structural evidence from 
Cramond does not clearly demonstrate an interval between 
Antonine and Severan occupations. 
5.5.7 The return to Hadrian's Wall and its aftermath (Fig 21) 
Since Hartley wrote, a deal of archaeological evidence of a 
mid-Antonine reconstruction and overhaul on Hadrian's Wall and 
its associated road systems has accumulated. Excavation in 
1991 (pers. comm. P. Bidwell) on the second stone road bridge 
where Hadrian's Wall crosses the North Tyne at Chesters has 
produced coarse pottery in a construction level which shows 
that this bridge, and therefore the accompanying road system, 
probably dates to the mid-Antonine period (correcting the 
Severan date proposed in Bidwell and Holbrook 1989). At 
another bridge site on the Wall, Newcastle, the coarse pottery 
shows that the fort was established in the mid-Antonine period 
(report by Tyne and Wear Museums in progress). 
Chester-le-Street, on the road that runs up from the south to 
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connect with Newcastle, seems to have not been built before the 
Antonine period, as BB2 in the rampart of the first timber 
phase shows (Frere 1991,238). At South Shields and Ebchester, 
rebuilding in stone took place in the mid-Antonine period 
(Maxfield and Reed 1975; Daniels 1989,83). By the nature of 
the archaeological evidence, this activity on Hadrian's Wall 
and its hinterland cannot be very closely dated, but it should 
combine with the evidence of-the samian and the structural 
evidence from the Antonine Wall to indicate that after the 
mid-Antonine period there was not a further abandonment of the 
southern wall and second re-occupation of Scotland. Once 
commenced, probably c158, the process of reconstruction on the 
southern Wall and its hinterland was never reversed. 
There is more evidence to suggest that the mid-Antonine 
re-occupation of Hadrian's Wall was connected with a continuing 
interest in Scotland, although the Antonine Wall was no longer 
held. The architectural techniques employed in Bridge 2 at 
Chesters have been observed to be closely similar to those used 
in the bridge at Corbridge, leading to the suggestion that the 
same architect may have been responsible (Bidwell and Holbrook 
1989,105). A further stone bridge, which while not employing 
identical architectural techniques, does resemble bridge 2 at 
Chesters in its possession of decorative columns, carried Dere 
Street across the Rede at Risingham. There is no way of 
proving at present that this bridge was part of the same 
building programme, but the possibility is there; a possible 
context for the work on these stone road bridges would be the 
governorship of Calpurnius Agricola, whose inscriptions, it- 
will be recalled, concentrate uponýStanegate sites, including 
Corbridge. Intriguingly there is a building inscription from 
Risingham (RIB 1227) almost certainly dated to 161-9. Bidwell 
and Holbrook made the suggestion that the building of Bridge 2 
at Chesters was associated with a transfer of the line of the 
Stanegate road so that it crossed the river by this fort rather 
than at an unguarded crossing further to the south (1989,1 
137-38); it is possible that the provision of the Military Way 
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on Hadrian's Wall, and associated alterations and repairs on 
the Stanegate went hand in hand with bridge building and 
maintenance-on the road north into Scotland. This was not 
because Scotland was-being re-occupied, but because 
communications with the remaining and increasingly isolated 
outposts there would require strengthening. 
Thus one solution which takes fair account of the evidence sees 
the reoccupation of Hadrian's Wall beginning in c158, under 
Julius Verus. This will have marked the end of the Antonine 
Wall as a formally operating linear system. The process of 
transferring garrisons south from the Antonine Wall may have 
continued into the term of Calpurnius Agricola, who was also 
responsible for continued building work on the new frontier, 
notably on the road system; communications with Scotland 
remained important. Here, Birrens, Newstead, Cappuck and 
perhaps Castlecary-'and Mumrills continued to be garrisoned; the 
latter outflung sites were perhaps the subject of some I 
agreement with local peoples. This drastically reduced hold on 
Scotland is the only meaning which the term 'Antonine III can 
have. Even Mumrills and Castlecary, if they survived at all, 
may have been given up by the 170s (Mann gives 175 as the 
earliest date for RIB 2148). 
For all this it is possible that evidence will one day accrue 
to point to the generality of sites in central Scotland being 
held into the 160s, perhaps down to the 168-9 date suggested by 
Daniels, with Castlecary and Mumrills held after that. Should 
this be the case, there will be no alternative but to accept 
that there was some building activity somewhere on Hadrian's 
Wall, as well a rebuilding of Birrens, while the Antonine Wall 
was still generally held. However, 'this would not invalidate 
the point established here: that, at whatever date between 158 
and 169 Antonine Scotland was abandoned, its occupation had 
been a single episode. There is no good evidence for a return 
to Hadrian's Wall followed by a re-occupation of the Antonine 
Wall. 
299 
5.6 The Frontier after the abandonment of Scotland 
Inevitably one is tempted to ask whether the abandonment of 
Castlecary (if we are right in thinking that it outlived the 
other northernýsites) was associated with the turbulent events 
of the early 180s, when we hear from Cassius Dio that the wall 
which separated the barbarians from the Roman forts was 
crossed, and a Roman general killed'with his army. There is no 
good reason, despite many protestations to the contrary, why 
this passage should not refer to the Antonine Wall, which, 
although no longer functioning, would have been a formidable 
physical-landmark and barrier. At this time, it would 
certainly have formed a cordon beyond which there were no Roman 
garrisons, exactly the description given in the source. 
Although Ulpius Marcellus is said to have inflicted terrible 
punishment on the invaders, the evidence considered'above does 
not support the notion that Scotland was re-occupied in force 
at this time. Indeed, the Romans may have resorted to buying 
peace, a policy'that was apparently still in place a decade and 
a half later when Virius Lupus, Severus' first governor, 
arrived in Britain. How long, if at all, after the events of 
the 180s Birrens and Newstead continued to be held cannot be 
ascertained from the evidence available. 
By the early third century, of course, the famous series of 
auxiliary regiments that were to man the Hadrian's Wall forts 
throughout the closing two centuries of Roman Britain were in 
place. As Horsley first perceived, these units are in almost 
every case tied to their individual Wall forts by both third 
century epigraphic evidence and the testimony of the 
late-fourth century Notitia Dignitatum. Along with the 
epigraphically attested cohortes milliarlae equitatae of the' 
outpost forts, these units formed the permanent garrison of the 
outward looking third century frontier. Although in the past 
the reform that brought this system about has often been dated 
to the aftermath of the Severan war in Scotland (Steer 1958), 
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others (Breeze and Dobson 1987,143-44), have pointed out that 
there is evidence for a number of the third century garrisons 
(at Benwell, Chesters, Birdoswald and Risingham) being in place 
by 205-7, before the Severan campaigns, and raised the 
possibility that much of the third century arrangement of 
Hadrian's Wall (including the permanent garrisons of Wall and 
outposts) originated as early as the 180s. At Old Carlisle 
(RIB 893) this was certainly, and at Chesters (RIB 1463-4) 
almost certainly, the case. Breeze and Dobson also-suggest 
that many of the changes that had taken place by the third 
century in the smaller installations of Hadrian's Wall 
(discussed below) may date from this time. An argument is also 
made for the existence of exploratores (such irregular units 
being well attested in the outpost forts of the third century) 
in an outpost fort - Netherby - as early as the mid-Antonine 
period (Breeze and Dobson 1987,144). This is because Birrens, 
which appears in the same Iter of the Antonine Itinerary as 
Castra exploratum (Netherby),, Iwas apparently abandoned by 
about 1841. The last argument is problematic,, because on the 
available evidence Birrens could have been held later than 
c184; the general point, however, that much of the third 
century character of Hadrian's Wall and its outpost system 
predated the Severan campaigns, remains forceful and 
convincing. Nor should this be surprising, given the military 
and diplomatic interest running north of Hadrian's Wall which 
we have argued to be characteristic of the Wall's mid-Antonine 
restoration. Breeze and Dobson are therefore right to remark 
, (1987,144) that: I ... the campaigns of Severus mark a complete 
break with his governors' policy of overhauling the system 
based on Hadrian's Wall ... After the campaigns of Severus 
Caracalla simply reverted to this system'. 
Into this picture of continuous development interrupted by the 
Severan campaigns, we have to fit the abandonment of inland 
outposts such as Birrens and Newstead, and the establishment of 
a new class of outpost fort. Although it is generally supposed 
(Robertson 1975,284-6; Bruce 1978,319) on the evidence of 
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samian pottery and an absence of Severan coinage, that-Birrens 
and Newstead were given up some time in the 180s, there is 
nothing to show that they were not held until the end of the 
second century, or even slightly beyond. If Castlecary really 
was-lost in the breach of a Wall in the 180s, it is tempting to 
wonder whether a deteriorating military situation led to the 
abandonment of'Newstead and other outflung sites at some date 
in the 190s. This-would provide the context in which the 
hapless Virius Lupus, arriving in Britain in 197, had to buy 
off the Maeatae. 
Virius Lupus and a succeeding governor, Alfenus Senecio, as the 
epigraphic evidence shows, concentrated on overhauling the 
forts on Hadrian's Wall and at least some of its outpost 
system; this was all they could do in the absence of a major 
offensive against the northern tribes. That offensive did 
eventually come when the Imperial family itself found the 
opportunity to instigate a major campaign against the Maeatae 
and the Caledones, in 208-11. To the army on the ground, this 
may have come as a surprising about turn in policy, which would 
explain why apparently defensive consolidation of frontier 
sites was formed the prelude to an apparent war of conquest. 
In fact, the reality of the situation on the ground may, as 
much as the death of Severus at York, have decreed that the 
wars were followed, not by an occupation of vast new 
territories, but rather by a return to the policy of diplomatic 
and outpost control from Hadrian's Wall. In any case, the 
division of the province rapidly led to a downgrading of the 
frontier of Britannia Inferior. 'The reduction in number of 
legions and lowering in rank of the governor effectively closed 
the period of military activity by consular governors in the 
north. In six years at the most Car6calla turned the scene of 
an imperial campaign into a quiet backwater' (Dobson 1971,13). 
Forts such as Newstead, which would have been important 
elements in such a network of occupation, were not re-occupied 
after the Severan campaigns. Rather we see the emergence of a 
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new class of site. The legionary base at Carpow was probably 
built after the campaigns. The fort at Cramond, which, on the 
evidence presented above, may not actually have seen a long 
break, or any break, in occupation, since the Antonine period, 
seems to have been in occupation at this time. Inveresk was 
noted above as another possibility. These coastal sites may 
have formed part of a new system of remote observation and 
control of tracts of land in and around the Firth of Forth and 
the Fife peninsula. They may-have served to protect friendly 
peoples inhabiting coastal plains in the area, and have 
operated as an economical system of military and diplomatic 
control in the same-way as was suggested above (2.3 and 3.4.1) 
for Lowland Scotland in the late Flavian and early Trajanic 
period. The defeat of the Maeatae and Caledones would have 
paved the way for such a diplomatic relationship, where the 
Romans did not resort to wholesale occupation but merely 
maintained sites, supplied by sea, at key concentrations of 
allied population. 
For a time, then, this 'coastal province' may have served as an 
annexe to the usually understood permanent network of third 
century military control known to extend from Hadrian's Wall as 
far north as High Rochester and any associated, undiscovered 
sites. It was a new conception, made possible by the weakening 
of the hostile confederation of northern tribes by the Severan 
campaigns. The payment of subsidy may also have played an 
important part in maintaining these arrangements, as it had 
done in central Scotland since the abandonment of the Antonine 
Wall (Todd 1985). 
At present, there is insufficient evidence to say how long the 
arrangement (if it survived the Severan wars by long) may have 
lasted. As far as actual garrisons are concerned, there is no 
evidence of occupation at these sites going into the second , 
half of the third century. The northern barbarians must have 
gradually regained strength (as campaigns at the end of the 
third century show), and by the second decade of the fourth 
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century even High 
and Savage 1980; 
at about the same 
Rhine and Danube, 
control as far as 
abandoned. 
Rochester and Bewcastle were abandoned (Casey 
Austen 1991). In the mid-third century, then, 
time as the Romans-lost the frontier beyond 
so the long and consistent attempt to exert 
the Highland line in Scotland was finally 
5.7 Hadrian's Wall in its restored state (Fig 21) 
5.7.1 Fort garrisons and spacing 
All of the Hadrianic forts on the Wall were apparently 
re-commissioned. The garrison of very few of the forts at this 
time can be established; inscriptions of cohors 11 Nerviorum at 
Wallsend (RIB 1303) and Vindolanda (1683) could belong to this 
time, or earlier, or later in the second century; at least part 
(a prefect rather than a tribune commands this milliary unit) 
of cohors I Vanglonum would seem to have been the Marcan 
garrison of Benwell, perhaps with some-legionary detachments, 
on the basis of RIB 1327 and 1328; but by 177-180 the unit may 
have been superseded by an ala (RIB 1329). At Chesters, ala 11 
Asturum was in garrison by c180 (RIB 1463); cohors I Delmatarum 
(Wright 1957,229) may have preceded them. At Greatchesters a 
cohors ... Raetorum is attested in 166-69 (RIB 1737). At 
Carvoran, cohors I Hamlorum had certainly returned by the 
governorship of Calpurnius Agricola to regarrison the fort that 
they had built before the Antonine episode in Scotland (RIB 
1792). At some time in the second century upon or after its 
departure from the Antonine Wall, cohors I Baetasiorum was 
transferred to Maryport. 
At outposts of the southern wall, cohors IV Gallorum seems to 
have garrisoned Risingham under Marcus and Verus (RIB 1227), 
while cohors II Tungrorum had replaced cohors I Nervana 
Germanorum at Birrens in c158 (RIB 2110). There are hints in 
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all this that some of the complicated garrisoning of the 
Antonine Wall may have survived into the Marcan period on the 
more southerly frontier; the detachment of a milliary unit and 
legionaries at Benwell, and the brief tenures of some units in 
the Marcan period, are reminiscent of the arrangements on the 
northern Wall. 
As noted above, Benwell, Chesters and Old Carlisle were already 
accommodating their permanent third century units by the 180s; 
the extent to which this was a general phenomenon of the 180s 
is uncertain. Nevertheless, the impression is gained that 
after the fluid arrangements of the reigns of Pius and Marcus, 
from the 180s the northern frontier was settling into the 
pattern of garrisoning that is epigraphically so clearly 
attested in the third century. The main differences in that 
pattern from what had gone before were: the addition of the 
known fort at Newcastle, probably from the 160s (the date of 
origin of a further small fort, Drumburgh, is uncertain); the 
supplementing of auxiliary units at some sites with irregulars, 
numerl, exploratores and the like; and the now formidable 
garrisons of the outpost system, predominantly cohortes 
milliariae equitatae, the largest and, most versatile units of 
the Roman auxiliary army, usually supplemented by an irregular 
unit or units. The mid-Antonine restoration of the southern 
Wall also saw the foundation or rebuilding for new units of 
several hinterland sites (Chester-le-Street, South Shields); as 
much attention, may have been paid to the support forts of the 
Wall, and, their communication system, as to the far-reaching 
outposts. 
An attempt to rationalise these developments might suggest the 
following: 
l. - The mid-Antonine restoration of Hadrian's Wall, c158-clBO. 
Much work on the Wall, its hinterland, and communications 
system; some sites still held as far north as Antonine Wall, 
possibly in expectation of return to Scotland. This phase ends 
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with barbarian invasion and loss of any remaining Antonine Wall 
sites. 
2. The Commodan settlement, c184-c205. Despite Ulpius 
Marcellus' campaign against the northern barbarians, Newstead 
now abandoned; the northern confederation held at bay with 
subsidies'and diplomacy. Hadrian's Wall forts and outposts now 
rebuilt to take their permanent garrisons, therefore perhaps no 
longer expectation of return to Scotland. Military situation 
in north deteriorates. 
3. The Severan phase, 211-c250?. Wars of-208-11 do not 
substantially alter pattern of 2. Their aftermath allows 
temporary diplomatic and coastal control of parts of Scotland 
beyond the outposts. 
5.7.2 Minor installations and their spacing 
The milecastles in general survived into the third century, 
though often with reduced gateways (Breeze and Dobson 1987, 
132); several of the turrets did not (Allason-Jones 1988). 
However, at least some turrets were re-occupied in the 
mid-Antonine period, as their pottery and occasional physical 
links to the Military Way demonstrate (Bidwell and Holbrook 
1989,136). Their eventual disuse and walling up (perhaps so 
that a wall-walk could continue over their sites) may date from 
the 180s onwards. Reasons for this are discussed in the 
comparative section on watchtowers. 
5.7.3 Building Materials 
The return to the southern Wall presumably entailed much 
rebuilding on that frontier, all of it in stone. It is 
possible that at-least some of the reconstruction associated in 
the past and more recently with the activities of Septimius 
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Severus in fact dates to the mid-Antonine re-occupation of the 
Wall: for example, Bridge 2 at Chesters. Nevertheless, as this 
structure obviously implies a grand architectural conception 
for the restored Wall and its associated works, we can expect 
such elaborate reconstruction work to have extended to the 
curtain itself and to other structures at this time. The 
mid-Antonine return to Hadrian's Wall provides the most 
attractive context-for the rebuilding of, the remainder of 
Hadrian's Turf Wall in stone. This event cannot be closely 
dated, and later contexts have been suggested, including a 
Severan date (Hassall 1984). A mid-Antonine date would, 
however, fit the available evidence. At. Garthside (TW turret 
54a), the first Turf Wall turret had collapsed into the ditch 
and had been replaced by a second free-standing stone turret 
and a length of turf wall and ditch on new alignment, before 
the Stone Wall which replaced the Turf Wall was brought up to 
abut the turret; yet this arrangement lasted for some time 
before the turret went out of use and was overlain by a rebuild 
of the Stone Wall. The whole sequence took place before the 
third century on the pottery evidence (Welsby 1985). At TW 
Milecastle 79, only Hadrianic-Antonine pottery was present, 
while purely Antonine pottery was absent. Unless the 
milecastle was rebuilt in stone on the eve of the advance to 
the Antonine Wall, a date immediately upon the return from that 
Wall seems likely (Bruce 1978,253). 
5.7.4 Communications 
Something has already been said above about the possibility of 
a complete overhaul of the communications system of the 
northern frontier in the mid-Antonine period, including bridge 
building and strong links with the outposts and Scotland. This 
was a policy which perhaps did not long survive the second 
century, after which there seems (for a while) to have been a 
greater emphasis on maritime links than road links with 
Scotland. However, the Military Way supplied on Hadrian's Wall 
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in the Antonine period (Bruce 1978,39; Bidwell and Holbrook 
1989,136) was to be an enduring feature. Its value had no 
doubt been learned on the Antonine W1 11; it functioned, as on 
that barrier, as a lateral communication linking forts and 
milecastles (and with paths originally going off to some 
turrets). Just as the Antonine Wall Military Way shows 
evidence of bypass loops for travellers using it'as an arterial 
route and not wishing to call at every fort, so on Hadrian's 
Wall a traveller could pass down to the Stanegate, much of 
which continued in use, for a more direct east-west route. 
Naturally, this is most noticeable in the central sector, where 
any direct traveller would wish to avoid the heights, and the 
two roads are widely separated. - Here the Stanegate retained 
its garrison forts (Vindolanda, Carvoran). The original 
crossing of the North Tyne by the Stanegate is lost, but the 
branch road that would have carried the traveller up, to share 
with the Military Way the new bridge crossing the North Tyne at 
Chesters, is well known. East of here, as on the Antonine 
Wall, the military way would not have been a seriously 
inconvenient route for arterial travellers, and so only one 
road - the Military Way - is known to have existed after the 
Antonine period. West of the Irthing, it is possible that the 
Hadrianic Service road discussed above (5.1.6) may have 
continued in use as a route after the addition of the Military 
Way immediately behind the Wall. 
Chapter 6 
SECOND CENTURY LINEAR FRONTIER DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHWEST EUROPE: 
COMPARATIVE ASPECTS 
By the later part of the second century, there were no 'porous' 
areas of unhindered movement remaining on the British or 
European frontiers. In this chapter, the'developments 
described above in Chapters 4 and 5-will be compared in order 
to shed light upon the common characteristics and function of 
(as well as differences between) the artificial linear systems, 
and to show how it is possible to see individual systems being 
adapted to peculiar local conditions. The second century 
frontiers will be examined under four heads: first, the 
acceleration of a move towards a merging of the roles of mobile 
troops and frontier police. Secondly, the varying intensities 
of provision of installations in different areas. Thirdly, the 
function of the continuous barriers and associated 
installations themselves will be considered. In a final 
comparative section, frontier development over a long period of 
time in Britain and northwest Europe will be examined. 
6.1 The continued transformation of a mobile army of 
occupation into a frontier force arranged in linear fashion 
A shift in the Roman army's perception of the likely role of 
frontier forces may be glimpsed in the well-known decision, 
taken during the construction of Hadrian's Wall in Britain, to 
place a regular series of auxiliary garrisons on the barrier 
itself. Before this, the intention must have been either to 
man the milecastles and turrets with small detachments from 
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auxiliary units based some distance away, or to have based some 
special low-grade force in the milecastles. Such a distance 
between garrisons and frontier posts was, as we have seen, 
characteristic of the Taunus-Wetterau in the years clOO-110, 
when fortlets stood in isolation on the frontier, presumably 
manned from the rearward forts. Such a division would always 
endure on the Raetian frontier. Against this background, -the 
first scheme'for Hadrian's Wall is not as anomalous as it might 
seem. 
The early-second century, however, saw, in many places, the 
final abandonment of the division of roles between the 
garrisoning of a rearward area or road and the manning of a 
linear frontier. It is possible that the Odenwald frontier, 
probably late-Trajanic in date, sees the earliest conception of 
a unitarily planned linear frontier with all forces on the 
line. ý Here, however, where the frontier was driven anew 
through formerly trackless territory, putting the forts close 
to the line must have seemed the obvious thing to do. There 
was no pre-existing road or network of garrisons in this area. 
In the Taunus-Wetterau by the Hadrianic period only Friedburg 
remained as a fort in the hinterland of the frontier; on the 
line itself auxiliary units were established at Zugmantel, 
Saalburg and RUckingen, and numerl at other sites formerly 
occupied by fortlets. There may still have been a division of 
duties between the inhabitants of full auxiliary size, and 
numerus-size forts, but now almost, all of these units were 
based on or near the frontier line itself. 
The army did not move onto the frontier itself in all areas 
with equal speed. In part, this has to do with varying 
difficulties of communication between rearward garrisons and 
the established frontier line; in part, perhaps, with a greater 
military need to have troops concentrated on or near the 
frontier itself in certain areas than others. The comparative 
advance of Hadrian's Wall and the Raetian frontier from 
rearward road dispositions is highly instructive. - 
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For reasons of security, observation and convenience, Hadrian's 
Wall-was sited not on, but, to the north of the Stanegate, which 
remained in use as an arterial route, and where, presumably, 
much of the Wall's garrison was originally intended to lie. As 
we have seen, there have been expectations of a linear frontier 
system on the Stanegate, although it was argued above that 
there is no evidence for such a system; and it is interesting 
that when a linear system was applied, it was a quite different 
alignment, placed in relation to, but away from, the Stanegate 
road (cf Figs 17 and 18). As we saw in the detailed 
examination of the communications of the Wall (5.1.6 above), 
the Tyne-Solway frontier system had a basic problem. The 
Stanegate was already in existence, and was to remain an 
important, route. The north rim of the Tyne Valley, the Whin 
Sill and the north side of the Irthing all lay at varying 
distances to the north of the road, and were not always 
conveniently placed for contact with it. This must be part of 
the reason why the forts had to be moved onto the Wall itself. 
The deliberate siting of an artificial frontier away from the 
line --along the road - that it might otherwise have taken 
through inertia finds a close parallel on the Raetian frontier. 
Almost exactly the same relationship between a road and a 
linear frontier may be seen there. When, probably in the 
decade cllO-cl2O (or shortly after), the first system of towers 
came to be laid out, between Ellingen and Ruffenhofen, this was 
to the north of the penetration road that had been pushed out 
from the Danube and Kosching in the Flavian period, and which 
ran from east to west past the northern fringe of the 
Ndrdlinger Ries (Fig 10). Just as on the Stanegate, the forts 
along this road had guarded river crossings-(Weissenburg, 
Aufkirchen) and a road junction (Gnotzheim). When, clOO-110, 
the first sites were established to monitor movement into the 
gap through the Schwabian Alb and Frankische Jura described 
above (1.7.2; 3.5) - Ellingen, Theilenhofen and Gunzenhausen - 
it is significant that they were not placed on the pre-existing 
road. These forts marked the line that would later be taken by 
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watchtowers and palisade, and when Dambach was added to the 
frontier it was built north of the road, right up against the 
watchtower line. The advanced frontier sites did occupy a 
slight ridge of land,, although by no means as prominent a 
landmark as the Whin Sill used by Hadrian's Wall. 
This apparently deliberate situation, of frontier control 
installations to the north of the'pre-existing road line should 
indicate that at some date in Raetia, as in Britain under 
Hadrian, there was either arealisation or a policy decision 
that there would be no further advance on this sector of the' 
frontier. In other words, the structural similarities between 
the origins of the Raetian frontier and Hadrian's Wall (even 
though the time scale is different) show that rather than 
growing up through inertia or default, the frontier in Raetia 
was at some time deliberately situated to complement the 
pre-existing road. 
It is possible to suggest convincing roles for these rearward 
road forts which have no connection with an incipient linear 
frontier to the north, and to see how the arrival of that 
linear frontier rendered some, but not all, of the rearward 
sites redundant. Just as on the Stanegate, the Raetian road 
forts were primarily concerned with safeguarding routes and 
traffic. Weissenburg lay at the intersection of the Roman road 
and the north-south route taken by the Schwabische Rezat. 
Gnotzheim lay at an important intersection of north-south and 
east-west-routes. Unterschwaningen lay where the MUhlbach ran 
from the north towards the Rdmerstrasse; Ruffenhofen lay at the 
confluence of the Sulzbach and the Wbrnitz, the latter 
presumably bridged or forded by the Roman road in the vicinity. 
Just as on the Stanegate in Britain, a number of sites remained 
in use on the Raetian frontier road after the crystallisation 
of the frontier to the north: Weissenburg, Gnotzheim, and 
Ruffenhofen; ýthese may be compared to Corbridge, Vindolanda, 
Carvoran and Carlisle, all of which most probably (5.2.2 above) 
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remained as fort sites after the garrisoning of Hadrian's Wall; 
the central two remained the bases of auxiliary units until the 
end of the Roman period. On the Raetian road, there is even an 
example of civilian development following the military 
abandonment of a site. This is at Unterschwanigen (Baatz 1975, 
231). The civilian development of this site was perhaps aided 
by its situation on an important road; it brings to mind the 
possible civilian occupation of the Stanegate site of Nether 
Denton, whose military occupation is thought to have ended in 
the Hadrianic period, but which hasýproduced later material 
(Bruce 1978,210-11). The redundancy of the-very short-lived 
site at Unterschwaningen and its replacement by nearby Dambach 
on the frontier line also provides a possible parallel for the 
apparently brief use of a Stanegate site such as Brampton Old 
Church, -and its probable replacement by Castlesteads in the 
completed Hadrian's Wall scheme. 
If there is a general-rule, it would-seem to be that the 
division between orthodox military occupation and road security 
and linear frontier manning was best maintained where the 
threat of infiltration or attack was lowest. Thus in Raetia, 
where the lowest density of frontier garrisoning occurs, the 
auxiliary forts never really became an intimate part of the 
linear frontier, much of which was always garrisoned by 
detachments, probably from the remote auxiliary forts. On the 
Neckar, the forts lining the river never lost the aspect of 
stations safeguarding a vital route and a fertile area. On the 
outer frontier, by which time infiltration was perhaps a 
growing problem, the auxiliaries and numeri were based closely 
alongside each other: the former, while still formally 
separated, have drawn closer to the subject of linear frontier 
control. In the Wetterau the auxiliaries were intimately 
involved from the beginning in the supervision of the frontier 
as the absence of numerl and the existence of fortlets for 
detachments from the auxiliary units testify. In this context 
it is interesting that Britain provides the most extreme 
example of auxiliaries and their bases becoming integrated into 
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the function of the linear barrier: first on Hadrian's Wall and 
then in an even more complex way on the Antonine Wall. The 
suggestion sometimes made that a separate force, based in 
milecastles, existed for the patrol of Hadrian's Wall will be 
considered below (6.3.3). 
In Germany, forts were never physically incorporated into the 
continuous., frontier in the manner of Hadrian's Wall, ýprobably 
because the nature of the building materials did not facilitate 
such a relationship, and on the older stretches of frontier, 
such as the Wetterau, the fort sites pre-dated the frontier 
line, which would have to have taken an odd course to 
incorporate the forts. In the absence of a strong reason for 
doing so, these long established fort sites were not readily 
abandoned; the continuing distance between auxiliary forts and 
the running barrier, particularly in the Wetterau, indicates 
that in contrast to Britain it was felt for a considerable time 
that the, forts could be left where they were. Interestingly 
the mid-second century, provision of large fortlets (each 
related to an auxiliary fort) on the frontier line suggests 
that the need was increasingly felt for a garrison presence on 
the continuous barrier itself. In Raetia, where the 
Teufelsmauer might have, been suitable for attaching to fort 
walls, almost all of the forts were already established to the 
south of the watchtower line, -and even after the mid-Antonine 
period when the Wall was built, no need was felt-to integrate 
the two. 
6.2 Varying densities of provision of installations in the 
linear systems 
Discussion of the function of linear frontiers has tended to 
concentrate upon the suitability of watchtowers for observing 
infiltration and summoning help from larger installations, and 
upon the suitability or otherwise of the continuous barriers as 
fighting platforms or devices for repelling attack. Less 
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attention has been paid to the detailed variations in the 
density of provision and siting of forts, fortlets and 
watchtowers, yet much can be learned from the different 
patterns to be observed from sector to sector of the frontiers 
considered. 
In Britain there is a fairly constant provision and spacing of 
installations with which to compare the variously spaced and 
irregularly provided installations of the continental 
frontiers. Obviously, there are imponderables, such as the 
lack of knowledge of how many milecastles and turrets were 
simultaneously held. Furthermore, we must be clear about 
exactly which stage of development on the British frontiers is 
being used in any given comparison; changes such as the 
apparent abandonment of many turrets at the end of the second 
century must always be borne in mind. In what follows, unless 
stated otherwise; the Antonine Wall will be considered in its 
completed (secondary forts) form, and Hadrian's Wall in either 
its completed Hadrianic, post mid-Antonine restoration, or 
post-c180 form, as specified. For Upper Germany and Raetia the 
great problem remains the dating of the period of use of minor 
installations. - In what follows, for the sake of comparison, it 
has been assumed that undated stone watchtowers and fortlets 
were in use from the time of the completion of the outer 
frontier (mid-Antonine period) until some date in the third 
century. This accords with the more prolific dating evidence 
from the forts and is not contradicted by those minor sites 
that have been excavated. 
The survey of the installations in the individual Strecken of 
Upper Germany and Raetia (4.7) revealed that there is no 
evidence for regularity of spacing. Rather, it is possible in 
most cases to ascribe particular roles to fortlets, and to 
account for the siting of both fortlets and forts by their 
proximity to natural corridors of movement, natural features, 
and suspected or known native populations. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to suggest that several 'types' of frontier system may 
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be recognised, in the same way that 'remote' and 'populous' 
watchtower systems were distinguished in section 3.1.1. 
6.2.1 'Remote' frontiers 
The Taunus (Strecken 2-3) in Upper Germany was characterised in 
its'first century form (3.1.2) as a remote frontier, with 
widely spaced, small fortlets and a very small available 
garrison which, even when supplied on the frontier line itself, 
comprised low grade numeri. This pattern persisted in the 
second century. In Strecke 2 only two forts existed in the 
mid-second century, and both probably contained numerl, with 
Holzhausen perhaps only being promoted to cohort-size at the 
end of the century. Strecke 3 also saw a build up of larger 
garrisons over time, but even at the height of the system two 
out of four of the forts were of numerus-size. In Strecken 
2-3, the average spacing between installations of larger than 
watchtower-size was some 4.48km; however, this figure includes 
a series of closely spaced fortlets (Altes Jagdhaus, 
Heidenstock, LochmOhle) which probably originated in the 
mid-second century, and the average spacing would once have 
been considerably wider. 
Most comparable to the remote Taunus frontier are the 
successive lines which crossed the northern Odenwald. The 
origins of the earlier, inner line (Strecke 10, northern part) 
were examined in section 4.7, and the similarities to the 
Taunus sector noted (Use of numerl; fortlets few and small). 
The most remarkable feature of the original northern Odenwald 
layout is the series of similar and relatively very closely 
spaced (5-6km) numerus-forts. The fact that smaller units were 
spread along this sector does not alone explain the close 
spacing of the forts, for nothing like it is seen in the 
Taunus, where numerl probably also predominated in the earlier 
arrangements. In fact, the arrangement of the Odenwald numerus 
forts has an air of regularity about it which is reminiscent of 
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the constant spacings between installations used on the British 
frontiers. Apparent confirmation for this can be gained by 
comparing the northern part of the outer frontier (Strecke 7) 
which replaced the old northern Odenwald line in the mid-second 
century. Here, conditions were similar; the same kind of 
impenetrable plateau, without large population or obvious 
corridors to fertile tracts, as had been secured by the old 
northern Odenwald line; indeed in this sector the new line was 
never more than 20km east of the old. But on the new frontier 
the old series of regularly arranged numerus forts was not 
repeated. In part, this must have been because the Main now 
served as the frontier for the northernmost part of the outer 
line; even so, in the long stretch between Miltenberg and 
Osterburken there was only one numerus fort, WalldOrn. Also of 
note is the special type of fortlet employed in Strecke 7 and 
the northern part of Strecke 8; the four known examples are 
large fortlets, at 0.20ha each. However, unlike the large 
fortlets of 0.40ha noted in Strecke 4, none of these occurs in 
close association with an auxiliary fort. Indeed, rather than 
supplementing a series of large auxiliary forts, these sites 
seem to compensate for a generally wide spacing of garrisons 
along the length of Strecke 7 and the northern part of Strecke 
8. Two of the three forts are numerus-sized, but their spacing 
is noticably wider than on the superseded northern Odenwald 
frontier where the numerus forts are very closely spaced; it is 
almost as if the section-presently under consideration was laid 
out in the light of certain lessons that had been learned from 
the northern Odenwald. In particular, -it may have been 
realised that in such an intractable landscape such a density 
of even low-status troop provision was not necessary, and that 
the task of surveillance could be effectively carried out by 
fewer such units, spread economically by the use of large 
detachments in widely spaced fortlets between the forts that 
were normally themselves only of numerus-size. This suggests 
that the original regular provision of numerl and their forts 
in the Odenwald may have represented an example of ideal 
frontier planning, as in the regularity seen on Hadrian's Wall. 
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That the 'ideal' regular spacing provided in the Odenwald was 
more than was necessary is implied by the more flexible 
situation seen on the successor line. That the density of 
installations, if not the regularity, of Hadrian's Wall was a 
practical necessity and not a mere example of cosmetic frontier 
arrangement is implied by, its repetition when in Britain the 
frontier was moved forward to the Antonine Wall. Here again 
the units were disposed more flexibly on the advanced frontier, 
but rather than there being a reduction in their overall 
proportional density, there, was a marked increase. If the 
northern Odenwald does represent an ideal arrangement of 
garrisons along a linear frontier, its date will be of 
interest: it was argued above (1.4.2 and 1.5.2) that it will 
have originated in the decade 100-110. Combined with the ideal 
scheme for'Hadrian's Wall originating in the 120s, this 
suggests that the early second century contained the apogee of 
idealised regular linear frontier planning. 
6.2.2 'Populous' frontiers 
In the second century the Wetterau still betrays its different 
nature, more fertile and accessible than the remote Taunus, by 
virtue of the different arrangement of its frontier 
installations. It has been suggested (3.1.2) that an early 
disposition of large, free-standing auxiliary forts pre-dated 
the installation of a patrolled, frontier line; the initial 
concern was evidently with the military occupation and defence 
of a populated area rather than with police-work against 
clandestine infiltration. The same division of roles was 
apparent in the Wetterau long after a patrolled 
anti-infiltration line was formed there. The predominance of 
auxiliary forts, in contrast to the widespread use of numerl on 
the Taunus and in the Odenwald, points to the possibility of a 
more conventional military role for the troops here. This 
sector also contains a remarkable series of (by the mid-second 
century) large fortlets - Degerfeld, Staden, Haselhecke -each 
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found in association with an auxiliary fort, and perhaps 
representing the bases of detachments on long-term frontier 
police duty. Here is an interesting contrast with Hadrian's 
Wall, where no large fortlets intervene between the auxiliary 
forts and milecastles; perhaps these fortlets came to 
compensate for the distance of the auxiliary forts from the 
frontier line as pressures on the frontier grew in the second 
century. 
Military activity on the Wetterau frontier in the mid-second 
century was evidently complex and intensive. 'In section 4.7 
the many possible routes crossing into the Wetterau were noted, 
and the point established that at least the earlier fortlets, 
and the auxiliary forts and their accompanying large fortlets, 
were probably situated in relation to these routes. The 
average spacing of installations larger than towers (including 
forts) is less than 3km, a clear contrast to the wider average 
spacing of the Taunus installations. , 
These conclusions raise a problem of interpretation. Whereas 
there can be little doubt that the general role of the military 
was directed to the security of the province, it could be 
argued that the relationship we have established between 
military installations, particularly fortlets, and 
cross-frontier routes is a result not of a wish to prevent 
incursion via these routes, but rather part of an active 
facilitation of civilian movement in and out of the province: 
in the same way, the milecastles on Hadrian's Wall have 
sometimes been seen as primarily customs posts. Does the 
'populous' frontier type indicate not the level of external 
threat, but rather the degree of peaceful movement? Or is 
there an element of both? It will be argued below (6.3.3) that 
the comparative plans and locations of fortlets suggest a 
purely military rather than a quasi-customs function. 
Furthermore, the key to establishing the presence of sanctioned 
civilian crossing points is surely the presence of suitable 
gateways in the continuous barriers rather than merely the 
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existence of fortlets themselves. The fact that fortlets in 
Upper Germany are apparently placed in relation to corridors 
approaching the frontier, yet at these points there are not 
always, as far as can be ascertained, breaks in the 
Pfahlgraben, ought to imply that the fortlets were sited with 
unwelcome approaches to the frontier in mind. 'It could be 
argued thatýprimary causeways might have been removed late in 
the frontier's life; on the other hand, the late appearance in 
some sectors of extra fortlets unrelated to topographic 
features, as, the frontier faced an increasing problem of 
incursion, illustrates that their prime concern was with 
hostile, not benign, movement. 
The southern part of the original Odenwald frontier seems to 
provide an intermediate stage between the extremes of remote 
and populous frontier defined by Taunus and Wetterau. Here, 
where the plateau, not as afforested in antiquity as the 
northern Odenwald (Baatz 1975,168) was more passable than the 
valley ridden north, and allowed access to the Neckar area, 
full-sized cohort forts were provided; but their very wide 
spacing, and the limited number of, fortlets, each at a point 
where movement across the frontier might be anticipated, 
suggests that infiltration from across the area by means of 
predictable routes posed the greatest problem, whereas in the 
Wetterau the protection of a population against inroads from 
many possible directions necessitated a more evenly spread 
coverage. 'The presence-at Neckarburken, alongside the cohort 
fort, of a fort for the numerus BrIttonum Elantlenslum, 
suggests the manning of the towers along large tracts of the 
southern Odenwald frontier by low grade troops, and that 
therefore the infiltration problems were, away from the obvious 
routes, those of a 'remote' frontier rather than the Wetterau 
type. 
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6.2.3 'Friendly frontiers' 
If we are right in deducing that proportionally closer spacing 
and larger garrison of the Wetterau sectors indicates an 
infiltration problem that was correspondingly greater than in 
the Taunus or Odenwald, then there must be an even more 
striking implication for the Raetian land frontier. The 
density of units and spacing of installations along the Raetian 
frontier was, compared to Upper Germany, very low. The average 
spacing between installations of greater than watchtower-size 
approaches lOkm in Strecke 12, double that in the Taunus and 
over three times the average spacing of the Wetterau. There is 
very little use of fortlets. Strecke 13 contains not a single 
known fortlet: the average spacing here was over 12km. In both 
of these Strecken it was argued in section 4.7 that the forts, 
which almost always lay well to the rear of the watchtower 
line, were predominantly concerned with the protection of roads 
behind the frontier. 
The frontier line, itself a very late development in these 
parts, seems incidental, an afterthought that functioned 
independently from most of the forts. The large, widely spaced 
'Blockhaus' type towers were all that small detachments 
required for a safe supervision of the frontier. This is 
rather a similar conclusion to that reached above (3.5) to 
explain the wide tower spacing and lack of full-sized auxiliary 
units in the old northern Odenwald; in the Raetian example it 
was not even felt necessary to concentrate whole units of even 
lower grade troops. Very small detachments from the distant, 
rearward cohort forts could safely suffice. In Strecke 14 it 
was observed that there is a notably denser provision of 
installations; this is the only sector of the Raetian frontier 
where small forts perhaps held by auxiliary detachments 
rather than numerl appear in some numbers, closer to the 
actual frontier line than the rearward auxiliary sites. Now 
also there are fortlets. The spacing is, as ever, highly 
irregular, as the installations are sited according to local 
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needs. As might be expected, a topographic reason for the 
change in density is apparent; an opening in the high plateau 
traversed by the frontier invites entry from the north into the 
fertile area around Weissenburg and the NOrdlinger Ries. Here 
there was apparently more movement to be observed, but it is 
notable that the, average spacing of installations of above 
watchtower-size, at about 5km, is close to that observed in 
what was characterised as a 'remote' frontier such as the 
Taunus, adapted to small scale infiltration. 
Strecke 15 represents a reversion to the lightest type of 
linear frontier holding; again the auxiliary forts were 
detached far behind the observation line and as intimately 
connected with the road system as with linear frontier control. 
The average spacing of installations larger than watchtowers, 
even including the postulated fort site in the Schambach 
valley, was very wide, at over 8km. Even then the fortlets may 
be late additions to the system. 
So the conclusion reached above (3.5) - that the Roman army did 
not encounter resistance in northern Raetia as formidable as 
that which it encountered in other frontier areas - is borne 
out by the appearance of the completed frontier system of the 
mid-second century in Strecken 12-15. Recent studies by German 
scholars suggest that there might have been little or no 
indigenous population in parts of Raetia (Sommer 1990,129; 
HUssen 1990); this has long been considered to be the case for 
much of the area immediately north of the frontier. The 
Raetian frontier remained 'open' long after any otherý and it 
was evidently crossed by several important trade routes; the 
traffic of the Hermunduri attested by Tacitus (Germania 41) is 
but the most famous evidence for this. The form of the 
completed frontier of Strecken 12-15 shows that the earlier 
characteristics of this sector endured until at least the 
mid-second century, and call for the designation of a third 
general frontier type, that of a 'friendly' frontier, where 
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neither formidable resistance-to the Roman military nor serious 
attacks from outside were commonplace. 
Intimately linked to this 'friendly' frontier was the 'open' 
system of forts which existed on the Neckar before the 
mid-second century advance to the outer frontier. The river, 
as argued above (1.4.3; 1,., 5.3), was a garrisoned thoroughfare 
rather than a controlled border. The evidently populous area - 
later to surround a self-governing civitas right on the outer 
frontier line - blended into the open and porous 'friendly' 
frontier land of western Raetia. 
6.2.4 The frontier types and their British counterparts 
The greatest contrast of all is that to be observed between the 
regularity of the provision of installations on the British 
walls and the general lack of regularity to be seen in Upper 
Germany and Raetia. Despite minor variations and addtitions, 
it is clear that in general terms the fortlets of Hadrian's 
Wall were provided at one mile intervals, with pairs of 
watchtowers at regular intervals in between. The addition of 
the primary forts to the Wall also appears to have followed a 
scheme of fairly regular spacing. This regularity is the case 
despite the variations in the terrain - and presumed densities 
of native population - through which the Wall ran. In short, 
Hadrian's Wall was planned and executed with a neatness and 
rationality that ran beyond the merely functional. A 
regularity modelled upon Hadrian's Wall as built is now widely 
accepted for the Antonine Wall; here the change wrought by the 
addition of secondary forts to the original scheme was of a 
more striking order. 
The regularity of the British frontiers is partly to be 
explained by the circumstances in which they came into being. 
Rather than being a development of a frontier line arrived at 
at an early date, and allowed to develop over a long period, 
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each of the British Walls represented an abrupt policy change 
and was built on a line where no linear frontier had been 
conceived of before. With few or no pre-existing sites, a 
fresh blueprint could be imposed, and all of the new sites 
bound into a unitary scheme. This could simply not be the case 
in the Taunus-Wetterau, on the Main or Neckar, or on the oldest 
parts of the Raetian frontier. Significantly, it may have been 
the case when the first Odenwald frontier forts were built in 
virgin territory. This factor alone, however, cannot explain 
the exceptionally unitary nature of the British Walls. It 
fails to explain why certain parts of the Upper German and 
Raetian frontiers which were built at one go, in hitherto 
unoccupied territory - the outer frontier beyond Odenwald and 
Neckar, and the completed Raetian line - display no more 
regularity in the spacing of their installations than the 
others. The only hint of a move towards unity of design is 
glimpsed in the dead straight layout of over 8Okm of the Upper 
German outer frontier. 
A second part of the, explanation would seem to be that the 
'new' stretches on the Continental frontiers were strictly 
limited in scale, and formed parts of much wider systems. The 
new outer frontier of Upper Germany was in excess of 100km. in 
length, but it was clearly conceived as part of something 
larger; as a link between the new forward dispositions of 
Raetia and the old system of forts on the Main. The Raetian 
frontier, on the other hand, had been extended piecemeal. When 
the section from Ruffenhofen to Buch was laid out it deviated 
around pre-existing forts; the final, 'new' frontier, first 
from the Kocher (Aalen) to the Rems, with a final addition from 
the Rems to Lorch, was laid out in two separate stages, and 
rather than being conceived in isolation, was designed to unite 
other dispositions in Raetia and Upper Germany. In Britain, in 
complete contrast, each of the frontier Walls stood in utter 
isolation, forming a whole frontier across a narrow isthmus. 
They were not sited or laid out with reference to any 
pre-existing or neighbouring linear frontier system; evidently 
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these circumstances made them more desirable candidates for a 
unitary and regular design. This may also lie behind the 
initial conception of the Tyne-Solway frontier as a substantial 
Wall; J Crow has suggested (1986) that the nature of the 
Isthmus (and perhaps the level of the perceived threat) may 
have invited the use of a form influenced by defensive 
long-walls elsewhere in the ancient, world. 
Both of these explanations assume that the designers of Roman 
frontiers would, where possible, make use of neat and rational 
dispositions of installations for their own sake; for more than 
purely functional purposes. However, a third possible line of 
explanation would see the design of a rational, constantly 
regular system of openings and installations, as on the, British 
Walls, as necessitated by the circumstances of local 
infiltration. The installations on the German frontiers, while 
displaying none of the regularity of those in Britain, are not 
simply randomly situated: it can be shown in most cases that 
they are situated in relation to corridors of movement. At 
first sight, the British Walls, rather than merely making 
regular the spacing between installations of a similar 
proportional number to that seen on the Continent, are actually 
provided with, proportionally, a much greater number of 
installations than on even the most heavily garrisoned German 
Strecke. 
But there is a problem here. The regularity of fortlets on the 
British Walls disguises a lack of knowledge about how 
individual examples actually functioned. In particular, any 
unexcavated milecastle looks like a type of German fortlet, but 
from the tiny number excavated, it appears that not all of them 
functioned as fortlets. Some seem to have served merely as a 
defended enclosure for a-very small group of men manning the 
tower and gate of the milecastle. Without knowing the 
proportions of each, it is difficult to compare the density of 
troop provision in fortlets, on Hadrian's Wall with that on the 
continental frontiers. It would therefore be simplistic to see 
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Hadrian's Wall as a vastly more endangered frontier merely 
because of its high density of fortlets. 
On the other hand, the existence of fully garrisoned 
milecastles is known, -, and the close proximity of two - 47 and 
48 - suggests that there were areas and special points where 
such detachments might be concentrated. This sort of 
flexibility, which might be disguised by the regularity of the 
ideal Hadrianic design, is much more reminiscent of Upper 
Germany. Even without a knowlege'of the interiors of many 
milecastles, the concentration of fortlet-type milecastles 
formed by 47 and 4B, combined with the spacing of the auxiliary 
forts, suggests that the section of the continental frontiers 
which Hadrian's Wall would most resemble would be the 
endangered Wetterau, with its fairly frequent occurrence of 
fortlets at necessary points and closely similar provision of 
auxiliary forts. 
If the completed Wall of Hadrian truly represented, as some 
have suggested, an unsuitable, blindly followed blueprint, or 
overkill, it is curious that the same system, with eventually 
an even greater proportional density of garrisoning, was 
applied in Scotland. The provision of the secondary forts on 
the Antonine Wall may be seen as an extension of the postulated 
policy of 'flexibly' garrisoning different milecastles in 
different ways. Now, however, instead of garrisoning certain 
of the fortlets, it was found necessary to replace some of them 
altogether with additional forts to house larger detachments. 
The absence of an equivalent to the Vallum on the Antonine Wall 
may be related to the 'secondary fort' decision. If the Vallum 
on Hadrian's Wall was intended to direct movement from the 
south away from the gates through the wall (the milecastles) 
that were reserved for mundane military use, and to direct 
traffic to the few major gates and the forts, it is possible- 
that the blanket provision of forts on the Antonine Wall, and 
the consequent downgrading of the fortlets, rendered such a 
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device unnecessary. Whichever opening-was approached would 
have a nearby concentration of troops. 
It might be argued that the absence of the Vallum indicates a 
higher level of tolerated civilian movement across the Antonine 
Wall, which, placed arbitrarily on its isthmus, well south of 
the cultural division at the edge of the Highlands, may have 
bisected a native community. However, there are serious 
objections to the use of fortlets such as those on the Antonine 
Wall for civilian passage (below 6.3.3), while the greatest 
density of secondary detachments is placed, where such movement 
might be least expected - at the west end, in front of the 
Kilpatrick Hills, and on the ridge in the central sector. The 
east end, which looked into the territory embraced by the 
outpost forts, seems to have been more lightly held. 
It is suggested, then, that the density of troop provision 
suggests a more complex or more formidable threat of attack or 
infiltration than that faced on Hadrian's Wall, itself a 
well-garrisoned and formidable frontier when compared to the 
most endangered of 'populous' continental frontiers. It is 
also now difficult to argue that there was an overprovision of 
troops on the Antonine Wall for political reasons. The 
secondary forts were not part of the original scheme,, but were 
seemingly added in the light of local experience. It has been 
thought that the Antonine Wall was more lightly garrisoned in a 
second period of occupation: but this assumes the existence of 
a general 'Antonine III period-on the northern Wall, a notion 
questioned above (5.5.2). - It is probable that the Antonine 
Wall in its completed state had a single period of occupation, 
after which troop withdrawals made the system untenable, and 
perhaps only one or two outposts briefly survived. 
The extension of a system of milefortlets and towers to the 
Cumberland coast, besides being wholly exceptional in extending 
the principle of a continuous cordon of small installations, 
and even possibly a running barrier, into a non-land frontier 
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context (5.3 above) would at first sight represent an 
over reaction to the problems of infiltration from the sea, for 
much of the system did not outlast the second century. It 
reverted in the later Roman period to being a system of 
auxiliary forts most probably interspersed with minor 
installations as necessary, in other words just such a system 
that would be expected on any of the river frontiers of 
northwest Europe before the mid-second century. Nevertheless, 
the provision of the Cumberland coastal system may be seen , 
against the same background of nervousness, and high rating of 
the frontier threat in northern Britain that led to the 
proportionately dense provision of installations on Hadrian's 
Wall and the Antonine Wall. 
Nor is the provision of such installations along this 
particular non-land frontier as mystifying as it has sometimes 
(Maxfield 1990,12-13) seemed; unlike the great river 
frontiers, where there could be direct Roman observation of 
activity on the opposite bank, and where the location of the 
Roman frontier must be known to all comers, the Cumberland 
coast looked out upon the several land-masses of the much 
traversed Irish Sea Province (Bellhouse 1989,62; 69-70); there 
was a need for the surveillance of traffic - and no doubt 
attackers - from quite unpredictable directions, and a need 
clearly to identify the Cumberland coast, which those 
traversing the sea might claim to be one coast among many, as 
that belonging to the Roman province. But perhaps most 
importantly, if the evidence is taken at face value, we are 
left with the simple possibility that in Continental Europe 
second century peoples were prepared to respect river lines as 
Roman frontiers to an extent that the inhabitants of the Irish 
Sea Province, when faced with the Cumberland coast, were not. 
Nor, just because the regular system of towers and fortlets was 
out of use by the end of the second century, can we be sure 
that the Cumberland coast did not receive new installations 
(after the manner of the Continental river frontiers, or 
indeed, the Yorkshire coast) in the late Roman period. It is 
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only the fairly regular system that has allowed so much of the 
Hadrianic system to be discovered, and late Roman towers, may, 
as on the great river frontiers, have displayed much less 
regularity of, spacing. 
To summarise: ýon the Upper German and Raetian frontiers, 
different densities of frontier installation correspond to 
differing threats and corridors of access. The most heavily 
policed frontier sector of the whole range, that encircling the 
vulnerable Wetterau, compares most closely with the British 
Walls. If the principle of explaining the different frontier 
densities of the continent is extended to Britain, the 
conclusion must be that raids or infiltration were anticipated 
at least to the same degree in north Britain as on the most 
dangerous-part of the Upper German frontier, and that this was 
a situation that persisted, ie was not the result of an 
initially over-pessimistic assessment of the situation. This 
conclusion runs counter to much recent thought about Hadrian's 
Wall and its Scottish version (see, e. g., Mann 1990): but 
attempts to denigrate the role of the British Walls as barriers 
against formidable or perceived threats, and to promote aspects 
of eccentricity, psychological intimidationj and economic 
regulation to account for their design, have generally treated 
of the British Walls without a really detailed comparison with 
their close relatives in Upper Germany and Raetia. On those 
frontiers there is little hint of the aspects so often invoked 
to explain the appearance of the British Walls. Rather there 
seems to be a rational correlation between the provision of 
installations and level of threat to sectors of the frontier. 
There is no good reason why the British frontiers should not be 
analysed in the same way, and the obvious conclusions drawn: 
that formidable border problems required formidable barriers to 
be built. 
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6.3 The function of individual frontier installations 
It should-be clear from the surveys in Chapters 4 and 5 that 
whatever the variations in density of the provision of frontier 
installations,,, similar. types of installation tend to occur, 
with local variations, on all'or most sectors of northwestern 
linear frontiers. An attempt is here made to classify these 
types and to examine what can be learned of their functions 
from the comparison of their contexts in various frontier 
arrangements. They are examined under the headings of 
continuous barriers; gateways; fortlets; towers; forts; 
communications. I 
6.3.1 Continuous frontier barriers 
The continuous barriers were co-existent with the type of' 
watchtower frontier we have already discussed. These 
artificial systems only appear where natural obstacles such as 
rivers do not exist, and never appear along the banks of the 
great rivers. Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine Wall are 
exceptional among northwest European land-frontier barriers in 
not having evolved from a pre-existing watchtower system. The 
explanation for this is that the British Walls were each built, 
as a result of a new policy, where no linear frontier had stood 
before. It will be observed in Chapter 7 that outside 
northwest Europe and Dacia there are no true occurrences of 
continuous obstacles of this kind (the African fossatum is seen 
as possessing a different character), just as there are no 
watchtower cordon frontiers outside these regions. In this 
light it seems fair to suggest that the purpose ofýartificial 
barriers was probably closely related to that of watchtower 
systems. 
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Provincial Boundaries 
It was suggested above (3.2.1) that the earliest watchtower 
cordons cannot have been intended to denote political 
boundaries because they were often only partially provided 
along the front of an occupied area. The same objection would 
seem to apply to the continuous barriers. A palisade existed 
on the central part of the Raetian frontier before the frontier 
was closed by the abandonment of the Alb sites and the 
extension of a palisade west of the Kocher to Lorch in the 
decade c155-165. This should show that, in origin at least, 
the continuous barriers can no more have denoted political 
boundaries than the watchtower cordons which they so often 
supplemented. 
It must be admitted, -however, that through the second century 
there was a tendency for artificial barriers to be consolidated 
and extended so that the only parts of the frontier remaining 
without them were the major rivers. It might be argued that 
over a period of time the artificial linear frontiers came to 
be thought of as denoting the boundaries of the empire, and 
hence of its frontier provinces (see 3.7 above). It is 
important to note, however, that in whatever way the linear 
barriers came to be regarded, this was unlikely to have been 
their original purpose. 
One further notable aspect of the new continuous barriers of 
the early second century - and later - is the heterogeneous 
nature of their construction, in terms both of scale and 
materials. Most clearly seen in the contrast between the 
German palisade and the Raetian stone Wall, or between either 
of these and Hadrian's Wall, this variation from province to 
province might be taken to imply that, the barriers were 
intended for provincial boundaries. However, this is a 
phenomenon also observed within individual provinces, as in the 
original division of Hadrian's Wall into turf and stone 
sectors. Here the change in materials cannot have had a 
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political significance, but is more likely to have been the 
result of the division of the work amongst the army and a 
reflection of the local availability of building materials. 
6.3.1.2 Defensive lines 
The absence of a walkway atop the various palisade types and 
the Raetian Wall confirms that, if Hadrian's Wall in Britain 
had a role in any way analogous, it can never have been 
intended as a fighting platform, as is now generally believed 
since Collingwood's (1921) attack on the 'fighting platform' 
notion. Further confirmation of this may be seen in the 
frequently wide separation of the fighting auxiliaries from the 
linear systems. It has been observed that 'Surely the fact 
that the units were not brought up to the Wall in the first 
scheme [for Hadrian's Wall] is decisive against any notion of 
fighting from the wall top' (Dobson 1986,6). The same 
separation of the fighting units is seen very clearly in 
Raetia, where much of the linear frontier was always distant 
from rearward auxiliary forts. When examined in detail the 
unsuitability of the German-Raetian barriers as a means of 
withstanding concerted attack at a given point is apparent in 
several places. The list of places in Strecken 3 and 4 where 
the frontier line is dominated by higher ground immediately 
beyond shows that 'die Anlage nie der Verteidigung dienen 
solltel (Klee 1989,93). There are also the places listed in 
4.7 where the Pfahlgraben is inexplicably broken or 
interrupted, sometimes for several kilometres at a time. In 
these cases, the palisade was apparently everywhere supplied. 
It is notable that the occurrence of these breaks coincides 
with those frontier areas we have characterised as 'remote'. 
The rigorousness with which the running barriers were upgraded 
and maintained seems, therefore, to form part of the same 
pattern of differential density of installations according to 
the degree of threat to a frontier area. Further unevenness in 
their provision is'seen in the early provision of a 
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Plechtwerkzaun pre-dating the general palisade-in parts of the 
Wetterau; and in the early provision of palisades in limited 
sectors of the Raetian frontier while other parts had not even 
been closed with a frontier of linear type. This makes it 
difficult to see the continuous barriers themselves as, 
defensible lines; that is not to say that they could not aid in 
the military interception of formidable parties of raiders, 
although such attacks were, clearly more, frequent in some 
sectors than others and therefore count as a persistent 
security problem rather than one of strategic or tactical 
defence. 
The absence of walkways on top of the Continental barriers has 
also sometimes been cited in support of the possibility that 
Hadrian's Wall, did not possess a patrolled top. Hadrian's 
Wall, however, was so self-evidently exceptional as an 
architectural conception, and in other ways - note the building 
of the Vallum, a unique feature - that the evidence of the 
Continental frontiers cannot, be considered decisive on this 
point. The archaeological evidence which suggests the 
existence of a wall-walk on Hadrian's Wall was considered, in 
5.1.5 above. 
6.3.1.3 Regulators of movement 
Are we correct to think in terms of security primarily against 
raids? An alternative view would see the continuous barriers 
as a means of checking essentially peaceful movements of local 
peoples and their flocks and herds; after all, the barriers 
must often have cut arbitrarily through communities and their 
lands, as the pre-Roman agriculture now so commonly attested 
underneath Hadrian's Wall illustrates (Fowler 1983,153-5). 
Such movement, especially if likely to disturb settled peoples 
within the occupied zone, might be considered a grave nuisance 
by the Roman military. All of the running barriers would have 
been effective in preventing unauthorised movement of this 
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sort, although if it was simply a question of migrating 
populations and herdsmen looking for new pastures, one would 
imagine that the original watchtower systems would have 
sufficed to detect and intercept the large and slow-moving 
groups that would have been involved in such social and 
economic movement. Later, in Upper Germany and Raetia, not 
only do we see the addition of-the first simple fence-like 
barriers, but then they grow ever more formidable and 
elaborate, to an extent that is not wholly explained by the 
need to construct them in more permanent materials. 
It-is notable-that Caesar's wall built against the migration of 
the Helvetii was - if his account, is not hopelessly exaggerated 
- intended to obstruct a military invasion directed towards the 
conquest of Gaul, and not a simple drift of population. The 
purpose of the Helvetii was to submit the whole of Gaul to 
their power: totlus GaIllae Imperlo potirl (BG 1.2). Caesar's 
wall was 19 miles long and sixteen feet high, blocking the 
obvious migration route of the Helvetii between Lake Geneva and 
the Jura range, and had garrisons posted along it at intervals 
(BG 1.8). The Helvetii attempted to break through the barrier 
forcibly but the barrier held them up while troops concentrated 
to repel them with missiles. Just as was suggested above 
(3.2.4) for the watchtower systems, continuous barrier building 
grew out of a long tradition of building, familiar to the Roman 
army, which was derived essentially from city defences and 
linear siege-works. 
It might be argued that the increasingly elaborate barriers 
reflect an increase in the numbers of pastoral peoples wishing 
to move in and out of, or find space within, the occupied zone. 
Interestingly in this context it has been suggested, on the 
basis of pollen-diagrams, that the very presence of the Roman 
army in frontier zones in northwest Europe may have caused a 
breakdown in the normal pattern of agricultural production, 
leading to a greater competition for available food-producing 
land and precipitating a decline in cultivation in favour of 
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herding of pasture animals (Groenmann vanýWaateringe 1983). It 
is-suggested that these changes may have begun to occur earlier 
in the Roman period than hitherto thought. The steady 
elaboration of the barriers in Upper Germany and Raetia does 
indeed suggest (6.4.6 below) that whatever threat the frontiers 
were facing was a growing one. However, if a breakdown in the 
traditional agricultural strategies of local peoples did take 
place from the early second century onwards, its effects will 
have been felt in ways more dramatic than merely numbers. of 
animals being herded in the direction of the frontiers. The 
resulting destabilisation of traditional societies is just as 
likely to have led to an increase in the tendency to raiding 
and endemic warfare conducted by extra-tribal retinues and 
their warrior leaders (who despised agricultural practice) 
which is so vividly recorded by Tacitus, and which apparently 
became increasingly characteristic of these societies from the 
time of Caesar onward (Thompson 1965; Cunliffe 1988,174-77). 
So while changes in agricultural strategies amongst native 
peoples on the frontier-may well have occurred, these would 
seem less likely to have been the primary factor in the 
formation of the artificial barriers than a tendency, perhaps 
related to the agricultural change, towards increased 
infiltration, raiding and attack. Tribes could, if under 
pressure from other tribal movements, or if led by a powerful 
leader, just as Orgetorix had led the Helvetii in Caesar's 
time, resort to mass-migration; the move of the Marcomanni from 
the Main to Bohemia (as a, result of Roman pressure) under 
Maroboduous is a further example., Such tribal movements must 
have involved all levels of society, and show that there was no 
simple division between warrior initiatives and movements of 
non-combatant pastoralists. Nevertheless, as Caesar's account 
of the Helvetian invasion makes clear, violence would be 
uppermost in the attempts to force such mass-movements. It is 
perhaps only because of the existence of the linear frontiers 
that we do not hear of attempts of mass-migrations into Roman 
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space; that, and the question of what they would do to avoid 
expulsion by the Romans once they had penetrated the empire. 
The tendency of tribes beyond the frontier to such instability 
and movement suggests an obvious purpose for the continuous 
frontiers of the northwest Roman empire. If there were rarely, 
if ever, concerted attempts at invasion, it is probable that 
the warriors of such societies, 'their livelihood based 
entirely upon obtaining spoils' (Cunliffe 1988,176) represent 
the threat which'the continuous barriers were intended to 
counteract. At their most elaborate, as they were in Britain, 
frontier Walls were more formidable than necessary for the 
diversion of movements of peaceful tribesmen and herds of 
animals- * The generalýprovision of the barriers, even in areas 
of low population and poor, intractable land, suggests that 
their primary purpose was directed against raids and 
infiltration. 
6.3.1.4 An intensification of border surveillance 
The localised and partial origins of continuous barriers would 
suggest that far from being intended as defensible lines they 
began as an ad hoc augmentation of the border surveillance 
systems formed by watchtowers, intended to assist in the 
deterrence, detection and hindrance of unwelcome parties of 
greater or lesser size attempting to cross the frontier. Like 
the original watchtower systems, the continuous barriers could 
have assisted in the direct interception of what may have been 
formidable armed bands trying to cross the frontier, by slowing 
the crossing process and by making it less likely that 
infiltrators could pass between towers without being detected. 
If the attack was too great to be met directly from watchtowers 
or fortlets, the barriers would hinder the movement of an enemy 
while assistance was sought from the auxiliary garrison, which, 
as we have suggested, would be present close by in larger 
numbers on those frontier sectors where this large scale type 
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of raid was expected. Barriers of this type would also' 
increase the effectiveness of the watchtower systems against 
smaller scale infiltration and illegal immigration, and so 
always appeared in the 'remote' frontier sectors, but generally 
only when it had been decided to make a general provision of a 
barrier such as the palisade along the entire land frontier; 
later, the Pfahlgraben was not as carefully completed in these 
sectors as elsewhere (eg 4.7. S7 above). 
There are patterns. of variation in the size and character of 
the continuous barriers, already referred to. The British 
Walls are notably more substantial than anything on the 
Continent., The probability that Hadrian's Wall and the 
Antonine Wall possessed a patrolled walkway along their tops is 
also a significant difference from any continental example; 
their unusual size and this special treatment supports the 
suggestion that an extraordinarily high level of surveillance 
was required on the British Walls. In Upper Germany, in the 
Wetterau, there is a steady escalation in the strength of the 
continuous barrier, with the original Zaun being replaced by a 
more substantial palisade, and then the Pfahlgraben being 
added. In Raetia, on the other hand, there are places where an 
original palisade has been replaced by a less substantial Zaun 
before the provision of the Raetian stone wall. This would 
support the impression gained from the forts and fortlets that 
much of the Raetian frontier faced comparatively minor threats 
of infiltration, at least before the later second century. 
6.3.2 Gateways through the continuous barriers 
Hadrian's Wall, with its well-known series of gates at regular 
intervals (the north gates of milecastles), provides a clear 
contrast with the upper German and Raetian frontiers, where no 
regular series of gateways seems to have existed. It is only 
the regularity of the Hadrian's Wall system which allows our 
knowledge of its extensive gate distribution: not all 
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milecastle north gates have been seen in excavation. It is the 
very lack-of regularity on the Continental frontiers which 
makes it difficult to know how frequently gateways were 
provided outside the small areas that have been excavated. 
If regularity did not determine the positions of openings on 
the Continental frontiers, what other factors were influential? 
If these factors can be isolated, it should be possible to see 
which of the basic possible functions of gateways were in fact 
the most important. In other words, the varying gate provision 
on the Continental frontier systems may provide a clue to the 
function of the more regularly provided gate structures on 
Hadrian's Wall. The following are the basic functions that 
might be ascribed to gates: 
1. To allow movement by the Roman army, whether for the 
purpose of offensive movement, patrol, or the interception and 
pursuit of attackers. 
2. To allow routine servicing of the frontier to be carried 
out. 
3. To allow and monitor cross-frontier trade along established 
routes. 
4. To facilitate and monitor civilian movement across the 
frontier for the purpose of everyday-trade and seasonal 
transhumance. 
In some recent studies of Hadrian's Wall the last of these 
functions, that involving routine civilian movement, has come 
to be considered very important, explaining the ubiquitous gate 
complexes formed by the milecastles. So: 
'The purpose of the barrier was to control movement, not to 
prevent it, as the liberal provision of gateways demonstrates. 
Civilians, whether merchants, local farmers moving their cattle 
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and sheep or simply local people visiting relatives on the 
other side of the Wall, would be allowed through the 
gateways... I (Breeze and Dobson 1987,40). 
'The track along the north [Vallum] berm would not only be used 
by army patrols, if these were considered necessary, but also 
by civilians. It seems unlikely that they would be allowed 
through the forts themselves, especially if they were driving 
their flocks and herds, but after crossing the Vallum at the 
fort causeway they would be directed along the track on the 
north berm to a milecastle where they could pass through the 
Wall itself' (Breeze and Dobson 1987,57). 
However,, the milecastle gates do not form the only category of 
passage through Hadrian's Wall. A gate structure is known at 
the Portgate, and another suspected-near Carlisle, to carry 
major Roman roads through the Wall. Other structures of this 
type may well await discovery elsewhere (it is accepted here 
that the Knag Burn Gate was most likely a convenient 
replacement of the north gate of Housesteads fort, for the use 
of the garrison, as suggested in Crow 1988,73-4). Although 
little is known of these road gates, one would imagine that 
they represented more substantial passages through the Wall 
than the milecastle gates. This raises a possible alternative 
interpretation to that offered in the quotations above: that 
the milecastle gates were reserved for purely military use, 
while all civilian traffic, whether of traders or local 
farmers, was only permitted to cross the Wall at certain 
special points, fewer in number than the milecastle gates. The 
existence of the Vallum in the first phase of the Wall's 
history adds obvious support to such an interpretation. 
Turning to the Upper German and Raetian frontiers, we observe 
the same division of openings into two types: those on major 
routes, and those with a more limited local service function. 
Although few of the actual openings have been observed, it 
seems a reasonable assumption that they would have been 
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provided opposite or in the vicinity of forts, if-only to allow 
for military manoeuvrability (Baatz, cited in Dobson 1986,29 
n. 94). A passage in the Saalburg pass was noted above. We 
have seen (4.7. SlO) the suggestion of roads crossing the 
frontier-hard by forts in the Odenwald. This also certainly 
happened by Gunzenhausen in Strecke 13. It may then be that 
openings by forts were the ones used by civilians as well as 
the military; the collegium convenarum and other evidence of 
cross-frontier trade at Ohringen comes to mind here. 
More commonly observed are openings in various sectors of the 
Upper German and Raetian frontiers which are not associated 
with forts, although these do not always seem to have had a 
continuous history through all phases of the frontier. Such 
breaks occur in the Pfahlgraben by stone towers in Strecke 2; 
these openings are certainly associated with the stone towers 
and it was suggested above (4.7. S2) that they were intended to 
provide access through the Pfahlgraben to service the palisade, 
which, at least in places, continued in use uninterrupted. 
This provides an interesting analogy for the general absence of 
causeways across the Hadrian's Wall ditch north of milecastles, 
and suggests that these openings, rather than providing access 
through the frontier, may have simply been intended to allow 
routine maintenance of the palisade by the military. In the 
same way, at various, points in Strecke 1 the Pfahl was 
interrupted, but not the palisade. 
In Strecke 7, openings, commonly occur in the stone wall 
provided there. Here there is no parallel continuous barrier 
to 'contradict' the openings as in the case of Strecke 2 or the 
milecastle north gates; however, the pattern is similar in that 
interruptions are confined to the stone wall phase (they have 
not been observed to date in the abandoned Pfahlgraben or 
palisade); they seem specifically connected to the relationship 
of the stone towers to the stone wall. 
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Two-alternatives present themselves; either the openings 
reflect an increasingly porous frontier system, crossed by 
increasing amounts of civilian traffic; or, as seems clearly 
the case in Strecke 2, the construction of installations'in 
stone necessitated the provision of a means of access so that 
soldiers from the individual watch-towers could move to the 
outside of the frontier barrier, ýwhether for reasons of 
surveillance or structural maintenance. The second conclusion 
seems the more reasonable, and if accepted would cast doubt 
upon'the widespread civilian use of milecastle gates. Rather 
the placing of milecastles so that their north wall, and, 
therefore north gate, coincided with the Great%Wall, was merely 
" neat way of providing service access through the Wall. Such 
" neat solution could not be applied in Germany because the 
fortlets already existed, lying detached from the barriers; 
therefore the most obvious place to supply the necessary 
openings was by the stone towers which came either to be 
incorporated in, or closely passed by, the frontier walls. 
Passages through the frontier which continue through all 
phases, interrupting earlier palisades and later walls 
(ignoring those related to forts), are much rarer than the 
suggested service openings. Although only a fraction of those 
that once actually existed may be known, it is notable that 
they have a differential distribution (Fig. 23) We see only 
one in Strecke 1 (1/65); none in Strecken 2 or 3 (though there 
are possible openings related to forts and the passes they 
guard here). Admittedly such openings may well have escaped 
detection in Strecken 4 and 5 where there has been much more 
agricultural attrition of the frontier. Such permanent 
passages are not known to have been a feature of the Odenwald 
or the outer frontier. In Strecke 13, a remarkable cluster of 
frontier passages is known, including places where both 
palisade and Raetian Wall were interrupted at 13/43 and 13/54. 
At the latter a paved road led to the frontier. At 13/50 an 
interruption in the Raetian Wall given inward projections, as 
if it were no mere service passage. The same is true-of 
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Strecke 14, which offers evidence of a gate inscription with 
bronze letters, gates through both palisade and Wall (14/4; 
14/12, also with a paved road), and several instances of breaks 
in the palisade, not frequently observed in our survey of the 
earlier Strecken to have been broken for service purposes. 
It is remarkable that what we have characterised as the least 
threatened, and friendliest, of frontiers, should possess such 
an array of passages near the AltmUhl and other approaches to 
Raetia, and tempting to suggest that here the frontier really 
was more porous, with an array of special passages for the 
movements of traders and other civilians maintained. -It is 
similarly remarkable that such openings are apparently absent 
on those sectors of the frontiers which we have characterised 
as remote, and where indeed the continuous construction of 
linear barriers themselves was not always completed. Passages 
remain at least undetected in the more endangered Wetterau and 
on the Outer frontier. In other words, the provision of 
passages'is in inverse relation to the intensity of military 
garrisoning of the Strecken; as long, that is, as the suggested 
distinction between service openings and openings for possible 
civil use is accepted. It is suggested, then, that movement of 
civilians or traders across the frontier may have been limited 
to certain key crossings, perhaps including those by forts, 
which will of course, especially if they lay on old passes and 
routes, also have been used by the army. This permeability of 
the frontier was apparently much more restricted in some areas 
than others. 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn in relation to Hadrian's 
Wall is that the milecastle gates were for purely military use, 
perhaps primarily for the servicing of the north face of the 
Wall-and the ditch. These gates did not give passage to paved 
roads, as did the notable frontier gates of Raetia; they gave 
directly onto a ditch without causeway. If we suspect 
sanctioned civilian passage through Hadrian's Wall, it may be 
preferable to look towards the Portgate and its possible 
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equivalents, though these no doubt had military uses too. If 
this conclusion is correct, it characterises Hadrian's Wall as 
a frontier that would be routinely crossed by civilians in very 
few places: much less permeable than the Raetian frontier, and 
perhaps less often routinely crossed, than much of the line-in 
Upper Germany., 
On the Continent, of course, the detached nature of the forts 
will have necessitated passages for military use which were not 
necessary in the case of the forts which formed a part of 
Hadrian's Wall. In the same way, the sheer proportionally 
higher number of gates provided on Hadrian's Wall (than on any 
Continental frontier) perhaps merely reflects the density of 
fortlet provision: each milecastle, being incorporated into the 
stone curtain, required a gate through it if its garrison was 
to have any freedom of movement or ability to maintain the Wall 
and Ditch. Even if the function of a-milecastle was reduced to 
mere watchtower status, it may still have been deemed desirable 
to have access through the Wall, as it was at the watchtowers 
behindýthe stone wall on the outer German frontier. There is 
no reason, either, why the same principle may not have been 
applied on the Antonine Wall, where ditch-causeways opposite 
fortlets are also unknown and the same problems of surveillance 
and maintenance will have arisen. 
6.3.3 Fortlets 
Fortlets to complement the full-sized garrison forts are a 
common, though by no means universal, feature of British and 
German frontiers. In general frontier fortlets outside Britain 
were sited where corridors and topographic features made them 
necessary, or were added at a late date in some formerly 
unthreatened sectors. On Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine Wall 
they appear in more or less regular systems, and as we have 
seen (6.3.2) have sometimes been interpreted as having 
functioned primarily as defended gateways through the Walls. 
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It is unlikely, for the reasons stated in the last section, 
that the milecastles were intended primarily for the use of 
civilian traffic, or for the overseeing of civilian traffic. 
This conclusion would draw support from the differential 
distribution of fortlets in Germany and Raetia; where gateways, 
perhaps for civilian traffic, were provided in some numbers in 
Raetia, ý there are hardly any fortlets (cf Figs 23 and 24). 
Where few gateways were provided, as in the remote Taunus, more 
fortlets existed. The troops in the fortlets were therefore 
more concerned with attackers and infiltrators than-the 
collection of customs dues. 
The most telling aspect of the milecastles and their Antonine 
Wall equivalents is their basic similarity to many of the 
fortlets of Upper Germany and Raetia. ý Several milecastle-sized 
German fortlets have only one gate, as in the R6telsee type, 
where the accommodation is accordingly ranged around three 
sides of the interior of the fortlet. However, several of the 
smallest German-Raetian fortlets (as well as larger fortlets 
and numerus forts) possess two gates opposite each other (eg 
12/33 Schirenhof); as they are without exception detached from 
the running frontier, this shows that the provision of passage 
through a frontier was not necessarily the paramount function 
of a fortlet with two gates. This point is reinforced by the 
recent discovery (Frere 1992,271) that Milefortlet 21 on the 
Cumbrian coast possessed two gates; the milefortlet, on a 
precipice overlooking the sea, cannot have functioned primarily 
as a passage. The conclusion must be that the milecastles and 
their equivalents on the British walls were consistently 
provided with two gates in order to allow the garrison passage 
through the solid frontier barrier, but that also, in 
possessing two gates and their distinctive barracks facing each 
other across a road, these familiar fortlets simply belonged to 
a class of installations widely used away from the linear 
frontiers and which we have recognised all along the German and 
Raetian systems. There is no reason to believe that civilians 
would any more be allowed routine access to these fortlets than 
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to full-sized military bases; in this case the milecastles of 
Hadrian's Wall should also simply be considered as places for 
the accommodation of soldiers. 
However, if the milecastles of Hadrian's Wall are simply 
interpreted as equivalents to continental fortlets, a problem 
of interpretation arises, for the density of their provision is 
much greater than on any part of the Upper German or Raetian 
frontier. One puzzling aspect of milecastle plans has been the 
varying sizes and types of accommodation inside them. One 
possible explanation of this suggests itself from the typical 
German frontier pattern, where fortlets are irregularly 
interspersed amongst a more regular cordon of watchtowers. It 
is possible that the main function of many milecastles was 
limited to the manning of the north gate tower. Against the 
background of the slighting of the turrets at the end of the 
second century, this may explain in part why the milecastles 
were such an enduring institution; they still provided a tower 
at every Roman mile. Some milecastles on the other hand, may 
always have retained their role as a garrisoned fortlet. These 
latter we might expect*to be dispersed irregularly through the 
system, where required. It is notable that milecastle 48, with 
its fortlet type accommodation, controls the Poltross Burn, as 
so many of the German fortlets are situated in relation to 
rivers, streams or passes. Those milecastles with limited 
internal accommodation may simply have been used as safe 
enclosures to house a small group of soldiers manning a tower 
or maintenance gate, and controlling an access point to the top 
of the Wall. 
The purpose of fortlets was to accommodate a smaller body of 
men than that which-normally constituted a whole auxiliary unit 
or numerus. They thus represent an element of the process 
discussed above (6.1) whereby fighting units become broken 
down in order that policing duties may be carried out; a 
distinction has grown between the traditional military function 
and the roles of policing, supervision, frontier control and 
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administration. Their distribution along linear frontiers 
would suggest that these fortlets provided the accommodation 
for the troops responsible for day-to-day patrol of the linear 
frontier and manning (perhaps in further subdivided 
detachments) of watchtowers, and special supervision of 
endangered or infiltration-prone parts of the line. 
It has been suggested in the past (Birley 1932,210-14) that a 
separate force from the auxiliary fort garrisons, akin to the 
numeri of Germany and Raetia, manned the milecastles of 
Hadrian's Wall. Birley was explicitly influenced (1932,12) in 
his conclusion by the existence of the German numeri; he was 
also persuaded by the apparently absurd juxtaposition of some 
forts and milecastles (in the case of Milecastle 31: 'It is 
difficult to believe that a detachment of fifty men would be 
sent out once a month... for a tour of duty only a hundred yards 
from the regimental headquarters') and the damage that such 
detachments would make to the fighting capability of auxiliary 
units (on this-see further: Maxfield, 1990,23-4). On the last 
point, the potential for large scale and complex detaching of 
troops from an auxiliary regiment, long before the age when 
these units had settled to stationary frontier duties, has been 
vividly illustrated by a recently discovered strength report 
from Vindolanda (Bowman and Thomas 1991). The juxtaposition of 
forts and milecastles was, of course, brought about by the 
addition of the forts in a second scheme, as Birley knew. This 
does not in itself explain the continuation of occupation in so 
close an outpost as milecastle 31 is from Carrawburgh; perhaps 
the milecastle was retained as a useful passage through the 
Wall which avoided use of the fort's north gate, rather like 
the Knag Burn gate at Housesteads. If we think of the - 
milecastle as merely housing a small detachment manning a 
watchtower and servicing the curtain and Ditch in the vicinity, 
much of Birley's objection is removed. 
On top of this there is no evidence for a separate milecastle 
garrison, of numerl or anything else. The separate force of 
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numert in Germany, of course, occupied small forts, not 
fortlets: as we have suggested, they were merely a variation on 
the standard auxiliary unit, and were employed in appropriately 
'remote' or lightly threatened landscapes. They themselves 
presumably sent out detachments to man fortlets and 
watchtowers. It is notable that those irregular units that are 
attested on Hadrian's Wall (probably mostly of the third, 
century) mostly occur in the central sector and outposts, and, 
of course, at forts, not milecastles. If we confine ourselves 
rigorously to the nearest morphological relatives of the 
milecastles, the fortlets of Upper Germany and Raetia (which 
occur in conjunction with both auxiliary forts and numerus 
forts) there is no evidence to suggest that they were not 
mannedýfrom the forts, whether auxiliary or numerus; as with 
the milecastles, their barrack accommodation, where known, 
suggests a subdivision of a larger unit, and apart from the 
forts themselves there is nowhere for such units to'have had 
their home base and administrative centre., On the contrary, it 
is probable that some auxiliary units based in forts were used 
to sending detachments to other frontier installations, for 
example the detachments of cohors I Breucorum, from PfUnz; 
serving at Bbhming; and-the possible use of detachments from 
6hringen at the small fort of Westernbach. There remains the 
problem of the class of larger (cO. 40ha) fortlets noted on 
parts of the Upper German frontier, some with their own 
bath-houses; although the nature of their garrisons remains 
obscure, unlike the milecastle-sized fortlets they are confined 
to certain parts of the frontiers, and most have a clear 
relationship to a nearby auxiliary fort. These large fortlets 
were a late development and it is suggested below (6.4.6) that 
they simply represent a need to concentrate larger bodies of 
troops on the actual frontier line in response to growing 
localised pressures. In this case the large fortlets may just 
as well have been garrisoned by a detachment from the auxiliary 
unit as by any separate force, for which we would have no 
equivalent sized accommodation at a date earlier than the 
mid-second century. In short, the use of the German numerl to 
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postulate a separate force on the British frontier is fraught 
with difficulty. In Britain there was no type of, fort to - 
provide headquarters bases for such a separate force. Finally, 
there is some material evidence from Britain tozuggest that 
the garrison of a milecastle was drawn from the same background 
as the soldiers of its nearest auxiliary fort: L Allason-Jones 
(1988,217) has suggested, on the basis of motifs on small 
finds, that the garrisons of Turret 35A, Milecastle 36 and 
Housesteads fort may have shared a devotion to Taranis, the 
Celtic wheel god. The same milecastle has produced a lead 
sealing of cohors I Tungrorum, the garrison of Housesteads (RIB 
2411.146). 
In short, there is no reason to believe that fortlets-were not 
meant to represent anything other than that which they 
immediately appear to be: small versions of Roman auxiliary 
forts, designed to accommodate detachments from whole auxiliary 
units, and meant to operate as a base, defensible in emergency 
or against surprise attack (note the formidable defences of 
Neuwirthaus fortlet in Strecke 5, which was isolated by marshes 
from nearby sources of reinforcement), from which the manning 
of watchtowers and other duties of frontier patrol and 
maintenance could be carried out. There is no reason to 
believe that civilians would any more be allowed routine access 
to these fortlets than to full-sized military bases; in this 
case the milecastles of Hadrian's Wall should also simply be 
considered as places for the accommodation of soldiers. Only 
further excavation will reveal how many contained sizeable 
detachments (in the manner of German fortlets), and how many 
simply housed men looking after the north gate and tower. 
6.3.4 Watchtowers 
There is no reason to see any fundamental change in the 
border-surveillance role, suggested for watchtowers in section 
3.2.4, during the second century. It is notable, however, that 
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a closer spacing of towers on the new outer frontier, and on 
certain reconstituted sections of the, Upper German frontier, 
suggests that increasing pressures of some kind were 
necessitating a more intensive provision of towers., There, are 
other interesting regional variations in the watchtower pattern 
which provide insights into the functions of the different 
frontier sectors: in Raetia, for example, a larger watchtower 
type ('Blockhaus) was always commoner, and associated with a 
general absence of fortlets; here it was not felt necessary 
even to concentrate the patrolling garrison in fortlets. On- 
the contrary, in Strecke 13 the troops manning the towers were 
sent over a considerable distance directly from the rearward 
auxiliary, forts, there the only other form of installation 
capable of housing troops. In Strecke-14 the towers were 
presumably manned from the intermediate sized forts near the 
frontier line, themselves most probably manned by-detachments 
from the rearward auxiliary sites. Even here some of the large 
towers lay a considerable distance from any kind of fort. On 
this 'friendly' frontier very small detachments of frontier 
police could safely operate for long periods away from larger 
troop concentrations. Because they, had to, be self-sufficient 
and without recourse to assistance for so long, they were , 
evidently provided with a larger accommodation, and perhaps 
organised into somewhat larger groups, than the garrisons of 
the standard Upper'German towers. The latter, although on a 
more dangerous frontier, could be smaller because they were 
part of an integrated system of forts and fortlets. 
In Britain the situation is different again. No evidence has 
yet emerged for a watchtower system on the Antonine Wall. On 
Hadrian's Wall, apparently in clear contrast to the continental 
situation, a number of turrets, especially in the central 
sector, seem to have gone out of use by, or around, the end of 
the second century. The general explanation advanced for this 
is that the turrets became superfluous once the garrison forts 
were added to the wall scheme, or that. there had always been an 
overprovision of turrets (Breeze and Dobson 1987,132-3). 
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Parts of the earliest Upper German frontier began as watchtower 
systems without much in the way of supporting, fortlets, and a 
complete absence of auxiliaryýforts. When sections of the 
Upper German frontier were advanced or newly constituted-in the 
mid-second century, there was a renewed emphasis on the role of 
watchtowers, for their spacing was narrowed to a considerable 
degree. The impression is inescapable, that as provision of 
watchtowers grew steadily more essential on the Continental 
frontier, the equivalents on Hadrian's Wall had become less 
important. - Only one, factor satisfactorily explains this: the 
probability that, Hadrian's Wall (and the - as far as we know - 
turretless Antonine Wall) carried patrolled wall-walks which 
rendered the provision of individual elevated platforms to look 
over the barriers redundant. -Having been built in the first, 
ideal-F-Hadrianic scheme, the turrets may well have been found 
useful in a practical way as accommodation or a means of access 
to the wall top: once, after a generation, their timbers began 
to rot, and after the experience of the Antonine Wall, which 
had perhaps done without such structures, it may have been 
concluded that the towers and wall-access points provided at 
the milecastles and a limited number of turrets were 
sufficient. This does not prove'the existence of a wall-walk: 
but by reducing the number of towers on partsýof the Wall to 
those provided by the milecastle gates, the Romans were 
adjusting the watchtower frequency to a level much more sparse 
than that on the German frontier. It is difficult to see how a 
surveillance of the Wall-line as effective as that in Germany 
could be achieved without a wall-walk. 
The recent discovery (Crow 1991,53) of an additional tower 
complementing the turret system at Peel Gap on Hadrian's Wall, 
between turrets 39a and 39b, serves to illustrate that the 
turrets were not wholly an overprovision or an institution 
rendered unnecessary by the addition of the forts. As with the 
turrets-in use in the Hadrianic period, there was evidently a 
time when extra surveillance from a tower was considered 
necessary here. Peel Gap tower probably surveyed an approach 
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to a potential, crossing point of the Wall, otherwise-sheltered 
from observation by precipitous crags; its placement right in 
the gap underlines its potential for direct intervention to 
obstruct unwelcome movement, and discoveries of sling-shots and 
a ballista bolt, as in the case of the well-known throwing 
stones attested at German towers, indicate that this 
intervention could be of a military nature, directed therefore 
at infitrators as much as delinquent farmers. The closer 
spacing of towers than-before on the German mid-Antonine outer 
frontier, and on various other later re-alignments in Germany, 
points to the same conclusion. In the British case, however, 
Peel Gap tower was out of use by the end of the second century. 
A probable stair platform built along the side of the redundant 
tower, however, underlines the importance of access to the 
Wall-top, and reinforces the conclusion that the unique demise 
of watchtowers in Britain was associated with the uniquely 
patrollable tops of-that province's frontier barriers. 
6.3.5 Forts 
The survey illustrates clearly that type, size and density of 
auxiliary forts varied, in common with the linear frontier 
installations, according to the degree of population and nature 
of the threat posed on various frontier sectors in Upper 
Germany and Raetia. For Britain this raises a similar problem 
to that discussed in relation to fortlets: was the initial 
regularity (and relative closeness) of fort-spacing on 
Hadrian's Wall an unnecessary and over-systematic plan, or does 
it reflect perceived difficulties on the frontier in Britain? 
As in the case of the milecastles, the enduring nature of the 
forts of Hadrian's Wall as institutions perhaps suggests that a 
relatively large garrison on this linear frontier was 
considered necessary for practical reasons. It must remain 
uncertain for the time being whether those reasons lay in a 
formidable armed resistance, or in a Roman belief that large 
population in a largely cleared landscape had to be matched by 
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a large garrison. The most similar spacings to be observed in 
Germany occur on the most endangered section - the Wetterau. On 
the mid-Antonine outer frontier, a closer spacing than before 
of watchtowers leads to the impression that the new system had 
been constructed in the face of growing pressures from 
infiltrators or attackers. 
For whatever reason, the Antonine Wall came to feature 
concentrations of troops in forts of greater or lesser size at 
the expense of a watchtower/fortlet surveillance and patrol 
system. Here it may be suggested that attempts to cross, or 
resistance to, the frontier were so dogged or formidable that 
detachments of smaller size than those finally used were not 
found to be effective or safe. The large fortlets of the 
Wetterau, closely associated with full auxiliary forts, and 
given a degree of independence with their own bath-house, 
recall the secondary Antonine Wall forts, and it is notable 
that the large Wetterau fortlets seem to have developed as an 
augmentation of the frontier during the course of second 
century, when it appears that pressure was mounting in this 
area. 
6.3.6 Communications 
It is often assumed that a road is one of the essential 
elements of a Roman linear frontier. However, the variety of 
types of road system points to, the conclusion that the foremost 
role of the frontier systems was not to protect roads. The 
Military Way that was added to Hadrian's Wall, connecting its 
forts and milecastles, was not an arterial east-west route. It 
must, have allowed for transport of supplies, movement of troops 
between sites and official tours or inspections of the frontier 
forts, but any direct traffic between east and west continued 
to use the Stanegate, to the south. The Military Way runs 
along the line of the Wall because this must have seemed an 
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obvious itinerary given that certain visits and deliveries 
would have to be made to all the forts. 
On the Antonine Wall the Military Way alone sufficed; there 
were no towns such as Corbridge or Carlisle near the northern 
Wall between which direct traffic would pass. Most traffic in 
the area probably had business with the frontier forts. The 
traveller was not forced to pass through every fort on his 
journey, as the by-pass loop at at least one fort illustrates. 
In Raetia the major road that connected the Danube and Upper 
Germany was never really incorporated into the linear frontier 
system. Indeed here the units in the forts never seem to have 
become as concerned with the frontier to the north as with the 
road. The forts tended to stay on-theýroad, with-detachments 
sent out to man the frontier from smaller sites. It is clear 
in this case that the watchtowers and walls were not 
specifically associated with the protection of traffic, but - 
rather with general infiltration. 'The same was true of 
Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine Wall, but in Britain the 
compact nature of the isthmus utilised by each determined that 
Hadrian's Wall should not be built far from the separate 
arterial road represented by the Stanegate, and that the forts 
on both walls be connected by a road. ' 
In the Taunus-Wetterau area of Upper Germany, the pattern is 
different again. Here the frontier did not follow an obvious 
route like the Tyne-Solway Isthmus, nor did it'grow up beyond a 
lateral road such as the Stanegate or the Raetian road. The 
frontier was, rather, built on the fringes of an area into 
which a'penetration road ran. The frontier line itself was 
sinuous and as a line served no communications purpose, except 
for a traveller wishing to visit a succession of frontier 
sites. Accordingly, only minor roads and tracks run along the 
frontier line, and the major roads known in the area branch out 
from a central, point in the Wetterau, each going individually 
to a frontier fort. 
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Given the existence of a linear arrangement of forts (eg 
Hadrian's Wall, the Odenwald), there would tend to be traffic 
along the frontier, simply for the routine business of supply 
and communication. But where that linear arrangement was not 
compact (eg the Taunus-Wetterau), major traffic reached the 
forts by more direct means than that supplied by the, frontier 
line. Where rearward lateral roads existed (eg the Stanegate, 
Raetia), their function seems unconnected with the artificial 
frontier. 
6.4 Second century frontier systems: coherent development, or 
inertia and oscillation? 
6.4.1 A rational limit to expansion in Upper Germany and 
Raetia 
The second century development of the linear frontier systems 
of Upper Germany and Raetia presents a picture of consistent 
progress in one direction. Different areas progressed towards 
their definitive frontier lines at different rates, but 
ultimately progressed as part of a general scheme. That this 
may not have been planned from the outset should not be taken 
to mean that the pragmatic completion of the frontier systems 
was an irrational or thoughtless process. For much of its line 
the Upper German frontier that was held until c260 was 
established as early as the first century. It-was argued above 
(3.3) that the establishment of such early lines represented a 
conscious decision, whether military or political. The , 
practicality of the decision in Germany was borne out by the 
longevity of the early line. In broad terms the second century 
sees the finalisation of the Raetian line and the corresponding 
forward adjustment of parts of the Upper German frontier; much 
of this can be seen as a gradual adjustment so that the 
frontier system worked better as a rational whole. ýIf the 
Vorverlegung involved the abandonment of the old Odenwald 
cordon, this simply, and exceptionally, happened because a 
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formal frontier had never been formed on the Neckar or in the 
far west of Raetia. The move forward from the old Odenwald 
line took place as part of the rational process of completion 
of the whole preclusive system. 
This is in contrast to various views of frontier movements as 
being irrational, oscillating or unco-ordinated. There is 
Mann's, classic argument (1974,519-20): 
'The upper German frontier was pushed eastwards, 'the Raetian 
frontier northwards, without the slightest evidence of any 
co-ordination between the two., In their final stages there was 
still a great re-entrant angle between them ... The Wetterau and 
lower Main, once occupied, seem to have remained under Roman 
control more through inertia than as the result of any coherent 
or objective, planning... I 
This view is contradicted by the dating evidence (4.4-5), which 
strongly suggests that the completions of the Upper German and 
Raetian lines occurred simultaneously,, an indication that the 
move was indeed a co-ordinated one. 
The famous re-entrant between Upper Germany and Raetia has 
exercised Mann and other scholars. To have attempted to close 
the re-entrant, however, would perhaps have signalled an 
involvement in Germany beyond the great rivers. This would 
have been associated with the policy of advance into free 
Germany that had been a dead letter since the time of Domitian. 
Of course, the drawing of a, straight line between Danube and 
Main ought to have been within the grasp of the army, and would 
have produced a shorter line, but this is to assume that the 
Romans thought in these terms at all. Rather their concern was 
with the effective holding of territory. The manpower 
available from the time of Domitian decreed that the Rhine and 
Danube should be the general limits of Roman administration. 
Topography and the needs of communication between provinces 
necessitated the occupation of certain key areas beyond the 
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rivers which it would simply have been dangerous to leave 
outside Roman control: the Wetterau and the Nbrdlinger Ries. 
As Schbnberger (1985,398) has observed, these areas were 
vulnerable in similar ways and both enclosed at an early stage 
by Roman frontier control. These areas dictated the line that 
the frontier would always take. At first, they were separated 
by porous communications systems, these, and-the fertile lands 
through which they ran, eventually being enclosed by the 
preclusive mid-Antonine outer frontier. Schbnberger (1985, 
399) can see no reason why the Romans should wish, in a 
frontier-straightening exercise, to include the area north and 
east, as far as the upper AltmOhl. In his view, the frontier 
line actually represents a deep awareness of the difficulties 
of the terrain (transected by deep river valleys) which was 
therefore always left outside. None of this is to say that 
there were'not fertile areas outside, the, Roman frontier; the 
Giessen basin, north of the Wetterau, is an example. The'point 
is that the Romans controlled those areas immediately beyond 
the rivers that they needed to control, and evolved a rational 
frontier system linking them. To have gone any further, even 
into attractive areas, would have been to push irrational 
salients into free Germany, and it was known that there were 
never likely to be the initiatives or manpower to make such 
advances rational by incorporating them into a general scheme 
of advance. 
Leaving aside the general failure to conquer the Germans, the 
frontier was rational and successful in terms of safeguarding 
that territory which could be effectively administered by Rome 
(until the onslaught of the mid-third century, of a kind 
against which the frontier had not been designed)'. The linear 
systems did not move backwards and forwards according to 
imperial whim; there was one careful and co-ordinated advance 
in the mid-Antonine period, more of a completion of existing 
frontier arrangements than an aggressive advance, and seemingly 
carried out not as an act of blatant imperial conquest, but- 
rather as a precautionary measure against growing, instability 
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in the frontier zone and attacks on the province. In this 
interpretation, German and Raetian frontiers can be seen to 
have reached the furthest rational limit of Roman expansion. 
Essentially the settlement areas focused on the Rhine and 
Danube and the most fertile parts of their major tributaries 
were effectively occupied by Rome: the occupation of these 
spheres, and construction of their protecting frontier systems, 
was rationally completed. The Roman army had got as far as it 
could reasonably wish to go without, embarking on an invasion of 
greater Germany. 
6.4.2 A rational limit of expansion in Britain, and the Roman 
failure to reach it permanently 
As in the first century, so in the second, it is possible to 
suggest that the same advance to a rational limit would have 
occurred in Britain, had policy in Britain not been frustrated 
by certain peculiar circumstances. Hadrian, it is true, had 
attempted to establish the frontier, on a seemingly permanent 
basis, on the Tyne-Solway isthmus. As a policy, however, 
Hadrian's decision may be seen as an aberration in contrast to 
what came before and later. It was argued above (3.3) that the 
return to the Forth-Clyde under Pius might be interpreted as a 
return to a long running policy of attempting to occupy a 
natural Roman constituency running as far as the edge of the 
Highlands, as defined by the old Gask line, and also indicated 
by the outpost fort line north of the Antonine Wall. As it 
happened, Pius' initiative was eventually frustrated, and the 
Antonine Wall abandoned after a short occupation. Maintaining 
a Roman military occupation up to the Antonine Wall and the 
Highland line would have been-the equivalent of the rational 
solution, the furthest desired extent (short of limitless 
conquest), which was achieved beyond Rhine and Danube. As it 
was, the Roman frontier in Britain from the mid-Antonine period 
on had to be drawn through an homogeneous area which might 
otherwise have been wholly incorporated into the empire, and 
there was a continued military and diplomatic interest in areas 
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far north of the actual linear frontier as represented by 
Hadrian's Wall. 
To ask why the rational solution of the problem of Roman 
Scotland was never achieved is to ask the simple question: why 
did the Romans fail to conquer Scotland? This question has 
tended recently to be answered in two basic (and rather 
contradictory) ways. The first way of answering the question 
places great emphasis on lack of imperial will at crucial 
moments to pursue the Scottish conquest to completion. In 
summary,, this view maintains that if the Romans had pursued a 
consistently determined policy of expansion in Scotland, 
nothing could have prevented their conquest of the whole island 
of Britain (Breeze 1988). 
In this approach some old and more recent suggestions are 
dismissed by process of elimination. Were the highlanders too 
warlike to be conquered? There is no direct evidence for a 
particularly fierce or effective waging of war on their part 
(Breeze 1988,8). Were the Highlands themselves too daunting a 
prospect to conquer? 'It is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that the Roman army, which was not beaten by any other terrain, 
could have dealt with the Scottish Highlands if it had wished' 
(Breeze 1988,11). Did Scotland offer too little economic 
return to justify conquest? Breeze concedes that Scotland 
probably offered little economic encouragement to the Romans, 
but goes on to make the important point that economic motives 
seem to have played little direct part in the decision to wage 
an ancient war of conquest. However, total conquest ought, as 
in the case of Wales, to have allowed reduction of the 
occupying army, this itself an economic return of sorts. 
Breeze then considers the theory of Groenman-van Waateringe 
(1980; 6.4.4 below) that native society beyond a certain point 
in Britain - and other frontier zones - was insufficiently 
urbanised or centralised to support an imposed Roman 
administrative structure and provide a food supply for the 
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Roman army. Breeze is led by a lack of evidence for social and 
economic difference between peoples in northern Britain within 
the province, and the inhabitants of lowland Scotland, to 
discount the Groenman van Waateringe theory, or at least to 
relegate it, with-the other factors described above, to-a 
contributory background against which the real reason for the 
failure to conquer Scotland must be set. 
That fundamental explanation is seen as a lack of-imperial will 
to continue conquest to completion at vital moments, combined 
with a recurrent need to withdraw troops from a peripheral 
province to meet emergencies on the Continent. Neither element 
of the explanation sees local circumstances in north Britain as 
being decisive in frustrating total conquest. We have already 
encountered one of the famous examples of the 'imperial whim' 
factor, in the apparent halt in Agricola's advance in the years 
80-81, which coincides with the reign of Titus. There was 
certainly a change of policy here, but this need not have been 
the only factor in deciding the ease with which the Romans 
would move further north; when Domitian overruled the halt of 
Titus' reign he may have been overruling a pessimistic 
assessment by Agricola and the army on the ground about the 
ease with which the remainder of the island could be conquered. 
The army on the ground may have been consistently aware of the 
difficulties of the situation and the fragile nature of 
conquest should troops be withdrawn. This local perception may 
have remained valid whatever the orders of individual emperors 
to hold or advance. 
For second century Britain, explanations stressing external and 
political factors have drawn support from the accepted history 
of the two frontier Walls. The limited nature of the Antonine 
invasion of Scotland, and its rapid abandonment, usually' 
thought to have occurred soon after Pius' death, has led to it 
being interpreted as a mere political move to boost the 
military prestige of the emperor (Breeze, 1988,18)'. But 
rather than representing an unusually limited advance into 
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Scotland, the Antonine advance - if we measure a permanent 
occupation by the distribution of permanent installations 
encompassed the same area, to the edge of the Highland line, 
that the Flavian Gask frontier and the known permanent 
installations of the Severan age covered. So consistent was 
the aim of Roman involvement in Scotland. 
Detailed interpretations of the perceived two phases on the 
northern Wall, Antonine I and Antonine II, have evolved. The 
nature of these two phases is commonly taken-to indicate that 
events in Scotland itself did not cause the oscillations in 
frontier policy. The perceived proportionally heavy garrison 
of the Antonine Wall in Antonine I has lent support toýthe 
theory that the building of the Wall was a political exercise 
to boost the emperor's military prestige (A Birley 1974,17-18; 
Breeze 1982,98-99; Hanson and Maxwell 1983,60-61, admitting 
other factors),, and a venture which was therefore intended to 
run no risk of failing: 'Controlling the tribes of the Scottish 
Lowlands [in Antonine II] may have required fewer units than in 
the first Antonine period, maybe because the earlier occupation 
had been in massive strength to ensure Pius his-easy victory' 
(Breeze and Dobson 1987,125). , 
The return to the Pennines by c158 has been linked with threats 
of internal unrest (the 'Brigantian-revolt' and with crises on 
the Continent. The possibility of local pressure on-the 
occupation playing a decisive, part is strenuously denied, and 
the absence of archaeological evidence for disaster emphasised: 
'The withdrawal from Scotland in the late 150s cannot then have 
been the result of hostile tribes from the north sweeping the 
Romans before them' (Hanson and Maxwell 1983,145). 
The perceived return in lesser numbers to Scotland in Antonine 
II has been taken to signify that opposition from the north was 
no more of a threat than that had arisen in the hinterland. - 
The implication drawn is that the subjugation of Scotland was 
not an onerous task for the Roman army, and that too many 
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troops had been dispatched to the north with Lollius Urbicus, 
with'the result that unrest among the Brigantes in the Pennines 
was encouraged. 
'The close density of military stations found in the earlier 
Antonine occupation [of Scotland] was abandoned, and the normal 
spacing between forts returned to a day's march. If the 
advance into Scotland in the early 140s had been in response to 
hostile moves north of the frontier it might be expected that 
the re-organisation reflects increasing Roman confidence in 
controlling the Lowland tribes. If, on the other hand, the 
move north was in order to help smooth the succession of 
Antoninus Pius then the change ... might reflect the fact that 
the heat was now off the local situation in Britain and matters 
could be allowed to return to normal' (Breeze 1982,121). 
'The second Antonine occupation of Scotland is marked by a 
considerable reduction in the overall garrison... This... 
hardly lends support to the suggestion that the return to 
Scotland was in answer to a northern threat, nor that the 
original evacuation had been prompted by any serious native 
pressure' (Hanson and Maxwell 1983,148-50). 
'The impression is that the Roman army moved north in great 
strength. The fact that some of these sites ... were abandoned 
within a few years [in Antonine II] suggests that the army may 
have overestimated the problem in the 140s and placed a greater 
occupation force in the Scottish Lowlands than was really 
necessary' (Breeze and Dobson 1987,109). 
In the same vein the final abandonment of the Antonine Wall is 
seen as an unlucky accident; the army, facing no insurmountable 
threat locally, had matters removed from its hands, and 
invasions across the Danube early in Marcus' reign led to troop 
withdrawals and the second abandonment of Scotland in a decade. 
The only archaeological evidence of destruction on the Antonine 
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sites in Scotland may be interpreted as orderly Roman 
withdrawal, and so: 
'It is difficult ... to believe that the final abandonment of the 
Antonine Wall was in any way connected with hostility in 
Scotland' (Hanson and Maxwell 1983,151). 
There are several characteristics of Roman frontier policy thus 
deduced from the accepted sequence of occupation on the British 
Walls. The emperor's military reputation in Rome is rated a 
highly influential outside factor, which might in itself alter 
the organisation of frontier systems out of all recognition. 
Chance factors such as the withdrawal of troops from the - 
low-priority province intervened. The army, on the ground is 
characterised as being supremely confident and in control, 
except in areas where conquest had not been followed by 
sufficient consolidation, leading to internal unrest. The 
whereabouts of a particular frontier line becomes almost a 
matter of chance, of academic interest; they are products not 
of a defensive - or administrative - rationale, but of 
situations bequeathed by the latest inertia or enthusiasm for 
frontier warfare shown by the emperor. 
6.4.3 The reason for the failure to conquer north Britain 
It was concluded above (5.5.2), however, that there is no real 
evidence for a break in the occupation of the Antonine Wall. 
All'that can be shown to have taken place are various 
modifications and changes of garrison, not all necessarily at 
the same time, at some of the sites. Antonine II, where it 
existed, represented a system of outposts north of the restored 
Wall of Hadrian. If this is accepted, it must cast doubt on 
some of the interpretations cited in 6.4.2. Instead of the 
Roman army apparently coming and going in north Britain as it 
pleases, we are left with a picture of a short, single 
occupation of Scotland with thinly spread garrisons and a 
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proportionally very heavy garrison on the frontier line itself. 
By the mid-Antonine period most of the army had returned to the 
Pennines and Hadrian's Wall. An obvious conclusion might 
suggest itself to a layman: resistance to the Antonine invasion 
of Scotland was formidable, and this, combined with events on 
the continent, made the Antonine Wall untenable. The standard 
theoretical reply at present might be that, however awkward the 
occupation of Scotland, it was the probable withdrawal of 
troops from Britain in the 160s which tipped the balance 
against the continued holding of, the Antonine Wall. If this 
was the case, however, it may be fair to ask exactly why, if it 
was possible to hold Scotland with appreciably fewer troops 
than were actually used - and this is, in effect, what the 
equation of a large garrison with a political exercise which 
must not be allowed to fail implies - this was not done. 
Marcus would surely have retained Pius' conquests if this could 
have been done with a significantly smaller garrison. It could 
not be. The persistent Marcan interest in the same area of 
Scotland had to be pursued through an outpost system. The 
withdrawal of troops from Britain thus merely highlights the 
necessity of a proportionally large garrison for the holding of 
Antonine Scotland, for what must have been local reasons. 
Naturally the number of troops available in Britain was a 
factor in part determined by outside events. However, Roman 
frontier policy in Britain in the second century may actually 
be seen as a fairly consistent response to local circumstances. 
Hadrian's reign, with its limited interest in lands beyond the 
Tyne-Solway, if anything represents the only exception - 
admittedly a clear example of a frontier transformed, or 
created, by an outside policy. Pius' advance (although it can 
hardly have harmed his military reputation) saw a return to a 
policy of control running as far as the edge of the Highlands; 
over the natural Roman constituency. Such were the military 
problems of the occupation, however, that it could only be 
achieved at the expense of a formidable garrison, whose 
enforced reduction in the 150s or 160s led to the abandonment 
363 
of the Antonine Wall. Some would suggest that the abandonment 
of Antonine Scotland was caused by nothing more or less than 
the death of Pius himself. However, the possibility was noted 
above (5.5.4-5) that the abandonment may haveýbegun as early as 
c158 (others would opt for the later 160s). Furthermore a 
military involvement with lowland Scotland persisted until late 
in the century; Pius' adventure had not taken him into-lands 
with no interest for his successors. The possibility of' 
outright occupation was perhaps beyond them, without a 
considerably larger provincial army, and ultimately the 
formidable nature of the opposition to the Romans amongst - 
certain peoples in northern Britain must play an important part 
in explaining why. The density of the military network in 
Lowland Scotland, and the proportional concentration of troops 
on the Antonine Wall itselff mark the northern frontier out as 
dangerous in comparison to Raetia and almost every part of 
Upper Germany. 
This interpretation of the Antonine advance into Scotland is 
unfashionable: it is not customary to see local conditions, let 
alone natives, hampering the Romans for long. This unusual 
perspective is suggested here because it explains the contrast 
between events and dispositions in Scotland and on the 
Continent, and because much of the reason for believing in 
supreme military confidence on the ground may be seen to be 
based on a mistaken two-period reading of the structural 
history of the Antonine Wall. ý 
Rather than Imperial whim and power-politics, then, the failure 
to conquer Scotland can be seen as a problem of special 
military difficulty in a peripheral area-set against a 
background of more directly threatening emergencies diverting 
troops to the Continent. 
Septimius Severus' campaigns have been cited (Breeze 1988, 
18-21) as another great example of imperial whim working 
against the (attainable, given determination) complete conquest 
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of Britain; it might have happened, had not Severus suddenly 
died and his son given up his conquests. Dio, who was in a 
position to know, and had no interest in disguising the truth 
(Isaac 1990,389-90), records that Severus' aim was to conquer 
the rest of Britain (76.13.1). Rather than being broken off by 
Severus' death, the campaigns may have been brought to aý 
conclusion by Caracalla (Frere 1987,162). Severus probably 
did set out with the aim of complete conquest in mind. As has 
been suggested (3.3 above) however, although there might be 
wars of conquest beyond frontiers, unless large numbers of 
troops were made available to garrison newly conquered areas, 
the limit of practical occupation would remain where it had 
been before. As the Continental frontiers show, such zones of 
practical occupation tended to remain the same, despite the 
grandiose statements of intent and efforts of individual 
emperors to move beyond them. In other words, -conquest could 
not always be followed by-consolidation on the Roman frontiers. 
Florus' remark (2.30) about Varus' Germany being defeated 
rather than subdued - Germani victi magis quam domift erant - 
comes to mind. Severus' initiative went the-same way as its 
two predecessors, those of Domitian and Pius, and as in each of 
those cases, although outside factors intervened, practical 
difficulties on the ground may have*been just as decisive. 
Perhaps Caracalla in Scotland simply perceived the 
practicalities of occupation more realistically than his father 
had done, and fell back on the tried policy of outposts and 
coastal control to conduct relations with the defeated 
Caledonians. As in Britain, so elsewhere: campaigns by 
individual emperors did not lead to formal linear frontier 
systems being moved wholesale. The Antonine Wall forms a great 
exception, and that simply because it overturned Hadrian's 
exceptional policy of having no military interest in Scotland, 
and was held as a linear system for 15-25 years before the 
normal situation of remoter control of Scotland re-asserted 
itself. The Vorverlegung in Germany marked the completion of 
an existing (and, in Raetia, still developing) system, and not 
a frontier pushed forward after a great conquest. 
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Thus Britain, as Germany, had its rational limit of expansion, 
and it was a fairly consistent policy of second century , 
emperors (Hadrian being the exception) to reach it, by whatever 
means possible given the size of the army available in Britain 
and the demands of events elsewhere. The single post-Flavian 
attempt at permanent occupation, under Pius, was short-lived. 
Although demands on the province from more urgent theatres of 
war were important, the sheer size of the British garrison in 
proportion to the armies of the Continental frontier provinces, 
and the formidable nature of the British linear frontier 
systems, strongly suggest that conditions in north Britain 
prevented. a smooth advance to the 'natural' limit achieved in 
much of Germany and Raetia. 
6.4.4 An economic explanation for the location of the 
frontiers in northwest Europe? 
This emphasis on the long-term practicalities of occupation and 
portrayal of frontier policy as consistent and rational in 
local terms rather than externally inspired or whim-driven 
leads us back to the Groenman-van Waateringe theory and the 
question of why exactly the rational limits of expansion fell 
where they did, and why the Roman state did or did not achieve 
these limits. The two approaches to Roman frontier history, 
that exemplified by Breeze, and that of Groenman-van 
Waateringe, are-direct opposites: one emphasises chance, and 
the conscious roles of named individuals, while the other sees 
events determined by social and economic structures. If we 
reject the former, must we revert to the latter, and accept the 
Groenman-van Waateringe theory? 
In proposing that only societies having achieved a given level 
of economic development and political centralisation could be 
absorbed into the Roman state, the Groenman-van Waateringe 
theory is economically and historically deterministic. It sees 
social and economic structures as the vital elements in 
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deciding the relations between the Roman state and indigenous 
peoples. The theory does not consider the possible importance 
of the conscious wills of individuals in forming relations with 
Rome: the possibility that chance, differing ideologies, or 
peculiar local conditions may have produced varying degrees of 
accommodation of the Roman state structure among frontier 
peoples of apparently similar levels of social and economic 
sophistication. 
The active role of individuals forming societies neglected in 
the Groenman-van Waateringe model may have manifested itself in 
parts of north Britain as the resistance to the Roman 
occupation suggested above (3.3; 6.2.3 etc. ) as being more 
formidable than in much of the Germanies and Raetia. While 
Groenman-van Waateringe is no doubt correct in supposing that 
the relatively limited degree of centralisation amongst such 
societies made the process of Romanisation more difficult than 
in the South,, - it may also be possible that for more or less 
complex reasons, such as population density, the occurrence of 
complexly interspersed agricultural and upland zones, or a 
geographical remoteness from the continental empire, people 
behaved differently towards the Romans in different areas, and 
that north Britain saw an especially fierce resistance to the 
Roman occupation. This is not to say that such peoples were 
unconquerable, but merely to emphasise factors of local 
interaction and resistance more strongly than in the Breeze 
model, where the fate of a conquest is decided primarily by the 
Roman attitude towards it, or in the Groenman-van Waateringe 
model, where attitudes are subordinated to the dictates of 
economic structure. In reality each of these factors probably 
had a role, but in recent interpretations the active attitudes 
of native peoples have not been seen to be as potentially 
important as the last two. 
Thus it does seem that variations in the attitudes of native 
peoples could be infinitely complex, and that rather than 
advancing as far as some neat line of transition between 
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Romanisable and unromanisable populations, the northwest 
European frontier simply absorbed into a rational system those 
populated territories and communications corridors which could 
be administrated without embarking on a massive conquest of 
more of free Germany. This is what explains the detailed 
location of the frontier installations. Of course, all this 
was against a background of a geographical transition from 
societies which were broadly governable by Rome to peoples who 
would only ever have been absorbed with difficulty, whatever 
the resources available: the continental frontier was 'roughly 
coincident with the southern boundary of the coniferous zone of 
northern Europe' (Cunliffe 1988,7). The Groenman-van 
Waateringe theory may therefore be valid in explaining some of 
the factors which impeded and eventually halted Roman imperial 
expansion in this area, but is of limited use in explaining the 
detailed location of the frontier lines themselves. 
Breeze has made a similar criticism of the theory as applied to 
Britain: he notes that 'The frontier lay well beyond the 
territories of the more advanced tribes discussed by Professor 
Groenman, with no clear distinction being identifiable between 
the nature of the tribes immediately within the province and 
those immediately beyond' (1988,14). One could argue that 
Groenman-van Waateringe is correct in that the Romans could 
only advance as far beyond the lowland-highland transition as 
they had troops to garrison the area beyond. It seems 
unlikely, however, that the permanent garrison of the Pennines 
was mainly concerned with policing the Brigantes. Wales, with 
no frontier, did not maintain a large garrison. The Pennine 
forts were surely a reserve directed at the north. In this 
case, as with the Welsh units, in theory these units could have 
been displaced into Scotland, as was actually tried under Pius. 
But it always proved difficult simply to move the available 
troops forward. The only thing that can explain this - for, 
after all, the Flavian period had shown that armies could be 
supplied in Scotland - is a more severe military problem in 
Scotland than in the Pennines. 
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6.4.5 An incomplete conquest in Britain compared to a 
completed frontier in Germany 
In Germany and Raetia, there was a much more rational 
completion of the process of Romanisation; the 'natural' extent 
of Roman administration was reached. There were few places 
where the frontier cut across well-populated, homogeneous zones 
of settlement; rather, as we have suggested, the frontier 
neatly took in the zones of settlement associated with the 
Rhine and Danube. This process-was rationally completed by the 
advance from the Neckar to the Outer frontier. In any case, as 
our study of the varying densities of frontier garrisons has 
suggested, the tribes in these areas were more prone to 
Romanisation. We see this in the rapid-development of 
civitates immediately behind the frontier line. Some areas of 
the Upper German frontier were seriously threatened-by external 
raiders - notably, on the evidence of installation density, the 
Wetterau; other sectors, facing apparently lightly populated 
areas, or friendly peoples, were relatively less troubled, at 
least to begin with. The lack of initial serious resistance 
beyond much of the frontier is signified by its gradual, 
bloodless advance and in places only gradual transition from a 
porous to a preclusive line. , So two attitudes shaped the Roman 
frontier: the Roman recognition of the rational limit of , 
advance, and the ready acceptance of the Romans by much of the 
native population; such attitudes were as important as the 
impersonal economic structures highlighted in the Groenman-van 
Waateringe theory in determining the detailed aspect of the 
frontier. In Britain another rational limit awaited the 
Romans, but was never permanently attained; the density of 
military dispositions in comparison to Germany would suggest 
that this had as much to do with the conscious attitude of 
native peoples as with either troop withdrawals or economics. 
Furthermore the failure to complete the task, the failure to 
enclose as a unity within the frontier a body of Romanisable-- 
population, and to isolate it from exterior influences, only 
exacerbated the problems of military occupation. 
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It is arguable that the German frontier presents a picture of 
how northern Britain might have developed if permanently 
conquered up to the Antonine Wall and the Highland line. 
Conversely, the frontier problem in Britain shows the kind that 
might have prevailed in Germany if the frontier had remained on 
the Rhine and Danube, with the'Wetterau and Neuwied basin and 
Nbrdlinger Ries left unoccupied. As well as a military problem 
in, north Britain, this may suggest a certain conservatism in 
Roman thinking there. Had Hadrian settled upon the Forth-Clyde 
Isthmus for his Wall, it might have endured - even beyond the 
160s. As it was, after the 120s, -the Romans never seem to have 
been able to tearýthemselves away from the concept of the 
Hadrianic frontier. For all protestations that works in turf 
and timber need not be impermanent, there was-something 
half-hearted about the finished appearance of the Antonine Wall 
and its forts. - In the mid-Antonine period the Romans seem to 
have drifted back to Hadrian's Wall without reluctance. The 
early second century was a time when-the permanence of, frontier 
lines was being widely established, and'Hadrian's (arguable) 
mistake in placing his Wall short of the 'natural' extent of 
Roman occupation seems to have weighed heavily on later 
generations. On the other hand, there must have been a great 
difficulty with the military situation, for the settlement of a 
permanent frontier on the Tyne-Solway to have seemed the wisest 
course-in Hadrian's time. 
In Britain from c160 until some date in the third century, a 
mixture of outposts, diplomacy and coastal control beyond 
Hadrian's Wall had to take the place of occupation up to the 
Highland line. As a result of the incomplete conquest of north 
Britain, a great military network had to become a permanent 
fixture in the north, filling the hinterland of Hadrian's Wall 
with permanent garrisons. This is direct contrast to the 
situation in Upper Germany and Raetia, where most of the 
hinterland was rapidly demilitarised. The hinterland garrisons 
of north Britain were there because they were needed for 
strategic intervention beyond the Wall, and for support of the 
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Wall system, all this only necessary because the conquest of 
north Britain remained incomplete. That such a network was not 
solely necessitated by internal unrest among a Pennine 
population which would not, or could not, Romanise, is 
suggested by Wales, where the military occupation was 
drastically thinned out from the Hadrianic period, although the 
Welsh tribes had initially put up a formidable resistance and 
always remained for the most part conspicuously unromanised. 
6.4.6, Changes in the frontiers and the threats facing them 
from the mid-second century 
In Germany there was a gradual intensification of the 
preclusive strength of the frontier, indicating that where once 
liberal and porous systems had sufficed, now more formal 
delineation of empire had to be introduced. This is seen in 
the build up of installations and addition of forts during the 
second century in various sectors, notably Strecken 1,2,3, 
and 4; this also occurs in Raetia, as for example in Strecke 
15. The suggestion was made above (4.7. S4) that fortlets were 
originally sited where local topographic requirements dictated, 
while the later fortlets placed without obvious regard to the 
topography were a response to a growing infiltration problem, 
and represent a move towards the regular provision of 
installations'against threats from increasingly unpredictable 
quarters. The addition in the Wetterau of a series of large 
(0.40ha) fortlets on the actual frontier line, but in close 
association with rearward, auxiliary forts, may also denote a 
need to concentrate more troops on the patrolled line itself, 
and therefore an intensifying problem of frontier control. 
Of course, the most graphic illustrations of the changing role 
of the German-Raetian frontier are the decisions to close the 
gap between Upper Germany and Raetia, constructing the Outer 
frontier, and,, - later, to add the Pfahlgraben and build the 
Raetian Wall. It is notable how more closely spaced are the 
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towers on the new Outer frontier between Miltenberg and Lorch. - 
Its dead straight alignment has been the source of much debate. 
It certainly implies, as do the other realignments of the-Upper 
German line, a lessening of the concern about long distance 
observation, and infiltration from particular points, displayed 
by the older, topographically sited frontier stretches. The' 
need is increasingly to draw an arbitrary, preclusive line 
across an entire landscape. 
It seems reasonable to link these changes on the Continental 
frontiers to the military crisis which assailed the frontier 
from the mid-Antonine period and which reached its climax in 
the Marcomannic wars of Marcus Aurelius. The earliest'attested 
troubles in Upper Germany and Raetia are invasions of the 
Chatti in 162 and 172 (SHA Marcus 8,7-8; SHA Didius Julianus 
1,6-9). The completion of the Outer frontier precedes these 
invasions slightly, but this may suggest that conditions on the 
frontier were degenerating into instability before the first 
invasion that we hear of in 162. This would explain the odd 
timing (at the end of Pius' reign) of the; probable date of the 
advance. Indeed, M Speidel, accepting the epigraphic evidence 
which indicates (Alf6ldy 1983) that C. Popilius Carus Pedo 
commanded extra troops in addition to the army, of Upper 
Germany, has suggested (1987,236) that: 
'The fact that in the years from 151 to 155 expeditionary 
armies had come to Germany is of great interest in assessing 
the move there to the outer limes. The Chatti must have posed 
a major threat to both German provinces and their allies, and 
indeed, six years later, in a large-scale attack, they invaded 
upper Germany as well as Raetia. In the great second-century 
drama of the European nations hurling themselves against the 
frontiers of the Empire, the Chattan war, or threat of war,, of 
151-155 is thus revealed as the first act'. 
There may even be a direct link with events in Britain, and the 
abandonment of the Antonine Wall. Speidel (1987,236-7) 
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associates the absence of British troops detached to Germany in 
151-55 with the 'Brigantian revolt' and 'first loss of the 
Antonine Wall'. He proposes that these troops, along with 
detachments from Germany and Raetia, returned to Britain in 
c158 (this providing the context for RIB 1322) to restore the 
Antonine Wall, but that their absence from Germany precipitated 
the Chattan invasion of 162, causing troop withdrawals once 
more from Britain and 'the second loss of the Antonine Wall 
around, 1631. Speidel is surely right to associate the 
construction of the Outer frontier with unrest preliminary to 
the, invasion of 162. However, the account of frontier history 
and troop movements which he arrives at takes its complex form 
because of an unquestioning assumption of the archaeological, 
fact of there having been two periods on the Antonine Wall. A 
simpler solution, in the light of the absence of evidence for 
Antonine I and II on the Antonine'Wall, would be that the 
transfer of troops from Britain to Germany in 151-55 led, by 
158, to the beginning of the process of abandoning the Antonine 
Wall, and that when legionary vexillations returned to 
Newcastle in 158 it was to assist in the restoration of 
Hadrian's Wall. Thus it is possible that the withdrawal from 
Scotland and the completion of the Upper German-Raetian 
frontier were simultaneous and associated events, precipitated 
by unrest and threats of war in Germany and Raetia, set against 
a background of-persistent military difficulty in Scotland. 
Pressure on the Continental frontier continued to increase, and 
we must see the construction of the new continuous barriers, 
and the dispositions added under'Commodus, against the 
background of the persistent unrest and instability amongst 
frontier peoples which must have accompanied the great 
Marcomannic Wars. The climax of those wars, in 169-71, with 
Roman armies defeated and plague ridden, and Italy invaded by 
barbarians, must mark a possible moment for the abandonment of 
the Antonine Wall in Scotland, as suggested by Daniels (1991) 
as a further alternative to the widely accepted date of c163. 
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In part the pressures behind this development may have been 
exacerbated by the presence of the Roman frontier itself; the 
completion of the formal frontier may have alienated once 
friendly peoples and contributed to the polarisation between an 
excluded, coalescing society anxious to share the wealth of the 
empire, and the beleaguered occupants of that empire. Thus the 
Hermunduri, noted (6.2.3) as being particularly friendly and 
trusted traders across precisely that gap in the frontier which 
the mid-Antonine completion closed, may well have resented 
exclusion beyond the new preclusive border of the empire. - Such 
tribes could in these circumstances themselves become the 
threat against which frontier installations were directed: we 
hear under, Marcus of 'tribes which had fled before the pressure 
of remoter barbarians, threatening war unless they were taken 
into the empire' (SHA Marcus 14.1). It is said that when the 
situation degenerated under Marcus, ie shortly after the 
completion of the Outer frontier, 'all the peoples from the 
limit of Illyricum as far as Gaul had conspired together' (SHA 
Marcus 22.1). Such a conspiracy perhaps involved formerly 
friendly, peoples, such as the Hermunduri. Obviously, greater 
and more distant migrations probably caused the pressures on 
these frontier peoples, but it is interesting to note that the 
Roman response -a move to a more preclusive frontier line, a 
more clear distinction everywhere, between those within, and 
those excluded from the empire --probably united the-excluded 
ones into an ever more formidable threat to the frontiers. - 
Precluded from the empire, and under pressure from westward 
tribal movements in Europe and Asia, such peoples became 
resentful and formidable opponents. 
JC Mann has suggested (1974,40-41) that an exactly similar 
situation came to prevail in Britain: I ... the rise of the 
Pictish kingdom was clearly a reaction to the continuing 
presence of Rome to the south ... The process has an exact 
parallel in the fusion of peoples on the Continent, in the face 
of Roman power, into such great federations as the Saxons, the 
Franks and the Goths. The Pictish kingdom was a product of the 
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Roman presence in Britain'. As, in the case of Germany and 
Raetia, -it is probable that the tendency towards coalescence 
amongst people north of the Highland line in Britain began at 
some time in the middle of the second century. 
6.4.7 The third century and beyond 
II 
When the German and Raetian frontiers began to be strengthened 
from the mid-second, century onwards, they began to approach, in 
places, the intensity of preclusive coverage displayed on the 
British Walls. Yet even at their most elaborate, the linear 
frontier systems of the Continent-were rarely, as-intensive as 
those of Britain. An intensification of frontier installations 
is presumably, what we might have seen if the frontier in 
Britain had stayed on the northern line. It is what we do see 
during the brief occupation of the Antonine Wall. 
However, because occupation in Britain could not be maintained 
up to the Highland line, from the mid-Antonine period into the 
third century control up to the Highlands was based upon 
outposts and diplomacy. This outward looking aspect of the 
northern frontier has long been realised. Formerly it was seen 
as 'using the outposts north of Hadrian's Wall as the bases for 
long range scouting and intelligence operations, in conjunction 
with the system of supervision implied by the loca listed by 
the Ravenna Geographer' (Mann 1974,37). In addition to the 
outpost system as long understood, we might now add the 
possibility of a 'coastal province', where distant outposts 
such as Carpow and Cramond observed and controlled affairs in 
inland areas without recourse to full occupation of the 
territory. This was a highly economical way of exerting 
control, which finds parallels elsewhere; its success may in 
part have relied upon the willingness of peoples south of the 
Highland line to cooperate with the Romans, in the face of the 
ever increasing threat from the coalescing confederation to the 
north. Perhaps it was the decay of this diplomatic agreement 
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under pressure and instability from the north which caused the 
breakdown of this system of control. 
In Germany the linear frontier, although strengthened, could 
not withstand the formidable invasions of the mid-third 
century, and by the 260s, now an anachronism from a former age 
of frontier control, was swept away. Of course, the Romans 
probably withdrew the troops themselves, becausethey were more 
urgently needed to stem the attacks on the central Danube 
frontier, which represented a threat to Italy itself. But it 
is notable that, as in the case of the Antonine Wall, it was 
not possible to continue holding the Upper German and Raetian 
land frontiers with a garrison appreciably smaller than that 
which they had possessed for so long. In Britain there was no 
linear frontier on the northern line to be swept away, but in 
an equivalent process the system of control to the north seems 
to have disappeared at some stage in-the third century, with 
even outpost forts relatively near Hadrian's Wall, such as High 
Rochester and Bewcastle, being given up by the early fourth. 
In the fourth century the British. and Continental frontiers 
still paralleled each other; each forced back from the 'natural 
limit' of expansion to a conveniently defensible rearward line 
- Hadrian's Wall in one case, the Rhine and the Danube in the 
other. And in each case a new distribution of forts, 
representing a defence in depth, had to be developed behind the 
Wall or river. 
Chapter 7 
FRONTIER DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM THE LAND-FRONTIERS OF NORTHWEST 
EUROPE, 
It is necessary to survey briefly the military frontier systems 
employed outside Britain, Upper Germany and Raetia, in order to 
establish the incidence elsewhere of formal linear systems of 
the type which formed such a consistent feature of the land 
frontiers of those three, provinces. A study of the numerous 
circumstances in which continuous linear frontiers were not in 
fact used, is useful in determining, why it might have been felt 
necessary to provide such elaborate systems particularly in 
northwest Europe. The other frontiers of the empire are 
treated under four heads; continental Europe, Dacia, the East, 
and Africa. 
7.1 Continental Europe (Figs 25,26) 
The earliest known linear arrangements of frontier garrisons 
are those that had been established by the reign of Claudius 
along the lower Rhine and upper Danube in Raetia. The latter 
was to be short-lived, apparently being an intermediate stage 
in an uninterrupted advance; but on the lower Rhine one of the 
great linear frontier cordons, which survived, intact, into 
late Antiquity, was essentially formed by the time of the halt 
on the Rhine following the cessation of Corbulo's campaign 
beyond the river in 47. 
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Although at first sight it is tempting to equate these linear 
developments with the linear dispositions in Upper Germany, 
Raetia and Britain of the Flavian period and onwards, there are 
various striking, but rarely considered differences between the 
development and function of the land and river frontiers. 
These differences go a long way to explaining why the great 
rivers did not develop in the same way the familiar 
paraphernalia (watchtowers, continuous barriers)-of linear land 
frontiers. 
It was argued above (3.3) that the lengths of artificial linear 
frontier which began to appear beyond Rhine and Danube after 
c90 (and in Scotland in either c80-81 or c90) resulted from a 
specific decision that expansion in certain areas had ceased; 
this began to happen quite suddenly, and quite late in the 
history of military affairs beyond the great rivers (and in 
Britain). The subsequentýdevelopment of these linear frontiers 
represented the working out of that decision. 
In complete contrast, the formation of the military 
dispositions arranged along the great rivers was a process that 
had been going on continuously since the Augustan-Tiberian 
period, when sites such as Bunnik-Vechten on the Lower Rhine, 
Linz in Noricum and Oescus in Moesia on the Lower Danube had 
been founded. As early as the campaigns of Lentulus (at some 
date between 10 BC and AD 11) the Danube was seen by the Romans 
as a boundary which the tribes beyond could be made to respect 
(Florus, Epitome 2,28; Wilkes 1983,276 n. 13; Syme 1971,40). 
At this early date, diplomacy and the deterrent value of 
rearward Roman forces were sufficient to control affairs on the 
Danube: 'Military occupation of the Danube frontier at the time 
of Augustus was a last resort' (M6csy 1974,36). 
It was in the Claudian period that both on the Lower Rhine and 
on the Upper Danube, sites began to accumulate in more linear 
fashion along the rivers themselves. Whether the bases along 
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the Rhine were coming to be-perceived of in a different way 
under Claudius, perhaps more in the sense of a frontier, is a 
difficult question. The archaeological evidence shows that 
development of this frontier took place in the Claudian period, 
but also that this was no new or sudden development. The 
samian ware suggestst for example, that Valkenburg may have 
been founded in the later 30s (Pferdehirt 1986,264-5). It may 
simply be that as the notion of the conquest of Germany beyond 
the Rhine receded further into the distance, and as the 
diversion of the British expedition gained momentum, it was 
found prudent to site the garrisons along the great 
communications corridor formed by the Lower Rhine. 
Although auxiliary forts were in existence-on the Danube by 
this time (and the fortress of XV Apollonaris at Carnuntum and 
bases for VIII Augusta at Novae and V Macedonica at Oescus), 
the famous career of the Moesian governor Plautius Silvanus 
Aelianus (ILS 986) demonstrates the continuation into Nero's 
reign of the Augustan policy of-predominantly diplomatic 
handling of the cross-Danube tribes, and shows that the river 
was still perceived as marking the boundary of Roman territory. 
Again, the growing concentration of forces on the river itself 
may at this stage have had as much to do with the garrisoning 
of a major artery of communication, and vital organ of 
mediation between Rome and the barbarians, as with the 
formation of any kind of preclusive cordon to prevent movement. 
Naval activity on the Danube dated from the Augustan period, 
and the famous fleets Pannonica and Moesica were active long 
before they-received their formal titles in the Flavian period 
(Starr 1941,131-2). 
At this stage in their development the great rivers and their 
dispositions of forts may be tentatively compared to the Fosse 
Way during the conquest period of Britain, where a linear 
disposition of sites should-not be taken to denote a 'frontier 
system'. On the Danube under Claudius and Nero the 'frontier 
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system' remained on the level of threatened military, power, 
diplomacy and personal relationships between Roman governors 
and-barbarian kings; the Roman military sites represent an 
aspect of*the military force that-underwrote this policy, but 
their situation was dictated mainly by considerations of 
supply, communication and dominance over local peoples. 
The Middle Danube moved decisively to the possession of a 
preclusive linear system of forts in the reign of Vespasian, 
rather than in the later Flavian period as was once thought 
(Gabler and Lbrincz 1977,174-5; Wilkes 1983,265-6). This 
great military re-organisation of the river in the Flavian 
period was a direct response to the threat posed from across 
the Danube during the civil war of 69, when, although diplomacy 
maintained the peace in Pannonia, Sarmatians were able to take 
advantage of the Romans' distraction and invade Moesia. While 
XV Apollinaris remained the sole legion based on the Pannonian 
Danube, the number of legionary bases on the Danube bank in 
Moesia rose from two to three or four under Vespasian. 
Thus it was a long-term policy to garrison the river, and as 
the policy intensified into the development of a linear chain 
of garrisons under the Flavians, the barbarian threat grew 
correspondingly more serious. Disaster struck again, beginning 
with the destruction in Moesia of Oppius Sabinus and a legion 
by the Dacians in c85-86, proceeding to the annihilation of a 
further army under Cornelius Fuscus c87, and culminating in the 
destruction of another legion c89-92 in the Suebian-Sarmatian 
war that followed Domitian's conflict with the Dacians. These 
events precipitated the movement of still more troops to the 
river line; a reaction which best explains the contemporary and 
sudden genesis of artificial watchtower frontiers in Upper 
Germany and Britain, where the Danube emergency, and its drain 
on troops, seems to-have had the effect of definitively ruling 
out the possibility of imminent further military advance. ' 
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On the eveýof Trajan's first Dacian War, while Moesia, recently 
divided'by Domitian into Superior and Inferior, still possessed 
some three or four legionary bases on the river, a transformed 
frontier in Pannonia spectacularly exhibited the measures taken 
in response to the deluge of the 80s and 90s. ýBy the end of 
the century Pannonia'had achieved its permanent total of four 
legionary bases on the Danube (Vindobona, Carnuntum, Brigetio 
and Aquincum) in addition to a formidable chain of auxiliary 
forts (Wilkes 1983,270; M6csy 1974,88; Gabler and Lbrincz 
1977). The Danube in Noricum was garrisoned by, auxiliary forts 
by the Flavian period (Wilkes 1983,270; 285 n. 84; Alfbldy 
1974,146); the Raetian Danube-frontier east-of Eining between 
c8O and c90. - Before c85, auxiliary-units had begun to 
accumulate on the Moesian-Danube (Wilkes 1983,266); by this 
time there were probably fleet bases on the lower part of the 
River (Wilkes 1983,280 n. 51). In Moesia the movement of 
auxiliary units to the river line was slower than in Pannonia, 
although Moesia Superior and Inferior soon had their-legions 
arranged on or near the river. In the immediate aftermath of 
the first Dacian war of Trajan occurs the first evidence for 
the garrisoning of the lowest part of the Danube, with two new 
legionary bases, Durostorum and Troesmis, after the second 
Dacian War (Wilkes 1983,273; Poulter 1986; 1990). 
The crisis of the 80s and 90s provides the key to the essential 
difference between the land frontiers of the northwest and the 
great river frontiers. In the former case some military 
advance had taken place beyond the Rhine in Germany and the 
lowland zone in Britain, and was gradually progressing; at once 
events dictated that these areas of military occupation should 
expand no further, and quite suddenly the limit of that 
occupation had to be carefully defined. On the great rivers, 
in contrast, ýmilitary and diplomatic power had been devolving 
onto the rivers since the Augustan age. In the former case, a 
line of security had to be invented; in the latter, a great 
line of military defence was being completed, and it was the 
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emergency which-interrupted the latter process in c86-92 which 
forced the halt in the former case, and permanently tipped the 
balance of military effort towards the Danube. 
The lengthy development of the Danube as a demarcation of 
territory, military frontier, and'garrisoned line of 
communication, helps to explain its differences from the 
artificial land frontiers of the northwest. - In this light the 
lack of evidence-for linear'frontier paraphernalia along the 
river at an early date is not so surprising. No evidence has 
yet emerged for continuous chains of timber watchtowers along 
any part of the river. Individual timber watchtowers of early 
date are known in Pannonia, near Fischamend, west of Carnuntum 
(RLO 4,23), and at Pilismar6t-Basaharc, west of Visegr6d in 
Hungary (T6th 1984; Visy 1988,70), but these have never been 
shown to be elements in continuous, cordons. It has been noted 
that individual, towers placed according to local needs may be 
characteristic of garrisoned communication lines, such as the 
Trajanic Stanegate in Britainý and in these cases signify 
something different from the towers which make up continuous 
frontier cordons. 
Although it is possible that erosion of the river's banks has 
removed the evidence, it is notable-that more towers of later 
date may still be traced, and it is tempting to wonder whether 
the long-standing nature of the great river as a recognised and 
patrolled boundary rendered the instant creation of watchtower 
systems as seen on land frontiers elsewhere unnecessary. 
Indeed watchtower systems seem to have been invented elsewhere 
specifically to provide the kind of patrollable line of 
demarcation and observation that the great rivers themselves 
had long offered, where they existed. Why, then, the apparent 
representation of a watchtower system on the Danube on Trajan's 
column at the outset of the first Dacian War (Lepper and Frere 
1988,47-8)? It is possible that some misunderstanding has 
occurred: the Danube on the Column perhaps represented the 
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concept of a frontier, and the elaborate detail with which 
frontier installations are represented on the column could have 
been drawn from the artist's knowledge-of such systems 
elsewhere; nearby examples could be found on the land 
frontier, perhaps created as early as Trajan's time, in Dacia 
beyond the Danube (7.2 below)P-and perhaps these were applied 
in error to the river frontier as represented on the column. 
It is-telling that the same absence (to date) of continuous 
watchtower systems of late-first or early-second century date 
is also characteristic of the Lower Rhine and every river 
frontier in Upper Germany, beyond the Rhine. 
However, if watchtower systems were not employed along the 
river systems, this does not mean that the river'garrisons were 
not directed against movements or infiltrations from across the 
river. On the contrary, in their developed form the 
differential distributions of forts along the Lower Rhine and 
Danube demonstrate that the army was concerned with such 
threats. The spacing of units along the Lower Rhine from the 
time of Claudius onwards was far from regular. The 120km 
between the sea and the junction of the Rhine and Waal always 
had a much greater density of forts than the remaining 160km of 
the Lower Rhine; in the former case the distance between forts 
varies between 6 and 20km, while the last 160km, before Upper 
Germany displays intervals between its irregularly spaced forts 
of up to 35km. These variations are related to the topography 
beyond the frontier. South of the Rhine-Waal confluence the 
right bank of the Rhine is overshadowed by steeply rising 
mountains, evidently acting as a natural, obstacle. North of 
the confluence, the river ran through a treacherous landscape 
of flat polders, ridges and trackways. It has been argued by W 
Willems (1986,69-70) that each of the forts in this area is 
linked to the hinterland by a direct route over a natural 
ridge; in other words they controlled routes of access that 
were both more numerous than further south, and well known to 
the native peoples of the area, for whom the river presented no 
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real obstacle in itself. In a similar way the natural 
protection of the Danube frontier of Raetia east of Eining by 
the mountain ranges of the Bbhmerwald and the Bayerisch Wald 
(Baatz 1975,277), and the absence here of a tribal population 
beyond-the frontier,, resulted in an absence of forts, in this 
sector before the mid-late, Flavian-period. Once they were - 
provided, there was a notably wide spacing; for example 40km 
between Regensburg-KumpfmUhl and Straubing. This is to be 
contrasted with, the much denser concentration of auxiliary 
forces on the middle Danube (spaced at about 20km intervals), 
facing open plains and populations. The uneven distribution of 
the legionary fortresses is closely related to population 
concentrations beyond the river. These variations show that it 
would be insufficient to think in terms of the river merely as 
a garrisoned line of communication, although it possessed that 
role: always employed as a demarcation of Roman territory, the 
Lower Rhine and Danube by the late first century functioned as 
linear systems directed at excluding certain invaders, or 
potential invaders. 
For all of the possible absence of watchtower chains, and 
certain absence of running barriers, on the great rivers, - their 
obvious linear arrangement - distinct by the time of Claudius, 
or at the very latest, on the Danube, by Vespasian's reign - 
may well have provided the direct inspiration for the invented 
land frontier systems. Furthermore, for all of their 
differences, the land and river frontiers of northwest Europe 
had one overriding similarity: each came to comprise a 
preclusive linear system arranged against the possibility of 
disruptive large-scale population movements or outright , 
invasions. In this the two basic types of northwest European 
frontier had much more in common with each other-than with the 
frontiers of Africa and the Eastern desert. 
In the great Marcomannic Wars of the 160s and 170s, the ., 
diplomatic relations with the tribes beyond the Danube were 
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torn apartf, and although interesting frontier agreements with-' 
the tribes were made under Marcus Aurelius and then Commodus, 
continued instability on the Danube now led to a provision of 
new fortresses in sectors previously lightly garrisoned; 
Regensburg in Raetia, and Lauriacum in Noricum, and the 
movement of V Macedonica from Troesmis into Dacia. If towers 
had formerly not been as important on the River frontiers as 
elsewhere, a famous series is now attested under Commodus on 
the Middle Danube. Although the system, with land frontiers 
here and there beyond the rivers, was to survive'for another 
century, the pressures that would'-eventually make the land 
security borders untenable had begun. 
For a short time, then, the northwestern land frontiers and the 
great river frontiers came'increasingly to resemble one 
another; the land frontiers, sometimes originally-thinly- 
garrisoned by detachments from a distance, acquired a denser 
garrison (we have noted the additions to the Upper-German 
frontier from the mid-second century onwards); the Danube 
eventually came to possess systems of watchtowers. The land 
frontier systems, originally security fences, came to face 
increasingly dangerous incursions; on the Danube (where the 
military threat had, ' at least in certain areas, always been 
potentially severe) infiltration grew to be a much greater 
problem as the situation deteriorated, despite a recovery of 
the situation and an extensive military and diplomatic control 
beyond the Danube under Septimius Severus and his successors 
(Pitts 1989). -But even now a further shift of military 
emphasis towards the Danube was taking place (M6csy 1974, 
200-12). Finally the land frontiers were everywhere given up 
in favour of heavily defended river frontiers of the type which 
the Danube had long known. Against the long history of the 
river frontiers bequeathed by Augustus, the land frontier in 
Upper Germany and Raetia was really very short-lived (although 
rationally conceived and completed in its own terms)., It was 
an artificial invention, left out, on a limb as a result of the 
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Danubian crisis, already-having to adapt itself to intensifying 
dangers by the time of its completion. Neither did the new 
late-Roman frontiers on Upper Rhine and Danube display the 
characteristic installationýcordons of the lost, artificial land 
frontiers. 
7.2 Dacia (Fig 26) 
One aspect of the crisis on the Danube in the 80s had been 
Domitian's War against the Kingdom of Dacia. Whereas pro-Roman 
factions-could successfully be maintained amongst the Quadi and 
Marcomanni until the 160s (Pitts 1989), these peoples being 
subsidised in order to prevent them uniting with the formidable 
Sarmatians beyond, the dangerous-independence of the Dacian 
state necessitated more and more direct Roman intervention. 
The persistent reluctance of Decebalus' kingdom to form a 
stable part of the Roman diplomatic settlement beyond the 
Danube frontier led to its destruction by Trajan in his two 
great wars, and the creation of a Roman province beyond the 
river. The sophistication of the Dacian state, which possessed 
a stable political structure (Wilkes 1983,264), of course 
tended to make it an easier proposition for absorption into the 
Roman world; to Trajan, the annexation of such a militarily 
important area, containing a recalcitrant kingdom of 
near-Hellenistic type, must have seemed a matter of urgency. 
The military importance of Dacia is revealed by Hadrian's 
division of the new territories into provinces which could work 
in concert with the Danube military commands in order to 
enclose the Iazyges to the west and the Roxolani to the east 
(Wilkes 1983,275). 
In Dacia after-106 a land frontier had to be developed, and 
significantly it was of a different kind from its predecessor 
on the Danube, displaying artificial cordons of installations 
(and later continuous barriers) analogous to those in Upper 
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Germany and Britain, where the first linear frontier works had 
been pioneered. 
The Dacian kingdom was centred on the Transylvanian plateau, 
made a natural fortress by the surrounding Carpathian and 
Apuseni mountains. Viable routes through the mountains are 
formed by the rivers Olt, running south into the Danube, the 
Mures, running into the Tisa to the west, and the Meses and the 
Somes, which run through a wide gap in the northwestern part of 
the mountains. -This was always the most vulnerable part of-the 
Dacian frontier, with rough but passable country which invited 
infiltration. 
Under Trajan, Dacia possessed two legionary fortresses, at 
Bersobis (12) (IV Flavia) andApulum (87) (XIII Gemina), both 
at key points on the routes leading to the heart of the 
kingdom. The reduced Dacias Porolissensis, Superior and 
Inferior established by Hadrian- possessed a single legion 
(Apulum), and saw the abandonment of Transdanubian Moesia. 
In the frontier system as elaborated under Trajan and Hadrian, 
it was the areas unprotected by the natural"Carpathian frontier 
which received the majority of installations. A ring of forts 
lay behind the Carpathians, individual sites guarding natural 
routes through the mountains. Key points in the west (IV) 
included Tibiscum (17),. which was extended to 5.44ha and housed 
up to three units; it is generally supposed that part of such a 
force would always have been outposted to frontier watchtowers 
or fortlets, but in this sector these await discovery. Micia 
(19), very large at c6.50ha, continued to be important, holding 
both an ala and a cohort at the point where the Mures valley 
from the west and the route from Viminacium to the southwest 
intersected. The use of large multi-unit sites at vulnerable 
passages and key points like this is different from the more 
regular spacing of single unit forts on the second century 
frontiers of Britain and Germany, where rather than plugging 
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holes in a natural frontier the Romans had to draw a line more 
arbitrarily through homogeneous areas; ýhowever, such multi-unit 
strong points recall the use of forts such as Echzell in the 
early Wetterau arrangements of c90-100. Other important sites 
in the northwestern Carpathian passage, were the Porolissum 
forts (25,26), Romanas (23) and Tihau (27). In the eastern 
Carpathians, important sites included Livezile, Brincovenesti, 
Calugareni and Sarateni (30,32-34)., 
The Olt, already a garrisoned route under Trajan, was provided 
with stone forts under Hadrian. Hadrianic inscriptions date 
Radacinesti (74), Bivolari (76) (Gudea 1980,804) and Copaceni 
(79) (Cataniciu 1981,29; the characteristic plans and sizes, of 
these forts allow the dating of others by analogy, including 
Racovita (80), Titesti (78) and Acidava (69). As far north as 
Castra Traiana (73) the Olt forts may have had a Trajanic 
foundation. Beyond the Olt (in the same-way that Hadrian's 
Wall and the Raetian frontier were constructed in advance of 
pre-existing roads) the 'Transalutanian' line of forts 
apparently originated under Hadrian (Cataniciu 1986). The 
so-called limes Transalutanus protected Hadrian's Dacia 
Inferior south of the Carpathians against the open plains of 
eastern Wallachia. 
Gudea (1979) has usefully divided the defences of Dacia into 
the sectors referred to here, and suggested a, theory of the, 
working of the system as it must have existed from the reign of 
Hadrian. The system is said to comprise three elements: a 
central defence with mobile forces (D), the legions, at Apulum, 
and, after 170, Potaissa. Then there was an intermediate ring 
of forts, manned mainly with cavalry units (E); at one of them, 
Optatiana (91), Dacia's ala milliaria was housed for a time. A 
road system, imperfectly traced, most probably allowed movement 
around the circuit of these forts, and also fanned out to allow 
access to the outer frontier forts. Thirdly, the outer 
frontier forts (V, VI, VII) generally contained infantry. 
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These forts usually kept the Carpathians in front ofthem, and 
it is on the heights between 3 and-10km beyond the forts that 
systems of watchtowers have been traced for long distances. 
Some 61 towers are known in the Meses sector in the northwest. 
All are of stone; dimensions vary, and both square and circular 
examples have been found. It is curious that no timber towers 
have been found, but this does not mean that they did not 
exist. There is no dating evidence but the range of towers, 
can hardly represent, a single date, and some, eg Poieni, have 
exhibited more than one phase. Smaller valleys have also been 
found to be guarded by burgi, by which Roumanian archaeologists 
seem to mean fortlets; and by short stretches of earth rampart 
(Cataniciu 1981,49). 
Although intricate attempts have been made to show how such 
towers may have functioned as advance warning systems for 
individual forts (see, eg, Gudea 1986, figs. 17-19; Gudea 1971, 
fig. 1), others have rightly considered (Macrea 1969,231) the 
Meses towers to form 'a closed limes, built to the pattern of 
the one in Upper Germany' (Ferenczi 1967, esp. fig. 4: 
conveniently reproduced in Maxfield 1987,183; Cataniciu 1981, 
101 n. 438). The often reproduced map of towers on the heights 
in relation to Bologa fort displays a-linear arrangement to the 
towers, and a closeness of spacing (in places less than lkm, 
even though some-towers in the series probably await discovery) 
that would be superfluous if, these were signal stations 
communicating hostile movements to the fort. On the contrary 
this system of towers seems to follow the model of the classic 
northwestern watchtower systems in being directed towards close 
ground surveillance as well as linear communication. The 
references to stretches of running barrier and fortlets in 
lesser valleys reinforces the picture of an artificial frontier 
closely related to the examples otherwise confined to Britain, 
Upper Germany and Raetia. In Dacia the extreme nature of the 
topography has simply rendered the system less continuous; this 
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is of great interest in emphasising the practical nature of 
such'border installations; in Dacia in their discontinuous 
state they can hardly have legally defined the boundary-of the 
empire. 
In the northern sector, too, in front of the forts of Tihau, 
Casei and Ilisua (27-29) (VI), a series of towers and fortlets 
has been traced. At least 50 sites are suspected as Roman 
towers, and there can be little doubt that these also represent 
a continuous watchtower frontier (Gudea 1979,74; Cataniciu 
1981,, 49-50). 
A better known system of walls lies in front of the forts and 
town of Porolissum, where'the Carpathians break to admit 
raiders. Here an earth-bank (8.50m wide at base, 1.50m 
surviving height), with ditch (3.50m wide, 1.40m deep), stone 
towers, and fortlets, runs for 4km. In places a stone wall 
replaces the bank. At one point, there is a double line, 
although, whether this represents two periods is not clear, 
(Cataniciu 1981,48-49). 
On the 'limes Transalutanus' a continuous frontier wall was 
provided. Although there is no dating evidence, there are 
indications that the barrier itself may have been provided at a 
later date than the forts themselves; it cuts through one of 
the Baneasa forts; its relationship to the northeast angle of 
Flaminda suggests that the fort existed first. Of varying 
dimensions (according to Cataniciuls (1981) description of the 
unpublished account by Tocilescu), the barrier is recorded 
having no ditch and two discernible phases:. first, a timber 
construction, filled with earth, and burnt in places; second, 
an earth mound heaped over the remains of the former., It is 
argued by Cataniciu (1981,33) that the barrier was only 
supplied in limited sectors of plain where no natural obstacle 
was provided by high ground: between the forts of Flaminda (51) 
on-the Danube and Gresia (56), and between Urluieni (58-9) and 
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Albota (63); however, it is possible that more once existed and 
has been destroyed by modern agricultural activity. This could 
also apply to early watchtowers along the transalutanian line. 
At present only individual tower sites are known. 
7.3 The East 
7.3.1 Arabia and Southern Syria: the desert frontier 
In Arabia and Syria Roman military control reached'a natural 
frontier at the edge of the desert. The frontier installations 
roughly coincide with the line east of which there is 
insufficient rainfall to sustain efficient dry farming (Banning 
1987,53; see map with-sites and 200mm isohyet in Gregory and 
Kennedy 1985). The great caravan routes coming into Syria from 
the Red Sea and from the East also skirted the borderland 
between desert and sown, for they took the most direct routes 
without actually plunging into the remote desert, in the manner 
of a-maritime periplus. These routes could not lose sight of 
water sources. A lesser trade route came from the Arabian 
peninsula through the Wadi Sirhan. All these routes had to be 
protected, for the prosperity of the cities of Syria and Arabia 
depended on their traffic (Rostovtzeff 1932,1-35; Jones 1937, 
228; Matthews 1984,170-1). On this desert frontier the Romans 
often left the policing to others, Palmyra being the most 
famous example. It was not Roman soldiers, but a-certain 
Soados, a private citizen of Hadrianic Palmyra, who was thanked 
in an inscription for saving 'the recently arrived caravan from 
Vologesias from the great danger that surrounded it' (Matthews 
1984,167). Sooner or later the protection of caravans and the 
pursuit of, bedouin raiders became concerns of the Roman army 
throughout Arabia and Syria, although the strata Diocletlana 
did not have-to be built until after the fall of Palmyra in 
273. It is notable that the frontier installations, on the 
desert edge coincide with the principal routes; little 
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permanent military occupation is recorded beyond or away from 
them. The other major job which confronted the Roman army, on 
the same desert fringe was the monitoring of seasonal movements 
of transhumants in and out of the sedentary areas (Parker 1986, 
8; 129; Banning 1986). What would have, been the point of 
constructing continuous barriers over a very long distance to 
exclude a desert with very few inhabitants except nomads who 
approached the agricultural zone by predictable routes? - There 
is very little evidence for serious nomadic raids across the 
frontier before the late-Roman period (Isaac 1990,72), 
although some (eg Parker 1992,468-70) have postulated more 
raiding than that for which there is direct evidence. 
This situation contrasts sharply with that on the European , 
frontiers where there were more serious military threats at an 
early date and a persistent tendency towards large-scale and 
destabilising population movement,, Even where, as was argued 
for Upper Germany and Raetia, the occupation of a well-defined 
area beyond the great rivers was rationally completed, the 
process still, left populations excluded from the area of 
occupation and therefore led to a border problem, and the 
eventual invention of ever more elaborate artificial - 
installations, for the points of diffusion were more numerous 
and less predictable than on the edge of the Syrian or Arabian 
desert. In the west, auxiliary units tended to remain 
concentrated in undivided form in their own bases, which were 
themselves, concentrated along the linear frontiers or in the 
frontier zones (the rather exceptional use of detachments on 
the Antonine Wall was a function of the need to concentrate 
more troops there than originally intended). 
Syria and-Arabia do not display the same intensive 
concentration of a'frontier army along an outer line as is seen 
in the western frontier provinces (except Britain); rather the 
army in the East enjoyed a peculiarly close relationship with 
cities. The Hellenised provinces of the East attracted Roman 
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forces. to their urban centres, in clear contrast'toýthe West. 
In the-province of Arabia, Petra, Gerasa and Philadelphia held 
vexillations (Kennedy 1980a, 289-302), while the capital city 
of Bostra was the base of III Cyrenalca. A legionary, presence 
was long maintained in the cities of Jerusalem and Caparcotna 
in'Palestine. At Palmyra and Dura a bewildering range of 
legionary vexillations and auxiliary units is attested in the 
second and third centuries (Rey-Coquais 1978,68-9). ' In 
northern Syria, although little is known in detail about the 
legionary bases, IV Scythica and XVI, Flavia Firma seem to'have 
been connected with Zeugma and Samosata, principal cities of 
the kingdom of Commagene. 
This relationship between the army, and cities has recently been 
explained in terms of the need to control subjugated 
populations (Isaac 1990), but this only seems really convincing 
for the legions stationed in Palestine. Nor, can it simply be 
that the region was sufficiently urbanised to allow the army 
naturally to gravitate to cities for its accommodation, for in 
the province of Africa,, where cities were well developed, along 
the coast and coastal plains, the army soon left the cities 
behind and developed its own network of communication and 
occupation in advance of the city areas, ie more in the style 
of western frontier systems. 'The one factor that the Eastern 
frontier was unique in possessing was an external threat, in 
the shape of Parthia, of equal sophistication and military 
potential to Rome. This entailed the permanent garrisoning of 
a large legionary force on'the Eastern frontier. However, the 
combination of a state powerful enough to stall Roman advance, 
and the geographic circumstance that (in contrast to Africa) 
the desert began close to the city zone, dictated that the 
legions be accommodated in the coastal cities of Syria, 
Palestine and Arabia. Against this background the basing of 
legions seems to have been carried out with broad strategic 
considerations in mind, cities usually having developed at 
nodes of communication which formed natural bases for mobile 
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troops. Key cities such as Samosata and Zeugma were 
safeguarded, as well as cities on the principal routes between 
the Mediterranean and the interior, as the continuing legionary 
activity at Raphanaea and Apamea illustrates. The continued 
use of Raphanaea and the Severan use of Apamea by legions also 
shows a partial continuation of the Augustan policy of 
concentrating the eastern legions in the Syrian coastal area so 
that they could be employed rapidly where required (Mann 1974, 
522-3). Although the legions in Palestine were no doubt 
situated with internal control in mind, III Cyrenalca at Bostra 
was placed as far north as possible in Arabia, so that while 
watching that province it also could swiftly intervene in any 
mobilisation against Parthia further north. This anticipates 
the late-Roman situation where seiges of cities formed the 
centre-pieces of the wars between Rome and Persia, and 
indicates an awareness, as early as the second century, that in 
a rich urban area that was theoretically open to invasion by 
Parthia, the legions were better employed in the cities 
themselves than on the desert edge, where, after all, the 
threat posed by nomads was insignificant enough to be dealt 
with by a very small frontier force on its own. The great 
military presence in the East - another contrast with Africa - 
therefore, had little connection with the small, scattered 
'desert castles' which, policed the routes into sedentary land. 
In the event of war with Parthia the arrangement of posts which 
has been from time to time interpreted as a linear system would 
become irrelevant to whatever military struggle ensued (which 
would typically involve cities and mobile forces). It is 
misleading to explain the specific function and^historical 
development of frontier installations in terms of major 
historical wars, although it is standard to centre 
interpretations of the eastern frontier on the chronicle of the 
wars between Rome and her eastern neighbour. 
Units living in cities seem to have been prone to outposting in 
detachments (Rey-Coquais 1978,70) to carry out the small-scale 
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police work necessary on the desert frontier. ' In Arabia the 
trade routes which contributed so much to the prosperity of the 
cities were policed from small forts placed at points of 
water-supply so that caravan raiders could be deprived of it 
and transhumants carefully watched and regulated. Hence , 
watchtowers and forts on wadisýrunning east-west. The location 
of military sites (where they are not simply stations on the 
strategic-north-south, road) in corridors of access from the 
East is clear from any general map of Roman dispositions on the 
Arabian frontier, (eg Parker 1986,1390). Bowersock (1983,105) 
writes that 'along the approaches from the east into the Wadi 
Hasa and the Wadi Mujib there are thick clusters of forts and 
watchtowers that protect the settled land'. 
Even so, few of these sites can be shown to be earlier than 
Tetrarchic in date. The Severan outposts of Qasr Uweinid and 
probably Qasr Asaikhin and Qasr Azraq, which supervise the 
major Wadi Sirhan, may be seen in this light (Kennedy 1980b). 
To the south, on the route which runs parallel to and east of 
the via nova Tralana, following the Darlbel Haj, the fort at 
Jurf ad Darawish, for which a thirdýcentury date has been 
cautiously argued (Parker 1986,91), is typical at only 0.13ha. 
It-is part of one of a series of clusters of installations 
occurring on wadis running west to the via nova. In this case 
the fort is connected with the approach to the Wadi Hasa. In 
the wadi itself, less than 20km to the north, lie two sites, Er 
Ruweihi and Umm Ubtulah, which may have had their beginnings in 
the Principate (Parker 1986,89). Most sites on the frontier, 
however, such as Qasr Bshir, on an approach to the Wadi Mujib 
and only 0.31ha in area, cannot be shown to be as early as the 
second or third centuries. Even if we take the frontier at its 
period of maximum elaboration, from-Diocletian onwards, there 
is no continuous linear system to be seen, even though much 
work has been carried out with the expectation of a linear 
frontier having existed at some time. Its real absence-is, 
revealed by the maps published by Parker (1986,138-40). 
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Parker (1980,871) clearly characterises the Diocletianic 
frontier in Central Arabia as a broad fortified zone. He 
argues that this entailed the abandonment of 'the Antonine 
concept of a linear defence'. But on the available evidence 
others have argued that the Arabian frontier, -from the start, 
had not been linear, but rather a fortified region (Bowersock 
1983). Taking the most generous view of the likelihood of 
sites being Principate period, they seem mostly small, widely 
spaced, and their position determined by the relation between 
settled and desert areas and by routes. While it is easy to 
see howthey may have protected traffic on the great 
north-south arteries-and supervised nomads using predictable 
corridors of access, it is difficult to see how these small 
posts, scattered in clusters, could have prevented large 
numbers of raiders or invaders,, in-any strategic or tactical 
way, from crossing the frontier. 
On the southern sector of the via nova it has been claimed that 
Roman forts established in the early second century formed a 
defended frontier line (Parker 1986, '112; see also 1985,76). 
Even if it is accepted that forts existed on these sites at 
such an early date - some have doubted their very existence 
(for example, Eadie 1986,246-7; Lander 1986,447-8) - and we 
accept Humayma, Quweira, Khalde and Kithara as Trajanic 
stations spaced at 20km intervals, 'it must be said that the 
frontier this has been said to resemble (Parker 1986,129)'JI the 
Stanegate in Britain, is itself most unlikely to have formed a 
linear defended frontier (2.4 above). One of the aspects of 
the Stanegate which militated against its identification as a 
linear frontier was the amount of Roman military activity which 
persisted far to the north of the road line, probably even 
after c105, and certainly at the period when forts along the 
Stanegate were at roughly 20km intervals. This should recall' 
Graf's demonstration that Roman military and diplomatic control 
did not stop short on the via nova: inscriptions from Rawwafa, 
over 200km beyond the Trajanic road, in the Hejaz, show Rome in 
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the 160s dealing with a confederation of nomadic tribes, 
presiding over their meeting place and acting as an 
intermediary in their disputes (Graf 1978; 1989). As in the 
case of the Stanegate, the, real reason for the placing of forts 
along the via nova was the need to safeguard an important, road. 
7.3.2 Northern Syria and Cappadocia: frontiers bordering on 
kingdoms 
Moving north of Arabia and the desert part of the Syrian 
frontier, there was a greater legionary presence as befitted 
the parts of the eastern frontier covering the possible 
northern routes between Parthian and Roman empires. The 
establishment of legions in three bases along the Euphrates - 
Zeugma, Samosata, Melitene - and a fourth at Satala, has been 
seen as a deliberate Flavian policyýdirected-at the threat 
posed by tribes in the Caucasus and those pushing them from' 
beyond (Bosworth 1976): in fact something closely related to 
the contemporary development on the Danube. In the east there 
was the additional factor of deteriorating relations with 
Parthia in the aftermath of Nero's war in Armenia. 
In Cappadocia a general paucity of evidence for accompanying 
auxiliary sites along the Euphrates beforeýthe third century 
has led to the suggestion (Crow 1986b, 87-8) that before that 
date there was no linear system on the river, and that the 
distribution of military inscriptions beyond the river line 
indicates a more complex form of diplomatic and military 
control reaching far into Armenia. Crow further suggests that 
the one known Flavian auxiliary inscription from the 
Cappadocian Euphrates (Dascusa) may relate to the garrisoning 
of the river crossing of a likely east-west road. However, on 
the model of the Danube (or for that matter, Hadrian's Wall), a 
strong military presence beyond the Euphrates would not be 
incompatible with garrisons on the river itself, and it must 
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remain a possibility that early sites have escaped detection. 
The Antonine, Itinerary names places per ripam (as does the 
later Notitia Dignitatum), showing that sites existed in the 
third century of which no structural trace has yet been seen; 
they may very well have had a Flavian origin. If this was the 
case the Euphrates and Cappadocian land frontier may have been 
developed as a garrisoned line at the same time as the burst of 
Flavian activity on the Danube. The same epigraphic evidence 
used, to argue, for the absence of a linear system before c200 
has been taken-to imply a Flavian linear frontier building 
programme in the decade after 76 (French 1989,2-3). 
Unfortunately the lack of, evidence - and exploration-- means 
that the question must remain, undecided for the time being. 
However, what does seem beyond doubt, is that, "even if auxiliary 
sites on'the river come to light, the Euphrates resembles the 
river frontiers of Europe in possessing none of the 
paraphernalia of land frontiers. Interestingly, there is a 
similar lack of evidence of watchtowers or barriers on the land 
frontier between the Euphrates and Trabzon. - 
Although, no elaborate system of frontier installations has come 
to light, --it is doubtful whether anythingýapproaching an 
artificial frontier on the western model should be expected. 
The Cappadocian Euphrates, and the more northerly (later known) 
frontier line, cutting through the Pontic Alps from the 
Euphrates to Trabzon (via Satala), ran through an inhospitable 
natural frontier land. This was pierced by certain routes 
suitable for strategic penetration, and the known legionary 
sites were established to control these points. These are not 
the circumstances in which continuous barriers or watchtower 
cordons were ever employed elsewhere. In the natural barrier 
of the Dacian Carpathians, for example, the provision of any 
kind of installation, including auxiliary forts, is thin or 
non-existent in comparison to the openings through the chain; 
on parts of the Danube facing mountains, forts were very widely 
spaced. Watchtowers (of unknown date) have been detected at 
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individuallocations on, the Euphrates (Crow and French 1980, 
910), but these may relate to particular points where passage- 
was easier, and, like the individually sited towers on the - 
Danube, need not imply a continuous chain. In any case, they 
may well be late-Roman. 
Furthermore, D French (1989,2) has emphasised the connection 
between the wholesale absorption of the former client states-of 
Cappadocia, Pontus and Commagene, and the creation of the 
Flavian road system, and perhaps riverine frontier, on the 
Euphrates: 'In, annexing... [Cappadocia and Commagene] ... the 
Romans were undoubtedly faced with an inherited concept of 
territoriality'. In these circumstances, the creation of a 
military frontier on the well-known and defined boundaries of 
ancient kingdoms did not necessitate the artificial delineation 
of a frontier, any more than on the Danube. 
Thus it seems that, even if conceived as a potential line of 
defence under the Flavians, and supplied with legions, the 
Cappadocian frontier, by virtue of its strategic (rather than 
blanket preclusive) role, natural protection, and the 
diplomatic relationship enjoyed with Armenia, differed from 
those in Europe. In Cappadocia the threats were more specific 
and strategic: there was less need to construct a blanket 
frontier against unpredictable and unstable population 
movement. The boundary between Rome and the states beyond was 
well known and clearly marked. The closest relative of this 
frontier was the Danube, but the latter faced a volatile 
barbarian threat rather than sophisticated states, whether 
allied or, like Parthia, potentially hostile. 
7.3.3 The Black Sea Forts 
Sometimes perceived as a linear arrangement is the remarkable 
series of forts flung out from Trabzon (at the northern end of 
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the Cappadocian land frontier) and spaced around-the eastern 
end of. the Black Sea. Some of these forts were evidently held 
as early as Vespasian's time (Braund 1989,33); by Hadrian's 
reign it is known from Arrian's-Periplus that at least four 
forts were garrisoned beyond Trabzon: Hyssus, and three major 
forts on the Colchian coast stretching as far as Sebastopolis. 
Beyond this a further fort at Pityus, not recorded by Arrian as 
being garrisoned,, may have been held before and was held after 
his time (Braund 1989,33; ND Or. 38,, 32). Speidel ('1986, 
658-9) has suggested a military site at Petra on the basis of a 
tile-stamp from Phasis. 
Trabzon 
24 
Hyssus 
[Rhizus) 
150km 
Absarus 
100km [Petra] 
Phasis 
120km 
Sebastopolis 
60km 
15, cohorts' 
400 men 
[Pityus] 
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Although this system of forts has in the past been perceived as 
'a massive defensive system equivalent in purpose to the 
installations ranged along the Cumberland coast to protect the 
flank of Hadrian's Wall' (Mitford 1977,509), it is fairly 
clear that the Black Sea forts do not have an analogous role to 
the Cumbrian coast stations. - The latter protected the Roman 
province from attacks from the sea; the Black Sea forts were 
flung beyond Roman occupied territory. They in fact formed a 
system of outposts, intended to watch and interfere in the 
affairs of, and no doubt be the channels of diplomatic 
relations with, the complex of peoples living in the Pontic and 
Colchian regions, - and beyond (Braund 1989). 
If a parallel must, be found for this kind of remote military 
control by use of coastal stations, it may be seen in north 
Britain, where, as was suggested above (5.6), coastal bases may 
have maintained control of a 'coastal province' on the eastern 
coast of Scotland in the first half of the third century. 
Although the overall distance around the Black Sea is much 
greater than that covered by the known Scottish coastal 
outposts, the intervals between individual anchorages/military 
bases are quite comparable; 100km between Absarus and Phasis, 
and 120km between Phasis and Sebastopolis, as compared to, say, 
a 120km sail from Cramond to Carpow. 
While thus providing a fascinating example of long-distance 
Roman military and diplomatic control, the Black Sea forts, 
like the forts of the Scottish coastal province, do not 
represent a formal linear frontier in the preclusive sense. 
They mark the economical and remote control of peoples who lay 
within Rome's constituency, but who for one reason or another 
could not be directly occupied; because of-the incomplete 
nature of the conquest of north Britain in the Scottish case, 
and because of the vast distances involved and the relatively 
stronger tradition of stable client relationships in the 
eastern example. The Colchian world was a natural extension of 
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the Pontic world of Cappadocia, and as with the coastal plains 
of eastern Scotland, there was'a finite amount of it over which 
control could be exerted by coastal means. No such opportunity 
offered itself beyond the mainland frontiers of Europe, where 
any successful direct'control beyond the linear frontiers would 
have had to have been part of a renewed large-scale conquest 
and occupation. 
7.4 Africa 
7.4.1 Mauretania Tingitana (Fig 28) 
This was one of the two provinces formed out of the-old 
client-kingdom of Mauretania under Claudius. Its relative lack 
of military importance is signified by the appointment of an 
equestrian procurator as governor. Yet the garrison of the 
province was proportionally as large (in comparison to its 
size) as those of Caesariensis or Africa. The formally 
governed Roman province remained confined to the prosperous 
cities of the coast and plains, between Tingis, Sala and 
Volubilis, while beyond, Moorish chieftains in the upland 
interior, and, of course, more distant desert tribes, 
maintained their independence, presumably by means of 
diplomatic relationships with Rome. The contact between Roman 
governors and the Baquates outside the province, including the 
occasional grant of citizenship to their chieftains, is one of 
the best epigraphically attested examples of such a 
relationship. In Mauretania Tingitana, then, rather than a' 
drive for all out conquest of the peoples inhabiting two 
considerable mountain ranges (The Rif and the Atlas) and the 
pre-desert steppe, we see a kind of survival of the old system 
of diplomatic rather than direct controll' which on most 
frontiers had passed away by the Julio-Claudian or Flavian 
periods. Relationships with'these peoples were perhaps not so 
different from the ones that had prevailed before the 
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annexation of the old kingdom of Mauretania, from which Tingis 
had in any case been detached as a Roman city since the time of 
Augustus, alongside colonies at Zilis, Banasa and Babba. 
Despite the-use of the term-'Le limes de Tingitanel (Euzennat 
1989), the garrison of the province in the high empire was in 
fact not arranged in a linear disposition, but seems rather to 
have been distributed for the protection of these individual 
cities, theirýattached agricultural zones, and the - 
communications between them. The so-called 'Limes of the 
Seboul may convincingly be seen as a road linking Sala, 
Thamusida, and Banasa, and passing thence to the provincial 
capital at Tingis. It would seal off nothingexcept a very 
narrow strip of coastline. --The towers known along the road do 
not form-a continuous cordon in the characteristic sense of a 
northwest European land frontier, and like other examples of 
'individual' towers are better seen as having protected traffic 
along the route. The Volubilis Ilimes!, seems merely to be a 
concentration of installations intended to alert that 
individual city to the approach of raiders, and to safeguard 
communications. The well-known stretch of Ifossatuml at Sala 
likewise provides protection., for that city and cannot be shown 
to have been part of a continuous linear system; it may 
plausibly be identified with the wall built around the town 
mentioned in the inscription set up in 144 in honour of 
Sulpicius Felix, a praefectus equitum stationed there. 
Euzennat (1989) has argued that rather than being the-commander 
of a nearby cavalry unit (as previously thought), this man was 
a deputy of the governor, in charge of a detachment of troops 
with the special task of safeguarding the city and its 
immediate surroundings. The inscription records-that he 
protected flocks from raids, intervened-in financial disputes, 
protected citizens working in woods and fields outside the 
city, and built a wall for its protection. Another such 
praefectus equitum is attested at Sala. The attachment of such 
special officers to a city in this way underlines the specific 
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role of the military installations of Tingitana, which did not 
form a fortified border to the province. 
7.4.2 Mauretania Caesariensis (Fig 29) 
In the other part of the old client kingdom, in contrast, the 
province graduallyýexpanded up toýthe edge of the pre-desert 
steppe in order to incorporate tribes within the system of 
direct imperial administration. The earliest distinctly linear 
arrangement of military installations occurs along the main 
east-west road through the province, along the Ch6lif valley, 
from Zarai via Auzia and'Rapidum, to Albulae and the coast at 
Siga, rather short of Mauretania Tingitana. The military 
settlement of-this line is epigraphically dated to the 
Trajanic-Hadrianic period. 
Although this has sometimes been seen as a defended linear 
frontier, the Ch6lif road is better seen, as 'a conveniently 
placed army of occupation' (Mann 1974,528) distributed to 
safeguard a key route. The spacing of the known military 
sites, which tends to be between 30 and 50km, exposes the 
porosity of this system in comparison to such garrisoned 
military roads as the Stanegate in Britain, let alone 
intensively garrisoned preclusive frontiers. ' There is 
epigraphic evidence of towers on thisýroad; at Auzia in the 
early 180s (ILS 396) new towers were-being built and old ones 
rebuilt; we hear-that at Albulae in 183-4 (CIL 8.22629) the 
province was defended by new towers. However, there is no 
evidence that these towers ever formed a continuous cordon, and 
it most likely that, as on the eastern model, they watched over 
traffic on the road or were clustered at particular points 
where movement - not necessarily of a militarily hostile nature 
- needed to be supervised. There is no evidence for continuous 
barriers of any kind in Caesariensis. 
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Under-Severus a more southerly line was garrisoned, at the edge 
of the pre-desert plateau, -for the most part south of the main 
coastal mountain ranges. This also has been interpreted as a 
defended frontier line (Rachet 1970; Benabou 1976), although 
like the more northerly, it displays none of the preclusive 
systems of towers or closely spaced fort systems that were a 
feature of defended frontier lines elsewhere. The fort spacing 
was in fact extremely wide, varying between 35 and 50km (Salama 
1977,586). Milestones give the road the appellation nova 
praetentura. Praetentura is not a term known to have been 
applied to defended frontier systems during the high empire, 
and there is no reason to give it anything other than its 
literal meaning: 'a new forward military disposition'. There 
is, in, short, no reason for considering the nova praetentura 
any"less a porous, non-preclusive system of forts than its 
predecessor in the Ch6lif valley. Salama (1977,581), however, 
has noted the greater incidence of alae on the Severan line, an 
indication of its role in monitoring the nomads of the 
plateaux, whereas the early-second century road garrison, where 
more cohorts were provided, was more concerned with mountain 
tribes. Salama has also made the interesting point that the 
Severan system, covering a, considerable distance with a very 
small garrison, seems to have been quickly and easily 
completed, suggesting that local peoples cooperated. Several 
far-flung outposts were provided in the pre-desert from the 
Antonine period onwards, reaching a peak in the, Severan period. 
These are considered under Numidia, for it was the army-of III 
Augusta, stationed there, which provided the garrisons for 
these outposts. 
7.4.3 Numidia (Fig 29) 
Although the western part of proconsular Africa, including the 
southern frontier area, did not become the separate province of 
Numidia. until the third century, the name Numidia is used 
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throughout here-to refer to the western military dispositions 
of the African province, in order to avoid confusion between 
the Roman use of the term Africa, and our modern use of it in 
the sense of the whole continent. In any case, since Gaius had 
removed the control of the military from the proconsul and 
placed it in the hands of his own legate, Numidia must rapidly 
have become a separate administrative entity. Although it 
remained in the control of-the proconsul, the area of 
Tripolitania, which likewise became a separate province in the 
Severan period, will be treated in the same way. 
In Numidia, to a greater extent than in Caesariensis, -the army 
came to mediate relations between a prosperous coastal area 
with many cities, and-a pre-desert zone populated by nomads. 
On the way to its final dispositions, the army-surrounded and 
pacified the Aurds massif: III-Augusta was based at Tebessa by 
c75, and the first fort at Lambaesis established shortly after 
in 81. By Hadrian's reign the legion was based at Lambaesis; 
meanwhile the Trajanic-Hadrianic period had seen an advance 
around the south side of the massif, via Ad Majores (built 104) 
to join the dispositions near Lambaesis at Thabunae. The fort 
at Gemellae, to the southwest of the Aur6s, was established 
under Hadrian. 
In the area of these last forts actual running barriers 
appeared, conventionally in the Hadrianic period. Knowný 
primarily from the air reconnaissance and ground exploration of 
Colonel J Baradez (1949), there is no close direct dating for 
the so-called Fossatum Africae, although pottery found by 
Baradez was taken to show a Hadrianic date; this could be 
supported by the known date of the associated fort at Gemellae, 
built 125-6. The fossatum falls into three principal sectors. 
That south of Gemellae runs for 60km and consists of a ditch 
fronting a mud-brick wall. Baradez,, in an account clearly 
influenced by knowledge of Hadrian's Wall in Britain, argued 
for an extremely regular system of towers and gates, with a 
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tower placed half-way between each pair of gates, placed at 
mile-intervals. However, this regularity has been seriously 
doubted by more recent observers. There is the obvious 
difficulty of knowing how much of what can be seen on the 
ground belongs to the same period; it has been claimed that 
Baradez's gateways are difficult to detect on the ground, and 
that there are 'considerably more towers than Baradez's account 
suggests, some-on or very close to the wall, others, sometimes 
in groups, a short distance-from it' (Daniels 1987,244). 
The second sector runs for some 45km to the north and west of 
Mesarfelta, crossing the broken spurs of the Saharan Atlas. 
Baradez published it as a slightly smaller wall and ditch, of 
varying widths, than the Gemellae stretch. The barrier itself 
runs on more than one line at some points, - showing successive 
replacements; it also seems clear that, not all of the towers 
can be of the same period. 
The third and least known element 
Bou Taleb - apparently runs for si 
the Hodna mountains, south of the 
further to the southeast, lengths 
detected across gaps in the Jebel 
Jerid, south of Capsa. 
of 
: )me 
ci 
of 
el 
the fossatum - known as 
140km around and through 
ty of S6tif. Finally,, - much 
clausura have been 
Asker, north of Chott el 
Here, then, are undoubtedly preclusive Roman military works of 
linear character. Is the fossatum to be seen as another 
example of the kind of secured border line at the extent of 
practical military occupation represented by the German and 
British land frontiers? This is certainly as close as Africa 
gets to a land-frontier on the European model, and as we shall 
see in a moment, there may be parallels to draw with certain 
early frontier developments in Germany. But there all 
resemblance stops. As barriers against the kind of 
ever-intensifying threat of infiltration and attack which we 
have suggested as the ralson d'Otre for the land frontier 
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systems of Britain '' Germany and Raetia, the Gemellae and 
Mesarfelta stretches of fossatum would have been ineffective; 
the discontinuous nature of the features would invite 
infiltration through the open areas. The lack of field-study 
of the third, Hodna Mountains, sector, renders assessment of 
its effectiveness as a surveillance device impossible. 
It has, in fact, been convincingly suggested that'these works 
were primarily concerned with the monitoring of movements of 
transhumant peoples between the pre-desert and theýsettled 
agricultural land around the cities of the province. ýWhittaker 
(1978), has argued for the probable symbiosis of 
agriculturalists and nomads in ancient north Africa, 'the former 
requiring labour from the latter at harvest time, while the 
nomads required access to summer pasture and supplies of grain. 
The relations between the sedentary peoples and nomads of the 
pre-desert are portrayed as having been extremely complex, with 
dominant groups and leaders on eitherýside rising and falling 
in a cycle, and with either side liable to play the dominant 
role. The Roman military intervention perhaps altered the 
balance decisively in favour of the sedentary culture, not by 
excluding the nomads, but''by carefully regulating their 
movements so that they arrived when their presence was useful, 
but not when it might be disruptive. 
The sectors of fossatum, like the legii 
Lambaesis, are closely associated with' 
linking the Sahara with the plateau of 
Tunisia... to which the nomadic tribes 
fringe'of the Sahara could gain access 
controlled, natural gaps' (Smith 1954, 
onary establishment at 
'a great natural route 
, eastern Algeria and 
inhabiting the northern 
by only a few, easily 
20). 
A role connected with transhumance of this kind along specific 
and predictable routes would help to explain the discontinuous 
nature of the fossatum. Furthermore, such a role is supported 
by the character of the terrain where the barriers were 
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provided. In the Mesarfelta sector, the fossatum is provided 
only-, to cover broken ground; at its northern termination there 
is an uncovered gap before the Hodna mountains begin. This 
takes-the form of a flat, easily negotiated plain. If directed 
at raiders, we would expect the barrier to cover the easiest 
route of penetration. In fact it covers the sort of ground 
where transhumant herds could have been sneaked through without 
detection, and leaves unprotected the open plain where dust 
visible from afar would betray the presence of nomads and their 
herds and give the army plenty of time to police them. 
Similarly the, Gemellae sector has been seen-as preventing 
uncontrolled access into the usable land of the Oued Djedi, and 
working in conjunction with roads passing around each of its 
ends-to funnel traffic from the south towards the centres of 
Thabudeos and Gemellae (Fentres ,s 1979,111)., Finally, the-deep 
valleys penetrating the Hodna mountains may have provided cover 
for delinquent nomads attempting to take their flocks, 
unauthorised, into the S&tif-Constantine area, and this may 
explain the curious barrier that possibly seals off those, 
mountains. 
In one way all this is reminiscent of the earliest development 
of a linear frontier in Upper Germany, where a watchtower 
system seems to have been provided first - in the Taunus 
where the landscape was most afforested and intractable and 
therefore more prone to clandestine movement. However, in 
Upper Germany the problems of infiltration rapidly became 
serious on other sectors of the frontier, and the installations 
of the frontier were extended and augmented as part of a 
general scheme. Such a development never occurred in Numidia, 
where the fossatum always retained its discontinuous character, 
with the separate sectors directed at particular channels of 
movement. In any case, as has been noted (Fentress 1979,112), 
we are dealing here with an obstacle much less formidable than 
the Wall in Britain with which comparisons have so often been 
drawn. 
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From the'mid-second, century, considerable long-distance 
military control running far southwest of the Gemellae sector 
becomes apparent. AD 148-9 saw the building of a fort at 
Medjedel, 150km beyond the fossatum, on the northern edge of 
the Oulad Nail mountains. In 174,250km further 
west-south-west, a mixed force of cavalry is attested (CIL 8. 
21567) at Agneb, although no fort site is known. Finally in 
the Severan period a network of forts and fortlets extended 
this whole system of far flung control, further still, seeing 
the establishment of Castellum Dimmidi to the south, and 
possibly sites up to 50km to the west, ' of Agneb. 
It has been remarked (Daniels 1987,253) that the small size of 
these outflung garrisons and the considerable intervals between 
them imply a self-confident Roman army facing little in the way 
of tribal opposition. It'should also be apparent that this 
network of military sites in no way forms a linear system. Its 
purpose could not have been preclusive; rather it was intended 
to monitor and interfere with the movements of nomads from the 
northern edge of the Sahara, by controlling predictable routes 
or areas of passage, or to gather intelligence about the early 
stages of nomadic movements. A close parallel for this kind of 
activity is provided by the Severan outposts which controlled 
oases marking points of access to the settled areas of Arabia 
(7.3.1 above). 
The army which provided these African outposts was projected 
from Numidia rather than Mauretania Caesariensis, in spite of 
the fact that the high plateau to the north of the outpost 
network would provide nomads with access to the latter province 
as much as the former. This, combined with the early- 
occurrence of the running barriers we have discussed in the 
Gemellae-Lambaesis area (contrasted with their utter absence 
from Caesariensis) may lead us to suspect that the main tenor 
of transhumant movement was always in southwest-northeast 
direction, converging on the corridors of access to the 
410 
sedentary African province which the fossatum helped to 
control. 
7.4.4 Tripolitania 
There have been recent suggestions (Mattingly 1989,137) of the 
presence of Roman forts in this area as early as the second 
century. This may begin to alter the picture that has long 
prevailed, of there being no serious military activity here 
before the thirdýcentury. It has always seemed as if for the 
first two centuries AD the emporia had to fend for themselves. 
This was no doubt done simply by continuing age-old diplomatic 
contacts with the peoples of the interior. The strong position 
which had made these famous cities prosperous in the first 
place allowed the treaty relationships which must have early 
been established with the coastal and hinterland tribes to be 
maintained. - Some have suspected that there-was in any case 
less seasonal movement in Tripolitania (Daniels 1987,254-5). 
Of course the discovery of forts of early date would not imply 
a linear frontier system. As elsewhere in Africa and the East, 
it is likely that such sites, where they exist, will have 
functioned primarily as road stations, controlled 
water-supplies, or provided garrison and protection for a 
particular area or population. 
A change is seen in the Severan period, with the establishment 
of three important forts, projected south of the irrigated 
pre-desert zone to guard oases on routes leading north - 
Ghadames, Gheriat el-Garbia, and Bu-Ngem. These forts may 
reflect a deterioration in the diplomatic control of peoples in 
the interior, as well as a need to control access to the 
irrigated pre-desert, whose prosperity, based on olive 
production, had blossomed phenomenonally over the previous 
century. However, it is clear that the new forts in no way 
represent a linear system. 
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To'the north of the agricultural zone, running along the Gebel 
escarpment which rose from the arid plain forming the immediate 
hinterland of the three emporia, we hear for the first, time in 
the Antonine Itinerary of a limes Tripolitanus: Item Iter quod 
limitem Tripolitanum per Turrem Tamalleni a Tacapes Lepti Magna 
ducit. A list of road stations follows. As Isaac (1988) has 
shown, the meaning here of the word limes is 'boundary'. It 
cannot mean 'road' in this context, as the road (Iter) is 
separately specified as following the limes. 
On the other hand, limes here can hardly mean an artificially 
demarcated boundary, or the boundary of the province or empire, 
for most of the zone of agricultural prosperity lay beyond the 
road; two roads with early-third century milestones led across 
and from the 'limes' into the area of the Wadi Sofeggin. What 
linear frontier would have excluded this area? The tortuous 
course taken by the limes, as it doubles on itself to go via 
Turris Tamalleni upon leaving Gabes on the coast, should also 
demonstrate its impracticability as any kind of linear 
frontier. The simplest explanation would be that in following 
the escarpment the road followed the edge of the coastal plain 
that was thought of as the area of the three cities; in other 
words at this time (probably the early third century) the road 
was seen, as following the limes of the Tripolis, rather than 
the frontier of the whole new province of Tripolitania. Isaac 
(1988,129) cites a'similar example from the Itinerary where 
limes refers to the boundary of an area within Italy - Campania 
- where it obviously cannot denote a military frontier or a 
provincial boundary. In the late-Roman period of course, the 
term limes takes on a new meaning in Tripolitania, in the sense 
of a fortified zone. 
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7.4.5 Cyrenaica and Egypt 
Under'the'Principate Cyrenaica possessed only'a tinyýprovincial 
garrison. There is no question of a linear frontier. 
Individual coastal cities-looked to their own protection, no 
doubt relying on long established relationships with the 
inhabitants of the northern edge of the desert. Also as in 
Tripolitania, the region was, in contrast to its earlier 
experience, to receive a considerable military upgrading in the 
late-Roman period, when some kind of really'formidable threat 
from the-south had emerged (Mann 1974,525; Daniels-1987, 
232-3). 
The garrison of Egypt as it had developed by the second century 
consisted of a legion at Alexandria -, presumably for the 
purpose of internal control - and a number of auxiliary units 
in the Nile valley, which do not seem to have been concerned 
with preventing inroads from the south; rather their role was 
one of internal policing, of the kind described so vividly for 
a later period in the letters of'Abinnaeus, Prefect of the ala 
V Praelectorum, at Dionysias in Egypt, in the reign of 
Constantius II (Bell et al. 1962). 
In addition, in the Eastern desert there was a network of 
garrisoned roads running from the Red Sea coast to the Nile. 
Besides the way-stations, some forts in the network were 
connected with the safeguarding of mining activities. In the 
case of the more southerly roads, their east-west orientation 
and, possession of military installations has sometimes resulted 
in the interpretation of one or more of them as'fortified 
linear frontiers against attackers from the south. - 
However, these roads, like those-we considered on the Arabian 
and Syrian frontiers, were really the product of an incoming 
trade in luxury goods and spices from Ethiopia, southern Arabia 
and India. The ports of entry for these goods were established 
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before the Roman conquest of Egypt, and by necessity they were 
linked to the Nile by communications routes, which simply 
received military stations in the Roman period for the 
protection of traffic on the roads. The nature of these 
stations is betrayed by their possession of cisterns and 
external enclosures for the overnight security of animal 
trains. 
These roads, like the Trajanic, Stanegate in Britain, should not 
be confused with linear frontier systems. They do not possess 
the characteristic watchtower cordons, and closely spaced 
installations of such systems. On one road, -the one running- 
from Leucos Limen to Phoenicon, intervisible watchtowers occur 
in the central sector of the road, placed high on the spurs 
through which it twists. This is typical extra-supervision for 
traffic in broken country, just as in the central sector of the 
Stanegate; in any case, this road lies far to the north of a 
further road with stations, that running from Berenice to 
Phoenicon, where the spacing of the forts is much more akin to 
that, on the via nova Tralana in Arabia than on any true 
defended frontier. Also, because this road clearly aims for 
the same point on the Nile as all the others, and therefore 
runs northwest-southeast, it is forced to cover about twice the 
distance that a defensive line drawn east-west from coast to 
Nile would have required. 
In short, although raids from nomadic tribes in the south are 
attested, there was insufficient threat to make the Roman army 
do more that post stations to safeguard internal communications 
and to protect the luxury traffic from the Red Sea. It was not 
considered necessary to garrison a border zone for the 
protection of the province as a whole against inroads, still 
less to construct any kind of linear or preclusive system for 
this purpose. 
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7.4.6 Africa in general 
The absence of continuous frontier systems in the African 
provinces must be set against a background of relatively very 
small scale military involvement in this frontier area during 
the Principate. CM Daniels (1987,235-6) has shown how 
strikingly small was the army that covered the vast combined 
area of Tingitana, Caesariensis, Africa, ýCyrenaica and Egypt, 
in comparison to the large garrisons of individual provinces in 
Britain, Upper Germany or on the Danube. Although after, the 
revolt of, Tacfarinas, the African provinces, particularly 
Mauretania, did see incursions, notably the Moorish war under 
Pius, the garrison never had to be permanently'augmented before 
the late Roman period. 
The picture that emerges of the Roman army in Africa has points 
of similarity and contrast to the way in which the army 
operated on the desert frontiers of Arabia and Syria. The role 
of the army in watching areas of access to farmed areas, and 
securing routes of communication and trade, is reminiscent of 
the East. However, a difference lay in the fact that in parts 
of Africa, a simple frontier at the desert edge was not always 
achieved. Not only were nomadic peoples left outside the area 
of military control, as in the-East, but so were various areas, 
such as the Rif and Middle Atlas in Mauretania Tingitana, which 
might well have been incorporated had Rome felt the need. In 
Caesariensis-numerous hill-peoples maintained a state of 
semi-independence. 
Africa in general displays some survival of the old diplomatic 
methods of controlling and treating with peoples without 
recourse to direct occupation. The, Roman military seem merely 
to have monitored and interfered in relations which had been in 
progress long before the arrival of the army. In Caeariensis 
and Numidia, internal affairs always remained very much the 
concern of the army: they were assigning farmland among the 
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Musulamii within Numidia in 198 (Millar 1981,175); the army 
was routinely employed in the surveillance and policing of 
periodic markets held by tribes within the African province 
(Shaw 1981,56). Beyond the cities and their surrounding 
lands, tribal structures and relationships were allowed to 
persist, subject to regulation. This, of course, may well have 
been true of the northwestern provinces as well; -the difference 
was that in Africa this seems to have been the only task facing 
the army. In Britain and Germany, in contrast, on top of these 
activities the army had to form a preclusive frontier against 
an external threat. 
The pattern of Roman advance in Africa during the Principate 
was never really one of progressive conquest, ultimately 
succeeding or failing, as in Spain or Britain. Rather the 
provincial armies go only as far as they need to go to maintain 
stable relations between the coastal cities, the 
agriculturalists and the nomads of the interior, and to dampen 
down whatever tendencies to instability - nomadic raids, 
internal power struggles - that did occur. -From the size of 
the army concerned, these threats were never really formidable 
under the high empire. 
In Numidia and Caesariensis a more extensive pre-desert area 
than in the east allowed the army to get away from the cities 
to a much, greater extent and to base itself further into the 
interior. The more gradual progression from coastal city zone 
to desert also meant that there were greater and more complex 
tribal movements to be monitored. As a result the pattern of 
military occupation - and the types of individual military 
installation - sometimes resemble those of the northwestern 
provinces more than the Eastern desert frontier. Even so, the 
army in the African provinces seems always to be reacting to 
an existing state of affairs, which it is incapable of 
radically altering. They watched known corridors of 
transhumant movement, and occasionally (as with the fossatum), 
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directed it by means of physical barriers; but given the 
evident predictability and low-key nature of the 'threat', 
there was no need for a general system of border defence, such 
as a continuous preclusive frontier. Indeed, it was argued 
above (6.2; 6.3) that such systems, where they do occur, only 
in northwest Europe, indicate a desire, to, prevent rather than 
regulate movement, except at a very few sanctioned crossing 
places. 
The, African adventures of the late Republic and early empire, 
such as Cornelius Balbus' visit to the Garamantes, revealed 
that there was no formidable threat lurking beyond the coastal 
city zone. Africa itself, however troublesome the nomadic 
raiders from the desert edge might be, was cut off from Europe, 
and, since the defeat of Carthage, posed no threat to the 
empire (as did Parthia in the East) or to. Italy itself (as did 
the northern barbarians). Thus whether for offensive or 
defensive reasons, there was no great people to wage war 
against, as had Augustus in Germany. There was no spur to 
attempted conquest of the type whose failure led to the 
creation, of artificial linear frontiers in the northwestern 
provinces, and the small African army contented itself with 
chasing small scale raiders and, regulating an economic 
relationship between the pre-desert and the city zone. It is 
only with the increase in size of the African army in the 
late-Roman period that we see that more dangerous opponents had 
emerged. 
EPILOGUE 
The last chapter has shown that the organisation of the Roman 
army in the frontier provinces of the principate was of diverse 
character. For all of the detailed research into individual 
frontier systems, there has been little attempt to classify 
types of system, or to compare military organisation in one 
area in close detail to that in another. Instead, modern 
research has proceeded on the implicit assumption that the 
military frontiers of the empire are varying examples of the 
same kind of thing. They may differ in emphasis and 
speciality, but essent ially one is comparing like with like. 
So, over the years, the same terms - particularly the word 
limes have tended to be applied to all areas. Luttwak has 
attempted to see a military strategy lying behind the 
frontiers, seeing them as an integrated system of deterrence 
and defence. Those that criticise this approach, notably 
Isaac, have also tended to view frontier installations as all 
of a kind. A view is derived from a study of the army in the 
East, of frontier organisation as non-defensive, lacking the 
concept of a military border, and concerned with the internal 
policing of civilians and aggressive wars against foreign 
peoples. This view is extended indiscriminately to the other 
frontiers of the empire, even though their installations have 
obvious physical differences, possessing in some cases 
artificial barriers. These 'have had a misleading effect'. 
Some Roman frontier systems were organised in a linear fashion, 
and others were not. Land frontiers were always marked not 
merely by a linear system of forts, but also by a chain of 
smaller installations and later a continuous barrier. 
Continuous land frontiers of this type are confined to the 
provinces of Britain, Upper Germany, Raetia and Dacia. These 
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frontier lines form a tiny part of the overall circumference of 
the empire. These provinces also-include the most famous and 
most intensively studied of frontiers. As a result, 
archaeologists-have often in the past tried to interpret other, 
quite different frontiers, in the same light. 
This study has attempted to define the characteristics of these 
localised systems, the only truly linear land frontiers of the 
empire, and to ask how they developed, what, was their purposel 
and what significance'they hold for-our understanding of the 
operations of the Romans on their-frontiers. - None of these 
questions can be answered-with certainty, and others, faced 
with the same evidence, will arrive at quite different 
conclusions. But it is suggested that the comparative study of 
this particular frontier type undertaken above points 
consistently towards certain tendencies. 
The earliest land-frontiers of northwest Europe may have 
originated at the same time and in response to the same 
emergency on the Danube. The very earliest watchtower systems 
did not always close off the whole frontier. In some places 
the system was soon extended to the whole frontier; in others 
this was a much slower process. Everywhere towers were only 
built when it was decreed that there would be no more advance. 
They acknowledged a permanence of the shape of the administered 
province and military area. Thus the watchtower frontier only 
gradually formed in second-century Raetia as the army moved 
towards optimum control of fertile areas north of'the Danube. 
In Britain, during a generation of war between c90 and c120, 
there was no linear frontier, as the situation was'not 
considered resolved or permanent. At certain times it is a 
mistake to interpret dispositions of forts along roads as 
linear frontiers, even in the handful of 'linear frontier' 
provinces in question. 
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After their first invention by the army-as-a security system 
for particularly infiltrated areas, the general extension of 
the linear systems to the whole land frontier represented not a 
gradual process of coalescence or inertia, but a decision. The 
frontiers were chosen: they did not 'congeal'. In most cases 
the early watchtower systems formed the first formal 
delineation of the land-boundary of a provinceý Thus the 
origins of the military installations, and the origin of the 
limes of-the province, -were in fact indistinguishable. This is 
not to say the limes would have been the Roman term for such a 
frontier, system. But it is notable that the only provinces 
with land boundaries described as limites in the first and 
second centuries are those with artificial linear barriers: the 
two concepts may have eventually become blurred. 
Eventually the towers were supplemented by running barriers and 
military units themselves became more closely linked to the 
frontier line. Many of the installations were converted into 
stone. This was a gradual process during the second century on 
the Continent., In Britain a varying. amount of success in 
maintaining control up to the Scottish Highland edge resulted 
in two frontiers being built a novo and occupied at different 
times on the-northern and southern, Isthmus. 
Frontier lines were not lightly built and abandoned, or moved 
backward and forwards. The British frontiers may give that 
impression, but in fact denote a consistent drive for 
influence, direct control if possible, up to the Highland line. 
The only continental lines to be abandoned were those affected 
by the precautionary decision to complete the closure of the 
Upper German-Raetian frontier in the mid-Antonine period. 
Otherwise, once chosen, frontier lines remained permanent until 
the loss of the entire continental land-frontier in the 260s. 
Furthermore, the development of the Continental land-frontier 
was not unco-ordinated and irrational. Apart from very limited 
sectors (such as that near Lorch) which were provided at the 
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very end to, tie together the system, the frontier as a whole 
shows a rational approach to, the control of desirable areas 
beyond Rhine and Danube. There is evidence for co-ordination 
between the Upper German and Raetianýcommands. The frontier 
progressed steadily to completion., A similar consistency of 
aim can be discerned in Britain, but-this was constantly 
frustrated by the removal of troops from the province. For all 
that the development of the frontier was'not blatantly 
irrational, there was no underlying grand strategy. The 
frontiers clearly developed at'different rates in different, 
places, and-co-ordination between them was precipitated by' 
events, rather than being the driving force in the first place. 
These linear frontier systems did not function as defensive 
lines. But a study of the varying densities of installation 
from sector to sector suggests that they were threatened by- 
something of varying intensity. The predominant function of 
these security, cordons and fences in all their stages of 
elaboration was that of border surveillance, against 
infiltrators or-raiders. It has been said that the Upper 
German palisade 'could only prevent infiltration in a situation 
where nobody dared to attack Roman troops, even if they 
consisted merely of four men on a tower' (Isaac 1990,415). 
But the fact that much greater concentrations of Roman troops 
lay on certain sectors than others shows that perceived threats 
existed, and the steady escalation of provision on certain 
parts of the frontier suggests that the threats materialised in 
some form. If a minimum barrier was all that was ever required 
to deter infiltration, why were the frontiers so consistently 
elaborated and augmented? It is also an inescapable fact that 
this type of frontier is found in association with the most 
intense troop concentrations of the empire. The more 
formidable the barrier, the greater the concentration of troops 
associated with it, as so clearly seen in the case of Hadrian's 
Wall. 
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There were friendly frontiers, with few troops, as in much of 
Raetia; there were remote frontiers, such as the Odenwald, 
where low grade troops watched out for small scale ý 
infiltration. If the intensity of installations is relied 
upon, the populous frontiers of the Wetterau in Upper Germany 
and north Britain were the most endangered. 
Some would argue that it is-simplistic to deduce the roles of 
military installations from their sites, and that a host of now 
undetectable factors may have played a part in their siting; 
that their functions may have varied over time. But here we 
are-dealing in most cases with sites intimately linked to a 
linear system, not forts or-fortlets in a looser arrangement as 
seen in the'Eastern provinces. The western frontier-forts and 
fortlets originated most often with, or later than, -, the 
frontier lines themselves. Like the frontier lines they were 
usually permanent institutions, not lightly abandoned or moved 
around; and often garrisoned by the same kind of soldiers for 
at least century and a half on end. Arguably, it is futile to 
construct a model of the role of such a permanently based 
garrison,, but that can only be said to be a very negative 
conclusion. 
There is no evidence that the linear frontier systems were used 
to regulate trade or civilian movement in and out of the 
empire. Although seized upon by those anxious to discount the 
'defensive border line' concept, the notion that these systems 
were designed to regulate traffic is as unfounded and unlikely 
as the view that they were used for static defence. The 
milecastles which formed gates through Hadrian's Wall are best 
seen as points of access to the Wall and its towers, or as 
fortlets for the accommodation of soldiers, closely comparable 
to examples in Upper Germany. There were perhaps very few 
places where Hadrian's Wall could be crossed by civilians. The 
same might be true of Upper Germany. There is evidence for 
more such crossing places in Raetia, but they seem to occur in 
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an area with very few military installations. This kind of 
passage could be supervised by very few soldiers (as in Africa, 
or the East). 'Troops were concentrated where trouble was 
expected. Scrutiny of the frontier systems of Africa and the 
East, where continuous linear systems never existed, suggests 
that the Roman army in these areas regulated movement and 
safeguarded its communications, without actually trying to 
exclude people. If we can suggest why linear frontiers, were 
not necessary in the East, we might begin to understand why 
such'elaborate systems were established in the West. The 
contrast suggests that in northern Europe the army was dealing 
with a larger population, elements of which had to be excluded 
from entering the occupied area at unpredictable points. 
Looked at as, a whole, the western frontiers appear as much less 
liberal or porous systems than in Africa or the East. 
The movements between Hadrianic and Antonine Walls in Britain 
have been described as holding nothing more than antiquarian 
interest'. This is a point of view that assumes that the Roman 
army came and went as it pleased, but failed to press 
consistently forward through confusion and apathy. It is 
closely related to the view which sees the movements of such 
frontiers as most closely influenced by external political 
considerations. But the above study has emphasised that there 
is no evidence that the Antonine occupation of Scotland 
consisted of more than a single period of activity. It 
represented a failed attempt to return to the traditional 
policy of occupying Scotland up to the Highland line. Once 
Antonine Scotland is seen as a single episode, it begins to 
look as-if the practical difficulty of occupation on the 
ground, combined with emergencies on the Continent, actually 
prevented Roman advance in Britain. 
The-frontier lines have a significance in that they show the 
limits of practical military occupation at a given time. Their 
various progresses to completion, and their omission in certain 
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cases, indicate that Rome faced more formidable low-intensity 
resistance in some areas than others. It is common to" 
criticise the empire for having frontiers at all, for spending 
so much effort on the elaborate linear systems rather than, 
going out to address the-problem. But in the end, we must ask 
why, if such barriers and walls had no more than rhetorical 
significance, they are only found in very limited areas of 
north and west Europe. This limited distribution surely 
suggests-that they-fulfilled a practical purpose there, related 
to the populations through whose lands the frontiers 
arbitrarily cut. 
The permanence of the general line of these frontiers, once 
chosen (or continually striven for in Britain) also suggests 
their sheer practicality as a mark of territory that. could be 
safely controlled and occupied. To accept the opposite view, 
that the lines represent, irrationally, the stopping points 
where various aggressive campaigns ground to a halt, - we would 
have to find much more evidence of them being moved or 
displaced, or displaying an utter lack of co-ordination. But 
there is little such evidence. Once Domitian's armies in 
Britain and beyond the Rhine were forced to call a halt, in 
general terms there is only permanence and consistency in the 
elaboration of the linear frontiers. Therefore they provide 
invaluable evidence for the relations between the Roman empire 
and the peoples beyond, for they show what was considered 
practical to administer with the resources available in any 
given theatre. 
Some commentators would still protest: this is to see the 
Romans, thinking in rational and defensive terms, for which 
there is no evidence in the literary sources. The army did not 
follow a consistent policy, but acted at the whim of the 
emperor and his advisers, in pursuit of his glory. It may well 
be that this was the way that the individuals who produced the 
source material'thought. This is undoubtedly how they wanted 
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things to happen. It does not mean that they always succeeded. 
Inbetween wars of aggression dictated by the emperor, the army 
on the ground was left with the task of practical occupation 
and anti-infiltration work. One significance of the linear 
frontier systems is their demonstration that the area in which 
this could be achieved remained constant, in spite of the 
attempts of individuals to carry out glorious conquest. In any 
case, beyond the Rhine and Danube there were few such 
initiatives after Augustus. The idea that the military machine 
was directed at the emperor's glory and not in any way 
defensive is one which works well for the East but looks less 
convincing when applied to northwest Europe. To put it another 
way: it is obvious that Domitian, would have liked the glory of 
unlimited conquest beyond the Rhine. That does'not mean that 
the army would necessarily have been capable of progressing 
much further than it had when the emergency of the Danube 
halted the Chattan war. Even if it had progressed, it might 
not have been practical to administer the new area permanently. 
Augustus' reign illustrates this: what was desired, and what 
could be permanently achieved, were different things. 
Against the scale of the whole history of the empire, the 
linear land frontiers enclosed small areas beyond the great 
rivers which were not held for very long. After the failure of 
the first century military initiatives, we seem to see a 
short-lived holding operation (severely compromised in Britain 
by troop withdrawal). The enclosed areas became increasingly 
beleaguered, and in the end the policed security lines of the 
Continent were useless in stemming the deluge of the third 
century. Only Hadrian's Wall in Britain survived, but as an 
anachronism from a previous age, still garrisoned in the late 
fourth century by old-fashioned units that had been based there 
for over two hundred years. 
As we look back upon the artificial linear frontiers from the 
perspective of the twentieth century, there is still no 
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agreement about why the Roman empire stopped expanding when and 
where it did. Traditionally it has been seen as a matter of 
rational choice on the part of the Romans. More recently 
explanations have stressed confusion, apathy or sheer chance in 
the location of the frontiers. It is true that the artificial 
frontiers of northern Europe do not have a neat or rationally 
planned overall apearance. Each was chosen in its given area 
when the Roman state had reached the limits of the direct power 
allowed to it by the available military resources. Once 
chosen, it was the manpower equation which decided their 
histories, and rarely chance. In this sense the Romans can be 
said to have had their frontOiers chosen for them, and the 
various lines existed for the duration of what, until the 
Marcomannic wars, seemed a golden age. It was lauded as such 
by Aelius Aristides, with specific reference to the artificial 
linear systems and the ideal arrangements which they formed. 
In retrospect, the period may be seen as an Indian summer 
during which peoples outside the empire had put a check upon 
the power of the Romans, but could still, - albeit to an ever 
decreasing extent, be excluded by simple obstacles and lines of 
demarcation. 
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APPENDIX 
A Schedule of forts and fortlets on the Upper German and 
Raetian frontiers in their final state 
The following schedule, running from the Rhine to the Danube, 
lists the known sites on the Continental land frontier, in 
order to illustrate the varying densities of minor 
installations and to provide the basic evidence on which the 
average densities and spacings given in Chapter 4 are based. 
There are obvious difficulties in knowing whether sites were 
all held at the same time. Timber fortlets belonging to an 
early period are generally bracketed, to exclude them from the 
spacing, as are fort sites that lie some distance behind the 
frontier. It is assumed that most stone fortlets were in use 
by about 200, by which time several forts had also been added 
or enlarged. 
The first column lists forts and the Strecke numbers. The 
second column gives the position, by watchtower reference, of 
fortlets. The third column gives the distance between 
installations, and the fourth names the fortlets. A final 
column gives the approximate size and the building material of 
the fortlet. 
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A note on the illustrations 
The illustrations are placed separately from the text in the 
belief that the reader will want to consult them on more than 
one occasion. A series of general maps (A-E) provides such 
information as the location of German rivers and geographical 
features frequently mentioned in the text, and the location of 
the Strecken into which the German frontier is divided. 
The detailed maps (Figs . 1-21) are intended to illustrate 
graphically the development of the northwestern frontiers, 
superimposed upon the topographical background. They have been 
uniformly produced at a scale of 1: 1,000,000 with north at the 
top. The two grades of stipple denote land above 200m and 
500m. The numbers refer to the same site from map to map, 
except that the British sites are numbered separately. There 
are, therefore two lists of sites: one for the British maps, 
and one for the German-Raetian maps. Some sites are left 
unnumbered if identified on the previous map in a series. 
Roads are only shown if described in the text. 
The conventions used on the detailed maps are: 
Legionary fortress H 
Auxiliary fort (1.30ha or over) n 
Small fort (0.50ha-1.30ha) d 
Large fortlet (0.10ha-0.50ha) A 
Fortlet (up to 0.10ha) A 
Linear frontier installations ------------- 
Road Postulated 
Town 0 
An open symbol denotes possible occupation of a site 
Figures 22-29 illustrate some points made in the text and 
provide some maps to illustrate the location of places named in 
the brief descriptions in Chapter 7 of frontiers outside 
northwest Europe. 
A. Location of the artificial linear frontiers. 
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E. The Strecken on the Upper German-Raetian f rontier 
F. Location of the detailed maps in relatic"I to the Upper 
German-Raetian Strecken 
Sites on the Upper German and Raetian maps: 
1 Mainz 
2 Hofheim 
3 Wiesbaden 
4 Heddernheim 
5 Okarben 
6 Friedberg 
7 Bad Nauheim 
8 Gross-Gerau 
9 Postulated fort at Dieburg 
10 Heddesdorf 
11 Bendorf 
12 Niederberg 
13 Marienfels 
14 Kemel 
15 Heftrich 
16 Feldberg 
17 Saalburg 
18 Kapersburg and Ockstadter Wald 
19 Langenhain 
20 Butzbach 
21 Arnsburg 
22 Echzell 
23 Ober-Florstadt 
24 Heldenbergen 
25 Hanau. -Salisberg 
26 Hainstadt 
27 Stockstadt 
28 Obernburg 
29 Wdrth 
30 Wimpfen 
31 Bdckingen 
32 Walheim 
33 Benningen 
34 Stuttgart-Canstatt 
35 Kdngen 
36 Dettingen-unter-Teck 
37 Rottenburg 
38 Gomadingen 
39 Donstetten 
40 Urspring 
41 GUnzburg 
42 Faimingen 
43 Burgh8fe 
44 Oberstimm 
45 Eining 
46 Kdsching 
47 PfUnz 
48 Weissenburg 
49 Gnotzheim 
50 munningen 
51 Oberdorf 
52 Ndrdlingen 
53 Heidenheim 
54 Augsburg 
55 Zugmantel 
56 Heidekringen 
57 Inheiden 
58 Altenstadt 
59 marköbel 
60 Rückingen 
61 Gross-Krotzenburg 
62 Seligenstadt 
63 Niedernberg 
64 Seckmauern 
65 Lützelbach 
66 Vielbrunn 
67 Eulbach 
68 Würzberg 
69 Hesselbach 
70 Schlossau 
71 oberscheidental 
72 Neckarburken 
73 Eislingen-Salach 
74 Deggingen 
75 Pförring 
76 Unterschwanigen 
77 Gunzenhausen 
78 Theilenhofen 
79 Ellingen 
80 Arzbach 
81 Ems 
82 Holzhausen 
83 Ruffenhofen 
84 Dambach 
85 Halheim 
86 Buch 
87 Aalen 
88 Unterböbingen 
89 Schirenhof 
90 Trennfurt 
91 Miltenberg-Altstadt 
92 Miltenberg-Ost 
93 Walldürn 
94 osterburken 
95 Jagsthausen 
96 Öhringen 
97 Mainhardt 
98 Murrhardt 
99 Welzheim 
100 Lorch 
101 Böhming 
102 Niederbieber 
103 Hunzel 
104 Degerfeld fortlet 
105 Hainhaus fortlet 
106 Haselhecke fortlet 
107 Staden fortlet 
108 Langendiebach fortlet 
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12. Raetia by c200 
Sites on the British Maps: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
Stracathro 
Inverquharity 
Cardean 
Inchtuthil 
Cargill 
Fendoch 
Dalginross 
Bochastle 
Malling/Menteith 
Drumquhassle 
Barochan 
Bertha 
Strageath 
Ardoch 
Postulated fort 
Camelon 
Castlecary 
Mollins 
Mumrills 
Elginhaugh 
Kaims Castle 
Glenbank 
Doune 
Loudon Hill 
Postulated fort 
Newstead 
Oakwood 
Cappuck 
Chew Green 
Low Learchild 
High Rochester 
Milton 
Dalswinton 
Broomholm 
Glenlochar 
South Shields 
near Stirling 
at Tweedmouth 
Washing Well, Whickham 
Ebchester 
Corbridge 
Vindolanda 
Carvoran 
Nether Denton 
Carlisle 
Kirkbride 
Chesters 
Newbrough 
Haltwhistle Burn 
Throp 
Castle Hill, Boothby 
Burgh-by-Sands I and III 
Risingham 
Birrens 
Netherby 
Beckfoot 
55 Maryport 
56 Wallsend 
57 Benwell 
58 Rudchester 
59 Haltonchesters 
60 Carrawburgh 
61 Housesteads 
62 Greatchesters 
63 Birdoswald 
64 Bewcastle 
65 Castlesteads 
66 Stanwix 
67 Burgh-by-Sands II 
68 Bowness-on-Solway 
69 Carriden 
70 Bar Hill 
71 Balmuildy 
72 old Kilpatrick 
73 Whitemoss 
74 Lurg Moor 
75 Outerwards 
76 Cramond 
77 Inveresk 
78 Carpow 
79 Chester-le-Street 
80 Lanchester 
81 Newcastle upon Tyne 
82 Drumburgh 
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21. Sites on the northern frontier c160-c220 
Open squares held for unknown duration in Severan period 
aq_ 
22. Excavated Antonine sites in Scotland 
Circle: Single Antonine period or no evidence for Antonine 
I and II 
Double circle: evidence for two garrisons or possible 
evidence for more than one Antonine period 
Square and circle: two Antonine periods 
1 Strageath 
2 Ardoch 
3 Camelon 
4 Mumrills 
5 Castlecary 
6 Bar Hill 
7 Old Kilpatrick 
8 Whitemoss 
10 Outerwards 
11 Cramond 
12 Inveresk 
13 Bothwellhaugh 
14 Loudon Hill 
15 Castledykes 
16 Lyne 
17 Newstead 
18, Wandel 
19 Crawford 
20 Cappuck 
21 Durisdeer 
22 Milton 
23 Raeburnfoot 
24 Barburgh Mill 
25 Carzield 
26 Burnswark 
28 Birrens 
29 Glenlochar 

23. Known gates 
(not including pr 
Upper case G deno 
denotes possible 
1/65 
4/507 
5/7? 
5/11 
5/13? 
8/44? 
12/81? 
13/5? 
13/22? 
13/43 
13/50 
13/54 
14/4 
14/5? 
14/12 
14/15? 
14/56 
14/78 
through the Upper German and Raetian frontier 
esumed gates at forts and service passages). 
tes established frontier gate; lower case g 
examples. For details see section 4.7 
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Sites on the maps of the Danube and Dacia: 
1 Oescus 
2 Novae 
3 Carnuntum 
4 Vindobona 
5 Brigetio 
6 Aquincum 
7 Durostorum 
8 Troesmis 
9 Regensburg 
10 Lauriacum 
12 Bersobis 
17 Tibiscum 
19 Micia 
23 Romanas 
25 Porolissum/Moigrad-Citera 
26 Porolissum/Moigrad/Pomet 
27 Tihau 
28 Caseiu 
29 Ilisna 
30 Livezile 
32 Brincovenesti 
33 Calugareni 
34 Sarateni 
51 Flaminda 
56 Gresia 
58 Urluieni I 
59 Urluieni II 
63 Albota 
69 Acidava 
73 Castra Traiana 
74 Radacinesti 
76 Arutela/Bivolari 
78 Titesti 
79 Copaceni 
80 Rucovita, 
25. The middle Danube: places mentioned in the text 
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26. Dacia and the Lower Danube: places mentioned in the text 
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27. Part of the Arabian frontier in the second century 
The southern sector of the Arabian frontier. 
The squares represent possible mditary sites of the 
earty second century 
Af rica: 
1 Siga 
2 Rapidum 
3 Auzia 
4 S6tif 
5 Theveste 
6 Lambaesis 
7 Zarai 
8 Thabunae 
9 Mesarfelta 
10 Gemellae 
11 Bou Taleb-Hodna Mountains 
12 mesarfelta fossatum 
13 Gemellae fossatum 
14 Capsa 
15 Ad Majores 
16 Medjedel 
17 Castellum Dimmidi 
18 Agneb 
fossatum 
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